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LIICHES AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Laches and equitable estoppel are both judicially-created equi-
table defenses to a patent infringement action. A successful laches
defense bars a patentee from recovering damages for acts of in-
fringement occurring at any time before the complaint was filed.
Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, is a complete defense to a
patent infringement action, barring the patentee from recovering
any damages for patent infringement and precluding the issuance of
an injunction against future infringement. In A. C Aukerman Co. v.
R.L. Chaides Construction Co.,1 the Federal Circuit went en banc
to reaffirm, clarify and, in a few instances, repudiate various princi-
ples governing the application of these two important defenses.2
Any prior Federal Circuit precedent inconsistent with Aukerman is
now overruled; that is the effect of an en banc decision.3 Any prac-
titioner considering application of the doctrines of laches and equi-
table estoppel to a given set of facts and circumstances must,
therefore, fully understand the principles of law pronounced by the
Federal Circuit in Aukerman.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts were not disputed.4 Plaintiff, Aukerman,
was the owner of two patents relating to a product, called a "slip-
form," and a method of using that product to form concrete high-
way barriers.5 Defendant, Chaides, used a slip-form product
purchased from a third party, Gomaco, to form concrete highway
barriers.6 Between February and April 1979, Aukerman sent letters
to Chaides accusing Chaides of infringing the patents, but offering
Chaides a license under the patents.7 In April 1979 Chaides pro-
vided a written response stating (i) that any responsibility was
Gomaco's, and (ii) that "if Aukerman wished to sue Chaides 'for
$200-$300 a year,' Aukerman should do so."' There was no further
correspondence or contact between the parties for more than eight
years, during which time Chaides increased its business of forming
1. 960 F.2d 1020, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
2. 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1324 ("The court has taken this case en
banc to clarify and apply principles of laches and equitable estoppel which have been raised as
defenses in this patent infringement suit.").
3. Newell Co.'s Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765, 9 USPQ2D (BNA) 1417,
1423 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("This court has adopted the rule that prior decisions of a panel of the
court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned en banc.").
4. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1323.
5. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1323.
6. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1323.
7. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026, 22 USPQ2D (DNA) at 1323.
8. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026-27, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1323.
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barrier walls with slip-forms by about twenty times and began man-
ufacturing its own allegedly infringing slip-forms.9 Then, in Octo-
ber 1987, prompted by a licensee's complaint about Chaides'
substantial competition, Aukerman sent a letter to Chaides advising
Chaides "that litigation against another company had been re-
solved, and threatening litigation unless Chaides executed a li-
cense."'1° Chaides refused to enter into a license, and on October 26,
1988, Aukerman sued Chaides for infringement."1
The district court held on summary judgment that Aukerman
was barred under principles of laches and equitable estoppel from
maintaining the suit. Aukerman appealed. On appeal, the Federal
Circuit reversed, holding that the district court improvidently
granted summary judgment of laches and estoppel.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE LACHES AND
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSES
1. Laches and Estoppel are Available Under 35 U.S. C.
§28212
The Federal Circuit rejected the patentee's argument "that the
defense of laches is inapplicable, as a matter of law, against a claim
for damages in patent infringement suits."13 Instead the Federal
Circuit reaffirmed its prior holdings that "[laches is cognizable
under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988) as an equitable defense to a claim for
patent infringement."1 The Federal Circuit made a similar holding
as to equitable estoppel, explaining that "[e]quitable estoppel is cog-
nizable under 35 U.S.C. § 282 as an equitable defense to a claim for
patent infringement." 5 In this regard, it is noteworthy that the
Federal Circuit explained, for the first time in any reported case of
which this author is aware, that laches and equitable estoppel are
"unenforceability" defenses within the meaning of 35 U.S.C.
§ 282(1)16 which provides in pertinent part: "The following shall be
9. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1027, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1323-24.
10. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1027, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1323-24.
11. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1027, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1324.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).
13. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1326.
14. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1324. The Federal Circuit
also stated: "Thus, we reaffirm the ruling in Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, 726 F.2d 734,
220 USPQ 845 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and our subsequent precedent that laches is available as a
defense to a suit for patent infringement." 960 F.2d at 1032, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1328.
15. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325.
16. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1029, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325-26.
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defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a
patent and shall be pleaded: (1) Noninfringement, absence of liabil-
ity for infringement or unenforceability .... 17
2. Laches and Estoppel are Both Committed to the Sound
Discretion of the District Court
The Federal Circuit explained that "[a]s equitable defenses,
laches and equitable estoppel are matters committed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge and the trial judge's decision is reviewed
by this court under the abuse of discretion standard." 18
3. Laches and Estoppel Must Both be Proven by a
Preponderance of the Evidence, Not by Clear and
Convincing Evidence
A patent is presumed valid by statute. 19 This presumption of
validity can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.2"
Inequitable conduct, an affirmative defense21 which renders a patent
unenforceable when the applicant for a patent intentionally makes
material misrepresentations to the patent office in order to procure
the patent, also must be established by clear and convincing evi-
dence.22 Since laches and equitable estoppel are affirmative de-
fenses23 which render, to different degrees, patents unenforceable,24
one might conclude that those defenses too must be established by
clear and convincing evidence. However, in Aukerman the Federal
17. 35 U.S.C. § 282(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
18. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
20. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452,
1459, 221 USPQ (BNA) 481, 486 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
21. In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1078, 231 USPQ (BNA) 178, 179 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
22. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872, 9
USPQ2D (BNA) 1384, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("Inequitable conduct resides in fail-
ure to disclose material information, or submission of false material information, with an
intent to deceive, and those two elements, materiality and intent, must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
23. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1333 ("Finally, we reiterate
that, at all times, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion of the affirmative
defense of laches."); Sig Swiss Indus. Co. v. Fres-Co. Sys. USA, Inc., 22 USPQ2D (BNA)
1601, 1602 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("SIG has asserted equitable estoppel as an affirmative defense"
against a claim for patent infringement).
24. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 877, 9 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1392 ("When a court has finally
determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or more claims during prose-
cution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered unenforceable. We, en banc,
reaffirm that rule as set forth in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561, 223
USPQ 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 1984).") (emphasis added).
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Circuit concluded that while it had never before addressed the is-
sue,2" laches and equitable estoppel in a patent case need only be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence,2 6 a much lower standard
for the defendant to meet than clear and convincing evidence.27
4. Laches Bars Only Pre-Filing Damages, While Estoppel Is
a Complete Defense to a Patent Infringement Suit
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed its prior holdings that a suc-
cessful laches defense only bars a patentee from recovering damages
for acts of infringement occurring before the complaint was filed,28
while equitable estoppel is a complete defense which bars the patent
owner from obtaining any remedy for patent infringement (e.g., re-
covering damages or infringement occurring before and after the
complaint was fied, securing an injunction against future
infringement).29
III. LACHES DEFENSE GENERALLY
1. The Two Elements of a Laches Defense: Undue Delay &
Material Prejudice
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed its prior holdings that made it
well settled that, to invoke the laches defense, a defendant has
the burden to prove two factors:
1. the plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and
25. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044-45, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338 ("This court has not
previously addressed the issue of what evidentiary burden must be met by litigants seeking to
prove a laches or an equitable estoppel defense. Because the question of quantum in patent
cases arises in every case within this area of our exclusive jurisdiction, we conclude that a
uniform Federal Circuit rule should be adopted.").
26. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1045-46, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1339 ("Accordingly, we
hold that 'preponderance of the evidence' is the appropriate evidentiary standard to establish
the facts relating to the laches issue"; and "we adopt the preponderance of evidence standard
in connection with the proof of equitable estoppel factors, absent special circumstances, such
as fraud or intentional misconduct.").
27. A defense is proven by a "preponderance of the evidence" when "it is more con-
vincing to the trier than the opposing evidence." Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1045, 22 USPQ2D
(BNA) at 1338 (quoting MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 339, at
793 (2d ed. 1972)). "'The phrase 'clear and convincing evidence' means evidence producing
a firm belief or conviction as to the matter sought to be established.'" Trans-World Mfg.
Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
28. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1041, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1335 ("[W]e will continue to
hold, as a matter of policy, that laches bars relief on a patentee's claim only with respect to
damages accrued prior to suit. At least on the facts presented in this case, we have no reason
to revisit this accepted principle.") (citations omitted).
29. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325 ("Where an alleged in-
fringer establishes the defense of equitable estoppel, the patentee's claim may be entirely
barred.").
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inexcusable length of time from the time the plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known of its claim against the defendant,
and
2. the delay operated to the prejudice or injury of the
defendant.30
a. Unreasonable and Inexcusable Delay
As to the first factor of unreasonable and inexcusable delay, the
Federal Circuit reaffi ed its prior holdings that "[tlhe period of
delay is measured from the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably
should have known of the defendant's alleged infringing activities to
the date of suit.31 However, the period does not begin prior to issu-
ance of the patent,"' 32 since there can be no "infringing activity"
before the patent issues.33 The Federal Circuit reiterated that "[t]he
length of time which may be deemed unreasonable has no fixed
boundaries but rather depends on the circumstances."34 Further, in
determining whether the delay was "unreasonable and inexcus-
able," the Federal Circuit explained that:
A court must also consider and weigh any justification of-
fered by the plaintiff for its delay. Excuses which have been rec-
ognized in some instances, and we do not mean this list to be
exhaustive, include: other litigation; negotiations with the ac-
cused; possibly poverty and illness under limited circumstances;
wartime conditions; extent of infringement; and dispute over
ownership of the patent.35
Another excuse recognized by the Federal Circuit, but not men-
tioned in the Aukerman decision, is that the patentee was waiting to
sue for infringement of a first patent until a second patent issued, so
that a single lawsuit could be filed for infringement of both
30. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1328. The Federal Circuit
further stated: "Material prejudice to adverse parties resulting from the plaintiff's delay is
essential to the laches defense." 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1328.
31. That is, from "the time the patentee knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known, of the alleged infringing activity." Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus.
Prod., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1552, 5 USPQ2D (BNA) 1779, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasis
added), overruled by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
32. Aukernan, 960 F.2d at 1032, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1328.
33. Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., 897 F.2d 508, 510, 13 USPQ2D
(BNA) 1972, 1974 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("It is obvious that a party cannot be held liable for
'infringement,' and thus not for 'willful' infringement, of a nonexistent patent, i.e., no dam-
ages are payable on products manufactured and sold before the patent issued.") (emphasis in
original).
34. Aukennan, 960 F.2d at 1032, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1328.
35. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329 (citations omitted).
1993]
8 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYL4WJOURMIAL [Vol. 9
patents.3 6
i Notice to the Infringer of the Reason or Excuse
for Not Suing Earlier is Not an Absolute
Prerequisite, and Application of That
Principle to the "Other Litigation"
Excuse
Where the patentee proffers a reason or excuse for not suing
the defendant earlier, the question which often arises is whether the
patentee must advise the defendant of why it is not being sued.
Most often this issue arises where the patentee's reason or excuse
for not suing earlier is that it was engaged in "other litigation" and
the patentee did not want to simultaneously maintain two separate
infringement actions. Thus, the patentee was delaying its suit
against the defendant until after completion of the lawsuit against
the other infringer.37 Under such circumstances, the Federal Cir-
cuit had expressly ruled on at least three separate occasions - in
Hottel Corporation v. Seaman Corporation,38 Jamesbury Corporation
v. Litton Industrial Products, Inc.39 and Vaupel Textilmaschinen
KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A. 4' - that in order to excuse
delay based on other litigation, the patentee must "give notice to the
alleged infringer of [1] the existence of the other litigation and [2] of
[an] intent to enforce its rights against the alleged infringer" at the
conclusion of the other litigation.41 Thus, summary judgment of
36. Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1452, 16 USPQ2D (BNA) 1055, 1057
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (hereinafter, "Meyers-P') (Federal Circuit reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment of laches in part because: "Awaiting issuance of the second patent to
sue on both at once conserved both the parties' and the court's resources. It may be that
there are times when a patentee must bring suit before the expected issuance of the second of
two related patents .... but this is not one of them.") (citations omitted), overruled by A.C.
Aukerman v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
37. Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 877, 20
USPQ2D (BNA) 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("The 'other litigation' excuse normally applies
when a patentee defers- suit against an alleged infringer until the conclusion of another law-
suit. If the party is ultimately sued and had received proper notice, the time delay consumed
by the original proceeding may be excused in evaluating whether laches occurred.").
38. 833 F.2d 1570, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) 1939 (Fed. Cir. 1987), overruled by A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
39. 839 F.2d 1544, 5 USPQ2D (BNA) 1779 (Fed. Cir. 1988), overruled by A.C.
Aukerman v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
40. 944 F.2d 870, 20 USPQ2D (BNA) 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
41. Jamesbury, 839 F.2d at 1553, 5 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1786. See also Hottel, 833 F.2d
at 1573, 4 USPQ2D at 1940-41; and Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 877, 20 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1050
("For other litigation to excuse a delay in bringing suit, there must be adequate notice of the
proceedings to the accused infringer. The notice must also inform the alleged infringer of the
patentee's intention of enforcing its patent upon completion of that proceeding.") (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
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laches has been affirmed by the Federal Circuit where the notice
met the first requirement but not the second,42 and where the notice
met the second requirement but not the first.43
42. In Jamesbury, plaintiff accused defendant of infringement, defendant denied in-
fringement, and the parties met but did not resolve the matter. 839 F.2d at 1553, 5 USPQ2D
(BNA) at 1786. Plaintiff then indicated in a letter to defendant that it had submitted defend-
ant's position to its attorneys and that the subject was under consideration. 839 F.2d at 1553,
5 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1786. There was no further contact until plaintiff sued eight years
later. 839 F.2d at 1553, 5 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1786. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary
judgment of laches because the patentee gave notice of the existence of the other litigation
(notice [1]), but not of an intent to sue the defendant after that other litigation was concluded
(notice [2]). According to the Federal Circuit:
In this case, there is no question that Jamesbury notified Contromatics of
the Court of Claims litigation, so it has met the first part of the test. It cannot
meet the second part, however. Jamesbury never clearly indicated that it in-
tended to enforce its rights against Contromatics after the Court of Claims
litigation ended. Jamesbury failed to give adequate notice to Contromatics, as
concluded by the district court.
839 F.2d at 1553, 5 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1786.
43. In Hottel, the "other litigation" was a pending reexamination of one of the four
patents-in-suit. 833 F.2d at 1572-73, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1940. Plaintiff accused defendant
of infringing the four patents, defendant denied infringement, and some back-and-forth letter
writing ensued. 833 F.2d at 1571-72, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1939-40. During that time plain-
tiff (through the inventor) filed for reexamination of one of the four patents. 833 F.2d at
1571-72, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1939-40. The reexamination was granted and the patent
office examiner issued a final, appealable rejection of all the claims of the patent. 833 F.2d at
1571-72, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1939-40. Plaintiff (through the inventor) appealed that deci-
sion in the patent office to the Board of Patent Appeals. 833 F.2d at 1571-72, 4 USPQ2D
(BNA) at 1939-40.
While that appeal was pending, and before the Board reversed the examiner's rejections,
plaintiff sent defendant a letter "Re: Huddle Patents" stating, "Please be advised that we are
appealing a decision rendered in the above matter and intend to pursue actively our patent
claims upon receipt of the ruling." 833 F.2d at 1572, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1940. The notice
letter was found to be deficient because, while the letter met the second notice requirement
(an intent to sue after "other litigation" concludes), the letter did not meet the first require-
ment (adequate notice of the "other litigation"). More specifically, "the letter shows that it
did not specify the patent or patents involved and did not indicate the nature of the proceed-
ings or the decision appealed" and, therefore, "did not provide adequate notice of a proceed-
ing relied on to excuse the delay." 833 F.2d at 1573, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1941.
Note should be made that the Federal Circuit stated that "[b]ecause the notice was defi-
cient we need not decide whether a reexamination proceeding may qualify as 'other litigation'
or whether a proceeding with respect to one patent may provide an excuse for not bringing
suit for infringement of other related patents." 833 F.2d at 1573 n.2, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) at
1941 n.2. Both questions were answered in subsequent cases. See Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 877, 20
USPQ2D (BNA) at 1050 (awaiting patent to emerge from a reissue proceeding may be a valid
excuse with the reissue proceeding qualifying as "other litigation"; reexamination and reissue
proceedings should both be treated the same since they both are patent office proceedings
where the validity of the claims of an issued patent are determined); and Meyers v. Brooks
Shoe Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1462, 16 USPQ2D (BNA) 1055, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Meyers-1)
(awaiting issuance of second patent may be a valid excuse for not suing on a first patent). See
also Collins Licensing L.P. v. Am. Tel. And Tel. Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4648, at *2
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 1992) (citing Vaupel for conclusion that "[t]he 1989 reexamination is
analogous to a reissue proceeding, and thus it constitutes 'other litigation' sufficient to toll the
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Notice is important for several reasons. It informs the ac-
cused infringer of the existence of the suit and that a subsequent
suit will be fied against him. He can then change his activities to
avoid liability. He can also bring a declaratory judgment action
if the delay in waiting for a judicial determination would be a
burden upon his proposed activities."4
In Vaupel, the Federal Circuit explained that the notice of the
"other litigation" need not come from the patentee; notice "in fact"
from other sources is adequate.45 Further, the notice of an intent to
enforce its rights against the infringer at the conclusion of the other
litigation need not be "expressly stated"; it can be understood from
the accumulation of correspondence and communications between
the patentee and the infringer." In other words, "[w]hat is impor-
tant is whether [the infringer] MEI had reason to believe [that] it
was likely to be sued."'47 That was the case in Vaupel where the
infringer actively participated in the "other litigation" because of
concern and an expectation that it would be sued when the other
litigation terminated."
In Aukerman, the Federal Circuit changed all this. In opposi-
tion to Chaides' motion for summary judgment, Aukerman sought
to excuse its delay by "present[ing] evidence that, during part of the
delay, it was engaged in other litigation," but "[tihe district court
rejected this excuse because at no time did Aukerman give Chaides
notice of such litigation and of its intention to sue Chaides upon its
conclusion."'49 The Federal Circuit held that this was error. Ac-
cording to the Aukerman court, "[t]he equities may or may not re-
quire that the plaintiff communicate its reasons for delay to the
laches clock"); Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 23 USPQ2D 1860
(BNA) (Fed. Cir. 1992) (hereinafter, "Hemstreet-l") (post-Aukerman case in which the Fed-
eral Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment of laches in part because
of the plaintiff's "other litigation" excuse; the "other litigations" were a patent infringement
suit with a third party and a reexamination of the subject patent instituted by that third
party).
44. Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 877, 20 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1050.
45. Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 877, 20 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1050 ("To establish whether such
notice was given, the district court must look not only at the actions of the patentee, but also
at evidence showing whether the alleged infringer was in fact on notice of an existing law-
suit.") (emphasis in original).
46. See Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 878, 20 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1051.
47. Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 878, 20 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1051.
48. In Vaupel, the other litigation was a reissue proceeding in which the infringer ac-
tively participated as a protester. The Federal Circuit held that a reissue proceeding over the
subject patent may be the "other litigation." 944 F.2d at 877, 20 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1050.
According to the Federal Circuit, "a reissue proceeding ... should be treated similarly to
infringement litigation for purposes of laches." 944 F.2d at 877, 20 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1050.
49. Aukernan, 960 F.2d at 1039, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1334.
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defendant."" ° More specifically:
... there can be no rigid requirement in judging a laches defense
that such notice must be given. If a defendant is, for example,
aware of the litigation from other sources, it would place form
over substance to require a specific notice. Where there is prior
contact, the overall equities may require appropriate notice, as in
Jamesbury. However, a notice requirement is not to be rigidly
imposed as the district court did in this case.51
The Federal Circuit thus went from an absolute rule requiring
that "in order to excuse delay based on other litigation, the patentee
must give notice to the alleged infringer ' 52 to a more vague princi-
ple requiring only that the totality of the circumstances be ex-
amined to determine whether the "overall equities . .. require
appropriate notice."5 3
What is particularly troublesome is that the Federal Circuit
never indicated that it was overruling its prior precedent, when that
is unmistakably what it was in fact doing. In Aukerman, there was
no notice whatsoever to the alleged infringer that suit was not being
brought in 1979 because of "other litigation" or for any other rea-
son. Indeed, after Chaides responded that it was not going to take a
license and if Aukerman did not like that it could sue, "[t]here was
no further correspondence or contact between the parties for more
than eight years."5 4 Under Hottel, Jamesbury and Vaupel, that
alone would have defeated the "other litigation" defense proffered
by Aukerman. And the district court, relying on that precedent,
correctly so held. Here, the Federal Circuit sub silentio overruled
that precedent and, on that basis, reversed the district court's deci-
sion. The end result being that, whereas before it was relatively
easy to defeat an "other litigation" excuse on summary judgment -
just establish that without dispute of material fact adequate notice
of the other litigation was not given - it is now much more diffi-
cult, if not virtually impossible, to challenge an "other litigation"
excuse on summary judgment. The "overall equities," when viewed
in the light most favorable to the patentee, as must be done on sum-
mary judgment, will invariably give rise to a reasonable inference
that notice was not required so that summary judgment of laches is
improper.55
50. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329.
51. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1334 (citations omitted).
52. See supra, note 41 and accompanying text.
53. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1334.
54. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1027, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1323.
55. Summary judgment cannot be granted unless the movant establishes that there is no
19931
12 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOUR/IIL [Vol. 9
i& The "De Minimis Infi'ngement" Excuse
A second excuse sometimes proffered by a patentee to explain
delay in bringing suit is that the infringement was de minimis such
that suit against the alleged infringer was not financially worthwhile
initially. Prior to Aukerman, the Federal Circuit had not addressed
this excuse in any reported decision. In pre-Federal Circuit cases,
however, the courts generally required that the patentee give notice
to the alleged infringer that the patentee will enforce the patent
when it becomes financially worthwhile.5 6 Thus, a notice require-
ment was in place for the de minimis excuse, much the same as it
had been for the other litigation excuse.
However, in Aukerman, the Federal Circuit ruled that the dis-
trict court had erred in rejecting the patentee's de minimis infringe-
ment excuse, even though there was apparently no notice from the
patentee that it would enforce the patent when it became financially
genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law
based on the uncontroverted facts. Armco, Inc. v. Cyclops Corp., 791 F.2d 147, 149 (Fed.
Cir. 1986). All evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant (op-
posing party), all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-movant's favor, and all
doubt over factual issues must be resolved in the non-movant's favor. Id.
A case which illustrates the significance of the change in the law announced in
Aukerman is Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 23 USPQ2D (BNA)
1860 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Hemstreet-1). In Hemstreet-I, a post-Aukerman case, the Federal Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment of laches and equitable estoppel.
As to laches, the Federal Circuit found that, on the record before the district court, the
"other litigation" excuse showed the delay to be both reasonable and excusable despite plain-
tiff's failure to explicitly advise defendant that it would be sued at the conclusion of the
"other litigation" between plaintiff and Burroughs. 972 F.2d at 1293, 23 USPQ2D at 1863.
The Federal Circuit explained:
It is true that prior precedent could be read to require explicit notice to the
defendant of both the existence of the other proceedings and the patentee's
intent to enforce its rights against the alleged infringer at the conclusion of
other litigation. Aukerman has clarified that this is far from a hard and fast
requirement. Instead, Aukerman restores equitable flexibility: 'The equities
may or may not require that the plaintiff communicate its reasons for delay to
the defendant.'
Here, we note that during the 1976-1989 period Hemstreet was busy en-
forcing his patent rights elsewhere, and indeed for a period of the delay [more
specifically, for about three of the approximately six years of delay] had no
valid patent rights to enforce, as the Burroughs trial court had erroneously held
the patent unenforceable [in the other litigation]. On the facts of record before
us, the delay involved here could not be considered unreasonable and
inexcusable.
972 F.2d at 1293, 23 USPQ2D at 1863.
56. See, eg., Dymo Indus., Inc. v. Monarch Marking Sys., Inc., 474 F.Supp. 412, 415,
206 USPQ (BNA) 185, 189 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("At the minimum, [the patentee] should have
notified [the infringer] that it intended to enforce the patent whenever [the infringer's] posi-
tion in the market rendered such a suit feasible.").
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worthwhile.57 Apparently, the Federal Circuit believed that given
the totality of the circumstances, an inference could be drawn that
the overall equities did not require notice because the defendant
knew or should have known that the patentee was not suing because
of the de minimis nature of the infringement, but that the patentee
would sue if the infringement became more substantial. After all,
the defendant responded to the charge of infringement by stating
that any responsibility was Gomaco's, and that if Aukerman wished
to sue Chaides "for $200-$300 a year," Aukerman should do so."
In other words, the defendant was telling the patentee not to sue
because it was not manufacturing the accused product, and its use
of the accused product was insubstantial. But both of these facts
changed and that is what led the patentee to sue the defendant.5 9
In reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit indicated that if de
minimis infringement is an adequate excuse for a delay until the
infringement becomes substantial, the delay (if any) after the paten-
tee knew or should have known that the infringement had become
or was becoming substantial must be separately considered. The de
minimis infringement may only excuse part of the delay period. In
this case, however, on summary judgment "[i]t could not be in-
ferred against the patentee that these changed circumstances [the
conversion from insubstantial infringement to substantial infringe-
ment] should have been known to the patentee or were immaterial
to the determination of laches." ° The issue of when the patentee
57. The Federal Circuit did not expressly mention the notice requirement issue with
respect to the de minimis infringement excuse. However, the Federal Circuit did say earlier,
with reference to excuses in general, that "[t]he equities may or may not require that the
plaintiff communicate its reasons for delay to the defendant." Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033,
22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329. Moreover, the Federal Circuit did overturn the district court's
rejection of the excuse even though there was no notice. 960 F.2d at 1039, 22 USPQ2D
(BNA) at 1334. And the comments that the Federal Circuit made with respect to the lack of
an absolute notice requirement relative to the other litigation excuse seem equally applicable
to all other excuses, including the de minimis infringement excuse.
58. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026-27, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1323.
59. The following comment was made by the Federal Circuit with respect to the equita-
ble estoppel defense, but may be equally applicable to the laches defense:
While the above factors favor the nonenforcement inference, Chaides' fur-
ther statement that Aukerman would only recover $200-$300 a year could lead
one in Chaides' position to infer that Aukerman did not sue because the
amount in issue was de minimis, not that Aukerman was abandoning its claim
against Chaides for all time regardless of quantum. At most Aukerman could
merely have been waiving an infringement claim for $300.00 per year.
In view of the different inferences which could be drawn from the ex-
change of correspondence, it is clear that the court drew an unfavorable infer-
ence against Aukerman. That is impermissible on summary judgment.
960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337-38.
60. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1334.
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knew or should have know that the infringement had become sub-
stantial and, therefore, whether the delay thereafter was excused,
had to be tried. It was inappropriate for summary judgment.6
b. Material Prejudice
As to the second factor - material prejudice to the defendant
occasioned by the plaintiff's delay in filing suit - the Federal Cir-
cuit explained that "[s]uch prejudice may be either economic or evi-
dentiary. '' 62  "Evidentiary, or 'defense' prejudice, may arise by
reason of a defendant's inability to present a full and fair defense on
the merits due to the loss of records, the death of a witness, or the
unreliability of memories of long past events, thereby undermining
the court's ability to judge the facts." 63 This type of prejudice must
be proven with particularity; broad, general, conclusory allegations
will not suffice.' 4
The Federal Circuit explained in Aukerman that "[e]conomic
prejudice may arise where a defendant and possibly others will suf-
fer the loss of monetary investments or incur damages which likely
would have been prevented by earlier suit."' 6  That is not a new
61. According to the Federal Circuit:
Similarly, we believe the court erred in resolving the issue of whether the
defendant's infringing activities changed sufficiently to disrupt the laches pe-
riod. It is not disputed that defendant's conduct changed during the laches
time frame both by its manufacturing its own slip-forming device and by
greatly increasing the amount of asymmetrical wall it poured. It could not be
inferred against the patentee that these changed circumstances should have
been known to the patentee or were immaterial to the determination of laches.
Upon the record before us, summary judgment of laches was improperly
granted. The issue of laches must be tried.
960 F.2d at 1039, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1334.
62. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1328.
63. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1328. See also 5 CHIsUM,
PATENis § 19.05[2][c] at 19-443 (1992 ed.) ("The courts universally accept this [type of
prejudice] as sufficient prejudice for purposes of laches," referring to "events that impair the
defendant's ability to defend a patent suit[, i]nclud[ing]... the death of critical witnesses, the
dimming of memories, and the loss of documents.").
64. In Meyers v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304,24 USPQ2D (BNA) 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(hereinafter, "Meyers-IP"), a post-Aukerman case, the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment of laches and equitable estoppel. As to laches, the Fed-
eral Circuit rejected the defendants' claim of "evidentiary prejudice" because:
Defendants also argue that they suffered evidentiary prejudice - loss of
key witnesses and loss of documentary evidence. However, none of the defend-
ants state exactly what particular prejudice it suffered from the absence of
these witnesses or evidence. Conclusory statements that there are missing wit-
nesses, that witnesses' memories have lessened, and that there is missing docu-
mentary evidence, are not sufficient.
974 F.2d at 1308, 24 USPQ2D at 1039.
65. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329.
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concept. It has been settled law for decades that where the infringer
expands or invests in its infringing business during the period of
plaintiff's delay in filing suit (e.g., builds new factories, hires more
employees, secures substantial financing, increases sales of infring-
ing products, introduces new infringing products), that constitutes
"economic prejudice" sufficient to establish that element of a laches
defense.66
Of course, where the defendant merely continues selling in-
fringing product at a constant rate using the same facilities and per-
sonnel during the period of plaintiff's delay in filing suit, she suffers
prejudice in the sense that infringement liability is incurred during
that period. However, the Federal Circuit in Aukerman was careful
to note that such damages, which are "merely... attributable to a
finding of liability for infringement" and which, therefore, "arise in
every suit," do not alone constitute the type of economic prejudice
adequate for a laches defense. 67 There typically would have to be
some "change in the economic position of the alleged infringer dur-
ing the period of delay,"' 68 such as substantial expansion of the in-
fringing business during the period of delay. Later Federal Circuit
decisions make plain that the defendant must establish that the
change in economic position resulted from the delay; Le., the
66. Sun Studs Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 993, 10 USPQ2D
(BNA) 1338, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (while the Federal Circuit reversed a jury verdict of
laches, the Federal Circuit also found no error in a jury instruction that: "'Prejudice arises
where on account of delay, the alleged infringer made a substantial investment in building up
its business ......."); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Miller Formless Co. Inc., 693 F.2d 697, 701 (7th
Cir. 1982) (in finding laches the court explained that "[a]s to the problem of prejudice to the
defendant through the long delay, there is no substantial question. [The infringer's] business
continued and expanded while the plaintiff was postponing suit."); Lemelson v. Carolina
Enter's, Inc., 541 F.Supp. 645, 657, 216 USPQ (BNA) 249, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (the
"change" in position which led the court to find material prejudice included continuous mar-
keting of infringing toys, entering into a license with another company to market a new toy
containing the infringing device, development of a new toy equipped with the infringing de-
vice); Coleman v. Coming Glass Works, 619 F.Supp. 950, 955, 226 USPQ (BNA) 991, 993
(W.D.N.Y. 1985) (in finding laches the court explained that "it is settled [law] that the suc-
cessful expansion of an infringer's business is itself the kind of prejudice which will support
the defense of laches"), aff'd, 818 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser
Am. Corp., 219 USPQ (BNA) 922, 926 (E.D. Va. 1983) (in finding laches the court explained
that one form of prejudice was the investment in a new plant to make the infringing product);
and Olympia Werke Aktiengesellschaft v. General Elec. Co., 545 F.Supp. 598, 609-10, 215
USPQ (BNA) 720, 729 (W.D. Va. 1982) (in finding laches the court explained that some
forms of prejudice were the investment of large sums of money in the development and pro-
motion of the accused device, and in plant facilities and in inventory and machinery for
production of the device; increase in sales many times over; the development and introduc-
tion of other models of accused devices and accessories and options therefor), aff'd 712 F.2d
74 (4th Cir. 1983).
67. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329.
68. Aukernan, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329 (emphasis in original).
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change would not have occurred had the plaintiff sued earlier.69
Another change in circumstances constituting economic prejudice
might be the discontinuance of a general reserve account to pay in-
fringement damages to plaintiff in the event a suit is brought.7"
However, the Federal Circuit in Aukerman was also careful to
69. For example, in Meyers v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304, 24 USPQ2D (BNA) 1036
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (Meyers-I1), the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment of laches and equitable estoppel. As to laches, the Federal Circuit rejected
the defendants' claim of "economic prejudice" because there was no showing that the defend-
ants would have done anything differently had they been sued earlier. 974 F.2d at 1307-8, 24
USPQ2D (BNA) at 1038-39. More specifically, the Federal Circuit stated:
[Defendants] Asics, ATC and Hyde all assert that since [plaintiff] Meyers'
initial contacts with them, they have spent substantial amounts of money to
design, develop and promote many new and different shoe models that Meyers
now alleges infringe his patents. There is no dispute that defendants have suf-
fered an economic detriment, the question is whether this prejudice resulted
from Meyers' delay.
None of the defendants submitted evidence that they curtailed design and
development of shees in response to Meyers' suit once it was actually filed.
Moreover, the sales data submitted by the defendants to support their assertion
of prejudice are not conclusive. Sales of the various models were somewhat
erratic, and do not show any clear trend. Finally, the evidence shows that
none of the defendants were concerned that its products might infringe Mey-
ers' patents, and does not show that any of the defendants would have acted
differently had Meyers sued earlier.
974 F.2d at 1308, 24 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1038-39. Another illustrative post-Aukerman case
is Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 23 USPQ2D (BNA) 1860 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (hereinafter, .temstreet-1), in which the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment of laches and equitable estoppel. As to laches, the Fed-
eral Circuit made the following comments regarding the defendant's claim of "economic
prejudice":
[Tmhe record reflects that [defendant] CES had expenditures of over $23 million
on research and development, $6.5 million on direct marketing costs, and $20
million to expand or consolidate manufacturing facilities. But these expendi-
tures have no explicitly proven nexus to the patentee's delay in filing suit, as
Aukerman requires for a finding of prejudice. It is not enough that the alleged
infringer changed his position - i.e., invested in production of the allegedly
infringing device. The change must be because of and as a result of the delay,
not simply a business decision to capitalize on a market opportunity. See
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D at 1329. Further, we note that
CES' prejudice argument is severely undercut by [plaintiff] Hemstreet's provi-
sion of explicit notice of the Burroughs litigation and implicit suggestion that
CES would soon face litigation if it refused to license. Presumably, CES itself
read the letter in that light, since it promptly inquired about licensing arrange-
ments. These factors should be carefully examined by the trial court if the
defendant chooses on remand to pursue a laches defense.
972 F.2d at 1293-94, 23 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1863 (citations omitted).
70. See eg., Olympia Werke Aktiengesellschaft v. General Electric Co, 545 F.Supp.
598, 610, 215 USPQ (BNA) 720, 729 (W.D. Va. 1982) (in finding laches court explained that
one form of prejudice was the creation and then termination of a general reserve account
based upon 5% sales assessment for any potential patent litigation), aff'd, 712 F.2d 74 (4th
Cir. 1983).
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explain that such a change in circumstances is not always essential
to a finding of economic prejudice. The court explained that a pat-
entee may not "intentionally lie silently in wait watching damages
escalate, particularly where an infringer, if he had notice, could
have switched to a noninfringing product."71 That too is not a new
principle. It has long been the law that if the defendant could have
turned to a noninfringing alternative, or initiated development of
such a product, the lost opportunity to do so, and thus mitigate her
potential damages, constitutes economic prejudice adequate to sup-
port a laches defense.72
Thus, according to the Aukerman court, "economic prejudice
is not a simple concept but rather is likely to be a slippery issue to
resolve."73
2. The Presumption of Laches
35 U.S.C. § 286 provides that "no recovery shall be had for
any [patent] infringement committed more than six years prior to
the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the
action."' From that the Federal Circuit decided in 1984 that a
delay of more than six years in filing suit would give rise to a pre-
sumption of laches; that is, unreasonable/inexcusable delay by the
patentee and prejudice to the infringer arising therefrom would
both be presumed when the delay in bringing suit was more than six
years.75 In Aukerman, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that decision,
explaining "that the presumption of laches based on the relevant
six-year period, previously adopted in our precedent, should be
maintained."76 Thus, "[prima facie, the underlying critical factors
71. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329 (citation omitted).
72. Sun Studs Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 993, 10 USPQ2D
(BNA) 1338, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (while the Federal Circuit reversed a jury verdict of
laches, the Federal Circuit also found no error in a jury instruction that: '""Prejudice arises
where on account of delay ... the accused infringer would have avoided the alleged infring-
ing conduct by modifying its business.' "); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 602
F.Supp. 159, 172, 225 USPQ (BNA) 765, 774 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (in finding laches court ex-
plained that one form of prejudice was the "lost opportunities to mitigate damages"); and
Potter Instrument Co. Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 207 USPQ 763, 769 (E.D. Va. 1980)
(in finding laches court explained that one form of prejudice was that the defendants "could
and would have circumvented [the patentee's] patent claims, had they been timely sued for
infringement") aff'd, 642 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981).
73. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1988).
75. Leinoffv. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 741-42, 220 USPQ (BNA) 845,
850 (Fed. Cir. 1984), overruled by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d
1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
76. Aukernan, 960 F.2d at 1035, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1331.
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of laches are presumed upon proof that the patentee delayed filing
suit for more than six years after actual or constructive knowledge
of the defendant's alleged infringing activity.""' "Without the pre-
sumption, the two facts of unreasonable delay and prejudice might
reasonably be inferred from the length of the delay, but not neces-
sarily. With the presumption, these facts must be inferred, absent
rebuttal evidence."78
3. The Laches Presumption Shifts the "Burden of Coming
Forward" With Evidence but the "Ultimate Burden of
Proof" Remains With the Accused Infringer
As noted above, the defendant (infringer) has the burden of
proving his laches defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
However, what happens when the defendant establishes a presump-
tion of laches? In Aukerman, the Federal Circuit acknowledged
that "[n]umerous decisions," including at least one by a panel of the
Federal Circuit, "indicate or suggest that the defendant's establish-
ing a six-year delay shifts the burden of proof, that is, the ultimate
burden of persuasion, from the defendant to the patentee."79 In
other words, once the presumption is established, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff (patent owner) to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the delay was reasonable or excusable, or that the de-
fendant sustained no damage as a result of the delay. Empirical
data demonstrates that rarely, if ever, has a plaintiff been able to
meet that burden. But in Aukerman, the Federal Circuit changed
all this.
In Aukerman, the Federal Circuit concluded that "[tihis view
of the laches presumption is legally unsound."8 ° So the Federal
Circuit overruled those prior decisions and pronounced, for the
very first time, that the laches presumption is of the type described
77. Aukerman, 960 F.2d 1035, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1331.
78. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1037, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1332 (emphasis in original).
79. Aukennan, 960 F.2d at 1307, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1332 ("Numerous decisions
indicate or suggest that the defendant's establishing a six-year delay shifts the burden of
proof, that is, the ultimate burden of persuasion, from the defendant to the patentee. For
example, the Leinoff [Federal Circuit] decision could be read to take that position. 726 F.2d
at 742.").
Leinoff does much more than "indicate or suggest" this; Leinoff expressly states it. In
Leinoff, the court stated that: The presumption "shifts the burden ... to the patent owner
now to prove the existence and reasonableness of such an excuse" and "[t]he patent owner...
bears the additional burden of showing lack of injury to the infringer caused by the delay";
"the burden of showing inexcusable and unreasonable delay and material prejudice is no
longer upon [infringer] Milona." 726 F.2d at 742, 220 USPQ (BNA) at 850.
80. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1037, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1332.
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in Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to wit, a "bursting
bubble" "presumption [which] has the effect of shifting the burden
of going forward with evidence, not the burden of persuasion."'"
More specifically, the Federal Circuit explained:
As finally adopted after much scholarly debate, Rule 301
embodies what is known as the 'bursting bubble' theory of pre-
sumptions. Under this theory, a presumption is not merely re-
buttable but completely vanishes upon the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the
presumed fact. In other words, the evidence must be sufficient to
put the existence of a presumed fact into genuine dispute. The
presumption compels the production of this minimum quantum
of evidence from the party against whom it operates, nothing
more. In sum, a presumption is not evidence. If the patentee
presents a sufficiency of evidence which, if believed, would pre-
clude a directed finding in favor of the infringer, the presumption
evaporates and the accused infringer is left to its proof. That is,
the accused infringer would then have to satisfy its burden of
persuasion with actual evidence. 8 2
Elimination of the presumption does not mean the patentee
precludes the possibility of a laches defense; it does mean, how-
ever, that the presumption of laches plays no role in the ultimate
decision. The facts of unreasonable delay and prejudice then
must be proved and judged on the totality of the evidence
presented. 3
Finally, we reiterate that, at all times, the defendant bears
the ultimate burden of persuasion of the affirmative defense of
laches. To the extent statements in [prior Federal Circuit Court
decisions], or other precedent may suggest otherwise, they are
expressly overruled. The burden of persuasion does not shift by
reason of the patentee's six-year delay.8 4
81. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325.
82. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1037-38, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1332 (citations omitted).
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, entitled "Rule 301. Presumptions in General Civil
Actions and Proceedings," provides that
[i]n all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Con-
gress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the pre-
sumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party
on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EVID. 301.
83. Aukennan, 960 F.2d at 1038, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1333.
84. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1333 (citations omitted).
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4. Bursting the Bubble: Rebutting the Laches Presumption
The Federal Circuit explained how the patentee may rebut the
laches presumption and burst the bubble:8"
Once a presumption of laches arises, the patentee may offer
proof directed to rebutting the laches factors. Such evidence may
be directed to showing either that the patentee's delay was rea-
sonable or that the defendant suffered no prejudice or both. By
raising a genuine issue respecting either factual element of a
laches defense, the presumption of laches is overcome.
Thus, the presumption of laches may be eliminated by offer-
ing evidence to show an excuse for the delay or that the delay
was reasonable, even if such evidence may ultimately be rejected
as not persuasive. Such evidence need only be sufficient to raise a
genuine issue respecting the reasonableness of the delay to over-
come the presumption. Evidence, for example, directed to the
excuses discussed in section III B, supra, will eliminate the laches
presumption if sufficient to raise a genuine issue.
A patentee may similarly eliminate the presumption with an
offer of evidence sufficient to place the matters of defense preju-
dice and economic prejudice genuinely in issue. Thus, the paten-
tee may eliminate the presumption by offering proof that no
additional prejudice occurred in the six-year time period, i.e.,
that evidence respecting an alleged infringer's defenses remains
available substantially as before the delay and that economic
prejudice of the type delineated in section III B, supra, has not
occurred.86
5. Summary of the Laches Presumption after Aukerman and
its Impact on Future Cases
In summary, the defendant has the initial burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's delay in filing
suit was unreasonable and inexcusable, and that the defendant sus-
tained damage from (i.e., was materially prejudiced by) the delay.
85. That is, of course, in addition to showing that the presumption does not in fact
exist:
As an initial response to the defendant's evidence of at least a six-year
delay, a patentee may offer proof that the delay has not in fact been six years
that is, that the time it first learned or should have known of the infringement
after the patent issued was within six years. If a patentee is successful on this
factual issue, no presumption arises.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1332-33 (citation omitted).
86. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1333 (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
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But if the defendant can proffer evidence that the plaintiff delayed
more than six years in filing suit, then laches is presumed. The de-
fendant will prevail on his laches defense unless the plaintiff offers
evidence of a legitimate reason or excuse for the delay, or evidence
indicating that the defendant in fact suffered no damage from the
delay. It is much more likely that the plaintiff will submit credible
evidence of the former (a reason or excuse for the delay), than the
latter (no damage to the defendant).87 In any event, once the plain-
tiff comes forward with that rebuttal evidence, everything reverts
back to the beginning. The defendant will not succeed unless he
proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff's de-
lay in filing suit was unreasonable and inexcusable, and that the
defendant sustained damage from the delay. The plaintiff does not
have to prove the opposite. Only if the trier of fact, judge or jury,
concludes that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff's delay
was unreasonable and inexcusable, and that there was prejudice to
the defendant therefrom, will the defendant prevail on his laches
defense. If the trier instead decides that the opposite is more likely,
the defendant loses. If the trier cannot make up his mind, and can-
not decide which is more likely (e.g., it is equally likely that the
delay was reasonable or unreasonable under the circumstances), the
defendant still loses. A tie goes to the plaintiff. Under pre-
Aukerman precedent, the tie would have gone to the defendant,
since under that precedent the presumption shifted the burden of
proof to the plaintiff to disprove the elements of laches (i.e., prove
the nonexistence of those elements). But, under Aukerman, that is
no longer the case. The burden of proof remains at all times with
the defendant; the defendant must prove the existence of both
laches elements.
The change in the law occasioned by Aukerman is quite dra-
matic. Before Aukerman, summary judgment of laches was rela-
tively commonplace where the delay in filing suit was more than six
years. 88 The patentee could not easily prove the non-existence of
the two laches factors once the presumption shifted the burden of
87. It will be the rare case indeed that after a six year delay the plaintiff can produce
evidence that there was no "evidentiary or defense prejudice" in the form of fading memories
or lost documents, or "economic prejudice" in the form of an expanded infringing business.
88. See, eg., Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1573, 4 USPQ2D (BNA)
1939, 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (summary judgment of laches affirmed), overruled by A.C.
Aukerman v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992); and Jamesbury
Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prod., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1553, 5 U.S.P.O.2d 1779, 1786 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (same), overruled by A.C. Aukerman v. R-L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
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proving such non-existence to the patentee. Now, according to the
companion opinion of Judge Plager in Aukerman, "[n]o lawyer...
should have any difficulty in creating the factual showing that will
cause both parts of the presumption to 'burst'." 89 Post-Aukerman
cases prove the correctness of Judge Plager's comments. 90
IV. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE GENERALLY
1. The Three Elements of an Estoppel Defense
The Federal Circuit set out three elements which "must be es-
tablished to bar a patentee's suit by reason of equitable estoppel." 91
Each element is discussed separately below.
a. Misleading Conduct by the Patentee
The first element of an equitable estoppel defense is the pres-
ence of misleading conduct by the patentee. That is, "[tlhe paten-
tee, through misleading conduct, leads the alleged infringer to
reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to enforce its pat-
ent against the alleged infringer." 92 The Federal Circuit explained
89. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1047, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1340 (Judge Plager concurring
in part and dissenting in part; Judge Plager dissented only to the extent that he would abolish
the presumption altogether).
90. On February 11, 1993, the author conducted a computerized search of the LEXIS
database for post-Aukerman patent infringement decisions which explicitly cited Aukerman
with respect to the doctrines of laches and estoppel. The cases uncovered in this search were:
Meyers v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304,24 USPQ2D (BNA) 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Meyers-Il)
(Federal Circuit reversed district court's grant of summary judgment of laches and equitable
estoppel); Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 23 USPQ2D (BNA)
1860 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Hemstreet-1) (same); Hemstreet v. Lundy Elec. & Sys., Inc., 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19153 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 1992) (same; unpublished); Hemstreet v. Bantec, Inc.,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19150 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 1992) (same; unpublished); Emhart Indus.,
Inc. v. Universal Instruments Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13458 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
1992) (defendants' motion for summary judgment of laches denied because presumption of
laches had been rebutted); Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8068, 23 USPQ2D (BNA) 1881 (N.D. Tex. June 4, 1992) (after trial to the court,
judge rejected the laches defense, holding that the presumption of laches had been rebutted,
and that defendant failed to prove the existence of material economic or evidentiary preju-
dice); and U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9390 (N.D. Ill.
June 25, 1992) (plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment of no laches or equitable estoppel
denied); Henstreet v. Scan-Optics, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18393 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 1992)
(same).
91. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325.
92. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325. The Federal Circuit
further explained:
The first element of equitable estoppel concerns the statements or conduct
of the patentee which must "communicate something in a misleading way."
The "something" with which this case, as well as the vast majority of equitable
estoppel cases in the patent field is concerned, is that the accused infringer will
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that "'[c]onduct' may include specific statements, action, inaction,
or silence where there was an obligation to speak."93 While the pat-
entee's conduct must be "misleading," it is not necessary that the
patentee intended its conduct to mislead.94 That is somewhat of a
departure from prior cases in which the Federal Circuit had stated
that "there is precedent for applying equitable estoppel where there
has been 'intentionally misleading silence'."95
As to misleading conduct through "inaction," the Federal Cir-
cuit explained that "[i]n the most common situation, the patentee
specifically objects to the activities currently asserted as infringe-
ment in the suit and then does not follow up for years."96 Accord-
ing to the Federal Circuit, there was "ample" precedent "that
equitable estoppel may arise where, coupled with other factors, a
patentee's 'misleading conduct' is essentially misleading inaction."9 7
"However, plaintiff's inaction must be combined with other
facts respecting the relationship or contacts between the parties to
give rise to the necessary inference that the claim against the de-
fendant is abandoned."9" "Delay in filing suit may be evidence
which influences the assessment of whether the patentee's conduct
is misleading"9 9 only where it is combined with other factors giving
rise to the necessary inference that the claim against the defendant
is abandoned. "It is clear, thus, that for equitable estoppel the al-
leged infringer cannot be unaware - as is possible under laches -
of the patentee and/or its patent. The alleged infringer also must
not be disturbed by the plaintiff patentee in the activities in which the former is
currently engaged. The patentee's conduct must have supported an inference
that the patentee did not intend to press an infringement claim against the
alleged infringer.
960 F.2d at 1042, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336.
93. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325.
94. The Federal Circuit held that with respect to the case at bar:
Aukerman argued that Chaides had to prove intentionally misleading silence.
The district court properly rejected Aukerman's argument respecting the need
to prove intent to mislead on the basis of Hottel, 833 F.2d at 1574-75, 4
USPQ2D at 1941-42. How one characterizes a patentee's silence is immate-
rial. Properly focused, the issue here is whether Aukerman's course of conduct
reasonably gave rise to an inference in Chaides that Aukerman was not going
to enforce the '133 and '633 patents against Chaides.
960 F.2d at 1043, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
95. Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1572, 4 USPQ2D 1939, 1941 (Fed.
Cir. 1987), overruled by A.C. Aukerman v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
96. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336.
97. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336 (emphasis in original).
98. Aukennan, 960 F.2d at 1042, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336.
99. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336.
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know or reasonably be able to infer that the patentee has known of
the former's activities for some time." 1°°
For that reason, "unreasonable and inexcusable delay" alone
cannot satisfy this first element. On the other hand, the first ele-
ment can be met where the misleading conduct is something other
than "inaction," such that there is no "unreasonable and inexcus-
able delay" in filing suit (a laches requirement). Thus, "[d]elay in
filing suit.., is not a requirement of equitable estoppel." 10 "Un-
like laches, equitable estoppel does not require the passage of an
unreasonable period of time in filing suit."" °2 Accordingly, while
the Federal Circuit had previously stated in Jamesbury that equita-
ble estoppel requires "unreasonable and inexcusable delay in filing
suit," 103 the Federal Circuit held here that "[t]he test set out in
Jamesbury confusingly intertwines the elements of laches and equi-
table estoppel and is expressly overruled."" °
i. Misleading Conduct Through a Charge of
Infringement Followed by Delay in Filing Suit
As noted above, in respect to misleading conduct through inac-
tion, "[in the most common situation, the patentee specifically ob-
jects to the activities currently asserted as infringement in the suit
and then does not follow up for years." °105 Thus, "[iln the cases that
have applied intentionally misleading silence [inaction] in the patent
infringement context, a patentee threatened immediate or vigorous
enforcement of its patent rights but then did nothing for an unrea-
sonably long time."106 But where "the periods of silence did not
follow any communication indicating that it would take immediate
100. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336.
101. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336.
102. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336.
103. Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prod., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1553, 5 USPQ2D
(BNA) 1779, 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1988), overruled by A.C. Aukerman v. R.L. Chaides Constr.
Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
104. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336.
105. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336.
106. Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1574, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) 1939, 1941
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), overruled by A.C. Aukerman v. R.L.
Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See also Jamesbury, 839 F.2d at 1555, 5
USPQ2D (BNA) at 1787 (patentee charged defendant with infringement; defendant asserted
that it did not infringe the patent; patentee told defendant its attorney was considering the
matter carefully; patentee then waited eight years before filing suit; Federal Circuit affirmed
district court's grant of summary judgment of estoppel, concluding that: "Jamesbury's silence
in the face of its obligation to inform Contromatics of the result of its consideration reason-
ably could have led Contromatics to conclude either that Jamesbury had determined that
Contromatics was not infringing or that it would ignore the infringement.").
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action, which if not followed up might indicate that [the patentee]
had dropped the matter," such conduct is insufficient to support an
equitable estoppel defense.107
In Aukennan there was no threat of "immediate or vigorous
enforcement" by the patentee prior to the long period of silence.
Instead, the correspondence in 1979 merely stated that the patentee
was seeking to enforce its patents against all infringers, and that it
would waive liability for past infringement if the defendant accepted
a license by June 1, 1979.108 Thus, one would have thought that the
inaction was not of the type sufficient to support an equitable estop-
pel defense. Nevertheless, the district court granted summary judg-
ment of estoppel and, while the Federal Circuit reversed, it did not
mention the lack of a threat of "immediate or vigorous enforce-
ment" as the reason for the reversal. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
said that the defendant could reasonably infer from the charge of
infringement and the patentee's eight year silence after the defend-
ant responded that the infringement problem was Gomaco's and
that the infringement was in any event de minimis, "that by remain-
ing silent Aukerman abandoned its claim against Chaides."'
Thus, it appears that the Federal Circuit has relaxed somewhat the
standard for estoppel. There is no longer what appeared to have
been an absolute requirement that the threat be of "immediate and
vigorous" enforcement.
As it had with respect to the laches defense, the patentee ar-
gued "that the delay is excused by reason of litigation against
others, even though Chaides was not informed of the litigation."' 10
The Federal Circuit rejected that argument here, as to estoppel,
even though it had accepted that argument before as to laches,
stating:
Aukerman argues that the delay is excused by reason of litigation
against others, even though Chaides was not informed of the liti-
gation. However, that argument is off the mark. A party must
generally notify an accused infringer about other litigation for it
107. Hottel, 833 F.2d at 1574, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1942 (emphasis added) (summary
judgment of laches affirmed; summary judgment of estoppel reversed). See also Meyers v.
Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304, 1309, 24 USPQ2D (BNA) 1036, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Meyers-
11) (post-Aukerman case in which the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment of equitable estoppel because "[t]he defendants have not shown that
[plaintiff] Meyers threatened immediate and vigorous enforcement of his patents and then by
silence lulled them into the belief that he did not intend to enforce his patents.").
108. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1323.
109. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337.
110. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337.
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to impact the defense of equitable estoppel. 1 ' This 'require-
ment' is a matter of logic. Other litigation can not logically enter
into whether Chaides reasonably drew an inference that it would
not be sued if such facts are not known to Chaides. 112
In other words, what the subjective reasons the patentee has for not
suing the infringer are irrelevant to a determination of whether the
patentee's overt actions towards the defendant were of the type
which would "[lead] the alleged infringer to reasonably infer that
the patentee does not intend to enforce its patent against the alleged
infringer.,"113
As noted above, the Federal Circuit found that one reasonable
inference to be drawn from plaintiff's eight year delay following de-
fendant's assertion that the infringement was de minimis and
Gomaco's problem was that "Aukerman abandoned its claim
against Chaides." 114 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit also found
that an alternative reasonable inference was that Aukerman was
only abandoning its claim as to de minimis infringement, not any
claim should the infringement multiply so as to become quite sub-
stantial.11 5 The district court on summary judgment was required
to accept the inference most favorable to plaintiff. But, instead, the
district court accepted the inference most favorable to the defend-
ant. That was error and the summary judgment was therefore
111. It should be appreciated that the cases cited by the Federal Circuit - Vaupel Tex-
tilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 877, 20 USPQ2D (BNA)
1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hottel, 833 F.2d at 1573, 4 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1940-41; and
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1330, 206 USPQ
(BNA) 577, 591 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980) - do not support the
Federal Circuit's conclusion. In both Vaupel and Hottel the Federal Circuit spoke of the
need for notice to the infringer only with respect to the laches defense, not the estoppel de-
fense. As noted above, the Federal Circuit inAukerman removed the absolute requirement of
notice in connection with the laches defense. Now it is, for the first time, indicating that an
excuse or reason for not suing which is not made known to the infringer cannot be applied to
defeat an equitable estoppel defense. In Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 616 F.2d at 1330, 206
USPQ at 591, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's finding of laches and estoppel in
part because there was adequate notice of the other litigation and intent to sue when that
litigation was completed.
112. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337 (citations omitted).
113. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325.
114. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337.
115. The Federal Circuit stated:
While the above factors favor the nonenforcement inference, Chaides' fur-
ther statement that Aukerman would only recover $200-$300 a year could lead
one in Chaides' position to infer that Aukerman did not sue because the
amount in issue was de minimis, not that Aukerman was abandoning its claim
against Chaides for all time regardless of quantum. At most Aukerman could
merely have been waiving an infringement claim for $ 300.00 per year.
960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337-38.
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reversed.1 16
The moral of the story is simple. If you try to dissuade a plain-
tiff from suing based on the minimal nature of the infringement, the
result may be a decision by the plaintiff not to file suit until your
infringement becomes substantial. But when the plaintiff does sue,
you may have no equitable estoppel defense. The jury might accept
an inference that plaintiff's conduct only indicated an intent not to
sue so long as your infringement remained de minimis. On the
other hand, if you respond to an infringement charge only with an
assertion that the patent at issue is invalid, unenforceable and/or
noninfringed, the aforesaid inference would not be reasonable in the
event the plaintiff elects not to sue without further communication.
The only reasonable inference would then appear to be that the
plaintiff abandoned its claim against you in its entirety because of
your challenge to the merits of the infringement claim. Of course, if
you do not raise the minimal nature of the infringement, the plain-
tiff might sue you notwithstanding your protestations about the
strength of the patent infringement claim. Thus, no response to an
infringement charge should be lightly made. All the possible out-
growths from that response should first be examined.
b. Reliance by the Infringer on the Misleading
Conduct
The second element of equitable estoppel is reliance "[t]he ac-
cused infringer must show that, in fact, it substantially relied on the
misleading conduct of the patentee in connection with taking some
action."'1 17 "To show reliance, the infringer must have had a rela-
tionship or communication with the plaintiff which lulls the in-
fringer into a sense of security in going ahead with building the
plant."' 1 8
c. Prejudice to the Infringer Caused by His Reliance
on the Misleading Conduct
The third element of an equitable estoppel defense is that of
prejudice to the defendant "[d]ue to its reliance, the alleged in-
fringer will be materially prejudiced if the patentee is allowed to
116. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338 ("In view of the different
inferences which could be drawn from the exchange of correspondence, it is clear that the
court drew an unfavorable inference against Aukerman. That is impermissible on summary
judgment.").
117. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042-43, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336-37.
118. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1043, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337.
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proceed with its claim."'1 9 "As with laches, the prejudice may be a
change of economic position or loss of evidence."120
2. Don't Confuse the Second and Third Elements
The Federal Circuit cautioned that the second and third ele-
ments - reliance and prejudice - should not be confused. There
must be reliance (which is a requirement of estoppel, but not laches)
which causes the prejudice:
The second element, reliance, is not a requirement of laches
but is essential to equitable estoppel. The accused infringer must
show that, in fact, it substantially relied on the misleading con-
duct of the patentee in connection with taking some action. Reli-
ance is not the same as prejudice or harm, although frequently
confused. An infringer can build a plant being entirely unaware
of the patent. As a result of infringement, the infringer may be
unable to use the facility. Although harmed, the infringer could
not show reliance on the patentee's conduct. To show reliance,
the infringer must have had a relationship or communication
with the plaintiff which lulls the infringer into a sense of security
in going ahead with building the plant.12
3. No Presumption of Estoppel
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed its prior holdings that, unlike
laches, there is no presumption of equitable estoppel, even where
the "misleading conduct" included an unreasonable and inexcus-
able delay of more than six years in filing suit. 122
119. Aukermnan, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325.
120. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1043, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337.
121. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042-43, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1336-37 (citation omitted).
In Meyers v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304,24 USPQ2D (BNA) 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Meyers.
II), the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment of laches and
equitable estoppel and, in so doing, reiterated that: "[D]efendants need not show that they
relied on [plaintiffl Meyers' delay to establish laches. However, they must show that the
prejudice they suffered resulted from the delay." 974 F.2d at 1308 n.1, 24 USPQ2D (BNA)
at 1038 n.l.
122. The Federal Circuit explained:
Another significant difference from laches is that no presumption adheres
to an equitable estoppel defense. Despite a six-year delay in suit being filed, a
defendant must prove all of the factual elements of estoppel on which the dis-
cretionary power of the court rests. The reasons for this are two-fold. First,
the presumed laches factors, that is, unreasonable and inexcusable delay and
prejudice resulting therefrom are not elements of estoppel. Second, the relief
granted in estoppel is broader than in laches. Because the whole suit may be
barred, we conclude that the defendant should carry a burden to establish the
defense based on proof, not a presumption.
960 F.2d at 1043, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337.
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V. OTHER EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MAY DEFEAT
A LACHES DEFENSE OR AN ESTOPPEL DEFENSE, EVEN A
PRESUMPTIVE LACHES DEFENSE
The Federal Circuit explained that, even where the two ele-
ments (factors) of a laches defense are met (undue delay and preju-
dice), a laches defense may be rejected because it is an equitable
defense, committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge based
on his consideration of the totality of the circumstances:
The application of the defense of laches is committed to the
sound discretion of the district court. With its origins in equity,
a determination of laches is not made upon the application of
"mechanical rules." The defense, being personal to the particu-
lar party and equitable in nature, must have flexibility in its ap-
plication. A court must look at all of the particular facts and
circumstances of each case and weigh the equities of the
parties. 1
23
The district court should consider [whether the patentee's
delay in bringing the suit was unreasonable and inexcusable,
whether the alleged infringer suffered material prejudice attribu-
table to the delay] and all of the evidence and other circum-
stances to determine whether equity should intercede to bar pre-
filing damages.
124
A patentee may also defeat a laches defense if the infringer
"has engaged in particularly egregious conduct which would
change the equities significantly in plaintiff's favor." Conscious
copying may be such a factor weighing against the defendant,
whereas ignorance or a good faith belief in the merits of a defense
may tilt matters in its favor. 125
Thus, for laches, the length of delay, the seriousness of prej-
udice, the reasonableness of excuses, and the defendant's conduct
or culpability must be weighed to determine whether the paten-
tee dealt unfairly with the alleged infringer by not promptly
bringing suit. In sum, a district court must weigh all pertinent
facts and equities in making a decision on the laches defense. 126
The Federal Circuit explained that even if the presumption of
laches cannot be rebutted, laches may not be found:
Even if unable to overcome the presumption, a patentee may
be able to preclude application of the laches defense with proof
that the accused infringer was itself guilty of misdeeds towards
123. Aukernan, 960 F.2d at 1032, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1328 (citations omitted).
124. Aukennan, 960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1324-25.
125. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329 (citations omitted).
126. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1034, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329.
1993]
30 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLOWJOUNPAL
the patentee. This flows from the maxim, "He who seeks equity
must do equity."' 27
Thus, the presumption does not require a finding of laches in every
case:
It must be emphasized that the establishment of the factors
of undue delay and prejudice, whether by actual proof or by the
presumption, does not mandate recognition of a laches defense in
every case. Laches remains an equitable judgment of the trial
court in light of all the circumstances. Laches is not established
by undue delay and prejudice. Those factors merely lay the
foundation for the trial court's exercise of discretion. Where
there is evidence of other factors which would make it inequita-
ble to recognize the defense despite undue delay and prejudice,
the defense may be denied.1 28
The Federal Circuit then explained that, like laches, the exist-
ence of the essential elements of an equitable estoppel defense does
not mandate a holding that the defense is present:
Finally, the trial court must, even where the three elements
of equitable estoppel are established, take into consideration any
other evidence and facts respecting the equities of the parties in
exercising its discretion and deciding whether to allow the de-
fense of equitable estoppel to bar the suit.129
1. Copying as the Most Common Equitable Factor Defeating
a Laches or Equitable Estoppel Defense
Knowingly (or deliberately or intentionally) copying a pat-
ented product from the product in the marketplace, or from the
patent describing the product, is "egregious conduct" which may be
applied to defeat a laches or equitable estoppel defense. 130 The Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed this principle in Aukerman, noting that
"[c]onscious copying may be such a [equitable] factor weighing
against the defendant, whereas ignorance or a good faith belief in
127. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1333.
128. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1036, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1331 (emphasis in original).
"A presumption of laches arises where a patentee delays bringing suit for more than six years
after the date the patentee knew or should have known of the alleged infringer's activity."
960 F.2d at 1028, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1325.
129. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1043, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337.
130. Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1576, 1 USPQ2D 1210, 1217 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ("[We hold that Four Star's defense of laches was defeated by its egregious conduct";
the egregious conduct was that defendant "knowingly copied Bott's carrier" and "inexcus-
ably accelerated its infringing sales after this court affirmed the district court's decision on
liability.").
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the merits of a defense may tilt matters in its favor."1 31 A represen-
tative case applying the "egregious conduct" through copying prin-
ciple is CR. Bard Inc. v. Cordis Corp. 32
In Bard, Cordis sued Bard for patent infringement in 1979.133
The parties settled with Bard taking a license.' 34 Bard paid royal-
ties until the end of September 1981 when Bard began to sell a new
product which it believed did not infringe the Cordis patent.1 31
Bard wrote Cordis a letter in January 1982 stating that no royalties
were required because Bard's in-house patent counsel had con-
cluded that the new product was noninfringing.1 36 With the letter,
Bard provided a sample of the new product for Cordis' considera-
tion.1 37 Cordis ignored the Bard letter.138 Nevertheless, seven
years later, in January of 1989, Cordis accused Bard of infringement
and breach of the license agreement for failing to pay royalties on
the new product.' 39 Bard filed an action for declaratory relief and
Cordis counterclaimed for patent infringement. Bard moved for
summary judgment on its laches defenses which the district judge
denied.
The district court noted that it was undisputed that while
Cordis should have known of Bard's alleged infringement in Janu-
ary 1982 when it received Bard's letter and a sample product,
Cordis delayed seven years before filing its counterclaim for in-
fringement.140 Thus, the delay of more than six years gave rise to a
presumption of laches.' 41 The court further held it beyond dispute
that Cordis had failed to rebut the laches presumption.142 Never-
theless, the judge denied Bard's summary judgment motion because
there was an issue of fact as to whether Bard's conduct was "egre-
gious," thereby defeating the laches defense. 14
The alleged evidence of egregiousness was (1) Bard's failure to
secure a competent legal opinion that its product did not infringe
131. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1329.
132. 17 USPQ2D (BNA) 1391 (D. Mass. 1990).
133. Id. at 1391.
134. Id. at 1391-92.
135. Id. at 1392.
136. Id.
137. CR. Bard, 17 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1392.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1393-94.
141. Id. at 1394.
142. CR. Bard, 17 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1394 ("Cordis offers nothing to rebut either of
these presumptions").
143. Id.
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the patent before selling it even though it was aware of the pat-
ent;1" (2) testimony by a Bard engineer that the primary goal in
designing the new product was avoiding the patent; 45 (3) Bard's
access to the patent and the patentee's product while designing its
product;1" and (4) Bard's operating under the license as to its prior
product which Bard's engineers conceded was covered by the patent
claims.147 The trial court essentially equated "egregious conduct"
sufficient to defeat a laches defense with "willful infringement" suf-
ficient to allow the court to "increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed" 148 under 35 U.S.C. § 284.149 That
is, the trial court denied summary judgment of laches, concluding
that "it is certainly an issue of fact whether Bard willfully infringed
the Stevens patent and engaged in egregious conduct."15 0
144. Id. Apparently Cordis argued that the opinion of Bard's in-house counsel was not
"competent."
145. Id. This is a curious factor cited as evidence of "egregious" conduct, since it is
settled law that one can avoid infringement by intentionally designing a product so that it
falls outside the scope of a patent's claims; indeed, the "negative incentive" to "design
around" a patent is encouraged, not discouraged, because that "bring[s] a steady flow of
innovations to the marketplace." State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226,
1236, 224 USPQ (BNA) 418, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Moreover, when such "design around"
attempts are unsuccessful and infringement is in fact not avoided, the good faith design
around attempt is a factor favoring a finding that the infringement was not "willful" and that
the actions of the defendant were not "egregious." 751 F.2d at 1236, 224 USPQ (BNA) at
424. See also Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, Stahlecker & Grill gmbH v. Schubert & Salzer
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1084, 4 USPQ2D 1044, 1051 (Fed. Cir.
1987) ("We have noted a good faith effort to 'design around' as indicating support for a non-
willful finding."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988).
146. CR. Bard, 17 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1394.
147. Id.
148. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988).
149. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543, 16 USPQ2D (BNA)
1622, 1625 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (a finding of "willful infringement" authorizes, but does not
mandate an award of increased damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284).
150. CR. Bard, 17 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1394. Bard also moved for summary judgment
on its equitable estoppel defense. Under Aukerman, the same conduct which defeated the
motion relative to laches should also have defeated the estoppel defense. However, the trial
judge, relying on pre-Aukerman precedent, rejected the equitable estoppel motion on other
grounds. The judge held that Cordis' silence in response to Bard's activity in January 1982
was "not affirmative conduct by the patent holder [which] has induced the belief that it has
abandoned its claim against the infringer" since "silence alone, unless it is intentionally mis-
leading, is not sufficient affirmative conduct to support an estoppel." Id. That was error. As
the Federal Circuit explained in Aukerman:
Aukerman argued that Chaides had to prove intentionally misleading silence.
The district court properly rejected Aukerman's argument respecting the need
to prove intent to mislead on the basis of Hottel, 833 F.2d at 1574-75, 4
USPQ2D at 1941-42. How one characterizes a patentee's silence is immate-
rial. Properly focused, the issue here is whether Aukerman's course of conduct
reasonably gave rise to an inference in Chaides that Aukerman was not going
to enforce the '133 and '633 patents against Chaides.
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2. Burdens Re Copying as an Equitable Factor Defeating A
Laches or Equitable Estoppel Defense on Summary
Judgment
Access to the patent or the patented product when the accused
device is developed may give rise to a presumption of copying, shift-
ing the burden to the defendant to show independent creation in
order to avoid a finding of egregious conduct.151 In Aukerman, the
Federal Circuit applied a variation of this presumptive principle
with respect to a motion for summary judgment of estoppel.
In Aukerman, both parties used the term "copy" to describe
the accused device. Moreover, the defendant's principal testified
that he could not remember any differences between the original
and the copy except in size.152 Thus, "[plaintiff] Aukerman argued
that [defendant] Chaides was guilty of inequity by building a 'copy'
of the [patented] mold." '53 According to the Federal Circuit, "for
purposes of summary judgment, Chaides' copying should have been
deemed misconduct to be weighed into the court's decision, but it
was not." 154 Instead, the district court erroneously placed the addi-
tional burden on plaintiff to produce evidence that the "copy" in-
fringed the claim in order to raise the "egregious conduct" element
to defeat the motion for summary judgment.'55 Since Aukerman
produced no evidence demonstrating "how the copy infringed the
patents," summary judgment was proper.1 56 That was error ac-
cording to the Federal Circuit. There was no such additional
requirement. 157
960 F.2d at 1043, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
151. TWM Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Dura Corp., 722 F.2d 1261, 1268-69, 221 USPQ (BNA) 25,
30 (6th Cir. 1983) (borrowing this concept of burden shifting from the laches defense as
applied in the copyright law). See also Bott, 807 F.2d at 1576, 1 USPQ2D at 1217 (Federal
Circuit discussed TWM's holding regarding burden shifting without expressly adopting or
rejecting it).
152. Aukennan, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338.
153. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338.
154. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338.
155. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338.
156. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338.
157. The Federal Circuit also stated that the evidence showing that the accused product
was a "copy" actually shifted the burden to the defendant to prove, without dispute of mate-
rial fact and resolving all issues and inferences in plaintiff's favor, that the "copy" did not
infringe the patent. 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338. If plaintiff proved this,
there would be no egregious conduct. But there would also be no infringement, a separate
defense from estoppel. Here the testimony of the product as a "copy," at least when coupled
with the testimony of defendant's principal that he could not remember any differences be-
tween the original and the copy except in size, created an inference of infringement. The
district court erred in discounting this inference, requiring plaintiff to produce evidence dem-
onstrating "how the copy infringed the patents."
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VI. LACHES AND ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO THE A UKERMAN
FACTS
The Federal Circuit concluded that it must reverse the district
court's grant of summary judgment of laches and equitable
estoppel.158
Reversal of the laches holding was required because of three
fundamental errors made by the district court in granting summary
judgment. First, the lower court improperly used the laches pre-
sumption to shift the ultimate burden of persuasion (proof) to the
patentee to prove that its more than six year delay in filing suit was
reasonable and excusable, rather than shifting only the burden of
coming forward. 159 Second, the trial court incorrectly made an ab-
solute requirement of the "other litigation" excuse, that the paten-
tee provide notice to the infringer of the reason that the patentee
delayed in filing suit." Third, the court erred in rejecting the de
minimis infringement excuse on summary judgment, since infer-
ences most favorable to the patentee would be that the insubstantial
infringement, under the totality of the circumstances, excused the
delay at least until the patentee knew or should have known that the
infringement was substantial, and that the patentee did not delay
unduly after it knew or should have known that the infringement
was substantial.161
As to equitable estoppel, reversal was necessary in light of two
basic errors made by the district court in granting summary judg-
ment. First, a reasonable inference favorable to plaintiff to be
drawn from plaintiff's eight year delay following defendant's asser-
tion that the infringement was de minimis and Gomaco's problem,
was that Aukerman was only abandoning its claim as to de minimis
infringement, not any claim should the infringement multiply so as
to become quite substantial. 16 2 The district court erred in accepting
a contrary inference, more favorable to the defendant, that
Aukerman was completely abandoning its infringement claim
against the defendant.' 63 Second, the district court erred in requir-
ing the plaintiff to produce evidence of infringement in order to de-
158. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338 ("We conclude that sum-
mary judgment, holding that Aukerman was equitably estopped from assertion of infringe-
ment against Chaides, was improperly granted and is reversed. The issue is remanded for
trial.").
159. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1334.
160. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1334.
161. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1334.
162. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1337-38.
163. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338.
[Vol. 9
LACHES AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
feat the motion for summary judgment. " Proof that the accused
product was a "copy" of plaintiff's product is without more suffi-
cient evidence of egregious conduct to defeat a motion for summary
judgment on the equitable estoppel defense. 165
VII. CONCLUSION
In the present climate of enormous damage awards, patent
owners are dusting off and scrupulously studying their patent port-
folios for patents which may be infringed. Often a potential in-
fringement is unearthed and a belated, sometimes more than a
decade belated, infringement claim is made. Occasionally, the
would-be infringement arises from use of technology adopted and
used by an entire industry of manufacturers, which have thus made
the technology an industry standard. Until recently, laches and eq-
uitable estoppel were two of the most potent defenses to such be-
lated charges of patent infringement. Moreover, again until
recently, summary judgment as to one or both of these defenses was
not an uncommon occurrence. With one swift stroke of the pen, the
Federal Circuit in Aukerman has drastically limited the availability
of these two defenses, and all but eliminated their application by an
accused infringer on summary judgment. The Aukerman case
should thus be studied and carefully considered before placing too
heavy a reliance on these defenses in opposition to a charge of pat-
ent infringement.
164. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQ2D (BNA) at 1338.
165. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044, 22 USPQd (BNA) at 1338.
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PATENT LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DURING 1991
Alex Chartove*
I. NOVELTY - 35 U.S.C. § 102
A. Extrinsic Evidence may be Considered to Explain the
Meaning of a Reference under 35 U.S.C. § 102
The subject patent in the case of Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.I was a reissue patent entitled "Ul-
trapurification of Factor VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies." 2
Before the district court, the accused infringer had argued that sev-
eral claims of the patent were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
based upon subject matter described in a 1979 publication by a Dr.
Harris The parties had filed three successive declarations of Dr.
Harris with the district court, each declaration explaining the
meaning of the 1979 publication.
The district court, citing the third Harris declaration, held that
the claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) in view of the
1979 Harris publication and granted the accused infringer's motion
for summary judgment on this issue.' The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that it is sometimes
appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of
a reference under 35 U.S.C. § 102.5 It is appropriate to use the ex-
trinsic evidence to educate the decision-maker to what the reference
meant to persons of ordinary skill in the field of the invention, but it
is not appropriate to use the extrinsic evidence to fill gaps in the
reference.6
In Scripps, the record showed apparent inconsistencies among
Copyright @ 1993 by Alex Chartove.
* B.A. Brandeis University; J.D. Duke University. Mr. Chartove is a partner in the
law firm of Spensley Horn Jubas & Lubitz, Washington, D.C.
1. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2D 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
2. Id. at 1003.
3. Id. at 1010.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle, mbH v. Dart Industries, Inc., 726 F.2d 724, 727, 220
USPQ 841, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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the three Harris declarations.7 To the extent that these apparent
inconsistencies raised questions of credibility and weight, whether
of the witness or of the interpretation of the publication, such fac-
tual questions were not properly resolved on summary judgment.
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the grant of partial summary
judgment of invalidity for anticipation by the Harris publication.'
B. Invalidity Under 35 U.S. C. § 102(b) Requires Proof by
Clear and Convincing Evidence
The respondent in the case of Intel Corporation v. U S. Inter-
national Trade Commission 9 had argued that the subject patent was
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because devices which embodied
the patented invention had been placed on sale more than one year
before the patent application's filing date. °
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the respondent had
not offered any direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the
patentee had sold the patented invention before the critical date.
Instead, the respondent had merely offered evidence showing that
such a sale had been "likely", and had argued that the fact of such
sale could be reasonably inferred from the evidence."
The Federal Circuit found that the reasonable inferences which
the respondent suggested be drawn from the evidence did not meet
the "clear and convincing" standard of proof required for showing
patent invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 12 Thus, the respondent
had failed to carry its burden of proof that a sale or offer to sell had
been made prior to the critical date. Accordingly, the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed the Commission's determination that the patent was
not proven invalid.' 3
C. Post-Critical Date Events May Be Used to Establish That
An Invention Was "On Sale" Under 35 US. C.
§ 102(b)
The application for the subject patent in the case of Sonoscan,
Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc. 4 had been filed on September 15, 1988. On
7. Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.; 18 USPQ2D 1001, 1004
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
8. Id. at 1016.
9. 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2D 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
10. Id. at 1169.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 936 F.2d 1261, 19 USPQ2D 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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September 10, 1987 (more than one year prior to the application
filing date) the patentee had quoted a price on a system including
the claimed invention to a first customer.15 On September 18, 1987
(less than one year prior to the application filing date) the patentee
had quoted the same price on the same system to a second
customer. 16
After the patent issued, the patentee filed suit against an al-
leged infringer. As an affirmative defense, the alleged infringer as-
serted that the patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) on the
basis that the claimed invention had been on sale more than one
year prior to the patent application filing date.
The patentee conceded that the September 18 quotation to the
second customer had been for the claimed invention, but argued
that on the September 15 "critical date" the invention had not been
sufficiently developed to be "on sale."' 7
The district court heard testimony concerning the state of de-
velopment of the invention both before and after the September 15
"critical date." The district court found that no serious change in
the invention had taken place between September 10 and September
18.18
On the basis of these findings, the district court concluded that
the claimed invention had been sufficiently developed so that the
September 10 quotation was a genuine offer to sell the claimed in-
vention. 9 The district court therefore held the patent invalid under
§ 102(b) and entered final judgment in favor of the alleged in-
fringer.2 ° The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the patentee argued that the September 18 quota-
tion was irrelevant because it had occurred after the critical date,
and that the district court had therefore erred by taking the Septem-
ber 18 quotation into consideration. 2
The Federal Circuit found, however, that the district court had
properly inquired as to what was offered in the September 18 quota-
tion, what development activities occurred between September 10
and September 18, and had properly inferred from the evidence that
what was adequately developed on September 18 was also ade-
quately developed on September 10. The Federal Circuit therefore
15. Id. at 1157.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1158.
18. Id. at 1159.
19. Sonoscan, 19 USPQ2D at 1158.
20. Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 17 USPQ2D 1247 (E.D. Va. 1990).
21. Sonoscan, 19 USPQ2D at 1159.
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affirmed the judgment of the district court.2 2
D. "Inherency" Represents An Exception to The Rule That
Anticipation Requires Every Element of the Claims to
Appear in A Single Reference
The subject patent in' the case of Continental Can Company
USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Company23 was directed to a plastic bottle
whose ribbed bottom structure had sufficient flexibility to impart
improved impact resistance, combined with sufficient rigidity to re-
sist ddformation under internal pressure. All of the claims recited
that the patented plastic bottle was "characterized by the feature
that the ribs are hollow." 24
The alleged infringer had moved for summary judgment of in-
validity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) based upon a prior art reference
to Marcus.25 The Marcus reference did not state that the ribs dis-
closed therein were "hollow., 2 6 The alleged infringer had argued,
however, that the Marcus ribs were formed by injection blow mold-
ing, which was the same process described for the patented ribs.
Therefore, according to the alleged infringer, the ribs of the Marcus
reference were "inherently" hollow, regardless of how the ribs were
shown in the Marcus reference. 27
The district court agreed with the alleged infringer, found that
all of the claims of the patent were anticipated by the Marcus refer-
ence, and granted summary judgment of patent invalidity. The pat-
entee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that the concept of
"inherency" represents a modest flexibility in the rule that anticipa-
tion under § 102 requires every element of the claims to appear in a
single reference. "Inherency" is not a substitute for determination
of patentability under § 103.28 Instead, "inherency" is intended to
accommodate those situations in which the common knowledge of
the skilled artisan is not expressly stated in the reference.29
To serve as an anticipation under § 102 when a reference is
silent about the asserted inherent characteristic, the missing de-
scription in the reference may be filled by extrinsic evidence. How-
22. Id.
23. 948 F.2d 1264, 20 USPQ2D 1746 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
24. Id. at 1747.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1748.
27. Id.
28. Continental Can, 20 USPQ2D at 1749.
29. Id.
[Vol. 9
PATENT LAWDEFELOPMENS'
ever, such evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive
matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference,
and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. In-
herency may not be established by mere probabilities or
possibilities.30
In Continental Can, there was no dispute that the Marcus ref-
erence disclosed an injection blow molding process.31 However,
there was a dispute regarding whether a skilled artisan would recog-
nize this process as necessarily producing "hollow" ribs, as the term
"hollow" was used in the patent. The Federal Circuit concluded
that this was a genuine dispute of a material fact which required a
trial for its resolution. Resolution of this disputed fact adversely to
the patentee was improper on summary judgment. The Federal
Circuit therefore vacated the grant of summary judgment of antici-
pation under § 102(a) and remanded the case.32
E. Conception of a Genetic Invention Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g) Requires That the Inventor Be Able to Define
the Gene So As to Distinguish It From Other
Materials
The subject patent in the case of Amgen, Inc., v. Chugai Phar-
maceutical Co., Ltd.33 was entitled "DNA Sequences Encoding Er-
ythropoietin. '' 34 The patent claims were directed to a "purified and
isolated DNA sequence" encoding human EPO. The structure of
this DNA sequence had not been known until September of 1983,
when the inventor had reduced the claimed invention to practice by
cloning the gene.35
The district court had found that the successful identification
and isolation of the EPO gene resulted from a probing strategy
which used two sets of fully-degenerate cDNA probes of two differ-
ent regions of the EPO gene to screen a cDNA library.36 The ac-
cused infringer had asserted that this successful strategy had first
been conceived by a Dr. Fritsch in 1981, and that Fritschhad been
diligent until he reduced the claimed invention to practice in May of
30. In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581, 212 USPQ 323, 326 (CCPA 1981); Hansgirg v.
Kemmer, 26 C.C.P.A. 937, 102 F.2d 212, 214, 40 USPQ 665, 667 (CCPA 1939).
31. Continental Can, 20 USPQ2D at 1750.
32. Id.
33. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2D 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
34. Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein consisting of 165 amino acids which stimulates
the production of red blood cells.
35. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1018.
36. Id. at 1019.
1993]
42 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY IW JOURNAL [Vol. 9
1984. The accused infringer therefore had argued that the patent
claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) due to Fritsch's prior
invention.37
The district court disagreed with the accused infringer and
held that the patent claims were valid and had been infringed.38
The accused infringer appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a gene is a chemical
compound.39 Conception of a chemical compound requires that the
inventor be able to define the compound so as to distinguish the
compound from other materials, and to describe how to obtain the
compound.' If an inventor is unable to envision the detailed con-
stitution of a gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as
well as a method for obtaining it, then conception is not established
until the gene has been isolated and thereby successfully reduced to
practice.41
Therefore, to act as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g),
Fritsch's conception of a process had to be sufficiently specific that
one skilled in the relevant art would succeed in cloning the EPO
gene. However, the record showed that prior to September of 1983,
Fritsch did not have a complete mental conception of a purified and
isolated DNA sequence encoding EPO and a method for its prepa-
ration, in which the precise identity of the sequence is envisioned.
All Fritsch had at that time was an objective to make an invention
which he could not then adequately describe or define sufficiently to
distinguish it from other genes. Fritsch had a goal of obtaining the
isolated EPO gene and an idea of a possible method of obtaining it,
but he did not conceive a purified and isolated DNA sequence en-
coding EPO and a viable method for obtaining it until after the
inventor.42
The record indicated that neither party had an adequate con-
ception of the DNA sequence until reduction to practice had been
achieved, and the inventor had been the first to accomplish that
goal.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had not
erred in finding that the claims directed to a purified and isolated
DNA sequence encoding human EPO were not invalidated under
37. Id.
38. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 USPQ2D 1737 (1990).
39. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1021.
40. Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583, 7 USPQ 1169, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
41. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1021.
42. Id.
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35 U.S.C. § 102(g) by the work of Fritsch.43
II. OBVIOUSNiESS - 35 U.S.C. § 103
A. Obviousness Is Not Negated by the Quantity of
References Cited
The claimed invention in the case of In re Gorman4 was di-
rected to a composite candy sucker on a stick, molded in an elasto-
meric mold in the shape of a human thumb. All of the claims had
been rejected as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of thirteen
references.45
On appeal, the applicant argued that when it is necessary to
combine the teachings of a large number of references in order to
support a rejection for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, this in
and of itself weighs against a holding of obviousness.46
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that the criterion for obvi-
ousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is not the number of references, but
what the references would have meant to a person of ordinary skill
in the field of the invention. 47
The Federal Circuit found that each element of the claimed
invention was present in the prior art, and that the prior art used
the various elements for the same purposes as in the claimed inven-
tion. These facts made the claimed invention, as a whole, obvious
in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103, and the obviousness of the claimed
invention was not negated by the large number of references cited.
The rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 was therefore
affirmed.48
B. Obviousness Rejection Requires Consideration of the
Degree to Which One Reference Might Discredit
Another Reference
The subject application in the case of In re Young 9 was di-
rected to a method and apparatus for generating an acoustic pulse
43. Id. at 1022.
44. 933 F.2d 982, 18 USPQ2D 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
45. Id. at 1887.
46. Id. at 1888.
47. See, Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383, 231
USPQ 81, 93 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 94 L. Ed. 2d 792, 107 S. Ct. 1606
(1987); Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1149, 219 USPQ 857, 860 (Fed. Cir.
1983); In re Troiel, 47 C.C.P.A. 795, 274 F.2d 944, 947, 124 USPQ 502, 504 (CCPA 1960);
In re Miller, 34 C.C.P.A. 910, 159 F.2d 756, 758-59, 72 USPQ 512, 514-15 (CCPA 1947).
48. Gorman, 18 USPQ2D at 1889.
49. 927 F.2d 588, 18 USPQ2D 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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in water. All of the claims had been rejected as obvious under 35
U.S.C. § 103 in view of a prior art patent to Carlisle. The Carlisle
reference taught both the method and the advantages of the appli-
cant's claimed invention."
The applicant had argued that the teachings of Carlisle had
been expressly discredited by a prior art article written by Knudsen.
The Knudsen article described a series of tests which evaluated the
Carlisle technique. The Knudsen article stated that the Carlisle
technique yielded no appreciable improvement in bubble oscillation
suppression.51
The applicant had argued that the effective teaching of the
Knudsen/Carlisle combination suggested avoidance of the Carlisle
technique, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would there-
fore not have considered Carlisle when developing a method and
apparatus for generating an acoustic pulse in water. The Board had
rejected the applicant's arguments, holding that Carlisle was appro-
priately applied notwithstanding the teachings of Knudsen.52
On appeal, the issue was whether the Board had properly af-
firmed the rejection over Carlisle in light of Knudsen's allegedly
contrary teachings.
The Federal Circuit stated that when the prior art contains ap-
parently conflicting references, each reference must be weighed for
its power to suggest solutions to the skilled artisan. In weighing the
suggestive power of each reference, consideration must be given to
the degree to which one reference might accurately discredit
another.53
In Young, the record showed that Knudsen did not test the
Carlisle technique under conditions which were directly comparable
to the conditions disclosed in Carlisle. Moreover, Knudsen's con-
clusion that the Carlisle technique was ineffective appeared to di-
rectly contradict at least some of the data contained in Knudsen. 4
The Federal Circuit concluded that, considering the discrepan-
cies between the Knudsen test and the Carlisle disclosure, as well as
the tendency of some of Knudsen's data to confirm the Carlisle
technique, the Board had correctly determined that Knudsen did
not convincingly discredit Carlisle and would not have deterred the
skilled artisan from using the teachings of Carlisle. The use of Car-
50. Id. at 1091.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1092.
53. Id. at 1091.
54. Young, 18 USPQ2D at 1092.
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lisle in the rejection of the claims was therefore not clearly errone-
ous and the Board's decision affirming the examiner's rejection was
therefore affirmed.55
C. Obviousness Rejection Requires Consideration of Whether
the Prior Art Discloses That the Skilled Artisan Would
Have a Reasonable Expectation of Success in
Making the Claimed Invention
The claimed invention in the case of In re Vaeck 56 was di-
rected to the use of genetic engineering techniques for the produc-
tion of insecticidal Bacillus proteins within transformed
cyanobacterial hosts. 7 The subject matter of the application in-
cluded a chimeric (i.e., hybrid) gene comprising (1) a gene derived
from a bacterium of the Bacillus genus whose product is an insecti-
cidal protein, united with (2) a DNA promoter effective for expres-
sing the Bacillus gene in a host cyanobacterium, so as to produce
the desired insecticidal protein.5
The claims had been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The ex-
aminer stated that the primary reference disclosed a chimeric gene
capable of being highly expressed in a cyanobacterium, the gene
comprising a promoter region effective for expression in a cya-
nobacterium operably linked to a structural gene encoding the en-
zyme chloramphenicol acetyl transferase (CAT). The chimeric
gene and the transformed host of the primary reference differed
from the claimed invention in that, in the primary reference, the
structural gene encoded CAT rather than insecticidally active pro-
tein.59 The secondary references taught genes encoding insecti~i-
dally active proteins produced by Bacillus, and the advantages of
expressing such genes in heterologous hosts to obtain larger quanti-
ties of the protein. The examiner contended that it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute the Bacillus
55. Id.
56. 947 F.2d 488, 20 USPQ2D 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 1439.
58. Claim 1 recited:
A chimeric gene capable of being expressed in Cyanobacteria cells comprising:
(a) a DNA fragment comprising a promoter region which is effective for ex-
pression of a DNA fragment in a Cyanobacterium; and (b) at least one DNA
fragment coding for an insecticidally active protein produced by a Bacillus
strain, or coding for an insecticidally active truncated form of the above pro-
tein or coding for a protein having substantial sequence homology to the active
protein, the DNA fragments being linked so that the gene is expressed.
Id. at 1440.
59. Id. at 1441.
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genes taught by the secondary references for the CAT gene in the
vectors of the primary reference in order to obtain high level expres-
sion of the Bacillus genes in the transformed cyanobacteria. The
examiner further contended that it would have been obvious to use
cyanobacteria as heterologous hosts for expression of the claimed
genes due to the ability of cyanobacteria to serve as transformed
hosts for the expression of heterologous genes. The examiner's re-
jection had been affirmed by the Board, and the applicant appealed
to the Federal Circuit.'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that where a claimed
composition has been rejected as obvious in view of a combination
of prior art references, a proper analysis under § 103 requires, inter
alia, consideration of two factors: (1) whether the prior art would
have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art that they should
make the claimed composition; and (2) whether the prior art would
also have revealed that in making the claimed composition, those of
ordinary skill would have a reasonable expectation of success. Both
the suggestion and the reasonable expectation of success must be
found in the prior art, not in the applicant's disclosure. 1
In Vaeck, the Federal Circuit found that there was no sugges-
tion in the primary reference of substituting in the disclosed plasmid
a structural gene encoding Bacillus insecticidal proteins for the
CAT gene utilized for selection purposes. Nor did the Federal Cir-
cuit find a suggestion in the secondary references of the substitution
of insecticidal Bacillus genes for CAT marker genes in cya-
nobacteria. While the secondary references disclosed expression of
Bacillus genes encoding insecticidal proteins in certain transformed
bacterial hosts, the secondary references did not disclose or suggest
expression of such genes in transformed cyanobacterial hosts.62
The similarity between bacteria and cyanobacteria alone was
not sufficient to motivate the skilled artisan to substitute cya-
nobacteria for bacteria as a host for expression of the claimed gene.
Evidence of recent uncertainty regarding the biology of cya-
nobacteria tended to rebut the position that the skilled artisan
would have considered the cyanobacteria effectively interchangeable
with bacteria as hosts for expression of the claimed gene.63
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the prior art of-
60. Id. at 1442.
61. In re Dow Chemical Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473, 5 USPQ2D 1529, 1531 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
62. Vaeck, 20 USPQ2D at 1443.
63. Id.
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fered no explicit or implicit suggestion of the substitution that was
the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art.
Moreover, the prior art did not convey to those of ordinary skill a
reasonable expectation of success in making the claimed composi-
tion." Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the rejection of
the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
D. Obviousness Rejection Can Not Be Overcome by a
Terminal Disclaimer
In In re Bartfeld6 the claims of a pending application had
been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of two U.S.
patent references. One of the two U.S. patent references was owned
by the owner of the pending application. Nevertheless, the co-
owned patent reference was available as prior art because the co-
owned patent reference had an earlier filing date than the pending
application and named different inventive entities than the pending
application.66 The PTO Board affirmed the § 103 rejection.67
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the applicant argued that, in
view of the co-ownership of the reference and the pending applica-
tion, the obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 was compara-
ble to an obviousness-type double patenting rejection. Conse-
quently, the § 103 rejection (like an obviousness-type double
patenting rejection) could be overcome by an appropriate terminal
disclaimer.68
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that there is a basic differ-
ence between an obviousness-type double patenting rejection and an
obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103. An obviousness-type
double patenting rejection depends entirely upon subject matter
that is claimed in an issued U.S. patent. An obviousness rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 depends upon subject matter that is disclosed
(regardless of whether the subject matter is claimed) in a prior art
reference (regardless of whether the reference is an issued U.S. pat-
ent). Consequently, a prior art reference that renders claimed sub-
ject matter obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 does not necessarily
create an obviousness-type double patenting situation.69
64. See In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 7 USPQ2D 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
65. 925 F.2d 1450, 17 USPQ2D 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
66. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
67. Ex Parte Bartfield, 16 USPQ2D 1714 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1990).
68. Bartfeld, 17 USPQ2d at 1886. In support of this position, the applicant cited the
legislative history underlying the 1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 103 and the Federal Cir-
cuit's holding in In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
69. Bartfeld, 17 USPQ2D at 1888.
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The purpose of a terminal disclaimer is to limit the term of a
patent, not to remove a reference as prior art. If claimed subject
matter is obvious in view of the prior art, then a terminal disclaimer
can not convert that obvious subject matter into unobvious (and
therefore patentable) subject matter.70 Given these fundamental
differences between an obviousness-type double patenting rejection
and an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Federal
Circuit coneluded that a terminal disclaimer is neither an appropri-
ate nor available means for overcoming a rejection under § 103 and
affirmed the decision of the Board.7
E. Evidence of "Secondary Considerations" May Not Be
Sufficient to Defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment
of Invalidity Under 35 US.c.§ 103
The subject patent in the case of Ryko Manufacturing Co. v.
Nu-Star, Inc. 72 was directed to an automatic car wash system elec-
tronically activated by an electrical numerical keypad device.
The district court determined that the difference between the
claimed invention and the prior art was the claimed invention's sub-
stitution of an electrical numerical keypad device for a coin box or
other common input device. The district court found that utiliza-
tion of a numerical keypad device to electronically activate an auto-
matic car wash system was a combination that was clearly
suggested by the prior art. The district court determined that the
patentee had shown evidence of so-called "secondary considera-
tions" (such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
and the failure of others to invent), but this evidence did not carry
sufficient weight to override a determination of obviousness. Ac-
cordingly, the district court granted the alleged infringer's motion
for summary judgment of patent invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The patentee then appealed.73
On appeal, the patentee argued that the district court had com-
mitted legal error by improperly focusing its obviousness analysis
on only one element of the claimed invention (the electrical numeri-
cal keypad device), rather than focusing upon the claimed invention
as a whole. 74
70. See In re Braithwaite, 54 C.C.P.A. 1589, 379 F.2d 594, 603, 154 USPQ 29, 36
(CCPA 1967).
71. Bartfield, 17 USPQ2D at 1889.
72. 950 F.2d 714, 21 USPQ2D 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
73. Id. at 1055.
74. Id. at 1056.
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The Federal Circuit acknowledged that, when analyzing the
question of obviousness, the district court must evaluate the claimed
invention as a whole and not unduly focus on one facet of the
claimed invention." However, the district court must also deter-
mine the principal differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art to place the obviousness analysis into proper perspec-
tive.7 6 The Federal Circuit concluded that, in evaluating the
claimed invention as a whole, the district court in Ryko had cor-
rectly compared the claimed invention to the prior art and had cor-
rectly found only one difference recited in the claims that was not
taught by the prior art.7
Regarding the "secondary considerations", the Federal Circuit
found that the district court had, on the alleged infringer's motion
for summary judgment, appropriately accepted the patentee's evi-
dence of commercial success as being true. The alleged infringer
had argued that the patentee had failed to produce evidence of the
required "nexus" between the commercial success and the merits of
the claimed invention. However, the Federal Circuit noted that
prima facie evidence of the required nexus is established if there is
commercial success and if the invention disclosed in the patent is
that which was commercially successful.78 In Ryko the Federal
Circuit found sufficient prima facie evidence in the record to with-
stand summary judgment on the nexus issue.7 9 Consequently, the
district court had appropriately assumed that a nexus existed be-
tween the commercial success and the merits of the claimed
invention.
However, even though the district court found that the secon-
dary considerations weighed in favor of the patentee, the district
court concluded that the secondary consideration did not carry suf-
ficient weight to override a determination of obviousness. The Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that, as long as the secondary considerations
are contemplated by the district court, it is appropriate for the dis-
trict court to reach such a conclusion on summary judgment. The
holding of the district court was therefore affirmed.80
75. W.L. Gore & Associates v. Garlock, Inc. 721 F.2d 1540, 1548, 220 USPQ 303, 309
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
76. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
77. Ryko, 21 USPQ2D at 1056.
78. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing, Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392, 7 USPQ
2d 1222, 1226 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 956 (1988).
79. Ryko, 21 USPQ2D at 1058.
80. Id.
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F. Obviousness-type Double Patenting Rejection Does Not
Mean That the First-filed Patent is a Prior Art
Reference Against the Later-filed Application
The patentee in the case of Quad Environmental Technologies
Corporation v. Union Sanitary District81 was the owner of two pat-
ents. The earlier issued '589 patent described and claimed a method
of removing odors from wet waste gas streams. The later issued
'461 patent described and claimed a method of removing odors
from dry waste gas streams. Both patents had been filed within a
year of one another, and both patents named the same inventor.8 2
The patentee had requested, and the PTO had granted, reex-
amination of the '461 patent. The Reexamination Order stated that
the '589 patent raised a new question of patentability under the ju-
dicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting.83
To "obviate" the issue of obviousness-type double patenting,
the patentee had filed a terminal disclaimer, disclaiming that por-
tion of the term of the '461 patent which extended beyond the expi-
ration date of the '589 patent. The examiner held that the terminal
disclaimer resolved the issue of obviousness-type double patenting,
and a Reexamination Certificate was issued.84
The patentee had then sued the alleged infringer for infringe-
ment of the reexamined '461 patent. The district court had granted
the alleged infringer's motion for summary judgment of invalidity
for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)/§ 103. The motion had
been based on the patentee's pre-trial stipulation that the invention
disclosed in the '589 patent had been in commercial use more than
one year before the filing of the '461 patent.8 5
The district court had not made an independent finding that
the '461 patent claims were obvious in view of the '589 patent dis-
closure. Instead, the district court held that the patentee's filing of
the terminal disclaimer to obviate the double patenting issue was an
admission that the '461 patent claims were obvious in view of the
'589 patent disclosure. The district court thus held that the paten-
tee was estopped from arguing that the '461 claims were unobvious
in view of the process disclosed in the '589 patent.8 6
The patentee appealed the summary judgment of the district
81. 946 F.2d 870, 20 USPQ2D 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 1393.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Quad Environmental Technologies, 20 USPQ2D at 1394.
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court holding all the claims of the '461 patent invalid on the basis of
obviousness.8 7
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that a rejection for
obviousness-type double patenting means that the claims of a later
patent application are deemed obvious from the claims of an earlier
patent.88 A rejection for obviousness-type double patenting does
not mean that the first-filed patent is a prior art reference under
§ 102/§ 103 against the later-fied application. 9 Thus, the "obvia-
tion" of an obviousness-type double patenting by filing a terminal
disclaimer has no effect on a rejection under § 103 based on the
first-filed patent. A rejection under § 103 based on the first-filed
patent can not be overcome by a terminal disclaimer.90 Thus, a ter-
minal disclaimer is not an admission of obviousness of the later-filed
claimed invention in light of the earlier-filed disclosure, for that is
not the basis of the disclaimer.
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the district court
had incorrectly granted summary judgment based on an error of
law. The Federal Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment
and remanded for trial.91
G. Obviousness-type Double Patenting Rejection of
Commonly Owned Applications Claiming Separate and
Independent "Subcombination" Inventions Requires
A "Two-way" Patentability Determination
The case of In re Braat involved a pending application to Braat
and an issued patent to Dil.9 2 Both the Dil patent and the Braat
application were assigned to the same assignee. The Dil patent had
issued in June 1980 based upon an application filed in January 1979.
The pending Braat application had been filed in July 1978. 9'
Both the Braat application and the Dil patent were directed to
compact discs. The Braat application was directed to a technique
for controlling the phase depth of information areas on compact
discs by varying the physical depth of the information areas. The
Dil patent was also concerned with controlling the phase depth of
87. Id. at 1392.
88. In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 893, 225 USPQ 645, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re
Braithwaite, 54 C.C.P.A. 1589, 379 F.2d 594, 600, 154 USPQ 29, 34 (CCPA 1967).
89. In re Bowers, 53 C.C.P.A. 1590, 359 F.2d 886, 887, 149 USPQ 570, 572 (CCPA
1966).
90. Bowers, 359 F.2d at 891 n. 7, 149 USPQ at 575 n. 7.
91. Quad, 20 USPQ2D at 1396.
92. In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 19 USPQ2D 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
93. Id. at 1290.
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information areas on compact discs, but was primarily concerned
with the effect that the angle of the side walls of the information
areas had on the phase depth.94
The Dil patent expressly acknowledged the Braat invention,
and stated that a compact disc having angled side walls (as taught
by Dil) was particularly useful when combined with an alternating
phase depth structure (as taught by Braat). Claim 1 of the Dil pat-
ent was directed to a compact disc having angled side walls. Claims
5 and 6 of the Dil patent, which depended from claim 1, were di-
rected to a compact disc having angled side walls (as taught by Dil)
in combination with an alternating phase depth structure (as taught
by Braat).
The PTO Board affirmed the rejection of the claims of the
Braat application on grounds of obviousness-type double patenting
in view of dependent claims 5 and 6 of the Dil patent.95
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that the
rejected claims of the Braat application were obvious in view of
claims 5 and 6 of the Dil patent. However, the Federal Circuit
found that the Board had erred in sustaining the obviousness-type
double patenting rejection without making a corresponding deter-
mination that claims 5 and 6 of the Dil patent were obvious in view
of the rejected claims of the Braat application. In the terminology
used by the Federal Circuit, the Board had erred in applying a
"one-way" patentability determination instead of a "two-way"
determination.9 6
Such a "two-way" patentability determination applies where,
for example, an applicant files a first application for a "basic" inven-
tion and then subsequently fies a second, separate application for
an "improvement" invention. As a matter of policy, such an appli-
cant should not be penalized by the different rates of progress of the
two applications through the PTO. 97 Therefore, if the later filed
improvement patent issues before the earlier filed basic patent, a
double patenting rejection is only proper against the claims of the
basic patent if the improvement invention is not patentably distinct
94. Id. at 1291.
95. Obviousness-type double patenting is a judicially created doctrine intended to pre-
vent improper extension of the patent term by prohibiting claims in a second patent which
define an obvious variation of an invention claimed in a first patent. In re Longi, 759 F.2d
887, 892, 225 USPQ 645, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Vogel, 57 C.C.P.A. 920, 422 F.2d 438,
441, 164 USPQ 619, 622 (CCPA 1970).
96. Braat, 19 USPQ2D at 1292.
97. Id. at 1293.
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from the basic invention.98 In such a situation, the order in which
the two applications issue is irrelevant. The relevant determination
is whether the improvement invention is patentably distinct from
the basic invention.99
The Federal Circuit determined that the same policy should
apply to the claims of the Braat application, even though the Fed-
eral Circuit did not consider the Dil invention to be an "improve-
ment" of the Braat invention. Instead, the Federal Circuit viewed
the Dil patent and the Braat application as disclosing separate and
independent "subcombination" inventions. Dil had simply com-
bined these two separate subcombination inventions to form a third
invention, which third invention was defined in dependent claims 5
and 6 of the Dil patent."°
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the common assignee of the
Dill and Braat applications should not be penalized merely because
the Dil patent happened to have issued first. Therefore, a double
patenting rejection would be sustainable only if the rejected claims
of the Braat application were obvious in view of claims 5 and 6 of
the Dil patent, and claims 5 and 6 of the Dil patent were obvious in
view of the rejected claims of the Braat application (thereby estab-
lishing the absence of a patentable distinction between claims 5 and
6 of Dil and the rejected claims of Braat).'1
The Federal Circuit found that claims 5 and 6 of the Dil patent
were not obvious in view of the rejected claims of the Braat applica-
tion. The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the obviousness-
type double patenting rejection was in error, and reversed the deci-
sion of the Board.102
III. THE PATENT SPECIFICATION - 35 U.S.C. § 112
A. The Written Description Requirement is Separate and
Distinct from the Enablement Requirement
The patentee in the case of Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar had filed
a U.S. design patent application directed to a double lumen cathe-
ter.103 The patentee had also filed a Canadian design patent appli-
cation comprising the same drawings as the U.S. design patent
application. The Canadian design patent application ultimately is-
98. In re Borah, 53 C.C.P.A. 800, 354 F.2d 1009, 148 USPQ 213 (CCPA 1966).
99. Id.
100. Braat, 19 USPQ2D at 1292.
101. Id. at 1293.
102. Id. at 1294.
103. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 19 USPQ2D 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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sued as a Canadian design patent.1°
More than one year after the issuance of the Canadian design
patent, the patentee filed two utility patent applications in the U.S.
The U.S. utility patent applications included the same drawings as
the U.S. design patent application and claimed the benefit of the
filing date of the U.S. design patent application. The U.S. utility
patent applications issued as U.S. utility patents.10 5
After issuance, the patentee was sued by an alleged infringer
seeking a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity and non-in-
fringement. The alleged infringer argued that the U.S. utility pat-
ents were not entitled to the filing date of the U.S. design patent
application under 35 U.S.C. § 120, because the drawings of the U.S.
design patent application did not provide an adequate "written de-
scription" of the invention claimed in the U.S. utility patents, as
required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, 11.106 The alleged infringer asserted
that, as a consequence, the U.S. utility patents were anticipated by
the Canadian design patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 107
The alleged infringer moved for summary judgment on the va-
lidity issue. For purposes of the summary judgment motion, the
patentee conceded that if the U.S. utility patents were not entitled
to the filing date of the U.S. design patent application under 35
U.S.C. § 120, then the Canadian design patent would represent an
anticipating § 102(b) reference against the claims of the U.S. utility
patents.108
The district court agreed with the alleged infringer and held
the U.S. utility patents invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).109 The
patentee appealed.
The issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in
concluding, on summary judgment, that the disclosure of the U.S.
design patent application did not provide a § 112, 1 "written de-
scription" adequate to support the claims of the U.S. utility
patents. 110
104. Id. at 1112.
105. Id. at 1113.
106. The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that:
the specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
107. Vas-cath, 19 USPQ2D at 1116.
108. Id. at 1117.
109. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 745 F. Supp. 517, 17 USPQ2D 1353.
110. Vas-Cath, 19 USPQ2D at 1117.
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The Federal Circuit initially noted that, under proper circum-
stances, drawings alone may be sufficient to provide the "written
description of the invention" required by § 112, 1.111
The Federal Circuit then explained the extent to which the
"written description" requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, is sepa-
rate and distinct from the enablement ("make and use") require-
ment of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1.112 As interpreted by the Federal
Circuit, the "written description" requirement requires more than a
mere explanation of how to "make and use" the invention.' 13 The
written description requirement also requires the applicant to con-
vey, with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the
fMling date, the applicant was in possession of the invention
claimed. 14
Thus, in Vas-Cath, the proper test under the "written descrip-
tion" requirement was whether the drawings of the U.S. design pat-
ent application conveyed with reasonable clarity to the skilled
artisan that the patentee had in fact invented the catheter recited in
the claims of the U.S. utility patents. The proper test was not
whether the drawings of the U.S. design patent application neces-
sarily excluded all diameters other than those within the range
claimed in the U.S. utility patents, as the district court had errone-
ously assumed. 115
In Vas-Cath the patentee had submitted the declaration of an
expert explaining why a skilled artisan, studying the drawings of the
U.S. design patent application, would have understood from the
drawings that the catheter must have a diameter within the range
recited by the claims of the U.S. utility patents. The district court
had relied upon later patents issued to the patentee which disclosed
diameter ratios that differed from those in the U.S. utility patents.
However, since application sufficiency under § 112, 1, must be
111. Id. at 1114.
112. In In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1520, 222 USPQ 369, 372 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1209, 84 L. Ed. 2d 323, 105 S. Ct. 1173 (1985), the Federal Circuit stated:
"The description requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112 and is separate from the enable-
ment requirement of that provision." However, in Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc.,835
F.2d 1419, 1421, 5 USPQ2D 1194, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008, 100 L.
Ed. 2d 198, 108 S. Ct. 1735 (1988), the Federal Circuit had stated: "The purpose of the
[written] description requirement [of section 112, first paragraph] is to state what is needed to
fulfill the enablement criteria. Those requirements may be viewed separately, but they are
intertwined... . The written description must communicate that which is needed to enable
the skilled artisan to make and use the claimed invention."
113. Vas-Cath, 19 USPQ2D at 1117.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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judged as of the filing date, 116 the Federal Circuit viewed these later
patents involving different range limitations as being irrelevant." 7
The Federal Circuit held that the patentee's unrefuted declara-
tion evidence gave rise to a genuine issue of material fact inappro-
priate for summary disposition. The district court's grant of
summary judgment holding the U.S. utility patents invalid under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) was reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings. 118
B. The First Paragraph of § 112 Requires That the Scope of
the Claims Must Bear a "Reasonable Correlation" to
the Scope of Enablement Provided by the
Specification
The claimed invention in the case of In re Vaeck "9 was di-
rected to the use of genetic engineering techniques for the produc-
tion of insecticidal Bacillus proteins within transformed
cyanobacterial hosts.' 0 The subject matter of the application in-
cluded a chimeric (i.e., hybrid) gene comprising (1) a gene derived
from a bacterium of the Bacillus genus whose product is an insecti-
cidal protein, united with (2) a DNA promoter effective for expres-
sing the Bacillus gene in a host cyanobacterium, so as to produce
the desired insecticidal protein.' 2 1
In addition to describing the claimed invention in generic
terms, the patent application disclosed two particular species of Ba-
cillus as sources of insecticidal protein and nine genera of cya-
nobacteria as useful hosts. The relevant working examples
described in the application detailed the transformation of a single
strain of cyanobacteria.122
The examiner had rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
116. United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251, 9
USPQ2D 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
117. Vas-Cath, 19 USPQ2D at 1119.
118. Id. at 1120.
119. 947 F.2d 488, 20 USPQ2D 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
120. Id. at 1439.
121. Claim 1 recited:
A chimeric gene capable of being expressed in Cyanobacteria cells comprising:
(a) a DNA fragment comprising a promoter region which is effective for ex-
pression of a DNA fragment in a Cyanobacterium; and (b) at least one DNA
fragment coding for an insecticidally active protein produced by a Bacillus
strain, or coding for an insecticidally active truncated form of the above pro-
tein or coding for a protein having substantial sequence homology to the active
protein, the DNA fragments being linked so that the gene is expressed.
Id. at 1440.
122. Id.
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first paragraph, on the ground that the disclosure was enabling only
for claims limited in accordance with the specification as filed. The
examiner took the position that undue experimentation would be
required of the skilled artisan to practice the claimed invention, in
view of the unpredictability in the art, the breadth of the claims, the
limited number of working examples and the limited guidance pro-
vided in the specification. The examiner's rejection had been af-
firmed by the Board, and the applicant appealed to the Federal
Circuit. 123
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that, although the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 does not so state, enablement requires
that the specification teach the skilled artisan to make and use the
invention without "undue experimentation." Some degree of exper-
imentation is permissible. The issue is whether the amount of ex-
perimentation required to make and use the invention is
"undue.", 124
Moreover, the first paragraph of § 112 requires that the scope
of the claims must bear a "reasonable correlation" to the scope of
enablement provided by the specification. 12' The first paragraph of
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires sufficient disclosure, either through illus-
trative examples or terminology, to teach the skilled artisan how to
make and use the invention as broadly as it is claimed. This means
that the disclosure must adequately guide the skilled artisan to de-
termine, without undue experimentation, which species among all
those encompassed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed util-
ity. Where a claimed genus represents a diverse and relatively
poorly understood group of microorganisms, the required level of
disclosure will be greater than the disclosure of an invention involv-
ing a "predictable" factor (such as a mechanical or electrical
element). 126
In Vaeck, the Federal Circuit observed that the rejected claims
were not limited to any particular genus or species of cyanobacteria.
Cyanobacteria are a diverse and relatively poorly studied group of
organisms, comprising 150 different genera, and heterologous gene
expression in cyanobacteria is "unpredictable." Only one particular
species of cyanobacteria was employed in the working examples of
the specification, and only nine genera of cyanobacteria were men-
123. Id. at 1442.
124. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37, 8 USPQ2D 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
125. In re Fisher, 57 C.C.P.A. 1099, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970).
126. Id.
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tioned in the entire patent application.127
Consequently, there was no reasonable correlation between the
narrow disclosure in the application and the broad scope of protec-
tion sought in the claims encompassing gene expression in any and
all cyanobacteria. Taking into account the relatively incomplete
understanding of the biology of cyanobacteria as of the application's
filing date, as well as the limited disclosure of particular cya-
nobacterial genera operative in the claimed invention, the Federal
Circuit found that the Board had not erred in rejecting the claims
under § 112, first paragraph. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph.128
C. The First Paragraph of 35 USC. § 112 Requires a
Description of All Claim Elements That Are Integral
to the Invention and Not Well Known in the Art
In the case of In re Buchner 129 the claimed invention was di-
rected to a digital transmission system which included a compara-
tor and a divider. Although the specification adequately disclosed
the functions performed by the comparator and the divider, the ex-
aminer found that neither the comparator nor the divider were stan-
dard elements, and that the specification failed to disclose the
structure of these two elements. The examiner therefore rejected
the application under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, for failing to describe
how to make and use the comparator and the divider without undue
experimentation. 130
In response, the applicant offered a declaration of an expert
stating that the divider and the comparator were well-known to the
skilled artisan as of the application filing date and that these two
elements were "routinely built." The expert's declaration provided
details concerning the structure and the function of the comparator
and the divider. 131
The Board found that the expert's declaration failed to over-
come the § 112 rejection. The Board characterized the declaration
as a mere conclusory statement unsupported by any factual docu-
mentation showing that the technology concerning the comparator
127. Vaeck, 20 USPQ2D at 1444.
128. Id. at 1445.
129. 929 F.2d 660, 18 USPQ2D 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1332.
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and the divider was, in fact, well-known.132
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the elements at issue
were integral to the practice of the claimed invention, and that
neither the specification nor the prior art appeared to describe the
structure of these elements. Consequently, it was reasonable for the
examiner in this case to doubt that the claimed invention could
have been carried out based upon the specification.
The Federal Circuit further held that if information is not well
known in the art, then § 112 requires the specification itself to con-
tain such information. It is not sufficient to provide such informa-
tion only through an expert's declaration. 3 3 Consequently, even
though the expert's declaration in Buchner provided significant de-
tail concerning the structure and function of the elements in ques-
tion, the declaration was insufficient to overcome the rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 11.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that the expert's declara-
tion was inadequate because the expert's opinion on the ultimate
legal issue was a conclusory statement unsupported by any addi-
tional evidence.134 The declaration failed to provide adequate evi-
dentiary support showing that the divider and the comparator were
well known to the skilled artisan as of the filing date and that they
were routinely built. Although the declaration described how to
construct the divider and the comparator, it did not demonstrate
that such construction was well-known to the skilled artisan. The
Federal Circuit reasoned that if the comparator and the divider
were so well-known and routinely built as of the effective filing date,
then the expert should have had no trouble documenting this fact.
The declaration did not, however, provide such supporting
documentation. 135
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the Board had
not erred in affirming the examiner's rejection of the claims for fail-
ure to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, and affirmed the Board's
decision. 136
132. Id.
133. In re Smyth, 38 C.C.P.A. 1130, 189 F.2d 982, 990, 90 USPQ 106, 112 (1951).
134. In re Brandstadter, 484 F.2d 1395, 1405, 179 USPQ 286, 294 (CCPA 1973).
135. Buchner, 18 USPQ2D at 1332.
136. Id.
19931
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D. For Claims Directed to DNA Sequences, the First
Paragraph of 35 U.S. C. § 112 Requires Disclosing
How to Make and Use Enough Sequences to Justify
the Grant of the Claims
The subject patent in the case of Amgen, Inc., v. Chugai Phar-
maceutical Co., Ltd. 137 was entitled "DNA Sequences Encoding Er-
ythropoietin."13 The patent claims were directed to a "purified
and isolated DNA sequence" encoding human EPO. Claim 7 en-
compassed all possible DNA sequences that will encode any poly-
peptide having an amino acid sequence "sufficiently duplicative" of
EPO to possess the property of increasing production of red blood
cells.
The district court found that over 3,600 different EPO analogs
could be made by substituting only a single amino acid position,
and over a million different analogs could be made by substituting
three amino acids. Thus, the number of claimed DNA encoding se-
quences that could produce an EPO-like product was potentially
enormous. 1
39
The district court concluded that the patent specification was
insufficient to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use
the invention defined by claim 7 without undue experimentation,
and held claim 7 invalid for lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.4 The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, an inventor must provide a disclosure sufficient to enable a
skilled artisan to carry out the invention commensurate with the
scope of the claims. For claims directed to DNA sequences, 35
U.S.C. § 112 requires disclosing how to make and use enough se-
quences to justify the grant of the claims sought. 4 '
Claim 7 encompassed every possible analog of a gene contain-
ing about 4,000 nucleotides. The patent specification disclosed only
how to make EPO and a few analogs. Considering the structural
complexity of the EPO gene, the many possibilities for change in its
structure, the uncertainty as to what utility might be possessed by
these analogs, the Federal Circuit found that the disclosure was
137. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2D 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
138. Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein consisting of 165 amino acids which stimulates
the production of red blood cells. Id. at 1018.
139. Id. at 1027.
140. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 USPQ2D 1737 (1990).
141. See Utter v. Hiraga, 845 F.2d 993, 998, 6 USPQ2D 1709, 1714 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In
re Robins, 57 C.C.P.A. 1321, 429 F.2d 452, 456-57, 166 USPQ 552, 555 (CCPA 1970).
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inadequate in terms of identifying the various analogs that are
within the scope of the claim, the methods for making them, and
the structural requirements for producing compounds with EPO-
like activity. 142
The record showed that there may be many other genetic se-
quences that code for EPO-type products. The patent disclosed
how to make and use only a few of them. The Federal Circuit
therefore concluded that the patent disclosure was inadequate to
support a patent claim covering all possible genetic sequences that
have EPO-like activity. The Federal Circuit found no error in the
district court's conclusion that claim 7 was invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.143
E. The Particulars of Making a Commercial Embodiment of
the Invention Do Not Necessarily Equate With the
"Best Mode" of Carrying Out the Invention
The subject patent in the case of Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Ac-
vious, Inc. 144 was directed to a reversible temperature indicating de-
vice useful in timing the cooking of eggs. A commercial
embodiment of the claimed invention had been mass produced us-
ing a technique known as "embedment molding." 145
The inventor had testified that, at the time the patent applica-
tion had been filed, the best technique for manufacturing the com-
mercial version of the claimed invention had been the embedment
molding technique. The alleged infringer asserted that because the
patent specification did not describe the embedment molding tech-
nique, the patent specification failed to disclose the best mode con-
templated by the inventor of carrying out the invention as required
by 35 U.S.C. § 112. The district court granted the alleged in-
fringer's motion for summary judgment on this ground, ruling that
the claims were invalid for failure to disclose the best mode. The
patentee appealed the district court's grant of summary
judgment. 146
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that a description of a
particular manufacturing technique may or may not be required as
142. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1027-28.
143. Id. at 1028.
144. 950 F.2d 1575, 21 USPQ2D 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
145. The embedment molding technique consists of layering plastic into a mold, followed
by an adhesive pouring, onto which a thermochromic layer is placed, followed by a third
pouring to complete the device. Id. at 1125.
146. Id. at 1126.
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part of a best mode disclosure respecting a device. 147 There is no
mechanical rule that a best mode violation occurs because the in-
ventor failed to disclose a particular manufacturing technique. One
must look at the scope of the invention, the skill in the art, the
evidence as to the inventor's belief, and all of the circumstances in
order to evaluate whether the inventor's failure to disclose a partic-
ular manufacturing technique gives rise to an inference that the in-
ventor concealed information which one of ordinary skill in the art
would not know. 148
The Federal Circuit further observed that any manufacturing
technique requires the selection of specific steps and materials over
others. The best mode does not necessarily cover each of these se-
lections. A technique considered "best" in a manufacturing sense
may have been selected for a non-"best mode" reason, such as the
manufacturing equipment was on hand, certain materials were
available, a prior relationship with a supplier was satisfactory, or
other reasons having nothing to do with the development of the
invention. Thus, the particulars of making a commercial embodi-
ment of the invention do not necessarily equate with the "best
mode" of "carrying out" an invention.' 49
In Wahl Instruments the record indicated that the embed-
ment molding technique had been well known at the time the appli-
cation had been filed, and that the embedment molding technique
would have been utilized if one in the business of fabricating solid
plastic articles had been asked to make the claimed invention.
There was no proof that the embedment molding technique was
"best" for any reason related to the claimed invention, other than
the commercial manufacture of a particular embodiment of the in-
vention. The record indicated that the embedment molding tech-
nique had been selected as the commercial manufacturing technique
solely for reasons of cost and volume.
The Federal Circuit observed that the claimed invention was
directed to a device and a method of. using the device, not to a
method of manufacturing the device. How to mass produce the
claimed invention was not part of the claimed invention or a best
mode of the claimed invention. The embedment molding technique
was therefore not a "mode" of "carrying out" the invention within
147. Christianson v. Colt Indust. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1562, 3 USPQ2d
1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
148. Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1531-32, 20 USPQ2d 1300,
1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 587, 7 USPQ2d
1050, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
149. Wahl, 21 USPQ2D at 1127.
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the meaning of the statute, and the inventor had concealed nothing
respecting the claimed invention by failing to disclose the embed-
ment molding technique.15
The Federal Circuit concluded that the patent was not invalid
for failure to disclose the best mode, and reversed the decision of the
district court. 51
F. Invalidity for Failure to Disclose the Best Mode Requires
Both Knowledge and Concealment of a Better Mode
The case of Engel Industries, Inc., v. The Lockformer Com-
pany'51 involved an appeal by a patentee from a district court deci-
sion holding the patent in suit invalid due to the patentee's failure to
disclose the best mode as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that invalidity for failure
to set forth the best mode requires that (1) the inventor knew of a
better mode of carrying out the claimed invention than the mode
disclosed in the specification, and (2) the inventor concealed that
better mode. 5 3 The element of concealment of the inventor's pre-
ferred mode must be established before claims may be invalidated
on best mode grounds. 5'
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had not
found such concealment, nor did the evidence support such a find-
ing. Since neither knowledge that there, was a better mode nor con-
cealment of that better mode had been established, the Federal
Circuit reversed the holding of invalidity for failure to comply with
the best mode requirement.155
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 946 F.2d 1528, 20 USPQ2D 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
153. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927-28, 16 USPQ2D 1033,
1036-37 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
154. Randomex, Inc. v. Sopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 588, 7 USPQ2D 1050, 1053 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); In re Gay, 50 CCPA 725, 309 F.2d 769, 774, 135 USPQ 311, 316 (1962); W.L.
Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556-57, 220 USPQ 303, 316 (Fed. Cir.
1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 851, 83 L. Ed. 2d 107, 105 S. Ct. 172 (1984); Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384-85, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 94 L. Ed. 2d 792, 107 S.Ct. 1606 (1987); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d
809, 816-17, 204 USPQ 537, 544 (CCPA 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 994, 210 USPQ 776, 68
L.Ed.2d 193, 101 S.Ct. 1694 (1981); In re Karnofsky, 55 CCPA 940, 390 F.2d 994, 997, 156
USPQ 682, 685 (1968).
155. Engel, 20 USPQ2D at 1304.
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G. No Cell Deposit May Be Required If the Specification
Enables the Skilled Artisan to Prepare the Best Mode
Cells from Known Materials
The subject patent in the case of Amgen, Inc., v. Chugai Phar-
maceutical Co., Ltd. 156 was entitled "DNA Sequences Encoding Er-
ythropoietin."' 15 7 The patent claims were directed to a "purified
and isolated DNA sequence" encoding human EPO.158
The accused infringer argued that the subject patent was inva-
lid under the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 due to the
failure of the patentee to deposit the best mode host cells. The ac-
cused infringer contended that the "best mode" requirement for
patents involving novel genetically-engineered biological subject
matter requires a biological deposit, so that the public has access to
exactly the best mode contemplated by the inventor.
The district court disagreed with the accused infringer and
held that the patent was valid and had been infringed."5 9 The ac-
cused infringer appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that analysis of the best
mode requirement has two components."6 The first is a subjective
inquiry, asking whether, at the time the patent application was filed,
the inventor contemplated a best mode of practicing the claimed
invention. If so, then the second inquiry is whether the disclosure is
adequate to enable one skilled in the art to practice the contem-
plated best mode.1 61
The Federal Circuit then observed that there is a basic distinc-
tion between novel genetically-engineered biological materials and
biological cells obtained from nature. When a biological sample re-
quired for the practice of an invention is obtained from nature, the
invention may be incapable of being practiced without access to that
specific biological sample. Consequently, the best mode require-
ment of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a deposit of that specific biological
sample.1 62
However, when an organism is created by the insertion of ge-
netic material into a cell obtained from generally available sources,
156. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2D 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
157. Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein consisting of 165 amino acids which stimulates
the production of red blood cells.
158. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1018.
159. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 USPQ2D 1737 (1990).
160. Chemeast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927, 16 USPQ2D 1033, 1036
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
161. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1024.
162. Id.
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then all that is required by 35 U.S.C. § 112 is a description of the
best mode and an adequate description of the means of carrying out
the invention. If the cells can be prepared without undue experi-
mentation from known materials, based on the description in the
patent specification, then a deposit is not required. 163
In Amgen, the record showed that the invention as it related to
the best mode host cells, could be practiced by one skilled in the art
following a specific example in the patent specification. The Federal
Circuit therefore held that there was no failure to comply with the
best mode requirement for lack of a deposit of the cells. The district
court finding that the accused infringers had not met their burden
of proving a best mode violation was affirmed. 1
H. Claims Are Properly Declared Invalid Under the Second
Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 If the Meaning of the
Claims Is In Doubt
The subject patent in the case of Amgen, Inc., v. Chugai Phar-
maceutical Co., Ltd. 165 was entitled "Method for the Purification of
Erythropoietin and Erythropoietin Compositions."' 166
Claims 4 and 6 of the patent recited a specific activity limita-
tion of "at least about 160,000." The district court found that the
term "at least about 160,000" gave no hint as to which specific ac-
tivity level constituted infringement. The district court therefore
held claims 4 and 6 to be invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.167 The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that if the meaning of
claims is in doubt, then the claims are properly declared invalid
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (especially when there is close prior art).168
The Federal Circuit found the district court's invalidity hold-
ing to be supported by the fact that nothing in the patent specifica-
tion, prosecution history, or prior art provided any indication as to
what range of specific activity was covered by the term "at least
about," and by the fact that no expert testified as to a definite mean-
ing for the term "at least about" in the context of the prior art.169
163. Id. at 1025.
164. Id.
165. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2D 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
166. Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein consisting of 165 amino acids which stimulates
the production of red blood cells. Id at 1018.
167. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 USPQ2D 1737 (1990).
168. Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 453, 227 USPQ 293,
297 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
169. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1031.
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The Federal Circuit cautioned that its holding in Amgen that
the term "at least about" renders claims 4 and 6 indefinite should
not be interpreted as ruling out any and all uses of this term in
patent claims. The term "at least about" may be acceptable claim
language in appropriate fact situations. 170
I. The Second Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 Does Not
Require Claims to Recite Each and Every Element
Needed for the Practical Utilization of the Claimed
Subject Matter
The subject patent in the case of Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Ren-
ishaw PLC 171 was directed to a "touch-trigger" probe used in ma-
chines for measuring the dimensions of objects to extremely fine
precision. Claim 3 of the patent recited a device for performing the
function of moving a stylus in a position-determining apparatus so
as to provide for repeatable displacement and return of the stylus to
a rest position.1 72
In the opinion of the district court, the touch-trigger probe in-
vention disclosed in the patent consisted of more than merely mov-
ing a stylus back and forth between a rest position and an unseated
position. Focusing on the fact that claim 3 did not recite any elec-
trical circuitry or other signalling means, the district court con-
cluded that claim 3 arbitrarily presented only a part of the
invention. The district court held that claim 3 was therefore invalid
as lacking claim definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 12. The paten-
tee appealed the judgment of the district court. 173
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a claim must recite a
structure that is capable of performing its purported function.1 7
4
The Federal Circuit found that the device defined by claim 3 was
capable of performing the purpose recited in claim 3 of "mounting a
stylus in position-determining apparatus" so as to provide for re-
peatable displacement and return to a rest position.' 75
The Federal Circuit further observed that it is not necessary
that a claim recite each and every element needed for the practical
utilization of the claimed subject matter. A single piece of appara-
170. See, W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557, 220 USPQ
303, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
171. 945 F.2d 1173, 20 USPQ2D 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
172. Id. at 1099.
173. Id. at 1100.
174. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 215 Ct. CI. 636, 572 F.2d 745, 198 USPQ 65
(1978).
175. Carl Zeiss, 20 USPQ2D at 1101.
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tus disclosed in the specification as an embodiment of an invention
may include several separate subcombination inventions. It is
therefore entirely consistent with the claim definiteness requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 to present "subcombination" claims, drawn
to only one aspect or combination of elements of an invention that
has utility separate and apart from other aspects of the invention.'7 6
Consequently, the district court's holding of invalidity based
upon a conclusion of lack of claim definiteness was legally incorrect.
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the holding and remanded
the case.
J. The Doctrine of Claim Differentiation Cannot Override
the Requirements of the Sixth Paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112
The subject patent in the case of The Laitram Corporation v.
Rexnord, Inc. 177 was directed to a conveyor belt. Claim 21 of the
patent included the following limitation:
means for joining said pluralities [of link ends] to one another so
that the axes of said holes of said first plurality are arranged
coaxially, the axes of said holes of said second plurality are ar-
ranged coaxially and the axes of respective holes of both plurali-
ties of link ends are substantially parallel; .... 178
Before the district court, the accused infringer argued that the
above-quoted means plus function limitation must be interpreted in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.179 Therefore, a proper finding
of literal infringement of claim 21 requires that the means in the
accused device must be structurally equivalent to the cross member
element described in the patent specification which performs the re-
cited function of joining the link ends to one another.'80
The patentee argued that an interpretation which reads the
structural limitation of a cross member into claim 21 is impermissi-
176. Bendix Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364, 1369, 220 Ct. Cl. 507, 514, 204
USPQ 617, 621 (1979).
177. 939 F.2d 1533, 19 USPQ2D 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
178. Id.
179. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corre-
sponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
180. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580, 12 USPQ2D 1382, 1386-87 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
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ble despite § 112, 6, because claim 24 of the patent (a claim which
depended from claim 21, but which was not in suit) specifically re-
cited a cross member. The patentee asserted that claim 21 cannot
also require a cross member because to do so would violate the doc-
trine of claim differentiation."' 1
The district court held that § 112, 6 was inapplicable to the
above-quoted limitation, because the means plus function language
already included a recital of structure. The district court therefore
did not compare the accused device to the cross member structure
disclosed in the patent specification. Instead, the district court held
that the above-quoted claim limitation was literally met by the ac-
cused device because the accused device included a means for per-
forming the recited function of joining. The district court therefore
ruled that claim 21 was literally infringed by the accused device.1" 2
The accused infringer appealed the judgment of the district court.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the applicability of
§ 112, 6 was not precluded merely because the means plus func-
tion language included a recital of structure. 1 3 The Federal Circuit
found that the recital of structure in the means plus function lan-
guage merely served to further specify the function performed by
the means. In other words, the recital of structure merely told what
the "means-for-joining" did, but did not tell what the "means-for-
joining" was structurally. The district court had therefore erred, as
a matter of law, by not interpreting the above-quoted subparagraph
in accordance with § 112, 6.
Regarding the patentee's argument that claim 24 prevented
claim 21 from being interpreted as statutorily mandated by 35
U.S.C. § 112, 6, the Federal Circuit noted that claim differentia-
tion is a judicially created guide to claim interpretation. This judi-
cially created guide cannot override the express statutory
requirements of § 112, 6. Therefore, a means-plus-function limita-
tion can not be made open-ended by merely adding a dependent
claim which specifically recites the structure disclosed in the specifi-
cation. Otherwise, the express requirement of § 112, 6 could easily
be avoided. 1 4
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that even under a proper
§ 112, 6 claim interpretation, claims 21 and 24 did not have ex-
181. See, SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1121, 227
USPQ 577, 586-87 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
182. See, Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 15 USPQ2D 1161 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
183. Laitram, 19 USPQ2D at 1367.
184. Id.
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actly the same scope, and consequently there was no violation of the
doctrine of claim differentiation. As properly interpreted under
§ 112, 6, claim 21 literally covered the cross member structure de-
scribed in the patent specification and equivalents thereof."8 5 In
contrast, dependent claim 24 literally covered the cross member
structure only, and did not literally cover equivalents of the cross
member structure. Claim 21 was therefore broader than dependent
claim 24.
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the district
court's finding of infringement had been based upon a legally erro-
neous claim interpretation, and that under the correct interpreta-
tion there was no proof of infringement, either literally or under the
doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the
judgment of the district court.18 6
K. Consideration of the Prior Art Is Not Necessary in
Applying the Sixth Paragraph of 35 U.S.C § 112
The respondents in the case of Intel Corporation v. U. S. Inter-
national Trade Commission'87 had challenged the Commission's
finding of infringement of several patent claims containing means-
plus-fumction limitations. The respondents argued that the Com-
mission had improperly construed these means-plus-function limi-
tations in view of the prior art. The respondents asserted that a
finding of equivalency of structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6, could
not be made if the prior art was considered.'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit pointed out that the respon-
dents had confused equivalent structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6
with equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents.
The Federal Circuit noted that to literally meet a means-plus-
function limitation, the accused device must (1) perform the identi-
cal function claimed for the means element, and (2) perform that
function using the same structure as disclosed in the specification or
an equivalent structure. 89 In determining equivalent structure
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6, the sole question is whether the single
means in the accused device which performs the function stated in
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2D 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
188. Id. at 1179.
189. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 USPQ2D 1737,
1739 (1987) (en banc); Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 19 USPQ2D 1367,
1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1357, 6
USPQ2D 1290, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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the claim is the same as, or an equivalent of, the corresponding
structure described in the patent specification as performing that
function.19 The aids for determining equivalent structure under 35
U.S.C. § 112, 6 are the same as those used in interpreting any
other type of claim limitation, namely, the specification, the prose-
cution history, other claims in the patent, and expert testimony.191
It is therefore not necessary to consider the prior art in deter-
mining equivalent structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 16. The Fed-
eral Circuit noted that individual claim limitations, including claim
limitations written in means-plus-function terminology, are fre-
quently found in the prior art. However, the fact that the prior art
discloses an individual claim limitation does not thereby limit the
scope of the claim. 192
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Commission's find-
ings of infringement.
IV. DivisioNAL APPLICATIONS - 35 U.S.C. § 121
A. 35 U.S.C § 121 Will Not Remove a Parent Patent As a
Reference if the Principle of "Consonance" Has Been
Violated
The case of Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc. 193 in-
volved several patents directed to methods and devices employing
lasers to read bar codes. 194
The patentee had filed its original application in February
1980. In the first office action, the examiner had required restric-
tion to one of seven species identified as Groups I - VII. The paten-
tee had elected to prosecute the Group I claims, directed to a light-
weight laser scanning apparatus. The original application contain-
ing the Group I apparatus claims matured into the "parent" patent.
After the examiner had required restriction, the patentee had
filed a divisional application containing method claims drawn to the
invention of the non-elected Group VI claims. This divisional ap-
plication, containing both the Group VI method claims as well as
new apparatus claims, had eventually issued as the "divisional"
patent.
190. D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575, 225 USPQ 236, 239 (Fed. Cir.
1985);Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201, 1 USPQ2D 2052,
2055 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
191. Intel, 20 USPQ2D at 1179-80.
192. Id.
193. 935 F.2d 1569, 19 USPQ2D 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
194. Id. at 1243.
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After issuance, the patentee had sued for infringement of both
the parent patent and the divisional patent. In response, the in-
fringer had argued that the divisional patent was invalid for obvi-
ousness-type double patenting over the parent patent. The infringer
had asserted that the parent patent was a reference against the divi-
sional patent because the patentee had violated the principle of
"consonance" by adding apparatus claims to the divisional patent
application. 195
The district court concluded that the divisional patent was not
proved invalid for obviousness-type double patenting over the par-
ent patent, and found infringement. 196 The infringer appealed the
judgment.
With regard to the issue of double patenting, the Federal Cir-
cuit observed on appeal that 35 U.S.C. § 121197 will not apply to
remove a parent patent as a reference where the principle of "conso-
nance" has been violated. The principle of "consonance" requires
that the line of demarcation between the independent and distinct
inventions that prompted a restriction requirement be maintained
throughout prosecution of a divisional application. Therefore,
although claims may be amended or added during prosecution of
the divisional application, they can not be amended or added so as
to bring them back over the line imposed in the original restriction
requirement which gave rise to the divisional application. If that
line of demarcation is crossed, then the prohibition of the third sen-
tence of § 121 does not apply, and the parent patent may be used as
a reference against the invention claimed in the divisional patent.198
The Federal Circuit read the infringer's assertion to allege that
because the Group VI invention had been described as a "method"
in the restriction requirement, the addition of apparatus claims in
the divisional application had crossed the line of demarcation.
However, the record showed that both the method claims and the
apparatus claims in the divisional patent were directed to the same
195. Id. at 1249.
196.' Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 17 USPQ2d 1737 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
197. Section 121 provides, in relevant part:
A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for
restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a
result of such requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent
and Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or
against the original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the
divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other
application.
4198. Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. v. Lectra Systems, Inc., 916 F.2d 683, 688, 16
USPQ2D 1436, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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Group VI invention. 199 The Federal Circuit found that the use of
the word "method" to describe the Group VI claims during restric-
tion did not mean that the claims were limited to a method, but
instead was merely used as a short-hand description of the invented
system. Therefore, the line of demarcation established in the re-
striction requirement had not been crossed, and the parent patent
was not available as a reference against the divisional patent under
§ 121. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of the
district court.2°
V. INTERFERENCE - 35 U.S.C. § 135
A. Actual Reduction to Practice May Be Shown by an
Adequate Simulation
The subject invention in the case of DSL Dynamic Sciences
Limited v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc. 201 was directed to a coupler
mount assembly used to attach equipment to a railway car coupler.
The appellant was the assignee of a U.S. patent which had issued in
June of 1985, based upon an application filed in September 1983.
The appellee was the assignee of a pending U.S. patent application
that had been filed in March 1984.202
An interference had been declared between the appellant's is-
sued patent and the appellee's pending application. During the in-
terference proceeding, the appellee argued that it had reduced the
invention to practice in the U.S. in May 1983. In support of its
reduction to practice, the appellee presented evidence of tests that
had been performed on moving trains during May 1983. These
tests involved the use of a prototype of the coupler mount assembly
on the caboose of a train.203
Because the appellant's activity relating to conception and re-
duction to practice had been performed in Canada, the appellant
was prevented by 35 U.S.C. § 104 from establishing an invention
date earlier than its U.S. filing date of September 1983. The Board
found that the appellee had established a reduction to practice of
May 1983, and was therefore entitled to priority of invention.2°
The appellant sought review of the Board's decision via an ac-
tion in federal district court under 35 U.S.C. § 146. In the district
199. Symbol, 19 USPQ2D at 1249.
200. Id. at 1250.
201. 928 F.2d 1122, 18 USPQ2D 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
202. Id. at 1153.
203. Id. at 1153-54.
204. Id. at 1154.
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court, the appellant argued that the appellee's tests had not been
performed in the intended environment of the claimed invention
and that the tests were therefore insufficient to establish a reduction
to practice of the claimed invention. According to the appellant,
the purpose of the claimed invention was to obviate the need for a
caboose at the end of a train. Therefore, the claimed invention
would never be attached to a caboose, but would instead be at-
tached to the coupler of a freight car. If the device tested by the
appellee in May 1983 had been attached to a freight car, then the
device would have failed. The district court declined to admit the
appellant's evidence on this point, and affirmed the award of prior-
ity to the appellee.21 5
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that even if the appel-
lant's evidence had been admitted by the district court, the appellee
would nevertheless still be entitled to the award of priority of
invention.20 6
The Federal Circuit noted that the appellee could meet its bur-
den of proving an actual reduction to practice by showing one of
two things: (1) that the use of a coupler mount assembly with a
caboose is an intended purpose of the claimed invention; or (2) that
if the use of a coupler mount assembly with a caboose is not an
intended purpose of the claimed invention, then the tests performed
on a caboose coupler sufficiently simulated the conditions present
on a freight car coupler to adequately show reduction to practice of
the claimed invention.20 7
The Federal Circuit found that, even if the district court had
accepted the appellant's argument that the claimed invention would
n6t be attached to a caboose, the tests performed on a caboose
coupler were sufficient to simulate the conditions present on a
freight car coupler to adequately show reduction to practice of the
claimed invention. Consequently, the appellee was entitled to the
award of priority of invention, and the decision of the district court
was affirmed.208
205. Id.
206. DSL, 18 USPQ2D at 1154.
207. Id. at 1154-55.
208. Id. at 1155.
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B. An Assistant Technician Performing Perfunctory Tasks
Under the Supervision of a Senior Scientist Is Not
Generally Necessary to Verify the Reliability of
Evidence About Scientific Methods or Data
The subject invention in the case of Holm wood v.
Sugavanam2 °9 was a chemical fungicide. Both parties had made
and marketed the chemical fungicide overseas. An interference had
been declared between Holmwood's U.S. patent application and
Sugavanam's U.S. patent application. 1
Sugavanam, the senior party, had an effective filing date of Oc-
tober 16, 1981. To defeat Sugavanam, Holmwood had attempted to
show that his invention had been reduced to practice in the U.S.
before October 16, 1981.211
The evidence showed that Holmwood's assignee, a German
corporation, had sent the claimed fungicide into the U.S. to verify
positive test results previously obtained in Germany. Dr. Walter
Zeck, a biological research manager for the U.S. affiliate of
Holmwood's assignee, had received the claimed fungicide on or
about September 16, 1980.212
, Upon receipt of the claimed fungicide, Dr. Zeck began a series
of standard tests for effectiveness. Two of Dr. Zeck's laboratory
assistants performed the tests in the U.S. and filed reports on the
results in October 1980. The test results showed that the claimed
fungicide worked for its intended purpose.213
Holmwood presented Dr. Zeck's testimony to the Board. The
Board attached negative implications to Holmwood's failure to call
Dr. Zeck's laboratory assistants to testify about their ministerial
role in the testing. The Board concluded that Dr. Zeck was not
"the most satisfactory witness concerning the testing of the sam-
ples" and refused to give any weight to Dr. Zeck's testimony in
reaching its conclusion.214
The Board held that Holmwood had failed to establish a reduc-
tion to practice before the effective filing date of Sugavanam. The
Board awarded priority to Sugavanam. Holmwood appealed from
the decision of the Board.215
209. 948 F.2d 1236, 20 USPQ2D 1712 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
210. Id. at 1713.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Holmwood, 20 USPQ2D at 1713.
215. Id.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a junior technician
performing perfunctory tasks under the supervision of a senior sci-
entist is not generally necessary to verify the reliability of evidence
about scientific methods or data. In the absence of indicia calling
into question the trustworthiness of the senior scientist's testimony,
the Board may rely on the trained supervisor's testimony to ascer-
tain scientific methods or results.216
The Federal Circuit found that, due to Dr. Zeck's careful su-
pervision of the testing program and the indicia of reliability in the
test program itself, the Board's refusal to accord full weight to Dr.
Zeck's testimony was unreasonable. The Board had erred in deter-
mining that, without his assistants' testimony, Dr. Zeck's testimony
lacked probative weight.217
The Federal Circuit concluded that Dr. Zeck had supplied reli-
able, unrebutted evidence showing that Holmwood's invention had
worked for its intended purpose. If Dr. Zeck's testimony was given
proper weight, then a preponderance of the evidence showed that
Holmwood's invention had been reduced to practice in the U.S.
before Sugavanam's effective filing date. Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit reversed the decision of the Board.218
C. A Pending Interference Proceeding May Not Serve as
Adequate Reason for the Dismissal of a Declaratory
Judgment Action for Non-infringement
The patent owner in the case of Minnesota Mining and Manu-
facturing Co. v. Norton Company219 had filed an application di-
rected to an aluminum-based process for making abrasive material.
Several months later, the accused infringer had filed a patent appli-
cation which claimed both an aluminum-based process for making
abrasive material as well as an iron-based process for making abra-
sive material. The iron-based process was used by the accused in-
fringer in the commercial manufacture of abrasive material.220
The application directed to the aluminum-based process had
issued as a patent while the accused infringer's application was still
pending. The accused infringer then initiated an interference pro-
ceeding with respect to the aluminum-based process. The patent
owner informed the accused infringer (as well as the accused in-
216. Id. at 1714.
217. Id. at 1715.
218. Id.
219. 929 F.2d 670, 18 USPQ2D 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
220. Id. at 1303.
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fringer's customers) that, under the doctrine of equivalents, the is-
sued patent covered the accused infringer's iron-based process.221
The accused infringer filed suit under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 seeking
a declaratory judgment that its iron-based process did not infringe
the issued patent.222 The patent owner moved to dismiss the declar-
atory judgment litigation, arguing that the results of the interfer-
ence proceeding might moot any declaratory judgment issued by
the district court. The district court granted the patent owner's mo-
tion and dismissed the accused infringer's complaint.223
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the accused infringer argued
that the harm threatened to its business entitled it to the benefits of
28 U.S.C. § 2201, and that the district court erred in giving too
little consideration to the harm which a delay in deciding the in-
fringement litigation would inflict on the accused infringer.224
The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the accused infringer, noted
that the pending interference proceeding would only determine the
issue of priority of invention. The pending interference proceeding
would not determine the infringement issue underlying the declara-
tory judgment litigation.225
If the interference proceeding resulted in an award of priority
to the accused infringer, then the infringement litigation would be
moot. However, the Federal Circuit found that the mere chance of
the infringement litigation becoming moot was not reason enough
to dismiss the litigation. The accused infringer was entitled by 28
U.S.C. § 2201 to have a decision on the infringement question and
not to have to wait until the final resolution of the interference
proceeding.226
The Federal Circuit noted (without providing specific exam-
ples) that there may be situations in which a district court should
decline to exercise its discretion to assume jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2201 when an interference proceeding is underway. How-
ever, in the case of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., the
Federal Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion to have dis-
221. Id. at 1304.
222. 28 U.S.C. § 2201, also referred to as the Declaratory Judgment Act, provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declara-
tion, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
223. Minnesota Mining, 18 USPQ2D at 1304.
224. Id. at 1305.
225. Id. at 1306.
226. Id.
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missed a declaratory judgment litigation for non-infringement based
on a pending interference proceeding, when the interference pro-
ceeding could not decide (or was not likely to moot) the infringe-
ment issues raised and when the declaratory judgment plaintiff
would likely suffer significant ongoing harm during any delay.' 7
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the judgment of the dis-
trict court and remanded for further proceedings relating to the de-
claratory judgment litigation.22
VI. APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CiRcurr - 35 U.S.C. § 141
A. A District Court Action Under 35 U.S.C. § 146 May Not
Preclude an Appeal to the Federal Circuit Under 35
U.S.C. § 141
The case of In re Van Geuns2 29 resulted from an interference
involving a patent application filed by Van Geuns and a patent is-
sued to Brown. During the interference proceeding, the Board had
determined that the subject matter of both Brown's patent and Van
Geuns' application was unpatentable for obviousness.230
Van Geuns appealed the Board's decision to the Federal Cir-
cuit under 35 U.S.C. § 141. Brown did not appeal to the Federal
Circuit. Instead, Brown's assignee filed suit against Van Geuns' as-
signee in district court under 35 U.S.C. § 146, alleging that the
Board had incorrectly held Brown's patent claims unpatentable.
Van Geuns asserted a counterclaim in the district court action.23 1
Van Geuns moved the Federal Circuit to enjoin Brown's dis-
trict court proceeding. Brown opposed Van Geuns' motion and
moved the Federal Circuit to either remand Van Geuns' appeal to
the PTO or to stay Van Geuns' appeal pending resolution of the
district court action.232
The Federal Circuit found that the patent statute provided
both Brown and Van Geuns with the right to seek direct review in
separate courts. Section 141 specifically permits a "party to an in-
terference dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Ap-
peals and Interferences ... [to] appeal the decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.. ." Section 146
227. Id.
228. Minnesota Mining, 18 USPQ2D at 1307.
229. 946 F.2d 845, 20 USPQ2D 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
230. Id. at 1292.
231. Id. at 1295.
232. Id.
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specifically permits "any party to an interference dissatisfied with
the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences...
[to seek] remedy by civil action .... ." Congress thereby explicitly
preserved both alternative routes for review of a Board interference
proceeding, and the Federal Circuit concluded that it could not
foreclose either route.233
The Federal Circuit noted that, to promote efficient judicial
management and conservation of scarce judicial resources, it may
enjoin parties under its jurisdiction from proceeding with a concur-
rent action involving the same or related issues.234 However, in In
re Van Geuns, the Federal Circuit found that Van Geuns' § 141
appeal did not feature the same parties or issues as Brown's § 146
district court case. 35
Van Geuns' appeal under § 141 contested only the Board's pat-
entability determinations on claims corresponding to the interfer-
ence count. Van Geuns' appeal was therefore no different than a
traditional ex parte appeal to the Federal Circuit from a Board de-
termination, and did not include any adverse entity other than the
Commissioner.236
In contrast, Brown's district court litigation under § 146 in-
cluded Brown's assignee as a party. Moreover, Brown contested the
propriety of the Board's rejection of Brown's charges of inequitable
conduct against Van Geuns. Van Geuns' § 141 appeal therefore did
not feature the same parties or the same issues as Brown's § 146
district court case, and resolution of one case would not dispose of
the other litigation.237
The Federal Circuit therefore denied Van Geuns' motion to
enjoin Brown's § 146 district court proceeding, and also denied
Brown's motion to either remand Van Geuns' § 141 appeal to the
PTO or to stay the appeal pending resolution of the district court
action.238
233. Id. at 1294.
234. Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1463, 15 USPQ2D 1554, 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
235. Van Geuns, 20 USPQ2D at 1295.
236. Id.
237. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 96 L. Ed. 200, 72 S.
Ct. 219 (1952).
238. Van Geuns, 20 USPQ2D at 1295.
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VII. PROTECTION OF FEDERALLY OWNED INVENTIONS - 35
U.S.C. § 207
A. A Licensee Under a Patent Owned by the Federal
Government May Maintain an Infringement Action
Without Joining the Federal Government as a Party
The lawsuit underlying the appeal in Nutrition 21 v. The
United States239 was for infringement of a patent owned by the
United States.240
The patent licensee had filed suit against an accused infringer
and had named the U.S. as a party defendant pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19(a). 241 The U.S. had moved to be dismissed from the case,
arguing that the suit could be maintained by the licensee alone,
without the need for the U.S. as a party. The U.S. based its argu-
ment on (1) the enforcement rights granted to the licensee by the
U.S. under the patent license agreement, and (2) the authorization
provided to federal agencies under 35 U.S.C. 207(a)(2) to grant pat-
ent enforcement rights to licensees.242
239. 930 F.2d 862, 18 USPQ2D 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
240. See, Nutrition 21 v. Thorne Research, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 671, 14 USPQ2D 1244
(W.D. Wash. 1990).
241. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) provides:
Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication
(a) Persons To Be Joined If Feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the
person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already par-
ties or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i)
as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that inter-
est or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties, subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order
the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses
to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involun-
tary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party
would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed
from the action.
242. Section 207 of Title 35, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Each Federal agency is authorized to -
(2) grant nonexclusive, exclusive, or partially exclusive licenses under
federally owned patent applications, patents, or other forms of protection ob-
tained, royalty-free or for royalties or other consideration, and on such terms
and conditions, including the grant to the licensee of the right of enforcement
pursuant to the provisions of chapter 29 of this title as determined appropriate
in the public interest;
(3) undertake all other suitable and necessary steps to protect and ad-
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The licensee acknowledged that it would not otherwise object
to proceeding without the U.S. as a party, but feared that if it pro-
ceeded without the U.S., then, after judgment by the district court,
the Federal Circuit might subsequently dismiss the infringement ac-
tion on appeal due to the absence of an indispensable party under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).24 3 The licensee therefore opposed the U.S.
motion to be dismissed, and moved for realignment of the U.S. as
an involuntary plaintiff pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a).
The district court, relying on the case of Independent Wireless
Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,2' concluded that the pat-
ent owner is a necessary party to a suit for patent infringement
brought by an exclusive licensee. The district court therefore issued
an order denying the U.S. motion to be dismissed as a party and
realigning the U.S. as an involuntary plaintiff.245
The question on appeal was whether the licensee could main-
tain a patent infringement action without the U.S. as a party, when
the U.S. had authorized the licensee to sue for patent infringement
in its own name and on its own behalf.2
4 6
In answering this question in the affirmative, the Federal Cir-
cuit emphasized the language of the patent license agreement,
which expressly empowered the licensee to bring infringement suits
in its own name, at its own expense, and on its own behalf, with the
U.S. retaining a continuing right to intervene in such suit.24
7
The Federal Circuit also noted that the public policy concerns
minister rights to federally owned inventions on behalf of the Federal Govern-
ment either'directly or through contract ....
243. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) provides:
Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible
If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party,
the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action
should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent
person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by
the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's
absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth,
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.
244. 269 U.S. 459, 70 L. Ed. 357, 46 S.Ct. 166 (1926). Independent Wireless held that
"both the owner and the exclusive licensee are generally necessary parties in the [patent in-
fringement] action in equity." 269 U.S. at 466.
245. Nutrition 21 v. Thorne Research, Inc., 130 F.R.D. at 671, 14 USPQ2d at 1244
(W.D. Wash. 1990).
246. Nutrition 21, 18 USPQ2D at 1352.
247. Id. at 1354.
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underlying passage of the legislation that included 35 U.S.C.
207(a)(2) (specifically, concerns regarding the effective private sec-
tor commercialization of inventions resulting from government-fi-
nanced research) support maintenance of the infringement suit
without the U.S. as a party. The case of Independent Wireless was
not controlling, because that case did not involve a government-
owned patent, and because the relevant law had been changed by
Congress.248
The Federal Circuit therefore held that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
207(a)(2) and the patent license agreement involved, the licensee
could maintain an action against the accused infringer without the
U.S. as a party. The Federal Circuit expressly declined to consider
the question of what preclusive effect the outcome of the lawsuit
might have upon the U.S. after its dismissal as a party.249
VIII. REISSUE - 35 U.S.C. § 251
A. A Patentee Can Not Be Compelled to Seek Reissue
Where the Patentee Insists That There Is No Error In
the Patent
In defense to a charge of patent infringement, the alleged in-
fringer in the case of Green v. The Rich Iron Company, Inc.250 as-
serted that the patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because
the invention had been in public use or on sale more than one year
before the application filing date.251
The alleged infringer filed a motion for summary judgment on
its § 102(b) defense. The district court denied the motion without
prejudice. However, the district court sua sponte ordered the paten-
tee to seek reissue from the PTO, stating that the PTO was the best
forum for consideration of the § 102(b) issue, given the special ex-
pertise of the PTO regarding the validity of patents and concerns of
judicial economy. The patentee appealed from the district court's
order.2 5
2
The issue on appeal was whether a district court can compel a
patentee to seek reissue, even though the patentee insists that there
is no error in the patent.
The Federal Circuit observed that 35 U.S.C. § 251 permits the
PTO to reissue a patent that "is, through error without any decep-
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1355-56.
250. 944 F.2d 852, 20 USPQ2D 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
251. Id.
252. Id.
19931
82 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYL4WJOUTAL [
tive intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by
reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the
patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the
patent." '253 The implementing regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(1),
requires the reissue applicant to file a statement under oath or a
declaration "when the applicant verily believes the original patent
to be wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, stating such belief and
the reasons why." '254 Similarly, 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(5) requires the
reissue applicant to explain how the errors arose or occurred, and
37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(6) requires the reissue applicant to affirm that
the errors occurred without any deceptive intention.255
The Federal Circuit noted that the case authority relied upon
by the district court involved reissue applications filed pursuant to
the "no-fault" reissue practice, under which an applicant was per-
mitted to fie for reissue merely for the purpose of obtaining a PTO
determination regarding the effect of newly discovered prior art.2" 6
Such "no-fault" reissue practice is no longer permitted, and reissue
is now available only for those patents which, through "error," are
deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.257
The Federal Circuit concluded that if the patentee insists that
there is no error in the patent, then ordering the patentee to seek
reissue would compel the patentee to attest to error which the pat-
entee does not believe exists. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit re-
versed the district court order and remanded the case for further
proceedings.2 58
B. That an Error Could Have Been Discovered at the Time
of Prosecution Does Not Preclude Correction of the
Error Through Reissue
The subject patent in the case of Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.25 9 was a reissue patent entitled "UI-
trapurification of Factor VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies." The
original patent had contained process claims and product-by-pro-
cess claims, but had not contained any product claims. The "error"
that the inventors had sought to cure via reissue was the claiming of
"less than they had a right to claim" in the original patent due to
253. Id. at 1076.
254. Id.
255. Green, 20 USPQ2D at 1076.
256. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4) (1981).
257. Green, 20 USPQ2D at 1077.
258. Id.
259. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2D 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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the omission of the product claims.2"
Before the district court the accused infringer had argued that
the patentee's reason for seeking reissue was inadequate under 35
U.S.C. § 251. The district court granted the accused infringer's mo-
tion for partial summary judgment of invalidity on this ground, and
the patentee appealed. 261
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that the district court
had mistakenly interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 251 as requiring a showing
that the error could not have been avoided. However, the reissue
statute does not require that no competent attorney could have
avoided the error sought to be corrected by reissue. Failure of an
attorney to appreciate the full scope of the invention, or failure to
claim the invention sufficiently broadly, are among the most com-
mon sources of errors in patents. The fact that the error could have
been discovered at the time of prosecution does not, by itself, pre-
clude a patentee from correcting the error through reissue.262
The Federal Circuit found that the inventors had established
that they had claimed less than they had a right to claim, that they
had done so in error, and that there had been no deceptive intent.
The application for reissue therefore fully complied with the re-
quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 251, and the district court's grant of par-
tial summary judgment was reversed.263
C. An Objective "Intent to Claim" Is Not Dispositive of Any
Required Inquiry Under 35 U.S. C. § 251
Less than one year after issuance of the subject patent in the
case of In re Amos,214 the patentees had submitted an application
for a broadened reissue. The broadened reissue application sought
to ?dd new claims 10-12 to original claims 1_9.265
The PTO Board had found that the disclosure of the original
patent failed to set forth an "intent to claim" the subject matter
defined by new claims 10-12, and that the "objective intent" of the
patentees, as manifested in the original patent, had been to solely
claim the invention defined by claims 1-9. Because it found that the
failure to claim the subject matter defined by new claims 10-12 was
not the result of an "error" as required by 35 U.S.C. § 251, the
260. Id. at 1008.
261. Id. at 1009.
262. In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 222 USPQ 369 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1209, 84 L. Ed. 2d 323, 105 S. CL 1173 (1985).
263. Scripps, 18 USPQ2D at 1009.
264. 953 F.2d 613, 21 USPQ2D 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
265. Id. at 1272.
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Board affirmed the final rejection of new claims 10-12. The paten-
tee appealed the Board's decision.266
The issue on appeal was whether the concept of "intent to
claim" had any role in a rejection of claims submitted during reissue
under 35 U.S.C. § 251.267
The Federal Circuit observed that there are four types of error
identified in 35 U.S.C. § 251 as being correctable via reissue.268
First, the patentee may correct an error in the specification.269 Sec-
ond, the patentee may correct a defective drawing. Third, the pat-
entee may correct original claims that are too broad. Fourth, the
patentee may correct original claims that are too narrow. 270 The
basis for correcting original claims that are too broad has generally
been the discovery of partially-invalidating prior art.271 In contrast,
the basis for correcting original claims that are too narrow has been
the post-issuance discovery of attorney error in understanding the
scope of the invention.272
The Federal circuit noted that the phrase "intent to claim"
does not appear in 35 U.S.C. § 251. The Federal Circuit read the
Board's phrase "intent to claim" as a decision that new claims 10-
12 were not for the "same invention" as disclosed in the original
patent, and interpreted the Board's decision as being based upon a
determination that the original patent disclosure did not support
the subject matter of new claims 10-12 as required by § 251.273
The Federal Circuit noted that the inquiry under § 251 as to
whether the new claims are for the same invention as disclosed in
the original patent is analogous to the analysis required by § 112,
11. The entirety of the original patent must be examined and a de-
cision must be made whether, through the "objective eyes" of the
hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art, an inventor
could fairly have claimed the new claims in the original
application.274
The record showed that the original patent disclosure did cover
the subject matter defined by new claims 10-12. Consequently, the
266. Id. at 1273.
267. Id.
268. In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623, 625-26, 187 USPQ 209, 211-12 (CCPA 1975).
269. In re Salem, 553 F.2d 676, 679, 193 USPQ 513, 516 (CCPA 1977).
270. In re Handel, 312 F.2d 943, 948, 136 USPQ 460, 464 (CCPA 1963).
271. In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801, 805, 6 USPQ2d 1930, 1932 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
272. In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519, 222 USPQ 369, 371 (Fed, Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d
1565, 1575, 18 USPQ2d 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
273. Amos, 21 USPQ2D at 1274.
274. Id. at 1275.
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Federal Circuit concluded that the Board had erred in denying the
reissue application on the basis of the lack of an "intent to claim."
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the Board, stating that the
presence or absence of an objective "intent to claim," standing
alone, is not dispositive of any required inquiry under § 251 and
cannot, alone, form the basis for a denial of reissue claims.27
D. Involvement in a Reissue Proceeding May Excuse a
Patentee's Delay in Filing Suit for Infringement
The subject patent in the case of Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v.
Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A.27 had issued in June, 1976. A reissue
application was ified in December, 1979, and the reissue proceeding
was completed in February, 1985. The patentee did not file suit for
infringement until August, 1988. The patentee asserted that its de-
lay in filing suit after it first learned of the infringement was excused
due to the patentee's involvement in the reissue proceeding.2 7
The district court found that the patentee had not shown evi-
dence sufficient to excuse its failure to file suit within six years of the
time the patentee knew or should have known of the infringement.
The district court therefore concluded that the patentee was barred
from maintaining an infringement action by laches. 27" The patentee
appealed the district court's conclusion.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that if a patentee estab-
lishes that it was engaged in "other litigation," then the patentee
may avoid the consequences of what would otherwise be an unrea-
sonable delay in filing suit.279 The "other litigation" excuse nor-
mally applies when a patentee delays filing suit against an alleged
infringer until the conclusion of a prior lawsuit. If the alleged in-
fringer is ultimately sued, and if the alleged infringer had received
adequate notice of the alleged infringement, then the time con-
sumed by the other litigation may be considered in determining
whether the patentee's delay in filing suit was reasonable.280
For purposes of determining the reasonableness of a patentee's
275. In re Hounsfield, 699 F.2d 1320, 216 USPQ 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
276. 944 F.2d 870, 20 USPQ2D 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
277. Id. at 1050.
278. Laches may be found when the patentee's delay in filing suit is shown to be unrea-
sonable and unexcused and the alleged infringer has suffered material prejudice or injury as a
result of the delay. Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, 726 F.2d 734, 741, 220 USPQ 845, 850
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
279. Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor Pullers Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1155, 1162, 208
USPQ 545, 551 (6th Cir. 1980).
280. Vaupel, 20 USPQ2D at 1050.
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delay in filing suit, the Federal Circuit saw no distinction between
litigation raising the issue of patent validity and a PTO proceeding
involving patentability. The Federal Circuit therefore reasoned that
a reissue proceeding should be treated in the same way as an in-
fringement litigation for purposes determining the applicability of
the' "other litigation" excuse.281
For the "other litigation" excuse to apply, the alleged infringer
must be adequately informed of the "other litigation" and must also
be adequately informed that the patentee intends to enforce the pat-
ent against the alleged infringer after the "other litigation" is
completed. 282
In Vaupel, the alleged infringer had been actively involved in
the reissue proceeding as a protestor. In the opinion of the Federal
Circuit, the record left no doubt that the alleged infringer had been
adequately informed of the "other litigation", and had been ade-
quately informed of the patentee's intent to enforce the patent after
the "other litigation" had been completed. Under these circum-
stances, the patentee was not required to provide the alleged in-
fringer with written notification of an intent to sue after completion
of the reissue proceeding in order to avoid a holding of laches. The
district court's conclusion that the alleged infringer had not been
adequately informed of the patentee's intent to enforce the patent
due to the patentee's failure to provide such written notification to
the alleged infringer was legal error.28 3
The Federal Circuit concluded that the patentee's delay in fil-
ing suit was excused because of the patentee's involvement in the
reissue proceeding, and the patentee was not guilty of laches. The
judgment of the district court relating to laches was reversed.
IX. PATENT INFRINGEMENT - 35 U.S.C. § 271.
A. Proper Claim Interpretation Is a Question of Law
The district court in the case of Key Manufacturing Group, Inc.
v. Microdot, Inc.2 4 had found the accused infringer liable for both
literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.28 5 The accused infringer appealed.
281. Id. at 1051.
282. Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1573, 4 USPQ2D 1939, 1940-41
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
283. Vaupel, 20 USPQ2D at 1051.
284. 925 F.2d 1444, 17 USPQ2D 1806 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also Key Mfg. Group, Inc.
v. Microdot, Inc., 15 U5PQ2d 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
285. Id. at 1807.
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The issue on appeal was one of proper claim interpretation,
which is a question of law freely reviewable by the Federal Cir-
cuit. 286 There were no factual disputes over the meaning of the sub-
ject claim language, and neither party asserted that the claim
language had anything other than its common, ordinary
meaning.
287
The Federal Circuit found that the district court's interpreta-
tion of the claims conflicted with the straightforward language of
the claims, as supported by the patent specification and the prosecu-
tion file history. The Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court had erred in interpreting the claims, and that the accused
product did not literally infringe the properly interpreted claims. 28
The Federal Circuit also found that the accused device did not
infringe under the doctrine of equivalents, because a hypothetical
claim which literally encompassed the accused device would have
been obvious in view of the prior art.289
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the judgment of the dis-
trict court.
B. Product-by-Process Claims Are Not Limited to the
Product Prepared by the Process Set Forth in the
Claims
The subject patent in the case of Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.2 90 was entitled "Ultrapurification of
Factor VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies." The patent owner had
argued that the accused infringer's recombinantly-produced Factor
VIII:C product infringed several of the patent's product-by-process
claims.2 91 The district court disagreed, concluding that the prod-
uct-by-process claims could not be infringed unless the accused in-
fringer also practiced the process defined by the claims. The district
court therefore refused to grant the patentee's motion for summary
judgment of infringement of the product-by-process claims. The
286. Durango Assocs. Inc. v. Reflange Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1356, 6 USPQ2D 1290, 1295
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1270, 229 USPQ
805, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 829, 107 S. Ct. 875
(1987).
287. Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 814 F.2d 638, 643, 2 USPQ2D 1271, 1273
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
288. Key Manufacturing, 17 USPQ2D at 1809.
289. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 14
USPQ2D 1942 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 537, 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990).
290. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2D 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
291. Id. at 1015.
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patent owner appealed.292
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the district court's
conclusion conflicted with precedent which indicated that, in deter-
mining the patentability of product-by-process claims during prose-
cution, the product is interpreted as not being limited by the process
stated in the claims.293 The Federal Circuit found that, since
claims must be construed the same way for validity and for infringe-
ment, the correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they
are not limited to the product prepared by the process set forth in
the claims. Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that infringement
of the product-by-process claims by the accused infringer's product
was an issue which may be considered at trial.294
C. A Claim Element Can Not Be Interpreted Contrary to Its
"Plain Meaning" Based Upon an "Alternative" to the
Claim Element Described in the Specification
The subject patent in the case of Unique Concepts, Inc. v.
Brown295 was directed to an "assembly of border pieces" used to
attach a fabric wall covering to a wall. The claimed assembly was
made up of a number of "right angle corner border pieces" and
"linear border pieces" which were arranged to form a frame.296
The alleged infringer had argued that the accused product did
not infringe because the accused product did not have corner border
pieces which were preformed at a right angle, but instead employed
two linear pieces which were each mitered, i.e., cut at a 45 degree
angle, and then placed together to form a right angle.2 9 7
After trial, the district court entered judgment for the alleged
infringer, finding that the mitered linear pieces used by the alleged
infringer did not meet the claim language "right angle corner bor-
der pieces," either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. 298
The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the claim language
made unambiguous reference to two distinct elements: "linear bor-
der pieces" and "right angle corner border pieces." The Federal
292. Id.
293. Eg., In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 227 USPQ 964 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Brown, 59
C.C.P.A. 1036, 459 F.2d 531, 535, 173 USPQ 685, 688 (CCPA 1972) ; In re Bridgeford, 53
C.C.P.A. 1182, 357 F.2d 679, 682 n.5, 149 USPQ 55, 58 n.5 (CCPA 1966).
294. Scripps, 18 USPQ2D at 1016.
295. 939 F.2d 1558, 19 USPQ2D 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
296. Id. at 1502.
297. Id. at 1503.
298. See, Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 735 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Circuit reasoned that if linear border pieces whose ends are mitered
are the same as linear border pieces and a right angle comer piece,
then the recitation of both "right angle comer border pieces" and
"linear border pieces" in the same claim would be redundant. The
Federal Circuit further reasoned that "merging" the two types of
claim elements into one would violate the "all elements rule,"
which requires that to prove infringement, every element in the
claim must be found in the accused device either literally or
equivalently.
299
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the patent specification
contained the following paragraph, which described the option of
using "improvised comer pieces" rather than "preformed right-an-
gle comer pieces":
Instead of using preformed right-angle comer pieces of the
type previously disclosed, one may improvise comer pieces by
miter-cutting the ends of a pair of short linear border pieces at
right angles to each other and providing a space between the cut
ends to define the necessary storage slot. For this purpose, a tem-
porary spacer may be used to provide exactly the right amount of
storage space. The advantage of such comer pieces resides in the
fact that linear pieces may be mass-produced at low cost by con-
tinuous extrusion, whereas preformed comer pieces must be
molded or otherwise fabricated by more expensive techniques.
On the other hand, a preformed comer piece is somewhat easier
for a do-it-yourselfer to work with.3°
The Federal Circuit viewed the above-quoted paragraph as dis-
closing an "alternative" to the claimed right angle comer border
piece, rather than disclosing an example of the claimed right angle
comer border piece.30 1 The Federal Circuit stated:
It would run counter to [the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter of
the invention] for an applicant for patent to expressly state
throughout his specification and in his claims that his invention
includes right angle comer border pieces and then be allowed to
avoid that claim limitation in a later infringement suit by point-
ing to one paragraph in his specification stating an alternative
299. See, SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889,
8 USPQ2D 1468, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
300. Unigue Concepts, 19 USPQ2D at 1503.
301. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Rich viewed the above-quoted paragraph as demon-
strating that the specification disclosed two different species of the claimed "right angle cor-
ner border pieces": (1) preformed one-piece and (2) mitered, short, linear pieces, arranged at
right angles and properly spaced at their junction. Id. at 1506.
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that lacks that limitation, and thus interpret the claim contrary
to its plain meaning. Such a result would encourage an applicant
to escape examination of a more broadly-claimed invention by
filing narrow claims and then, after grant, asserting a broader
scope of the claims based on a statement in the specification of an
alternative never presented in the claims for examination.3°2
The Federal Circuit concluded that if the patentee had in-
tended to claim mitered linear border pieces as an alternative to
right angle corner border pieces, then the patentee was required to
persuade the examiner to issue such a claim. The patentee failed to
do so. Consequently, the mitered linear border pieces disclosed but
not claimed in the patent application were dedicated to the
public.303
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had cor-
rectly found that a proper construction of the claim language "right
angle corner border pieces" required a single preformed corner
piece, and that the patent did not literally cover the alleged in-
fringer's corners formed by aligning two mitered straight pieces.
The decision of the district court was therefore affirmed.
D. An Infringement Analysis Requires Comparison of the
Accused Product to the Patent Claims, Not To Another
Product
The subject design patent in the case of Lund Industries, Incor-
porated v. Go Industries, Inc.3 was directed to an automobile sun
visor. The parties had previously settled an earlier lawsuit by enter-
ing into a settlement agreement in which the accused infringer had
conceded the validity of the subject design patent and had admitted
infringement.3 °5
After settlement of the earlier lawsuit, the accused infringer
had introduced a new sun visor product. The patentee had sought a
preliminary injunction, charging that the accused infringer's new
sun visor product infringed the design patent.30 6
In weighing the likelihood of success on infringement, the dis-
trict court compared the new visor and the admittedly infringing
old visor covered by the settlement agreement. The district court
302. Id. at 1504.
303. Edward Miller & Co. v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352, 26 L. Ed. 783
(1881).
304. 938 F.2d 1273, 19 USPQ2D 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
305. Id. at 1384.
306. Id. at 1385.
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found that the new visor did not colorably differ from the admit-
tedly infringing old visor. Relying on the case of KSM Fastening
Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co.,3° to justify its comparison of the new visor
with the old visor, the district court concluded that the new visor
also infringed the design patent and therefore issued a preliminary
injunction. The accused infringer appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district court
had erred by relying on KSM. In KSM, the Federal Circuit had
permitted comparison of an infringing device and an accused device
as part of the inquiry into whether contempt proceedings were ap-
propriate. However, in KSM the Federal Circuit had not permitted
comparison of an infringing device and an accused device to deter-
mine whether the patent had been infringed.08
In Lund, the Federal Circuit held that a proper infringement
analysis requires comparison of the accused design to the patent
claims, not to another design.30 9 The district court's departure
from this proper infringement analysis was not justified by the ac-
cused infringer's prior admission of infringement with respect to a
different (albeit related) product. The Federal Circuit therefore va-
cated and remanded with instructions for the district court to ana-
lyze the alleged infringement of the design patent by comparing the
accused device to the patent claim.310
E. Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents Is the
Exception, Not the Rule
The subject patent in the case of Wallace London v. Carson
Pirie Scott & Co. 311 was directed to clamps used to hang clothes
securely in travel garment bags. The patentee had alleged that the
accused clamps infringed literally and under the doctrine of
equivalents. Both the patentee and the alleged infringer had moved
for summary judgment relating to infringement. The district court
granted the alleged infringer's motion. The patentee appealed only
that part of the district court's judgment relating to infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.312
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that while designing
around patents to make new inventions is encouraged, piracy is not.
307. 776 F.2d 1522, 227 USPQ 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
308. KSM, 776 F.2d at 1530, 227 USPQ at 682.
309. KSM, 776 F.2d at 1530, 227 USPQ at 682; Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823
F.2d 1538, 1545, 3 USPQ2D 1412, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
310. Lund, 19 USPQ2D at 1386.
311. 946 F.2d 1534, 20 USPQ2D 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
312. Id. at 1458.
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Thus, where an infringer, instead of inventing around a patent by
making a substantial change, merely makes an insubstantial change,
essentially misappropriating the patented invention, infringement
may lie under the doctrine of equivalents. Nevertheless, the Federal
Circuit made clear that:
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, how-
ever, not the rule, for if the public comes to believe (or fear) that
the language of patent claims can never be relied on, and that the
doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong of every in-
fringement charge, regularly available to extend protection be-
yond the scope of the claims, then claims will cease to serve their
intended purpose. Competitors will never know whether their ac-
tions infringe a granted patent.313
In Wallace London the Federal Circuit found that the accused
device did not work in substantially the same way as the claimed
device, and therefore did not infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents. Because the evidence showed that the accused device
did not meet the claim limitations either literally or equivalently,
the alleged infringer was properly entitled to summary judgment as
a matter of law. The ruling of the district court was therefore
affirmed.3 14
F. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents Exists
Only If the Changes Made to the Claimed Invention
By the Accused Infringer Are Not Substantial
The subject patent in the case of Slimfold Manufacturing Com-
pany, Inc. V Kinkead Industries, Inc.3 1 had issued in 1974 and was
directed to a "Pivot and Guide Rod Assembly for Bi-Fold Door."
In 1976, after becoming aware of the patentee's product, the ac-
cused infringer instructed its engineers to produce a similar product
referred to as the "Type I door." In 1978, after becoming aware of
the patent, the accused infringer abandoned the Type I door and
began making the "Type II door." The Type II door had been de-
liberately designed to avoid infringement of the patent.' 16
In a suit for patent infringement, the district court found that
the Type I door literally infringed the patent, and that the Type II
door infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. The district court
also found the infringement to be willful, and held that the patent
313. Id. at 1458-59.
314. Id. at 1460.
315. 932 F.2d 1453, 18 USPQ2D 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
316. Id. at 1845.
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owner was entitled to treble damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 and
attorneys fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.3"7
On appeal, the accused infringer argued that the district court
had erred in finding that the Type II door infringed under the doc-
trine of equivalents and in finding its infringement to be willful.
3 18
With respect to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
the Federal Circuit found that the district court had been overly
concerned with the fact that the Type II door had been deliberately
designed to avoid infringement. Noting that intentional "designing
around" the claims of a patent is not, by itself, a wrong which must
be compensated by invocation of the doctrine of equivalents, the
Federal circuit stated:
Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which the
patent system works to the advantage of the public in promoting
progress in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose. Inherent in
our claim-based patent system is also the principle that the pro-
tected invention is what the claims say it is, and thus that in-
fringement can be avoided by avoiding the language of the
claims. 319 It is only when the changes are so insubstantial as to
result in "a fraud on the patent" that application of the equitable
doctrine of equivalents becomes desirable.320
Therefore, liability for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents may be found only if the changes made to the claimed
invention by the accused infringer are not "substantial." Under the
Graver Tank tripartite test, the changes made to the claimed inven-
tion are not "substantial ' 321 only if the accused device performs
substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to
achieve substantially the same result as the claimed invention.
Noting that the claimed invention in Slimfold was a mechani-
cal combination in a crowded field and therefore entitled to only a
narrow scope of equivalents, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
Type II door did not operate in substantially the same way as the
claimed invention. Consequently, the Type II door avoided in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and the district
court's finding to the contrary was reversed.322
317. Id. at 1847.
318. Id.
319. Slimfold, 18 USPQ2D at 1845-46, quoting Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S.I.T.C.,
805 F.2d 1558, 1572, 231 USPQ 833, 841-42 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
320. Slimfold, 18 USPQ2D at 1846, quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod-
ucts Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 94 L.Ed. 1097, 70 S.Ct. 854, 85 USPQ 328, 330 (1950).
321. Slimfold, 18 USPQ2D at 1846.
322. Id.
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The Federal Circuit found sufficient evidence in the record to
support a finding of willfulness with respect to infringement by the
Type I door. However, the Federal Circuit also found that the dis-
trict court's findings regarding willfulness and the exceptional na-
ture of the case had been influenced by the district court's incorrect
assumption that the accused infringer did not avoid infringement
when it developed the Type II door. Therefore, the Federal Circuit
directed the district court, on remand, to re-determine whether the
facts of the case, in light of the holding of no infringement with
respect to the Type II door, still merited a finding of willfulness and
a finding of "exceptional case" under 35 U.S.C. § 285.323
G. A Patentee Must Prove Substantial Identity As to Each
of the Function, Way, and Result Prongs of the
Doctrine of Equivalents Test
The subject patent in the case of Malta v. Schulmerich Caril-
lons, Inc.324 was directed to improvements in the design of
handbells, of the type used by music groups in churches, schools,
and the like. The subject handbells consisted of a bell, a handle,
and a clapper pivotably mounted inside the bell.32
The patent disclosed two different embodiments for the clap-
per. The first embodiment had three opposing pairs of "striking
surfaces." The second embodiment had three "opposed pairs of
buttons" attached to the surface of the clapper. The patent specifi-
cally used the term "striking surfaces" with respect to the first em-
bodiment, and used the different term "buttons" with respect to the
second embodiment. The patent stated that the two different em-
bodiments shared the same advantages, but varied in design, flexi-
bility and simplicity.326I Claim 2 of the patent used the broad term "surface portions"
to describe the surface of the clapper. Claim 3 of the patent was
very similar to claim 2, but used the narrower term "buttons" to
describe the surface of the clapper.327
The patentee had alleged infringement of both claims 2 and 3.
The jury had been given special interrogatories asking whether the
accused handbells infringed claims 2 and 3 of the patent, either lit-
erally or under the doctrine of equivalents. In response, the jury
323. Id. at 1847.
324. 952 F.2d 1320, 21 USPQ2D 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1166.
327. Id.
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had found that claim 2 was not infringed, but that claim 3, while
not literally infringed, was infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents.328
The alleged infringer moved for JNOV on the grounds that the
evidence was not sufficient to support the finding of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. The judge agreed, and granted
judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict of non-infringement in
favor of the alleged infringer. 329 The patentee appealed from the
grant of JNOV of non-infringement.33 °
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that claim 2 of the patent
used the broad term "surface portions" to describe the surface of
the clapper, whereas claim 3 used the narrower term "buttons."
The Federal Circuit reasoned that where a broad term is used in one
claim and a narrower term is used in a second claim, and is used
with respect to only one embodiment in the specification, the impli-
cation is that infringement of the second claim can be avoided by
not meeting the narrower term.331
The Federal Circuit further noted that the patent stated that
the two different embodiments were alternatives to each other, but
varied in design, flexibility and simplicity. The Federal Circuit
viewed this as indicating that the two different embodiments did not
perform the claimed function in substantially the same "way," as
that term is used in the Graver Tank test.332
In attempting to prove infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, the patentee had principally relied upon the testimony
of the inventor. The Federal Circuit found the inventor's testimony
to be conclusory and lacking a sufficiently particularized explana-
tion of both how the overall function, way, and result of the accused
device are substantially the same as those of the claimed device, and
how the plastic/slotted plastic/felt arrangement of the accused de-
vice is the equivalent of the claimed "buttons" limitation.33 The
evidence failed to prove that all three prongs of the Graver Tank
test had been met, or that the "buttons" limitation had been met
equivalently. 334 The Federal Circuit could find no other evidence in
the record to provide the necessary substantial evidence on the issue
328. Malta, 21 USPQ2D at 1163.
329. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons Inc., 13 USPQ2d 1900 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
330. Malta, 21 USPQ2D at 1164.
331. Id. at 1166.
332. Id. at 1165.
333. Id. at 1166.
334. Id.
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of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 335
The patentee had therefore failed to present evidence sufficient
to support a finding of infringement of claim 3 under the doctrine of
equivalents, and the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's
grant of JNOV on the ground of non-infringement.336
H. Prosecution History Estoppel Does Not Necessarily
Preclude Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents
The district court in the case of Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corpo-
ration 337 had determined that the accused device did not infringe
literally, and that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
was precluded by prosecution history estoppel.331 The district court
therefore granted the alleged infringer's motion for summary judg-
ment of non-infringement. The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the patentee argued that, even in the face of prose-
cution history estoppel, the patentee should still be able to obtain
some degree of equivalence, and that a total preclusion of all equiva-
lence should not apply. 339 The Federal Circuit agreed that, as a
general proposition, the patentee's argument was correct.3 4° How-
ever, the Federal Circuit found that the district court in Dixie had
not applied total preclusion.341 Instead, the district court had con-
sidered the nature of the prior art and the amendments and argu-
ments made during the prosecution of the subject patent application
and had concluded that the scope of equivalence being urged by the
patentee was precisely that which was forbidden by the prosecution
history.342
The Federal Circuit therefore found that the district court had
properly applied the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel and
affirmed the decision of the district court.343
335. Malta, 21 USPQ2D at 1166.
336. Id. at 1167.
337. 927 F.2d 584, 17 USPQ2D 1968 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
338. Id. at 1969.
339. Id. at 1970.
340. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prod., 793 F.2d 1279, 1284, 230
USPQ 45, 48 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
341. Dixie, 17 USPQ2D at 1970.
342. Id. at 1971.
343. Id.
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X. DEFENSES TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT - 35 U.S.C. § 282
A. Intent to Deceive the Patent Examiner Is an Essential
Factual Predicate to Inequitable Conduct
The appeal in the case of Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt -
Und Marketing Gesellschaft MH.34 was taken from the judg-
ment of.the district court holding the subject patent unenforceable
based on inequitable conduct.34 5
The inequitable conduct issue involved a reference to Hoffar
which the patentee had called to the examiner's attention only after
allowance of the claims, following which the examiner had re-
opened prosecution. There was evidence that the patentee's Ger-
man patent attorney had known of the Hoffar reference, and had
believed that the Hoffar reference was merely cumulative to the
prior art already before the U.S. examiner; that the German attor-
ney responded promptly to the request by the U.S. patent attorney
for all references cited in other countries; and that after receiving
these references, which included the Hoffar reference, the U.S. pat-
ent attorney promptly cited the Hoffar reference to the PTO. There
was also evidence that the PTO, investigating the charge of inequi-
table conduct, had found that the Hoffar reference was merely cu-
mulative to other references already of record.3'
The jury found that the patentee had made material misrepre-
sentations during patent prosecution, and that the patentee had ac-
ted with gross negligence, but that the patentee had not intended to
deceive the patent examiner.34 7 Based on these findings, the district
court held the patent invalid for inequitable conduct.348
On appeal, the patentee argued that the district court's ruling
was contrary to law, in light of the jury's finding that intent to
deceive had not been proven.34 9
The alleged infringer argued that the jury had simply found
that intent to deceive had not been proven by clear and convincing
evidence, but that the jury's finding of gross negligence did establish
a sufficient threshold level of intent, which the district court then
correctly balanced against the jury's finding of materiality to sup-
344. 945 F.2d 1546, 20 USPQ2D 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
345. Id. at 1333.
346. Id. at 1334.
347. Id. at 1335.
348. Id. at 1336.
349. Tol-O-Matic, 20 USPQ2D at 1336.
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port a finding of inequitable conduct.35 °
The Federal Circuit noted that inequitable conduct carries the
consequence of permanent unenforceability of the patent.35' Forfei-
ture is not favored as a remedy for actions not shown to be culpable.
Consequently, clear and convincing evidence of conduct sufficient
to support an inference of culpable intent is required for a holding
of inequitable conduct.352 Gross negligence alone, absent culpable
intent, does not provide a sufficient basis for a holding of inequitable
conduct.
353
The Federal Circuit noted that the jury's specific finding that
intent to deceive had not been established, although gross negli-
gence had been established, was not a trivial distinction.35 4 Since
intent to deceive the patent examiner is an essential factual predi-
cate to inequitable conduct, the finding that intent had not been
proven bars a ruling of inequitable conduct.355 The Federal Circuit
therefore reversed the judgment of inequitable conduct.
B. The Materiality of a Withheld Reference Requires
Consideration of Both Similarities and Differences
Between the Prior Art and the Claimed Invention
The district court in the case of Halliburton Company v.
Schlumberger Technology Corporation 356 determined that the pat-
entee had engaged in inequitable conduct by withholding an impor-
tant prior art reference from the PTO during prosecution.35 7 The
patentee admitted that it had been aware of the withheld reference,
but had not considered the reference to be material. 35 8 The district
court refused to enforce the patent and awarded the accused in-
fringer attorney fees and expenses.3 9  The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit initially noted that a two-step
350. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 223 USPQ 1089 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
351. Tol-O-Matie, 20 USPQ2D at 1337.
352. Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939, 15 USPQ2D 1321,
1327 (Fed. Cir.)"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296, 112 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1990).
353. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9
USPQ2D 1384, 1392 (Fed.Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067, 104 L. Ed. 2d
633, 109 S. Ct. 2068 (1989).
354. Tol-O-Matic, 20 USPQ2D at 1340.
355. Id.
356. 925 F.2d 1435, 17 USPQ2D 1834 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
357. Id. at 1836.
358. Id. at 1841.
359. Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 722 F. Supp. 324, 12 USPQ2D
1765 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
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analysis is required to properly find inequitable conduct.3" First,
the trial court must determine whether the withheld reference satis-
fies a threshold level of materiality and whether the applicant's con-
duct satisfies a threshold showing of intent to mislead.36 x Second,
the trial court must balance materiality and intent.362 The more
material the reference, the less culpable the intent required, and vice
versa.
363
Regarding materiality, the Federal Circuit noted that a refer-
ence is "material" if there is "substantial likelihood that a reason-
able examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to
allow the application to issue as a patent."' 36" However, a patent
applicant is not obligated to disclose a material reference if the ma-
terial reference is merely cumulative, or if the reference is less mate-
rial than those references already before the examiner.365
In determining whether a withheld reference is merely cumula-
tive, or less material than those references already cited, the Federal
Circuit observed that consideration must be given to both similari-
ties and differences between the prior art and the claimed invention,
including portions of the withheld reference that teach away from
the claimed invention.366
In Halliburton, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court had misunderstood the claimed invention, and had therefore
failed to appreciate the significance of the differences between the
claimed invention and the withheld reference. These differences
distinguished the withheld reference from the claimed invention,
and also made the withheld reference less material than the cited
references.367
Because the withheld reference was less material than the cited
references, the patentee was under no obligation to disclose the
360. Halliburton, 17 USPQ2D at 1841.
361. FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415, 5 USPQ2D 1112, 1115 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60, 223 USPQ 1089,
1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 822, 88 L. Ed. 2d 60, 106 S. Ct. 73 (1985).
362. Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1559,4 USPQ2D 1772, 1777
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
363. N.V. Akzo v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, 810 F.2d 1148, 1153, 1 USFQ2d 1704,
1708 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
364. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1989).
365. Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 992, 6 USPQ2D 1601, 1609
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
366. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443,448-49, 230
USPQ 416, 420 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 823 , 98 L. Ed. 2d 47, 108 S. Ct. 85
(1987).
367. Halliburton, 17 USPQ2D at 1842.
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withheld reference to the PTO.168 Consequently, when the patentee
decided to withhold the reference from the PTO, the patentee could
not have acted with culpable intent to mislead.369
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that both the district
court's materiality and intent findings were clearly erroneous, and
that the patentee had not engaged in inequitable conduct. The
judgment of the district court was therefore reversed.370
C. A Reference That Is Material Only to Withdrawn Claims
Can Not Be the Basis of a Holding of Inequitable
Conduct
The subject patent in the case of Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.371 was entitled "Ultrapurification of
Factor VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies. 372 The accused in-
fringer appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment
that the patent owner had not engaged in inequitable conduct dur-
ing prosecution of the subject patent application.373
The prosecution history of the patent contained numerous ref-
erences, including a single paragraph abstract written by a Dr.
Meyer, as well as a 27 page paper also written by Dr. Meyer. The
Meyer paper, which cited the Meyer abstract, contained a much
more detailed disclosure than the Meyer abstract. The Meyer paper
had been submitted to the PTO by the patent applicant as part of an
information disclosure statement. The Meyer abstract had not been
submitted to the PTO by the patent applicant, but had been inde-
pendently discovered by the Examiner.374
On appeal, the accused infringer charged the patent owner
with inequitable conduct resulting from the patent owner's failure
to bring the Meyer abstract to the examiner's specific attention.375
The Federal Circuit observed, however, that the Meyer ab-
stract merely summarized the Meyer paper, and was therefore
merely cumulative to the Meyer paper. A reference that is merely
cumulative to other references does not meet the threshold of mate-
368. Specialty Composites, 845 F.2d at 992, 6 USPQ2d at 1609; J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at
1559-60, 223 USPQ at 1092.
369. Halliburton, 17 USPQ2D at 1842.
370. Id.
371. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2D 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
372. Id. at 1003.
373. Id. at 1004.
374. Id. at 1015.
375. Id.
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riality that is a predicate to a holding of inequitable conduct. 37 6
The Federal Circuit further stated that when a reference is
before the examiner, whether through the examiner's search or the
applicant's disclosure, it can not be deemed to have been withheld
from the examiner. Thus, what is controlling is whether the Meyer
abstract had been considered by the examiner, not how the Meyer
abstract came to the examiner's attention.377
The accused infringer also charged the patent owner with ineq-
uitable conduct because the patent owner had originally sought
claims to certain monoclonal antibodies, and had subsequently can-
celed those claims after the examiner had required the patent owner
to provide comparative data with the monoclonal antibodies de-
scribed in the Meyer abstract.378
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that an applicant has the
absolute right to decline to do work suggested by the PTO, and to
withdraw claims that had been presented for examination, without
incurring liability for inequitable conduct. The Federal Circuit held
that a reference that is material only to withdrawn claims can not
be the basis of a holding of inequitable conduct.3 79
The Federal Circuit concluded that, drawing all factual infer-
ences in its favor, the accused infringer had failed to offer evidence
or legal argument showing that inequitable conduct could be proven
at trial, as to either materiality of the Meyer abstract, or the paten-
tee's intent to deceive or mislead.380 The Federal Circuit therefore
affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment of
no inequitable conduct based on the Meyer abstract.381
D. Disputed Fact Questions Regarding Inequitable Conduct
Are Not Appropriately Resolved by Summary
Judgment
The subject patent in the case of Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.3 82 was a reissue patent entitled "Ul-
trapurification of Factor VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies. 383
376. Haliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1440, 17 USPQ
2d 1834 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991).
377. Scripps, 18 USPQ2D at 1015.
378. Id.
379. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Co., 745 F.2d 1437, 1457, 223 USPQ
603, 616-17 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
380. Scripps, 18 USPQ2D at 1015.
381. Id. at 1016.
382. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2D 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
383. Id. at 1003.
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During the prosecution of the reissue application, the examiner
had raised various questions under 35 U.S.C. § 112 relating to the
purity of the Factor VIII that was the subject of the proposed prod-
uct claims. In response, the inventors had made several statements
in the record regarding the purity of the claimed Factor VIII. 84
The district court had found that the inventors' statements
about the purity of the product were unsupported by the evidence.
The district court therefore granted partial summary judgment of
unenforceability of the claims due to inequitable conduct.38 5
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that there are two essen-
tial factual predicates to a determination of inequitable conduct:
the materiality of the representation, and whether the representa-
tion was made with intent to deceive or mislead. 86
In Scripps the Federal Circuit found that there was a factual
dispute regarding whether the inventors' statements concerning pu-
rity were in error. Moreover, there was a factual dispute regarding
the inventor's intent to mislead or deceive the examiner, an issue
about which the district court had failed to make any finding.38 7 It
was not appropriate to resolve either of these factually disputed is-
sues on summary judgment. The Federal Circuit therefore reversed
the grant of partial summary judgment of unenforceability of the
claims for inequitable conduct.
E. Determination of Privity Under the Doctrine of Assignor
Estoppel Requires Consideration of Both Direct and
Indirect Contacts With the Patentee
Assignor estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents a pat-
entee who has assigned the rights to a patent from later contending
that what was assigned is a nullity. 88 The doctrine also bars a simi-
lar challenge by any party in privity with the assignor. Privity de-
pends upon the closeness of the relationship based upon a balancing
of the equities.3 89
The complainant in the case of Intel Corporation v. U. S. Inter-
384. Id. at 1011.
385. Id. at 1012.
386. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 541, 16 USPQ2D 1622, 1624
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
387. Scripps, 18 USPQ2D at 1006.
388. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224, 6 USPQ2D 2028,
2030 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
389. 'Shamrock Technologies, Inc. v. Medical Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789, 14
USPQ2D 1728 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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national Trade Commission3 9° had argued that assignor estoppel
prevented a first respondent from challenging the validity of the
subject patent because the inventor, a major shareholder and chief
executive officer of the first respondent, had assigned the patent to
the complainant.391 The complainant further argued that assignor
estoppel similarly prevented a second respondent from challenging
the validity of the subject patent because of the close relationship
that the inventor and the first respondent had with the second
respondent.392
The Commission determined that the first respondent was in
privity with the inventor, and was therefore prevented by assignor
estoppel from challenging the patent's validity. However, the Com-
mission determined that the second respondent did not have suffi-
cient contacts with the inventor to be in privity, and that the second
respondent was therefore not estopped from challenging the pat-
ent's validity. 93 The complainant appealed the Commission's deci-
sion that the second respondent was not in privity with the
inventor.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the Commission had
improperly limited its analysis to whether the relationship between
the inventor and the second respondent was enough to find that the
two were in privity.394 In determining whether the second respon-
dent was in privity with the inventor, the Commission should have
considered all contacts between the second respondent and the in-
ventor, direct and indirect, including the contacts between the first
respondent and the second respondent. The Commission had not
adequately considered the part the inventor had played in creating
the joint venture between the second respondent and the first re-
spondent, under which both respondents sought to mutually de-
velop the allegedly infringing product.395  The Federal Circuit
concluded that the balance of the equities required a finding of priv-
ity between the second respondent and the inventor.396
Because of its privity with the inventor and the first respon-
dent, the Federal Circuit concluded that the second respondent
should not have been allowed to challenge the validity of the patent.
Because the second respondent had been improperly permitted to
390. 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2D 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
391. Id. at 1175.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 1176.
394. Intel, 20 USPQ2D at 1177.
395. Id.
396. Id.
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contest the validity of the patent, the Federal Circuit vacated the
Commission's holding that claim 1 of the patent was invalid.3 9 7
XI. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF - 35 U.S.C. § 283
A. The Patentee Has the Burden of Showing Likelihood of
Success With Respect to Validity and Infringement At
the Preliminary Injunction Stage
The trial court in the case of Nutrition 21 v. The United
States398 had granted a preliminary injunction pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 283, which enjoined the alleged infringer from selling or
offering for sale a product encompassed within the patent claims.399
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the alleged infringer sought relief
from the injunction on grounds that the district court had erred by
failing to set forth adequate findings of fact to support the prelimi-
nary injunction. 40°
The Federal Circuit initially noted that the issuance of a pre-
liminary injunction turns upon four factors: 1) the probability that
the party seeking the injunction will succeed on the merits; 2) the
threat of irreparable harm to the party seeking the injunction
should a preliminary injunction be denied; 3) the balance between
this harm and the harm that granting the injunction will cause to
the other parties; and 4) the public interest." 1
Regarding the first factor (the probability that the party seek-
ing the injunction will succeed on tile merits), the Federal Circuit
observed that while a patent is presumed valid, that presumption of
validity is a procedural device that places the burden of going for-
ward and the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial on the party
attacking the validity of a patent.402 Prior to trial, at the prelimi-
nary injunction stage, the burden of showing likelihood of success
on the merits with respect to the patent's validity, enforceability,
and infringement is placed upon the patentee.4° A patentee must
therefore "clearly show" that the patent is valid and infringed
397. Id. at 1181.
398. 930 F.2d 867, 18 USPQ2D 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
399. Nutrition 21 v. Thorne Research Inc., 130 F.R.D. 671, 14 USPQ2D 1244 (1990).
400. Id. at 1245.
401. Pretty Punch Shoppettes v. Hauk, 844 F.2d 782, 783, 6 USPQ2D 1563, 1564 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
402. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988); Roger Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 757 F.2d 1266,
1270, 225 USPQ 345, 347 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
403. Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chemicals, 773 F.2d 1230, 1233, 227 USPQ 289, 292
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
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before a court may preliminarily enjoin an alleged infringer.' In
the case of Nutrition 21, the Federal Circuit found that the required
"clear showing" of validity and infringement was absent.4"
Regarding the second factor (the threat of irreparable harm to
the party seeking the injunction), the Federal Circuit noted that
without a clear showing of validity and infringement, a presumption
of irreparable harm does not arise in a preliminary injunction pro-
ceeding." 6 There is no presumption that money damages will be
inadequate. Nor is irreparable harm proven by evidence of the diffi-
culty of calculating losses in market share or speculation that such
losses might occur.
The Federal Circuit therefore vacated the preliminary injunc-
tion due to the district court's failure to set forth adequate findings
of fact to support the preliminary injunction." 7
B. Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Infringement Under
The Doctrine of Equivalents Requires a Finding That
the Function/Way/Result Test Has Been Met
The patentee in the case of The Conair Group, Inc. v. Automa-
tik Apparate-Maschinenbau Gmbh"° had filed suit against the al-
leged infringer and had moved for a preliminary injunction. The
district court concluded that both literal infringement and infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents were reasonably likely to be
found, and granted the motion.4° 9 The alleged infringer appealed
the preliminary injunction order.
The issue on appeal was whether the District Court had abused
its discretion, committed an error of law, or seriously misjudged the
evidence by granting the patentee's motion for a preliminary
injunction.410
With regard to literal infringement, the Federal Circuit noted
that the record contained uncontradicted evidence indicating that at
least one limitation of the patent claim was not met by the accused
404. Roper, 757 F.2d at 1271-72, 225 USPQ at 348-49; Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool
Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1580-81, 219 USPQ 686, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
405. Nutrition 21, 18 USPQ2D at 1347.
406. Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 786 F.2d 398, 400, 229 USPQ 41, 42-43 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Roper, 757 F.2d at 1271, 225 USPQ at 349.
407. Roper, 225 USPQ at 349.
408. 944 F.2d 862, 20 USPQ2D 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
409. See Conair Group, Inc. v. Automatik Apparate-Maschinenbau, 19 USPQ2D 1535
(W.D. Pa. 1990).
410. Conair Group, 20 USPQ2D at 1069.
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device.4 1' The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the district
court had seriously misjudged the evidence, and that the district
court's determination of a likelihood of success on grounds of literal
infringement was erroneous.4 12
With regard to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
the Federal Circuit noted that Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires a district court to make findings of fact to
support the granting of a preliminary injunction. Failure to provide
adequate findings of fact is an error of law.413
The Federal Circuit noted that-the district court had failed to
make any findings that the accused device performed substantially
the same function as the claimed invention, that the accused device
did so in substantially the same way, or that the accused device
obtained the same result.41 4 The district court had further failed to
make any findings that the range of equivalents sought by the paten-
tee did not "ensnare the prior art. ' 415 Lastly, the district court had
failed to make any findings regarding whether the doctrine of prose-
cution history estoppel applied to limit the range of equivalents.416
Since the district court had made none of the required findings
with regard to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the
Federal Circuit found no basis for concluding that there was a like-
lihood of success on that ground. Consequently, the injunction was
vacated. 17
411. Id. at 1070.
412. Id. at 1071.
413. Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869, 18 USPQ2D 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
1991). Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings
of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action ....
414. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 94 L. Ed. 1097, 70
S. Ct. 854, 85 USPQ 328 (1950).
415. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 685, 14
USPQ2D 1942, 1949 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 537, 112 L. Ed. 2d 547, 59 U.S.L.W.
3392 (1990).
416. Conair, 20 USPQ2D at 1070.
417. Id.
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C. Preliminarily Injunctive Relief Against Infringement
Under the Doctrine of Equivalents Requires
Consideration of Whether the Teachings of the Prior
Art Would Have Made Obvious the Range of
Equivalents Being Asserted
The patent owner in the case of We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark
International Corp.418 had filed suit against the alleged infringer and
had sought a preliminary injunction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 283 to
prevent the manufacture and sale of the accused device while the
suit was pending.419 The district court determined that the patent
owner would probably not be able to prove literal infringement, but
granted the injunction based on the finding that the patent owner
was likely to prove infringement at trial under the doctrine of
equivalents.420 The alleged infringer appealed the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that the doctrine of
equivalents may not be used to extend a patent owner's right to
exclude beyond what could lawfully have been obtained in the origi-
nal patent application. Therefore, in determining infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, the prior art must be examined to
assure that the range of equivalents being asserted does not en-
croach upon subject matter in the prior art.421 This examination
necessarily involves consideration of not only what the prior art
would have anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102, but also what the
prior art would have made obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, at the
time the patent application was filed.
With respect to the requisite prior art analysis, the district
court in the case of We Care had observed that the none of the
relevant prior art references "identically disclosed" every element of
the patent claims, as "extended" by the doctrine of equivalents. The
Federal Circuit found that the district court's prior art analysis did
not go far enough, since the district court failed to consider whether
the teachings of the prior art would have made obvious the range of
equivalents being asserted for the patent claims.422 The Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court had erred by not consider-
ing, in an obviousness context, whether a range of equivalents broad
418. 930 F.2d 1567, 18 USPQ2D 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
419. Id. at 1563.
420. We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l Corp., et al., 741 F. Supp. 743, 14 USPQ2D 1804
(D. Minn. 1989).
421. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 685, 14
USPQ2D 1942, 1949 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
422. We-Care, Inc., 18 USPQ2D at 1565.
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enough to find infringement was permissible. 23
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary in-
junction and remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the range of equivalents sought by the patent owner en-
croached upon the prior art. 24
D. Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Design Patent
Infingement Requires a Finding That the Novelty in
the Patented Design Has Been Appropriated and
That the Ordinary Observer Would Be Deceived
In the case of Oakley, Inc. v. International Tropic-Cal, Inc."5
the District Court had granted a preliminary injunction enjoining
the alleged infringer from infringing a design patent. The alleged
infringer appealed the injunction.426
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that under Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a preliminary injunction must
be supported by findings of facts.427 The test of the adequacy of the
findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and perti-
nent to the issue to form a basis for the decision. 428
In the case of a design patent, proof of infringement requires a
showing that an ordinary observer would be deceived in a manner
that would induce the observer to purchase the accused device sup-
posing it to be the patented design.429 In addition to overall similar-
ity of design, the accused device must also appropriate the novelty
in the patented design which distinguishes it from the prior art.430
In Oakley, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had
failed to make any explicit findings regarding these facts.431 The
district court had made no express or implied finding that the pat-
ent owner was likely to be able to prove at trial that the alleged
infringer's products infringed the patent.432 Because the district
court's findings of fact were insufficient for proper review of the
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. 923 F.2d 167, 17 USPQ2D 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
426. Id. at 1402.
427. Id. at 1403.
428. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 873, 228 USPQ 90, 98 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
429. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S.(14 Wal.) 511,, 20 L. Ed. 731 (1872).
430. Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., 853 F.2d 1557, 1565, 7 USPQ2D 1548,
1554 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 628, 223 USPQ
584, 590 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
431. Oakley, 17 USPQ2D at 1403.
432. Id.
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issues, the Federal Circuit vacated the District Court's preliminary
injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings."'
E. Likelihood of Success On the Merits Includes a Showing
That the Plaintiff Holds Title to the Patent
The inventor of the patented subject matter in the case of
Filmtec Corporation v. Allied-Signal Inc.4" 4 had been one of the
founders of the plaintiff corporation.43 Prior to founding the plain-
tiff corporation, the inventor had been employed at a non-profit re-
search organization.436
. The inventor's work at the non-profit research organization
had been carried out under a contract with the U.S. Government.
The contract required the non-profit research organization to grant
to the U.S. Government the entire right in any invention made
under the contract or any subcontract thereunder. The contract
further required the non-profit research organization to warrant
that it would obligate its employees to assign their rights in any
invention made under the contract to the non-profit research
organization.437
The inventor had left the non-profit research organization in
January of 1978. The subject patent application had been filed by
the inventor in February of 1979. The inventor assigned his rights
in the patent application to the plaintiff corporation. After the sub-
ject patent issued, the plaintiff corporation sued the alleged infringer
for infringement.438
The alleged infringer asserted that the invention claimed in the
patent had been made by the inventor while employed by the non-
profit research organization. The alleged infringer asserted that,
under the contract between the non-profit research organization
and the Government, the Government held legal title to the inven-
tion and therefore the inventor had no rights to assign to the plain-
tiff. Since the plaintiff lacked legal title to the patent, the plaintiff
had no standing to bring an infringement action under the
patent.439
The district court concluded that, as a matter of law, even if
the invention had been made while the inventor had been employed
433. Id. at 1404.
434. 939 F.2d 1568, 19 USPQ2D 1508 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
435. Id. at 1509.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1510.
439. Filmtec, 19 USPQ2D at 1510.
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at the non-profit research organization, the Government could have
no more than equitable title to the patent, which equitable title
could not be asserted as a defense by the alleged infringer.' 0 The
district court issued a preliminary injunction against the alleged in-
fringer, and the alleged infringer appealed.
The Federal Circuit viewed the issue on appeal as not who
should ultimately be held to have title to the patent, but instead
whether the plaintiff had made a sufficient showing to establish rea-
sonable likelihood of success on the merits, which included a show-
ing that title to the patent was held by the plaintiff.41
The Federal Circuit agreed with the alleged infringer that if the
subject matter of the patent had been invented by the inventor dur-
ing his employment with the non-profit research organization, and
if the inventor had granted the non-profit research organization
rights in the invention made during his employment, then the in-
ventor had nothing to give to the plaintiff and the purported assign-
ment to the plaintiff was a nullity." 2 Consequently, the plaintiff
would lack both title to the patent and standing to bring the present
action.443
However, the record did not indicate whether the employment
agreement between the inventor and the non-profit research organi-
zation either granted or required the inventor to grant to the non-
profit research organization the rights to the patented invention. 4'
The Federal Circuit was therefore unable to determine who held
legal title to the patent and was unable to determine if the plaintiff
could make a sufficient legal showing to establish the likelihood of
success necessary to support a preliminary injunction." 5
Because the record left serious doubts as to who had title to the
patent, the Federal Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits on the
title issue. Consequently, the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of
the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court for
further proceedings." 6
440. Id. at 1511.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 1512.
444. Filmtec, 19 USPQ2D at 1512.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 1513.
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XII. DAMAGES - 35 U.S.C. § 284
A. A Party Seeking to Recover Money Damages for Patent
Infringement Must Have Held Legal Title to the
Patent During the Time of the Infingement
The assignee of the subject patent in the case of Arachnid, Inc.
v. Merit Industries, Inc.' 7 had entered into a consulting agreement
in 1980. The consulting agreement provided that any inventions
conceived by the consultant's employees in the course of the project
covered by the agreement would be the property of the patent as-
signee, and all rights to the invention "will be assigned" by the con-
sultant to the patent assignee.44
In November, 1982, several months after the consulting agree-
ment was terminated, the consultant's employees filed an applica-
tion for the subject patent. However, instead of assigning the patent
application to the patent assignee, the consultant's employees as-
signed the patent application to the consultant. 9
In April, 1983, the patent assignee sued the consultant for
breach of the 1980 consulting agreement, seeking an assignment of
all right, title, and interest in the patent application (from which the
subject patent had subsequently issued) that had been filed by the
consultant's employees.450
In April, 1987, the district court declared the patent assignee
to have been and to be the lawful owner of all right, title, and inter-
est in and to the patented invention since the conception of the in-
vention.451 The district court ordered the consultant to assign all its
right, title, and interest in the patent to the patent assignee.452
In October, 1987, in accordance with the district court order,
the consultant executed an assignment of all of its right, title, and
interest in and to the patent to the patent assignee.453 The assign-
ment did not include any assignment of the right to recover for past
infringement.454
Meanwhile, in May, 1985, the consultant had granted a nonex-
clusive license to practice the patented invention to the alleged in-
447. 939 F.2d 1574, 19 USPQ2D 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
448. Id. at 1515.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Arachnid, 19 USPQ2D at 1516.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
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fringer.455 Beginning in December, 1985, and ending in June, 1986,
the alleged infringer had manufactured and sold a device which ad-
mittedly fell within the scope of the patent claims. 456
In June, 1989, the patent assignee sued the alleged infringer in
district court, seeking to recover money damages based upon the
alleged infringer's sales of the accused device in the 1985-86 pe-
riod.4 57 The patent assignee moved for a directed verdict on the
issue of infringement. The district court granted the patent as-
signee's motion, directing a verdict of infringement and assessing
money damages.458 The alleged infringer appealed from the district
court's final judgment.
On appeal, the issue was whether the patent assignee had
standing to sue for money damages for infringement that occurred
in 1985-86.4
The alleged infringer argued that the patent assignee did not
have standing to sue for an infringement that had occurred in 1985-
86.' s The alleged infringer asserted that until October 1987 (when
the consultant assigned the patent to the patent assignee), the patent
assignee had only "equitable title" to the patent, not "legal title,"
and that such equitable title alone was not sufficient to confer stand-
ing to sue for money damages for infringement.461
The patent assignee argued that it had acquired all legal and
equitable rights to the patented invention when the consultant
signed the consulting agreement in 1980.462 The patent assignee
had therefore always been the legal and equitable owner of the pat-
ented invention, and on that basis the patent assignee had standing
to sue the alleged infringer for the infringement occurring in 1985-
86.463
The Federal Circuit noted initially that an action to recover
money damages for patent infringement is an action "at law,"
rather than an action "in equity."' 464 The general rule is that one
seeking to recover money damages for patent infringement must
have held the legal title to the patent during the time of the
455. Arachnid, 19 USPQ2D at 1515.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 1516.
459. Id.
460. Arachnid, 19 USPQ2D at 1516.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. An example of an action "in equity" is an action seeking an injunction for patent
infringement.
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infringement.465
The Federal Circuit found that the 1980 consulting agreement
was merely an agreement to assign, rather than an assignment."6
The statement in the agreement that all rights to inventions devel-
oped during the consulting period "will be assigned" to the patent
assignee was not a present assignment of an existing invention and
was not effective to transfer all legal rights to the patent assignee.
The patent assignee therefore did not obtain legal title to the patent
until October 1987, when the consultant executed an assignment of
all of its right, title, and interest in and to the patent to the patent
467assignee.
The Federal Circuit further found that the 1987 district court
order decreeing the patent assignee to have been the owner of the
invention since the invention's conception may have validated the
patent assignee's right to seek equitable relief against the consultant.
However, the 1987 district court order did not retroactively divest
the consultant of legal title to the patent during the 1985-86
timeframe and revest that legal title in the patent assignee for stand-
4681ing purposes.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court
had erred in directing a verdict of infringement in favor of the pat-
ent assignee, and reversed the judgment of the district court.4 69
B. A Reasonable Royalty Under 35 U.S.C. § 284 Is Not
Restricted to a Specific Figure Put Forth By One of the
Parties
The accused product in the case of SmithKline Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corporation470 had been held to infringe
465. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 67 L. Ed. 516,43
S. Ct. 254 (1923). An exception to the general rule is recognized where the assignment of a
patent is coupled with an assignment of a right of action for past infringement. Another
exception to the general rule has been recognized which confers standing upon non-patent
owners to join in infringement suits as co-plaififfs with the patentee; see, eg., Kalman v.
Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 16 USPQ2D 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (sole licensee with clearly
defined nexus to patentee); Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 223 USPQ 369 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (exclusive vendor of patented product), cerL denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S. Ct. 1844, 85
L. Ed. 2d 143 (1985).
466. Arachnid, 19 USPQ2D at 1518.
467. Id. at 1519.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 1519.
470. 926 F.2d 1161, 17 USPQ2D 1922 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also SmithKline Diagnos-
tics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 891, 8 USPQ2D 1468, 1479 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
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the patent.471 The district court had concluded that the patentee
had failed to establish the requirements for a damage award based
upon lost profits.472
The district court turned to the alternative damage remedy
available under 35 U.S.C. § 284, namely, the calculation of damages
based upon a "reasonable royalty".473 The district court entered a
"reasonable royalty" damage award based upon a 25% royalty for
the infringer's sales of infringing goods.474
The patentee appealed the judgment of the district court, urg-
ing that the district court had wrongly denied the patentee a greater
amount calculated on the basis of the patentee's lost profits. The
infringer cross-appealed, asserting that the district court's award
based on the 25% royalty figure could not be upheld because this
figure was not specifically advocated by either party.475 The in-
fringer asserted that the district court should have entered a "rea-
sonable royalty" damage award based on only a 3% royalty figure,
since this was the royalty figure at which the infringer had licensed
other, similar products. 76
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the amount of a pre-
vailing party's damages is a finding of fact.477 Consequently, if the
amount of a prevailing party's damages is fixed by the district court,
then the damage award is reviewed in accordance with the "clearly
erroneous" standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).478
The Federal Circuit then affirmed the district court's finding
that the patentee had failed to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, its entitlement to recover its lost profits as actual
damages.479
With respect to the district court's determination of a reason-
able royalty, the Federal Circuit ruled that a district court is not
restricted in finding a reasonable royalty to a specific figure put
forth by one of the parties.480 The district court may reject the
figures proffered by the parties and may substitute an intermediate
figure as a matter of the district court's judgment based upon all of
471. SmithKline, 17 USPQ2D at 1923.
472. Id. at 1924.
473. Id.
474. SmithKline Diagnostics Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 12 USPQ2D 1375 (E.D.
Tex. 1989).
475. SmithKline, 17 USPQ2D at 1924.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 1925.
479. Id.
480. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co., 788 F.2d at 1556-57, 229 USPQ at 433 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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the evidence.481
In SmithKline, the record showed that the infringer had en-
tered licenses for products similar to the infringing product at roy-
alty rates as low as 3% and 5%.482 However, the record also
showed that the infringer had competed with lower priced competi-
tors than the patentee. Furthermore, the evidence showed that the
patented product had achieved immediate commercial success, that
the patented product had satisfied a long felt need, that the patentee
had never licensed the patented technology, and that the patentee
had intended to maintain its exclusivity of the patented technology
by refusing to grant licenses under the patent.483
The Federal Circuit concluded that the finding of 25% as a
reasonable royalty had been based on all of the evidence and was
not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the 25% royalty as reasonable.484
C. Lost Profit Damages Must Be Based on Infringing Sales
The subject patent in the case of Standard Havens Products,
Inc. v. Gencor Industries, Inc.485 was directed to a "counterflow"
method of producing asphalt compositions.48 6 The patentee had
charged the alleged infringer with contributing to or inducing in-
fringement of the patent via the sale of the alleged infringer's
asphalt-producing "Ultraplant," which plant allegedly performed
the claimed "counterflow" method.48 7
The district court found that the alleged infringer had contrib-
uted to and induced infringement of the patent, and that the paten-
tee had suffered lost profit damages.488 The district court based the
amount of lost profit damages upon the alleged infringer's sale of
ten asphalt plants. 8 9 Judgment was entered against the alleged in-
fringer, and the alleged infringer appealed.
On appeal, the alleged infringer argued that the damage award
should be vacated because the patentee had never bid on two of the
ten asphalt plant sales used to calculate the damage award.4 90
481. SmithKline, 17 USPQ2D at 1926.
482. Id. at 1928.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 1928.
485. 953 F.2d 1360, 21 USPQ2D 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
486. Id. at 1323.
487. Id. at 1324.
488. Id. at 1325.
489. Id.
490. Standard Havens, 21 USPQ2D at 1325.
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However, the Federal Circuit found that there were no acceptable
noninfringing substitutes for asphalt plants that used the patented
"counterflow" process.491 Consequently, it was not of controlling
significance that the patent owner did not bid on every one of the
infringing sales, since this fact did not show that the patentee could
not or would not have made those sales if the infringer had not
infringed.492 Thus, the Federal Circuit did not view the fact that
the patentee had not bid on two of the ten asphalt plant sales in-
cluded in the damage award as a basis for overturning the award.493
The alleged infringer further argued that four of the ten asphalt
plant sales were improperly included in the damage award, since
three of the sales were of noninfringing asphalt plants, and one sale
had been made to a foreign customer located in England.494
Regarding the three noninfringing asphalt plant sales, the pat-
entee argued that the alleged infringer's bids for those sales had in-
cluded the infringing "counterflow" asphalt plant, and it was only
after the bid had been accepted that the alleged infringer substituted
a noninfringing "parallel flow" asphalt plant.495 Because of that
substitution, the patentee contended that it had lost sales of its
"counterflow" asphalt plant.496 However, because an infringing
"counterflow" asphalt plant had never actually been sold, the Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that there had been no direct infringement
and, therefore, no contributory infringement.497
Regarding the sale to the foreign customer, the patentee as-
serted that the sale had been made in the U.S. However, the Fed-
eral Circuit observed that the patent claimed a method for
producing asphalt, not an apparatus for implementing that process.
Consequently, the sale in the U.S. of the unpatented apparatus
alone did not make the alleged infringer a contributory infringer of
the patented method.4 98
Moreover, there was no evidence that the foreign customer had
used the asphalt plant in the U.S., or that the foreign customer had
shipped products back to the U.S. made abroad by the patented
491. Id.
492. Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 222 USPQ 4 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
493. Standard Havens, 21 USPQ2D at 1326.
494. Id. at 1328.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 1329.
497. Porter v. Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 884, 229 USPQ 814, 815 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
498. Standard Havens, 21 USPQ2D at 1330.
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process. 99 Consequently, infringement by the foreign customer
had not been shown and, in the absence of direct infringement,
there can be no inducement of infringement or contributory
infringement.5°°
The Federal Circuit therefore vacated the patent damage
award and remanded the case for redetermination of the proper
award for lost profits based on the six infringing asphalt plant
sales.50
1
D. A Patent Owner Establishing All Four Panduit
Requirements Has Sustained the Burden of Proving
Entitlement to Lost Profits for All Infringing Sales
Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a district court is required to award
damages adequate to compensate the patent owner for infringe-
ment, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty. Generally, in
determining whether a patent owner is entitled to obtain damages
for lost profits caused by the infringement, the district court must
conclude (1) that the patent owner would have made the sales of the
patented product but for the occurrence of the infringement, and (2)
that proper evidence supporting the computation of lost profits was
presented at trial. ° 2
The only specific test approved by the Federal Circuit in deter-
mining whether a patent owner is entitled to obtain damages for lost
profits caused by the infringement was introduced in the case of
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works, Inc..o The Panduit
test has four requirements. To obtain damages for lost profits, the
patent owner must prove (1) a demand for the patented product, (2)
the marketing and manufacturing capability to exploit the demand,
(3) an absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes for the pat-
ented product, and (4) the amount of profit which the patent owner
would have made."°
During the accounting phase of litigation in the case of Kauf-
man Company, Inc. v. Lantech, Inc."' the district court, applying
499. Id.
500. Id. at 1331.
501. Id. at 1332.
502. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 863, 226 USPQ 402,409 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 89 L.Ed. 2d 312, 106 S.Ct. 1197 (1986).
503. 575 F.2d 1152, 197 USPQ 726 (6th Cir. 1978).
504. Id. at 730.
505. 926 F.2d 1136, 17 USPQ2D 1828 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The Federal Circuit had previ-
ously affirmed a judgment of willful infringement. Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d
970, 1 USPQ2D 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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the Panduit test, had concluded that the patent owner was entitled
to lost profit damages for only 8 of 44 infringing sales.506 The dis-
trict court had concluded that lost profit damages should not be
awarded for 36 of the infringing sales because the third Panduit ele-
ment had not been satisfied for these sales (i.e., the patent owner
had failed to show an absence of acceptable noninfringing substi-
tutes for these 36 infringing sales).5" 7 This finding was based on the
fact that the patent owner had presented specific evidence of the
absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes for 8 of the infring-
ing sales, but had failed to present specific evidence of the absence
of acceptable noninfringing substitutes for the remaining 36 infring-
ing sales.50 Because the district court found that acceptable nonin-
fringing substitutes for the patented product did exist, the court
denied lost .profit damages for 36 of the 44 infringing sales.509
On appeal, a threshold issue was whether the district court had
applied the correct rule of law in finding that there existed accepta-
ble noninfringing substitutes for the patented product.510
The Federal Circuit noted that to be deemed acceptable, a non-
infringing substitute must not have a disparately higher price than,
or possess characteristics significantly different from, the patented
product.5 1 In Kaufman, the allegedly noninfringing substitutes did
not possess all of the beneficial characteristics of the patented prod-
uct, nor were they priced as low as the patented product.5 12 The
district court therefore erred when it concluded that the allegedly
noninfringing substitutes were "acceptable" noninfringing substi-
tutes.5 3 The district court should have found that there were no
acceptable noninfringing substitutes, and therefore should have
found that all four factors of the Panduit test had been satisfied.5 14
The Federal Circuit further ruled that because the patent
owner had established all four Panduit requirements, the patent
owner had sustained the burden of proving entitlement to lost prof-
its for all infringing sales.51 5 In other words, because all four
506. Kaufman, 17 USPQ2D at 1829.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 1830.
510. Id.
511. Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 553, 222 USPQ 4, 7
(Fed.Cir. 1984).
512. Kaufman, 17 USPQ2D at 1830.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 1832.
515. See, eg., Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604,
616,222 USPQ 654, 663 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038, 83 L. Ed. 2d 405, 105 S. Ct.
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Panduit requirements were satisfied, it was reasonable to infer that
the patent owner probably would have made all 44 of the infringing
sales but for the occurrence of the infringement.516 The burden
should then be placed upon the infringer to show that it is unrea-
sonable to infer that some or all of the infringing sales probably
caused the patent owner to suffer lost profits. Any doubts regarding
the calculatory precision of the damage amount are resolved against
the infringer.5 17
According to the Federal Circuit, the reasonableness of the in-
ference that the patent owner probably would have made all 44 of
the infringing sales was not negated by evidence showing a cus-
tomer preference for the infringer's services over those of the patent
owner. 18 Nor was the reasonableness of the inference negated by
the patent owner's admission that it would not have competed with
the infringer for every one of the 44 infringing sales. 19
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded this case for the
district court to calculate and award to the patent owner those prof-
its lost on all 44 infringing sales. 20
E. Damages May Not Be Increased Under the Second
Paragraph of 35 U.S. C. § 284 to Rectify a Perceived
Inadequacy in an Actual Damage Award
The infringer in the case of Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England
Printing and Lithographing Co.52 had intentionally destroyed evi-
dence, thereby hindering the patentee in proving infringement and
making it more difficult to accurately determine the actual damages.
The district court decided to triple the damage award, explaining
that the damage award was tripled not as a penalty, but to provide
the patentee with adequate compensation for the infringement.522
516 (1984). The patent owner is only required to show that there was a "reasonable
probability" that it would have made the infringing sales but for the occurrence of the in-
fringement. The patent owner is not required to negate every possibility that a purchaser
might not have bought another product other than the patented product absent the infringe-
ment. Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 554, 222 USPQ 4, 8 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
516. The inference that the patent owner probably would have made all of the 44 infring-
ing sales but for the occurrence of the infringement was also compelled by the fact that the
patent owner and the infringer were the only two suppliers competing in the market. Lam,
Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065, 219 USPQ 670, 675 (Fed.Cir. 1983).
517. Id.
518. Kaufman, 17 USPQ2D at 1832.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. 923 F.2d 1576, 17 USPQ2D 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
522. Id.
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The principal issue on appeal was whether the district court
had improperly tripled the damages on the theory that the increased
award was necessary to adequately compensate the patentee for the
infringement. 523
The Federal Circuit noted that the provision of the patent laws
governing the award of damages for infringement is 35 U.S.C.
§ 284.524 The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 284 requires the dis-
trict court to award damages "adequate to compensate for the in-
fringement." The second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 284 authorizes
the district court to increase the damages up to threefold. The stat-
ute does not state the basis upon which a district court may increase
damages. However, case authority states that increased damages
may be awarded only as a penalty for an infringer's willful infringe-
ment or bad faith. 525
The Federal Circuit held that the adequacy of the damage
award must be measured by actual damages pursuant to the first
paragraph of § 284, rather than by increased damages pursuant to
the second paragraph of § 284.26 If, as in Beatrice, the infringer's
own conduct makes it difficult or impossible for the patentee to ac-
curately determine the actual damages, then a district court may
resolve all doubts against the infringer and determine the actual
damages based upon the best available evidence. 527 However, a dis-
trict court may not increase the actual damage award under 35
U.S.C. § 284, second paragraph, in order to rectify what the district
court views as an inadequacy in the actual damage award.5 2  A
district court may increase the actual damage award under 35
U.S.C. § 284, second paragraph, only as a penalty for an infringer's
willful infringement or bad faith.529
The Federal Circuit in Beatrice therefore affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court insofar as it awarded actual damages, but
523. The case was before the district court on remand from the Federal Circuit for the
purpose of determining the patentee's damages. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England
Printing and Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1176, 14 USPQ2D 1020, 1024 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
524. Beatrice, 17 USPQ2D at 1554.
525. Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277, 227 USPQ 352, 358
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 474-75, 213 USPQ 1061,
1070-71 (10th Cir.), cer. denied, 456 U.S. 1007, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1302, 102 S. Ct. 2298 (1982).
526. Beatrice, 17 USPQ2D at 1556.
527. Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065, 219 USPQ 670, 675 (Fed.
Cir. 1983):
528. Beatrice, 17 USPQ2D at 1557.
529. Id.
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vacated the judgment insofar as it awarded increased damages.53 °
F. A Reduction of Lost Profit Damages Can Not Be Based
Solely on Market Share
The district court in the case of Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin- Wiley
Corp. 531 had found the infringer liable for patent infringement. In
assessing damages, the district court had found that no acceptable
non-infringing substitutes for the patented product existed in the
relevant market.532 The district court had further found that, in the
absence of the infringing sales, the patentee would have possessed
an 80% market share.533 The district court therefore awarded the
patentee damages for lost profits on only 80% of the infringing
sales.534 The patentee appealed the judgment on the grounds that
the district court had erred as a matter of law in reducing the dam-
age award by 20%.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that the district court
had erred. The Federal Circuit stated that the mere existence of a
competing product in the market does not necessarily make that
product an "acceptable substitute." For example, a competing
product which lacks the advantages of the patented product is not
an acceptable substitute to a customer seeking those advantages.536
Consequently, merely because a share of the market is held by com-
petitors, it does not necessarily follow that acceptable non-infring-
ing substitutes exist in the market. 537
The Federal Circuit further stated that in determining whether
a reduced damage award for lost profits is justified, the controlling
issue is not whether there are other competitors in the market, but
instead whether such competitors sell an acceptable non-infringing
substitute.538 The district court had found that there were no com-
petitors selling an acceptable non-infringing substitute, and this
finding was not clearly erroneous.5 39 Thus, the patentee should
530. Id. at 1557.
531. 939 F.2d 1540, 19 USPQ2D 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
532. Id. at 1434.
533. Id.
534. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wley'Corp., 721 F. Supp. 28, 13 USPQ2D 1192
(Conn. June 26, 1989, Aug. 21, 1989).
535. Id. at 1435.
536. Id. at 1436.
537. TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901, 229 USPQ 525, 529 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 93 L. Ed. 2d 117, 107 S. Ct. 183 (1986); Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v.
MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1556, 229 USPQ 431, 432-33 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
538. Uniroyal, 19 USPQ2D at 1437.
539. Id.
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have been awarded a profit on all of the infringing sales."4 The
district court's reduction of lost profits based solely on market share
was inconsistent with the finding of an absence of acceptable non-
infringing substitutes. 41
The Federal Circuit therefore vacated and remanded for the
entry of a judgment for damages reflecting the patentee's lost profits
on all of the infringing sales.5 42
G. A District Court Determination Denying Enhanced
Damages May Not Be Overturned Absent A Clear
Showing of Abuse of Discretion
After finding infringement, the district court in the case of
State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. 141 had awarded the
patentee lost profits on some infringing sales and a royalty on the
remaining sales." 4 The district court had also found that the in-
fringement had not been willful and had denied enhanced damages
under 35 U.S.C. § 284. as
The Federal Circuit had affirmed the district court's judgment
insofar as it had awarded lost profits and a royalty.5 46 The Federal
Circuit had vacated the district court's judgment insofar as it had
denied increased damages, and remanded to the district court to
reconsider whether a finding of willful infringement and enhanced
damages was justified.547
On remand, the district court concluded that a finding of will-
ful infringement and enhanced damages was not justified, and en-
tered an order denying them.5 48 Because the district court's order
left its damage award unchanged, the patentee appealed.
The patentee argued on appeal that the district court's failure
to find willfulness was clearly erroneous, and that the district court
had erred in not awarding enhanced damages.5 9
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a district court's
analysis of whether to increase damages is a two-step process. First,
the district court must determine whether willful infringement has
540. Id.
541. Id. at 1438.
542. Id. at 1439.
543. 948 F.2d 1573, 20 USPQ2D 1738 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
544. Id. at 1739.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 1740.
548. State Industries, 20 USPQ2D at 1740.
549. Id.
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been proven. Second, if the district court finds that willful infringe-
ment has been proven, then it must still determine whether or not,
under the totality of the circumstances, increased damages are war-
ranted. 50 This determination is committed to the sound discretion
of the district court.55 ' A finding of willfulness, though a sufficient
basis for an award of enhanced damages, does not compel such an
award. 5 2 The district court's determination may not be overturned
absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. 3
The Federal Circuit found that the patentee in State Industries
was unable to point to any basis on which clear error in the district
court's willfulness finding could be shown.554 Moreover, even if the
finding of no willfulness was overturned, that would not mandate
reversal of the district court's discretionary decision to deny en-
hanced damages.5 5
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing enhanced damages, the Federal Circuit affirmed. And because
the Federal Circuit found the patentee's appeal to be frivolous as
filed and as argued, the Federal Circuit imposed sanctions pursuant
to Fed.R.App.P. 38.56
XIII. A'1TORNEY FEES - 35 U.S.C. § 285
A. Restitution of Fee Award Under 35 U.S.C. § 285 May Be
Inferred From Appellate Opinion
The district court in the case of Sun-Tek Industries, Inc. v.
Kennedy Sky Lites, Inc. 557 had originally held that no "exceptional
case" under 35 U.S.C. § 285 had been established, and had entered
final judgment.5 58 Seven months later, the District Court reversed
its determination and entered an amended final judgment which
awarded the plaintiff attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.15 ' The
defendant appealed to the Federal Circuit and challenged the dis-
trict court's authority to reverse its original final judgment and
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 542-43, 16 USPQ2d 1622,
1625-26 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2017, 114 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1991).
553. State Industries, 20 USPQ2D at 1740.
554. Id. at 1742.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. 929 F.2d 676, 18 USPQ2D 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
558. Id. at 1333.
559. Id.
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enter an amended final judgment awarding attorney fees." 6
While that appeal had been pending, the defendant had been
unable to maintain the bond required by the district court in order
to stay execution of the amended final judgment.5 61 As a result, the
plaintiff had satisfied the amended final judgment against the de-
fendant through execution on the proceeds of a sale of the defend-
ant's assets.562
Thereafter, the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court had
been without jurisdiction and authority to reverse its original final
judgment . 63 The Federal Circuit vacated that portion of the dis-
trict court's amended final judgment which had awarded attorney
fees to the plaintiff. 5"
The district court then determined that the mandate of the
Federal Circuit did not include any stated requirement to order the
plaintiff to make restitution of the attorneys' fees awarded in the
amended final judgment.565 The district court therefore ruled that
(1) the plaintiff did not have to repay the attorney fees it had re-
ceived pursuant to the amended final judgment, and (2) the pro-
ceedings in the district court following the amended final judgment
supported a new finding of an "exceptional case" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 entitling the plaintiff to additional attorney fees.5 66 The de-
fendant appealed both rulings of the district court.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the district
court may have been technically correct in stating that the Federal
Circuit's mandate did not include an explicit requirement to order
restitution. 67 However, the Federal Circuit's prior opinion had
held that the district court did not have authority to amend its orig-
inal final judgment, and that the district court's reversal of the origi-
nal final judgment had been improper. 568 Consequently, the award
of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 after the original final judg-
ment had been entered had been a nullity.569 The Federal Circuit
concluded that, under these circumstances, the district court had
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Sun-Tek, 18 USPQ2D at 1333.
563. Id. at 1333-34.
564. See Sun-Tek Indus., Inc. v. Kennedy Sky Lites, Inc. et al., 848 F.2d 179, 6
USPQ2D 2017 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1009, 102 L. Ed. 2d 784, 109 S. Ct.
793 (1989).
565. Sun-Tek, 18 USPQ2D at 1334.
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id.
[Vol. 9
99 TENT LAW DEVELOPMET7
been given more than sufficient guidance to be able to infer the Fed-
eral Circuit's intention to order restitution. 70 Thus, under the Fed-
eral Circuit's previous holding that attorney fees were improperly
awarded, the Federal Circuit required the plaintiff to repay all it
had collected in the grant of attorney fees, plus interest to the date
of repayment.571  With respect to the district court's award of ad-
ditional attorney fees for the defendant's post-judgment conduct,
the Federal Circuit observed that a district court may properly
award attorney fees under § 285 to prevent "gross injustice" when a
party has litigated vexatiously 572
The district court had based its award of additional attorney
fees on the defendant's post-judgment litigation tactics, including
the defendant's violation of the bond reduction order and attempts
to defeat the plaintiff's execution on the amended final judgment.5 73
The district court had evaluated the defendant's post-judgment con-
duct in light of the defendant's previous litigation tactics.5 74
The Federal Circuit found that it was proper for the district
court to take into consideration the pattern established by the de-
fendant during the trial in determining whether the defendant's
post-judgment conduct had been vexatious.57 5 The Federal Circuit
could not say that the district court's conclusion that the defend-
ant's post-judgment actions were vexatious had been improper.576
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found that the district court's
award of additional attorney fees for post-judgment vexatious con-
duct had not been an abuse of discretion. 77
XIV. TIME LIMITATION ON DAMAGES - 35 U.S.C. § 286
A. A Patentee's Delay In Bringing Suit Does Not Alone
Create a Presumption of Prejudice
The patentee in the case of A. C. Aukerman Company v. R.L.
Chaides Construction Co. 578 had advised the accused infringer of the
570. Sun-Tek, 18 USPQ2D at 1334.
571. Id.
572. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1552, 13
USPQ2D 1301, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Machinery Corp. of America v. Gullfiber AB, 774
F.2d 467,227 USPQ 368 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 736 F.2d
688, 222 USPQ 97 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
573. Sun-Tek, 18 USPQ2D at 1335.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. 18 USPQ2D 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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alleged infringement in 1979.17' Essentially no further contact had
occurred between the parties for approximately eight and one-half
years."8 In 1988 the patentee filed suit for infringement.
The accused infringer responded by raising the defenses of
laches and estoppel. The accused infringer asserted that the paten-
tee's delay in filing suit had created a presumption that the delay
was unreasonable and prejudicial, and the burden of proving the
reasonableness of the delay or lack of prejudice was thereby shifted
to the patentee.5 8
1
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
accused infringer, holding that the doctrines of laches and estoppel
blocked the patentee's recovery of any damages.5" 2
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that 35 U.S.C. § 286 per-
mits a patentee to sue for damages even though the first act of in-
fringement had occurred more than six years prior to filing suit.58 3
However, in such a case, any damage award is limited to acts of
infringement which occurred within the preceding six years.5 84 The
Federal Circuit further observed that the issue of what presump-
tions arise from a patentee's delay exceeding the six year period of
§ 286 is a matter about which there is some confusion. 8
In the case of Cornetta v. United States5 86 (a non-patent case),
the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, emphasized that delay alone
does not constitute laches.58 7 The Federal Circuit rejected the idea
that a defendant asserting a laches defense can rely on a presump-
tion of prejudice, or shift the burden to the plaintiff to show lack of
prejudice, merely because the delay is long.588
However, in the case of Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc.,"9
the Federal Circuit stated that a delay of more than six years in
bringing an infringement action after the infringement is "noticed"
is a presumptively unreasonable delay, and a patentee who waits for
579. Id. at 1625.
580. Id.
581. See, for example, Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 839 F.2d 1544, 5
USPQ2d 1779 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988).
582. A.C. Aukerman, 18 USPQ2D at 1625.
583. Id. at 1622.
584. "Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any infringe-
ment committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for
infringement in the action." 35 U.S.C. § 286.
585. A.C. Aukerman, 18 USPQ2D at 1622.
586. 851 F.2d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. 726 F.2d 734, 220 USPQ 845 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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more than six years before filing suit must explain the delay.590 If
the patentee fails to explain the delay, then a district court may find
that the period of time alone to be sufficient evidence of undue de-
lay.5 91 Moreover, a delay of six years raises a presumption of mate-
rial injury, and places on the patentee the additional burden of
proving a lack of injury to the infringer caused by the delay.5 92
In Aukerman, the Federal Circuit adopted the rule in Cornetta
and specifically rejected the notion that a presumption of prejudice
arises due to the mere fact that the patentee delayed bringing
suit.5 93 The Federal Circuit ruled that prejudice requires a showing
that the patentee's delay was both unreasonable and inexcusable.5 94
Furthermore, the burden of proof in establishing the defenses of
laches and estoppel remains with the accused infringer who alleges
the defenses.5 95
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the district court
had erred in placing the burden on the patentee to rebut the pre-
sumption of prejudice, and had erred in concluding that the paten-
tee was barred by the defenses of laches or estoppel.5 96 Accord-
ingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment
and remanded.
(Subsequent to rendering the above decision in the case of A. C.
Aukerman Company v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., the Federal
Circuit vacated the decision and granted a rehearing.)5 97
XV. REQUEST FOR REEXAMINATION - 35 U.S.C. § 302
A. Extrinsic Evidence May Be Considered In a
Reexamination to Explain the Meaning of a Reference
The subject patent in the case of In re Baxter Travenol Labs5 98
was directed to a system for collecting, processing and storing com-
ponents of blood. The claimed invention included a blood bag con-
taining DEHP, a plasticizer.5 99
The patentee had filed a request for reexamination based upon
a prior art article, written by an employee of the patentee, which
590. Id.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 850.
593. A.C. Aukerman, 18 USPQ2D at 1623-24.
594. Id. at 1624.
595. Id.
596. Id. at 1625.
597. Id.
598. 952 F.2d 388, 21 USPQ2D 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
599. Id. at 1283.
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described a blood bag system similar to the commercial blood bag
system produced by the patentee.6w At the time the prior art arti-
cle had been published, the commercial blood bag system produced
by the patentee contained a blood bag plasticized with DEHP. The
prior art article did not, however, contain any express mention of
DEHP.601
The patentee had discovered the prior art article during prepa-
ration for an interference proceeding. Testimony taken during the
interference proceeding was also submitted as part of the
reexamination. 2
The PTO Board concluded that, since the prior art article de-
scribed the patentee's commercial system, and the patentee's com-
mercial system utilized a DEHP plasticized blood bag, the skilled
artisan would understand the prior art article as describing a blood
bag plasticized with DEHP. Consequently, the Board found that
the prior art article anticipated the claimed invention under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b).603
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the dispositive question re-
garding anticipation was whether a skilled artisan would reasonably
understand or infer from the prior art article that the blood bag
described therein was plasticized with DEHP.04
The patentee argued that the testimony taken during the inter-
ference proceeding, upon which the Board had relied in affirming
the § 102(b) rejection, was extrinsic evidence which should not have
been considered in determining the anticipatory teachings of the
prior art article. 6°5 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
holding that extrinsic evidence may be considered when it is used to
explain, rather than to expand, the meaning of a reference. 1 6 In
the case of In re Baxter Travenol, the testimony taken during the
interference was used to identify the material employed in the pat-
entee's commercial blood bags, thereby explaining what the lan-
guage in the prior art article would have meant to the skilled
artisan.6°7 The testimony showed that the skilled artisan, reading
the prior art article, would have understood the article to be
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. Baxter, 21 USPQ2D at 1284.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576-77,
18 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
607. Baxter, 21 USPQ2D at 1284.
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describing a blood bag plasticized with DEHP °8
The patentee further argued that the skilled artisan would not
necessarily have thought that the blood bag disclosed in the prior
art article was plasticized with DE-IP, since there were other, non-
DEB? plasticizers available at the time the article had been pub-
lished.60 9 The Federal Circuit found this argument unpersuasive,
since the prior art article specifically described the patentee's com-
mercial blood bag, and the patentee's commercial blood bag was
known to be plasticized with DEHP.61 0 Consequently, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the prior art article disclosed all of the ele-
ments of the claimed invention, and this disclosure was unaffected
by the availability of other, alternative elements.61'
The Board's finding that the claims were anticipated by the
prior art article was therefore affirmed by the Federal Circuit.61 2
B. Claims Are Not Deemed Substantively Changed As a
Matter of Law When Amended During Reexamination
Following a Rejection Based on Prior Art
During reexamination of the subject patent in the case of Lai-
tram Corporation v. NEC Corporation,61 3 the examiner had rejected
the patent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and § 103 in view of
certain newly cited references. 14 In response to the rejection, the
patent owner had amended the claims and had pointed out how the
teachings of the references differed from the amended claims.615
The examiner allowed the claims, as amended.616
In a subsequent suit for patent infringement, the alleged in-
fringer asserted that because the amendment to the claims during
reexamination had been made to overcome a rejection based on
prior art, the amendment had been substantive as a matter of
law.617 Consequently, the patent owner could not recover damages
for the alleged infringement during the period between the date of
issuance of the original patent and the date of issuance of the reex-
amined patent, because the original and reexamined claims were not
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Baxter, 21 USPQ2D at 1284.
613. 952 F.2d 1357, 21 USPQ2D 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
614. Id. at 1277.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 1278.
617. Id.
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"identical" in scope, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 252.618
The patent owner responded by asserting that the amendment
to the claims during reexamination had been done to more particu-
larly define the invention, and that the words added by amendment
stated inherent details and did not change the scope of the
claims.
6 19
The district court did not decide the question of whether the
changes to the claims were in fact substantive, or discuss the scope
of the claims before and after amendment.620 The district court
ruled summarily that any amendment to overcome a rejection on
prior art is substantive as a matter of law.621 The district court's
grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the alleged infringer
was certified for immediate appeal.
On appeal, the issue was whether amendments made to patent
claims during reexamination of the patent are substantive as a mat-
ter of law, when the amendments are made following a rejection
based on prior art.6 22
The Federal Circuit initially noted that the word "identical" in
§ 252 does not mean verbatim.623 Instead, the word "identical" in
§ 252 means, at most, without substantive change. 624
The Federal Circuit noted further that the cases relied upon by
the alleged infringer were cases in which prosecution history estop-
pel limited application of the doctrine of equivalents.625 The Fed-
eral Circuit observed that each of these cases had been decided on
its particular facts, taking into account relevant evidence of the
specification, prosecution history, prior art, and other pertinent cir-
cumstances.62 6 Consequently, none of these cases supported theper
se rule urged by the alleged infringer.627
Thus, with respect to the issue of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents, Federal Circuit precedent had rejected the
proposition that any amendment to a claim acts as a per se estop-
618. Laitram, 21 USPQ2D at 1279.
619. Id. at 1281.
620. Id. at 1280.
621. Id.
622. Id. at 1278.
623. Laitram, 21 USPQ2D at 1279.
624. Seattle Box C. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 827-28, 221
USPQ 568, 575 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
625. Laitram, 21 USPQ2D at 1279.
626. Id.
627. Id.
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pel. 6 28 By analogy, in the case of Laitram, where the issue was sub-
stantive change on reexamination, the Federal Circuit similarly
declined to adopt a rule of per se estoppel.
The Federal Circuit held that when claims are amended during
reexamination following a rejection based on prior art, the claims
are not deemed substantively changed as a matter of law. Instead,
to determine whether a claim change is substantive, it is always nec-
essary to analyze the claims of the original and the reexamined pat-
ents in light of the particular facts, including the prior art, the
prosecution history, other claims, and any other pertinent
information.
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.629
XVI. DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A. The Proper Focus in Determining Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Is Whether the Plaintiff Has Pleaded the
Elements Required for a Patent Infringement Claim
The Official Gazette of the PTO had listed the subject patent in
the case of Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corporation 63
0
as being issued on September 19, 1989. On that same date the pat-
entee had filed suit against the alleged infringer in district court.631
However, for a substantial period of time after September 19,
1989 the patent document had not been printed, the patent grant
had not been signed by or on behalf of the Commissioner, the offi-
cial seal had not been affixed, a copy of the specification and claims
had not been available to the public, and access to the prosecution
history had been denied.632
Based upon these facts, the alleged infringer argued that the
subject patent had not in fact issued on September 19, 1989 and that
as of that date there had been no valid patent on which to sue. The
alleged infringer therefore moved to dismiss the infringement suit
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.633
The district court denied the alleged infringer's motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the alleged infringer
628. Hi-Life Products, Inc. v. American National Water-Mattress Corp., 842 F.2d 323,
325, 6 USPQ2d 1132, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
629. Laitram, 21 USPQ2D at 1281.
630. 935 F.2d 1263, 19 USPQ2D 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
631. Id. at 1061-62.
632. Id. at 1062.
633. Id.
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appealed.634
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that jurisdiction of the
district court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which grants the
district court original jurisdiction of any civil action "arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents." Jurisdiction under
§ 1338(a) exists when a well-pleaded complaint establishes that fed-
eral patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal patent law.635 Therefore, under the "wel-
pleaded complaint" rule, the proper focus in determining subject
matter jurisdiction is on whether the plaintiff actually pleaded the
elements required by the patent laws for a patent infringement
claim.
6 3 6
In Exxon, the Federal Circuit found that the patentee's com-
plaint had pleaded a valid patent infringement claim. This "well-
pleaded" complaint thereby established proper jurisdiction as a
matter of law. The alleged infringer's challenge to jurisdiction was,
in fact, directed only to the merits of a question of patent validity
(including the date of patent validity). This question of patent va-
lidity remained to be resolved at trial. The Federal Circuit therefore
held that the district court had correctly assumed jurisdiction under
§ 1338(a) on the basis of the well-pleaded complaint.637
B. A Post-filing Covenant Not to Sue May Be Considered In
Evaluating Whether an Actual Controversy Exists
The patentee in the case of Spectronics Corporation v. H.B.
Fuller Company, Inc.631 had sent a letter to various competitors,
including the alleged infringer, announcing the issuance of the sub-
ject patent. After receiving the letter, the alleged infringer had filed
suit against the patentee under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201, seeking a declaratory judgment that the patent was
invalid or not infringed by the alleged infringer.639
After suit had been fled, the patentee entered into a covenant
634. Id. at 1062-63.
635. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09, 7 USPQ2d
109, 1113 (1988).
636. Kunkel v. Topmaster International, Inc., 906 F.2d 693, 695, 15 USPQ2d 1367,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
637. Exxon, 19 USPQ2D at 1063.
638. 940 F.2d 631, 19 USPQ2D 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
639. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), provides in pertinent part: "In
a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction .... any court of the United States, upon
the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought."
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not to sue the alleged infringer for infringement of the patent
claims. The patentee also submitted the patent to the PTO for reis-
sue. The patentee then filed a motion to dismiss the alleged in-
fringer's complaint for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201
due to the absence of an "actual controversy." The district court
granted the patentee's motion to dismiss, and the alleged infringer
appealed.'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit initially observed that the exist-
ence of an "actual controversy" is an absolute requirement for
proper jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 1 In cases in which an
alleged infringer seeks a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity
or non-infringement, the courts apply a two-pronged test for deter-
mining whether an "actual controversy" exists. First, the accused
infringer must have actually produced or prepared to produce an
allegedly infringing product.' 2 Second, the patentee's conduct
must create an objectively reasonable apprehension on the part of
the accused infringer that the patentee will initiate suit if the alleg-
edly infringing activity continues."43
In the case of Spectronics, the alleged infringer argued that the
required apprehension that the patentee will initiate suit should be
determined at the time the complaint is filed, and that later events
(such as a patentee's covenant not to sue) can not influence the ju-
risdiction of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.6'
The Federal Circuit agreed that a party seeking a declaratory
judgment must plead facts sufficient to establish the existence of an
actual controversy at the time the complaint is filed, and that later
events may not create jurisdiction where none existed at the time
the complaint is filed. However, the Federal Circuit ruled that an
actual controversy must be present at all stages of review, not
merely at the time the complaint is filed, and that the burden is
upon the alleged infringer to establish that an actual controversy
existed at, and has continued since, the time the complaint was
640. Id. at 1547.
641. Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 840 F.2d 902, 905, 5
USPQ2d 1788, 1791 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
642. Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398-99, 222 USPQ 943,
949 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
643. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736, 6 USPQ2d
1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d
953, 955, 3 USPQ2d 1310, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Indium Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781
F.2d 879, 228 USPQ 845 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 93 L. Ed. 2d 37, 107 S.
Ct. 84 (1986).
644. Spectronics, 19 USPQ2D at 1548.
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In the case of Spectronics, the covenant not to sue, forever pre-
vented the patentee from asserting the patent claims against the al-
leged infringer, and the alleged infringer had thereby effectively
"won" the non-infringement case pleaded in its complaint. The
Federal Circuit concluded that the post-filing covenant not to sue
was properly considered by the district court in evaluating whether
an actual controversy existed. 46
The alleged infringer further argued that, irrespective of the
covenant not to sue, the potential grant of a reissue patent placed
the alleged infringer at risk of further litigation on the subject mat-
ter contained in the patent.' 47
However, the Federal Circuit found no guarantee that the reis-
sue patent would eventually issue. Moreover, even if the alleged
infringer could establish an objectively reasonable apprehension
that the patentee would initiate suit based upon the reissue patent,
the alleged infringer could not demonstrate that its present activity
was potentially infringing of any reissue patent claims, since no reis-
sue patent claims yet existed by which infringement could be
measured. 648
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of the dis-
trict court granting the patentee's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.' 49
C. A Grantee of All Substantial Patent Rights May Sue for
Infringement In Its Own Name Without Joining the
Patent Owner As a Party
The district court in the case of Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v.
Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A.65 o found that the subject patent had
been infringed. The infringer appealed, alleging that the suit should
have been dismissed because the plaintiff was a mere patent licensee
and could not maintain an infringement action without joining the
patent owner as a party.651
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a patent license gives
645. Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1549, 3 USPQ2d 1412, 1420
(Fed. Cir. 1987); International Medical Prosthetics Research Assocs. v. Gore Enter. Hold-
ings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 575, 229 USPQ 278, 281 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
646. Spectronics, 19 USPQ2D at 1551.
647. Id. at 1549.
648. Id.
649. Id. at 1551.
650. 944 F.2d 870, 20 USPQ2D 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
651. Id. at 1046.
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the licensee no title in the patent and no right to bring suit in its
own name for infringement. 65 2 If a licensee brings suit for infringe-
ment, then the licensee must join the patent owner as a party, so
that the possibility of two separate suits on the same patent against
a single infringer is eliminated. 653
Whether a particular transfer of patent rights constitutes an
assignment or a license is determined by the substance of the trans-
action, rather than by the name given to the transaction by the par-
ties.6 4 If it appears from the agreement and the surrounding
circumstances that the parties intended that the patent owner sur-
render all substantial rights to the invention, then the transfer will
be considered an assignment.6 55
In the case of Vaupel, the patent owner had transferred to the
plaintiff all but four rights to the invention.6 56 The Federal Circuit
concluded that none of these four rights reserved by the patent
owner was so substantial as to reduce the transfer to a mere license
or indicate an intent not to transfer all substantial rights. 65 7
One of the rights transferred by the patent owner to the plain-
tiff was the right to sue for infringement. Consequently, the Federal
Circuit found that the suit provided complete relief between the
plaintiff and the infringer, and there was no substantial risk that the
infringer would incur double obligations to both the patent owner
and the plaintiff. Therefore, the suit did not undermine the policy
of eliminating the possibility of two suits on the same patent against
a single inffinger.658
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the agreement
between the plaintiff and the patent owner, although not constitut-
ing a formal assignment, was a grant of all substantial rights and
permitted the plaintiff to sue without joining the patent owner. The
district court's ruling that the plaintiff had standing to sue for in-
fringement without joining the patent owner as a party was there-
652. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255, 34 L. Ed. 923, 11 S. Ct. 334 (1891).
653. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 38, 67 L. Ed. 516,
43 S. Ct. 254 (1923).
654. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 256.
655. Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1011, 152 USPQ 182,
184 (1967).
656. The patent owner retained: 1) a veto right on sublicensing by the plaintiff; 2) the
right to obtain patents on the invention in other countries; 3) a reversionary right to the
patent in the event of bankruptcy or termination of production by the plaintiff; and 4) a right
to receive infringement damages.
657. Vaupel, 20 USPQ2D at 1049.
658. Id.
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fore affirmed.65 9
D. A Member of the Public Who Perceives They Will Be
Harmed By an Issued Patent Which They Believe to
Be Invalid Does Not Necessarily Have Standing to
Sue
In the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,"0 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that non-naturally occurring man-made living microor-
ganisms fall within the definition of patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101.661 In the case of ExParteAllen,6 2 the PTO Board
applied Chakrabarty to hold that § 101 was not a bar to patentabil-
ity for a specific non-naturally occurring genetically altered strain of
polyploid oysters.663
Shortly after the Board's decision in Allen, the PTO had issued
a Rule which stated, in part, that the PTO "now considers non-
naturally occurring, non-human multicellular organisms, including
animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35
U.S.C. § 101. ' '664
In the case of Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg,65 various
plaintiffs (including nonprofit organizations whose goal is the pro-
tection of animals) had filed suit in district court challenging the
Rule on procedural and substantive grounds. The goal of these
plaintiffs was to stop issuance of patents for animals.
The PTO Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
The motion was granted by the district court, and the plaintiffs
appealed.666
In a first cause of action the plaintiffs had alleged that the Rule
declaring animals to be patentability subject matter exceeded the
659. Id.
660. 447 U.S. 303, 65 L. Ed. 2d 144, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
661. § 101 Inventions patentable
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, man-
ufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
662. 2 USPQ2D 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
See also Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985).
663. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
664. See 1077 Official Gazette 24 (April 21, 1987).
665. 932 F.2d 920, 18 USPQ2D 1677 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
666. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 710 F. Supp. 728, 9 USPQ2D 1816 (N.D.
Cal. 1989).
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authority delegated to the Commissioner under the patent statute.
As relief for this alleged violation, the plaintiffs sought a declaration
that animals are not patentable subject matter under § 101 and an
injunction against the issuance of any patents directed to animals.667
The plaintiffs had asserted essentially two types of personal in-
juries from the Commissioner's allegedly erroneous interpretation
of § 101: (1) having to pay increased costs in the form of royalties
on patented animals, and (2) suffering decreased profits because of
competition from more productive non-naturally occurring
animals.668
The Federal Circuit found that these alleged economic injuries
were highly speculative and not "fairly traceable" to the Commis-
sioner's allegedly erroneous interpretation of the statute. 669 The
Federal Circuit further found that the "zone of interests" of the
patent laws is not so broad as to encompass any member of the
public who perceives they will be harmed by an issued patent which
they believe to be invalid. The Federal Circuit therefore concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts sufficient to give them
standing to sue on the first cause of action.67
In a second cause of action the plaintiffs had asserted that the
PTO Commissioner had violated the Administrative Procedure Act
by failing to publish a notice of the proposed Rule in the Federal
Register, by failing to allow interested persons an opportunity to
submit public comment, and by failing to state the basis and pur-
pose of the Rule following consideration of public comment. 671 The
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the PTO from approving or issuing any
patents on multicellular living organisms, including animals, or tak-
ing any action to effectuate the Rule, until the PTO complied with
these procedural requirements. 672
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 96
S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
670. To establish standing to sue, a party must show (1) "that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct" (personal in-
jury), (2) that "the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action'" (causation), and (3)
that the injury "is likely too be redressed by a favorable decision" (effective relief). Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). In addition to these requirements for
standing, the Supreme Court has further limited standing to those parties within the "zone of
interests" a particular statute addresses. Air Courier Conference of America v. American
Postal Workers Union, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1125, 111 S. Ct. 913, 59 U.S.L.W. 4140, 4142 (Feb. 26,
1991).
671. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and (c).
672. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 18 USPQ2D at 1687.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that prior public no-
tice and comment regarding certain agency actions is required
under § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.67 However, no-
tice and public comment is not required for interpretative rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, proce-
dure, or practice.674
The Federal Circuit noted that the subject Rule clearly corre-
sponded with the interpretation of § 101 set out in Allen and
Chakrabarty. Thus, the Federal Circuit viewed the Rule as being
merely interpretative of previous valid administrative actions and
not representing a change in the law by the Commissioner. The
Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the Commissioner's Rule
fell within the "interpretative" exception to the § 553 public notice
and comment requirement, and that the plaintiffs consequently had
no standing to assert the second cause of action.
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's rul-
ing on the ground that the plaintiffs had lacked standing to sue.
E. Intervention Under Fed.R. Civ.P. 24(A)(2) Is Appropriate
Only Where Disposition of the Action May Impair the
Intervenor's Ability to Protect Its Interest
The subject patent in the case of Chapman v. Manbeck 675 had
lapsed because the patentee had failed to pay maintenance fees re-
quired under 35 U.S.C. § 41(b). The Commissioner had denied the
patentee's petition to reinstate the lapsed patent pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 41(c)(1). The patentee then filed an action under 5 U.S.C.
§ 701-06 in federal district court in Virginia to compel the Commis-
sioner to reinstate the patent. The Virginia district court ordered
the Commissioner to reinstate the patent.676
Previously, the patentee had filed suit against an accused in-
fringer in federal district court in New Jersey. Immediately after
the Virginia district court ordered the Commissioner to reinstate
the patent, the patentee amended the complaint in the New Jersey
suit to charge the accused infringer with infringement of the rein-
673. (b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Regis-
ter, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have
actual notice thereof in accordance with law ....
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments .... 5 U.S.C. § .553(b), (c).
674. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
675. 931 F.2d 46, 18 USPQ2D 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
676. Id. at 1566.
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stated patent. The New Jersey district court thereafter issued an
order preventing the accused infringer from raising a lapsed patent
defense against the new infringement claim.677
The accused infringer then moved to intervene as a third party
in the patentee's suit for reinstatement against the Commissioner in
the Virginia district court. The Virginia district court denied the
accused infringer's motion to intervene, and the accused infringer
appealed that denial to the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that intervention by third
parties is governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Under subsection (a), Rule 24 permits intervention of right:
"When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, un-
less the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.1678
The Federal Circuit found that the decision of the Virginia dis-
trict court ordering reinstatement of the patent was not binding
upon the New Jersey district court. If the New Jersey district court
prevented the accused infringer from raising a lapsed patent de-
fense, then the decision of the New Jersey district court could be
challenged by the accused infringer via an appeal to the Federal
Circuit. The Virginia district court action therefore did not impair
the accused infringer's ability to fully litigate its rights. Conse-
quently, the Virginia district court's denial of intervention did not
"impair or impede" the accused infringer's interest "as a practical
matter." 679
The Federal Circuit therefore affimed the Virginia district
court's denial of the accused infringer's motion to intervene.
F. Lear v. Adkins Does Not Override the Res Judicata Effect
of a Consent Judgment Declaring a Patent Valid
The subject patents in the case of Foster v. Hallco Manufactur-
ing Co., Inc. 680 had come into dispute between the same parties in
an prior infringement litigation. The parties had entered a settle-
ment agreement of that prior litigation, under which the alleged in-
677. Id.
678. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), [emphasis added].
679. The Federal Circuit additionally found that the Virginia district court had not
abused its discretion in denying permissive intervention. Chapman, 18 USPQ2D at 1565.
680. 947 F.2d 469, 20 USPQ2D 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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fringer had obtained a nonexclusive royalty bearing license under
the patents. The parties had terminated the prior litigation by the
entry of a consent judgment in which the alleged infringer had ac-
knowledged the validity and infringement of the patents. 681
About four years after entry of the consent judgment, the al-
leged infringer began producing and marketing new models of the
accused products. The alleged infringer took the position that the
new accused products did not infringe the patents in the license
agreement, and therefore the alleged infringer had no obligation to
pay royalties to the patentee on sales of the new accused products.
The patentee disagreed, taking the position that the new accused
products were covered by the license agreement, and demanded
royalty payments on the new accused products.682
The alleged infringer then filed suit, seeking a declaration that
the patents were invalid and unenforceable. The patentee moved
for partial summary judgment, on the ground that the alleged in-
fringer was precluded from raising the issues of validity and en-
forceability by reason of the consent judgement entered in the prior
litigation between the parties, which stated that the patents were
valid and enforceable. The alleged infringer responded by asserting
that the consent judgment was itself unenforceable because the con-
sent judgment was equivalent to an agreement not to challenge the
validity of a patent. The alleged infringer based its position on the
case of Lear v. Adkins, 6 s in which the Supreme Court held that
patent licensees are not precluded from challenging the validity of
licensed patents because of the federal policy favoring full and free
use of ideas in the public domain.
The district court held that the provision in the consent judg-
ment with respect to the validity and enforceability of the patents
contravened the federal patent policies recognized by the Supreme
Court in Lear v. Adkins and, thus, the consent judgment did not
preclude the alleged infringer from raising the issues of validity and
enforceability. 68 4
On appeal, the issue was whether the patent policy expressed in
Lear v. Adkins overrides the res judicata 685 effect which would
681. Id. at 1242.
682. Id.
683. 395 U.S. 653, 23 L. Ed. 2d 610, 89 S. Ct. 1902 (1969), 162 USPQ 1. Foster, 20
USPQ2D at 1244.
684. Foster, 20 USPQ2D at 1244.
685. Res judicata precludes the relitigation of a cause of action, or any possible defense
to the cause of action, which is ended by a judgment of the court. Res judicata applies
whether the judgment of the court is rendered after a trial and imposed by the court, or the
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otherwise result from a consent judgment which declared a patent
valid and enforceable.
The Federal Circuit observed that the issue considered by the
Supreme Court in Lear involved the right of a patent licensee to
challenge the validity of a licensed patent in a suit for royalties
under a contract. The issue therefore involved a conflict between
federal patent policy and state contract law. The Supreme Court in
Lear concluded that federal patent policy should prevail, and there-
fore ruled in favor of precluding restrictions on attacks on patent
validity.6 86
However, the Supreme Court in Lear did not deal with the
specific fact situation presented in Foster, in which prior litigation
had been terminated by a consent judgment that expressly acknowl-
edged a patent's validity. In such a situation, the Federal Circuit
found that other strong competing policy considerations came into
play, namely, preserving the finality of judgments as well as the
strong public policy of encouraging settlements. Moreover, unlike
Lear, where there was a conflict between federal patent policy and
state contract law, in Foster these strong competing policies did not
involve questions of the primacy of federal law over state law.6 87
The Federal Circuit concluded that the patent policy expressed
in Lear v. Adkins did not override the res judicata effect which
would otherwise result from a consent judgment that declared a
patent valid and enforceable.68 8 The Federal Circuit therefore re-
versed the district court's ruling based on Lear and held that a con-
sent judgment respecting validity and enforceability may bar future
litigation of those issues. However, because there were genuine is-
sues of fact and law respecting the application of principles of res
judicata, the Federal Circuit remanded to the district court for re-
689consideration of those issues.
G. Fed. R. Evid. 705 Is Applicable to Opinion Testimony on
Infringement of Means-Plus-Function Claims
The case of Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc. 90 in-
volved several patents directed to methods and devices employing
judgment is entered upon the consent of the parties in a consent judgment. Foster, 20
USPQ2D at 1244.
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. Id.
690. 935 F.2d 1569, 19 USPQ2D 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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lasers to read bar codes.69 1
At trial, the patentee had offered the testimony of an expert
witness, accompanied by charts and drawings, to demonstrate in-
fringement of the asserted claim--, each of which contained "means
plus function" limitations as permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.
The patentee's expert stated that, in his opinion, each claim limita-
tion was met by a corresponding structure in the accused device.692
At trial, the patentee had suggested that, under Fed. R. Evid.
705,693 the district court receive the exhibits representing the ex-
pert's testimony without foundation, thereby avoiding the need to
go through lengthy testimony explaining with each infringing de-
vice how the expert found that each element was infringed. The
infringer raised no objection, and failed to cross-examine the paten-
tee's expert on the issue.
The district court found infringement,694 and the infringer ap-
pealed the judgment. On appeal, the infringer argued that the pat-
entee had failed to present sufficient evidence during its case-in-
chief to establish a prima facie showing of infringement. The in-
fringer contended that a party asserting infringement of claims con-
taining "means plus function" limitations must demonstrate how
each structure in the accused device, asserted to meet a functional
claim limitation, is the same as or equivalent to a corresponding
structure disclosed in the specification. 695 The infringer argued that
the patentee's expert had testified on the ultimate issue of infringe-
ment, but had failed to discuss in detail the equivalency between the
structure of the accused device and the structure disclosed in the
patent specification.696
The Federal Circuit observed, however, that the purpose of
691. Id. at 1242.
692. Id.
693. Rule 705 provides:
Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons there-
for without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
Symbol Technologies, 19 USPQ at 1241.
694. Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 17 USPQ2d 1737 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
695. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 USPQ2D 1737,
1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961, 108 S. Ct. 1226 (1988). In Pennwalt the
Federal Circuit stated: "Where the issue is raised, it is part of the ultimate burden of proof of
the patent owner to establish, with respect to a claim limitation in means-plus-function form,
that the structure in the accused device which performs that function is the same as or an
equivalent of the structure disclosed in the specification." Id.
696. Symbol Technologies, 19 USPQ2D at 1241.
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Rule 705 is to abbreviate trials by permitting expert witnesses to
state opinions without first specifying the data upon which the opin-
ion is based. The Federal Circuit confirmed that Rule 705 is fully
applicable to patent trials and to opinion testimony on infringement
of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.
The patentee was therefore permitted, under Rule 705, to rest
its prima facie case on the expert's testimony that the patents were
infringed. The Rule provided the infringer with the opportunity to
demonstrate by cross examination that the expert's opinion testi-
mony was factually incorrect. However, the infringer chose not to
cross examine the patentee's expert on this issue. The Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that under Fed. R. Evid. 705 the patentee had made
a prima facie showing of infringement and affirmed the judgment of
the district court.6 97
H. The Purpose of Requiring a Respondent to Post a Bond
With the ITC Is to Protect the Complainant As Well
As the Public Interest
The complainant in the case of Biocraft Laboratories, Inc. v.
U.S. International Trade Commission 6 98 alleged that the respondent
had violated § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930699 by importing and
selling crystalline cefadroxil monohydrate (cefadroxil), an antibiotic
covered by the complainant's U.S. patent.7°°
The Commission had issued a temporary cease and desist order
against the respondent. The temporary relief order had required
the respondent to post a bond with the Commission to allow the
respondent to sell cefadroxil which the respondent had imported
prior to the temporary relief order. The temporary relief order
stated that specific conduct otherwise prohibited by the order would
be permissible if such specific conduct was authorized by the com-
plainant in writing. Pursuant to the temporary relief order, the re-
spondent posted a bond with the Commission.
The Commission subsequently concluded its § 337 investiga-
tion and issued a permanent cease and desist order against the re-
spondent.7 °1 Shortly after the Commission issued the permanent
relief order, the complainant and the respondent settled a separate
district court litigation concerning the subject patent. The district
697. Id.
698. 947 F.2d 483, 20 USPQ2D 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
699. 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
700. Biocraft, 20 USPQ2D at 1447.
701. Id.
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court settlement agreement provided that the complainant would, if
requested by the respondent, join in any petition by the respondent
to obtain a return of the bond posted by the respondent with the
ITC.702
The respondent then requested that the Commission return the
bond. Pursuant to the district court settlement agreement, the com-
plainant submitted a letter joining the respondent's petition. The
Commission denied the respondent's request to return the bond,
and the respondent appealed.70 3
On appeal, the respondent argued that the district court settle-
ment agreement constituted the written authorization required by
the temporary relief order, and thereby made the bonding require-
ment inapplicable. The respondent also pointed out that the pur-
pose of the respondent's bond was to protect the complainant, and
the complainant here had agreed to the Commission's return of the
bond.7o
The Commission, on the other hand, argued that the district
court settlement between the respondent and the complainant had
occurred after the respondent had made the sales covered by the
bond, and that the temporary relief order required the complainant
to provide written authorization prior to such sales being made.70 5
The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the respondent, found that
once the sales in question had been authorized, the sales became
exempt from the bond and were no longer a justification for the
Commission to attempt to enforce the bond. The Federal Circuit
observed that settlement of conflicts is in the public interest and
should be encouraged. Where the complainant, whose competitive
position was being protected by the bond, agreed to its return as
part of a district court settlement agreement, return of the bond was
consistent with the intent of the parties, thereby encouraging settle-
ment. An opposite result would tend to discourage settlement.70 6
The Federal Circuit therefore held that where a complainant
agrees as part of a settlement agreement to the return of a bond, the
bond itself states that it does not apply to sales authorized by the
complainant, and the purpose of the bond is to protect the com-
plainant as well as the public interest, it is an abuse of discretion for
the Commission to decline to return the bond merely because of
702. Id. at 1448.
703. Id.
704. Id. at 1449.
705. Biocraft, 20 USPQ2D at 1448.
706. Id. at 1449.
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sales by a respondent of goods known to the complainant at the
time of the settlement agreement. The Federal Circuit therefore re-
versed the Commission's denial of the respondent's request for re-
turn of the bond posted pursuant to the temporary relief order. 7
XVII. APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A. The Path of Appeal to the Federal Circuit Is Determined
By the Basis of Jurisdiction in the District Court
The case of Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan70 8 arose from an
interference proceeding in the PTO involving a patent application
of Brennan and a patent owned by Abbott. The Board had awarded
priority of invention to Brennan.7° 9
Abbott had then brought a civil action in district court pursu-
ant to 35 U.S.C. § 146, seeking to set aside the award of priority to
Brennan. Brennan had brought a counterclaim in the district court
action for fraudulent misrepresentation, abuse of process, tortious
interference with economic relations, antitrust violations, violation
of the RICO Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.710
The district court had awarded priority of invention to Bren-
nan. The district court had also denied Brennan's motion for sanc-
tions under Rule 11 and had denied Brennan's motion for a new
trial on his counterclaim of tortious interference with economic re-
lations. The district-court had further denied Abbott's motion for
JNOV or a new trial on the issue of abuse of process, and had par-
tially denied Abbott's alternative motion for remittitur.711
Brennan and Abbott sought review by the Federal Circuit of
various aspects of the judgment of the district court. However, Ab-
bott did not seek review of the district court decision awarding pri-
ority of invention to Brennan.
The Federal Circuit observed that, in view of Abbott's omis-
sion of appeal on the issue of priority of invention, no issues arising
under the patent law remained on appeal, and none had been re-
ferred to in the notice of appeal. The remaining issues on appeal
were either matters of state law based on pendent jurisdiction, or
issues of federal law that were not within the exclusive assignment
of the Federal Circuit, but that had been properly included at
707. Id. at 1450.
708. 952 F.2d 1346, 21 USPQ2D 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
709. Id. at 1193.
710. Id.
711. Id.
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trial.712
The threshold question was therefore whether the Federal Cir-
cuit had jurisdiction over the appeal.7 13
The Federal Circuit noted that the path of appeal is deter-
mined by the basis of jurisdiction in the district court, and is not
controlled by the district court's decision or the substance of the
issues that are appealed. 714 Thus, the direction of appeal to the
Federal Circuit does not change during or after trial, even when the
only issues remaining are not within the exclusive assignment of the
Federal Circuit.715
Abbott's civil action had been properly brought under 35
U.S.C. § 146. The district court's jurisdiction had therefore arisen,
in part, under the patent statute, Title 35, and thus satisfied the
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).7 16 All appeals in such circum-
stances are assigned exclusively to the Federal Circuit under 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 717
The path of the appeal in Abbott had been established with the
filing of the civil action to obtain a patent in accordance with 35
U.S.C. § 146. Although the § 146 issue was not appealed, the Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that the appeal of the other issues had been
correctly taken to the Federal Circuit.718
B. To Be Considered "Final" an Order Must Be Effectively
Unreviewable on Appeal From a Final Judgment
During the pre-trial stages in the case of Quantum Corporation
v. Tandon Corporation71 9 the patentee had moved to compel the
alleged infringer to produce documents relating to opinion letters of
counsel. The alleged infringer had countermoved for a separate
trial on the issue of willfulness after the conclusion of a trial on
liability and damages, and for deferral of discovery of the attorney
712. Id.
713. Abbott, 21 USPQ2D at 1192.
714. Id.
715. See, eg., Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417, 419-20, 9
USPQ2d 1540, 1541-42 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422,
1427, 223 USPQ 1074, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
716. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) provides that "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents...".
717. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) provides that "The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction - (1) of an appeal from a final decision of a
district court of the United States... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in
part, on section 1338 of this title ... ".
718. Abbott, 21 USPQ2d at 1192.
719. 940 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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opinion letters until after the trial on liability and damages.7 2
The district court had granted the patentee's motion to compel
production of the attorney opinion letters, and had denied the al-
leged infringer's motion to defer the trial on willfulness. The al-
leged infringer then sought to appeal the orders of the district court
compelling production of the attorney opinion letters and deferring
the trial on willfulness. The patentee moved to dismiss the appeal,
arguing that the orders appealed from were not final and therefore
were not appealable.721
The Federal Circuit noted that before a district court order
may be considered final, the order must (1) conclusively determine
the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unre-
viewable on appeal from a final judgment.7 22
The Federal Circuit found that the two orders appealed from
in Quantum did not satisfy the third requirement, because the two
orders were effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded that the two orders
were not presently appealable, and granted the patentee's motion to
dismiss.723
C. The Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying Presumed
Jury Findings Cannot Be Challenged on Appeal Where
a Motion for a Directed Verdict Was Not Made at
the Close of the Evidence
The case of Jurgens v. McKasy724 involved an appeal from a
district court judgment in a jury case involving patent infringement.
The judgment awarded damages and injunctive relief to the patent
owner for infringement of a patent directed to a windsock device.725
In Jurgens, the infringer had failed to bring a motion for a di-
rected verdict at the close of the evidence. Where a motion for a
directed verdict is not made at the close of the evidence, the suffi-
ciency of the evidence underlying presumed jury findings cannot be
720. Id. at 643.
721. Id.
722. Id. See also, Gulfstreamn Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276,
99 L. Ed. 2d 296, 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 546, 93 L. Ed. 1528, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949).
723. Quantum, 940 F.2d at 642.
724. 927 F.2d 1552, 18 USPQ2D 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
725. Id.
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challenged on appeal.726 Accordingly, when the infringer failed to
move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, the infringer
waived its right to challenge the presumed jury findings as unsup-
ported by substantial evidence. That failure dramatically changed
the standard of review on appeal with respect to fact issues decided
by the jury.727
For example, on appeal the infringer challenged the district
court's finding of patent validity under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of
two prior art references. Before the district court the patent owner
had argued that the first of these two prior art references was not
analogous art, and that the second of these two prior art references
did not show a windsock. 28
The question of what constitutes analogous art, as well as the
question of what a reference teaches, are questions of fact for the
jury to decide. On appeal, it is presumed that the jury decided these
fact questions in favor of the patent owner, concluding that the first
reference was not analogous art and that the second reference did
not show a windsock.729
Because the infringer had failed to move for a directed verdict,
the infringer could not challenge these presumptions on appeal.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit was required to presume that the
first reference was not analogous art and that the second reference
did not disclose a windsock. In accordance with these presump-
tions, the Federal Circuit concluded that the first reference could
have no bearing on the validity of the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103,
and that the second reference would not have rendered the patent
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103.730
On appeal, the infringer also challenged the district court's
finding of patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
The infringer asserted that if infringement was present under the
doctrine of equivalents, then the patent would encompass the prior
art. 3 More specifically, to cover the infringing windsocks literally,
the hypothetical claim would define a windsock which would have
been obvious in view of the second reference.
However, for the reasons stated above, the Federal Circuit was
726. Smith v. Ferrel, 852 F.2d 1074, 1075 (8th Cir. 1988); Hubbard v. White, 755 F.2d
692, 695-96 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 834, 88 L. Ed. 2d 87 , 106 S. Ct. 107 (1985).
727. Jurgens, 18 USPQ2D at 1031.
728. Id.
729. Id.
730. Id.
731. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 683, 14
USPQ2D 1942, 1947-48 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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required to presume that the second reference did not disclose a
windsock. In accordance with this presumption, the Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that the hypothetical claim, viewed as a whole,
would not have been obvious in view of the second reference and
that the second reference therefore did not bar infringement by
equivalents. The judgment of the district court was therefore
affirmed.
D. A Post-verdict Motion Is a Prerequisite to Appellate
Review of the Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying a
Jury Verdict
At the conclusion of testimony in the case of Biodex Corpora-
tion v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc.,7 32 the patentee had orally moved
for a directed verdict. The patentee had not made a specific asser-
tion that the alleged infringer's evidence in support of invalidity or
non-infringement had been insufficient, although judgment had
been requested on both issues as a matter of law. The district court
never ruled upon the patentee's motion.7 3
Both parties had requested and submitted various jury instruc-
tions. The district court, however, drafted its own instructions, to
which the patentee had objected.
The district court submitted the case to the jury with multiple
special verdict forms. In the special verdicts, the jury found that
one patent had been proven invalid and that the other patent had
not been infringed. The district court entered judgment on the jury
verdicts. The patentee made no post-verdict motions, either by re-
newing its motion for a directed verdict, moving for a new trial, or
by moving for judgment non obstante veredicto ("JNOV"). The
patentee appealed the judgment of the district Court.7 34
On appeal, the patentee argued that neither special verdict had
been supported by substantial evidence.
The Federal Circuit viewed the issue on appeal as being
whether a post-verdict motion is a prerequisite to appellate review
of the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a jury verdict. In Bi-
odex, the patentee had made an oral motion for a directed verdict at
the conclusion of the evidence. However, the patentee had not re-
submitted or renewed the motion in any form after the verdict.
The Federal Circuit reasoned that a requirement for an express
post-verdict motion by the potential appellant assists appellate re-
732. 946 F.2d 850, 20 USPQ2D 1252 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
733. Id. at 1253.
734. Id.
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view. A rule that requires explicit formulation and specification of
the preserved issues after the verdict requires the prospective appel-
lant to present the preserved issues to the district court in a well-
known and defined format after the verdict.735
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that it could not re-
view the sufficiency of the evidence after a jury verdict absent some
post-verdict motion. The patentee's failure to present the district
court with a post-verdict motion precluded appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence, and was thereby dispositive of that por-
tion of the appeal directed to whether there was substantial evi-
dence to support the special verdicts.736
On appeal, the patentee also contended that the district court's
failure to give the patentee's requested jury instructions was prejudi-
cial error. 37 The Federal Circuit noted that jury instructions must
be both legally correct and sufficiently comprehensive to address
factual issues for which there is disputed evidence of record. To
succeed on appeal, the patentee must (1) prove that the jury instruc-
tions, read in their entirety, were incorrect or incomplete as given,
and (2) demonstrate that the jury instructions suggested by the pat-
entee could have cured the error. The Federal Circuit concluded
that the patentee had failed in both tasks.73
Since the Federal Circuit concluded that it may not review for
sufficiency of the evidence, and since there was no prejudicial legal
error, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court.
E. Prejudicial Legal Error Must Be Shown to Vacate a
Judgment Where No Motion for JNOV or a New Trial
Was Made After a Jury Verdict
Before the district court, the appellants in the case of Acousti-
cal Design, Inc. v. Control Electronics Company, Inc. "I had failed to
move for a directed verdict after the close of testimony, had failed
to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and had
failed to move for a new trial. The district court entered final judg-
ment holding the appellants liable for patent infringement and en-
joining them from further infringement.
On appeal, the issue was whether the Federal Circuit should
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Biodex, 20 USPQ2D at 1252.
738. Id.
739. 932 F.2d 939, 18 USPQ2D 1707 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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vacate and remand for a new trial a judgment rendered on a jury
verdict when no motions for directed verdict, JNOV, or new trial
were made before the district court.
Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a
motion for JNOV only when a party has previously moved for a
directed verdict. If no motions for JNOV or new trial are made in
the district court after a jury verdict, then the appellant is required
to show that prejudicial legal error occurred in the conduct of the
trial in order for the Federal Circuit to vacate the judgment of the
district court and remand for a new trial.7'
The Federal Circuit concluded that the appellants had not
demonstrated that prejudicial legal error occurred in the conduct of
the trial. Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment
of the district court.
F. Sanctions May Be Appropriate Where an Appeal Is
"Frivolous as Filed" or "Frivolous as Argued"
The appeal in the case of Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company"4
resulted from a history of over twelve years of litigation by the ap-
pellant against the appellee.
The appellant and the appellee had originally been co-defend-
ants in a federal district court action in which the appellant had
ified a cross-claim against the appellee. After filing the cross-claim,
the appellant filed a separate complaint, in the same district court,
asserting claims identical to those in the cross-claim. All of the
counts alleged in both the complaint and the cross-claim were dis-
posed of by summary judgment for the appellee.
The appellant then fied a separate complaint against the appel-
lee in the same district court, substantially identical to the cross-
claim. The appellee moved for a dismissal of the complaint, and the
appellant did not oppose the motion. The district court granted the
appellee's unopposed motion to dismiss the new complaint, holding
that the complaint was duplicative of the proffered cross-claim and
that each count of the new complaint was barred by res judicata.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's or-
der dismissing the complaint because the appellant had failed to op-
pose the motion to dismiss, because the complaint was duplicative,
and because each claim in the complaint was barred by res judicata.
740. Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1511, 220 USPQ 929, 934
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871, 105 S. Ct. 220, 83 L. Ed. 2d 150, 224 USPQ 520
(1984).
741. 926 F.2d 1574, 17 USPQ2D 1914 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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Having determined that the district court's judgment must be af-
firmed, the Federal Circuit then addressed the appellee's request for
sanctions.
The Federal Circuit noted that there are two distinct bases on
which an appeal may be deemed frivolous, either one of which alone
is sufficient to support sanctions. First, an appeal may be deemed
"frivolous as filed" if the judgment of the district court is so plainly
correct and the legal authority contrary to the appellant's position
is so clear that there is no appealable issue. 42 Second, an appeal
may be deemed "frivolous as argued" where genuinely appealable
issues may exist, but the appellant's contentions in prosecuting the
appeal are frivolous.743
In the case of Finch, the Federal Circuit found the appellant's
appeal to be both frivolous as filed and frivolous as argued. Because
the appellant had no arguable basis in fact or in law for filing the
appeal and had made numerous arguments in support of the appeal
that were without any basis, the Federal Circuit granted the appel-
lee's request for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and required the appellant to pay the appellee
double its costs.
742. See, e.g., In re Perry, 918 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Octocom Systems, Inc. v.
Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943, 16 USPQ2D 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Synan
v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 765 F.2d 1099, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
743. Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 921 F.2d 1247, 1256, 16 USPQ2D 1347, 1354
Fed. Cir. 1990); Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 919 F.2d 1579, 1583, 16
USPQ2D 1929, 1933 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Devices for Medicine, Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062,
1068-69, 3 USPQ2D 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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DEVELOPING CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES:
A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS
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and
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of critical technologies in the United States first
emerged as a way to guard scientific knowledge about technology to
protect national security.1 The National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 19892 included requirements for a critical tech-
nologies plan to develop the technologies most essential to ensure
superiority of United States weapons systems.3 Since then, the criti-
cal technologies concept has expanded. Ensuring national security
includes not only defense leadership but also commercial prosper-
ity. Advancement of critical technologies creates new industries
and generates jobs leading to increased economic growth and im-
proved global competitiveness of the United States.
Technological advancement requires basic research undertaken
to gain knowledge and understanding of the fundamental aspects of
the universe. The difficulty of investing in basic research for private
industry is threefold: it is long-term; the results are not always mar-
ketable; and the rewards may not be evident.4
Applied research and development are also crucial for technol-
ogy advancement. A goal of applied research is "to provide techno-
logical solutions to identified problems." 5 "Development is the
Copyright © 1993 by Lewis D. Solomon and Suzanne E. Schoch.
* Mr. Solomon is a Arthur Selwyn Miller Research Professor of Law at the George
Washington University National Law Center.
** Ms. Schoch holds a B.A. from the University of Richmond and a J.D. from the
George Washington University National Law Center.
1. The Initial Military Critical Technologies List, 45 Fed. Reg. 65,014 (1980), merely
listed exports believed to threaten national security. Kenneth Propp, Note, Export Controls:
Restrictions on the Export of Critical Technologies, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 411 (1981).
2. National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, 102
Stat. 1918 (1988).
3. Id. 102 Stat. at 2018 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2368 (1988)).
4. Wendy H. Schacht, Technological Advancement and US. Industrial Competitive-
ness, CONG. Rs. SERVICE R.P., Oct. 28, 1988, at 5.
5. Id.
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process of taking the results of research and using them to generate
... commercially viable technolog[ies]." 6 The last stage of techno-
logical development is the commercialization of the new products
and processes. It is here that U.S. companies need to succeed,
where technology arguably has the "'greatest economic impacts in
terms of productivity, growth, and competitiveness.' "I
This article focuses on the commercialization of innovative
critical technology. It examines U.S. technology policy including
research and development (R&D) funding, macroeconomic influ-
ences and recent federal initiatives. In looking to the future, the
free market advocates, private sector competitiveness groups, and
government agencies will all vie for the lead role in directing the
technology competitiveness of the United States.
II. U.S. TECHNOLOGY POLICY
"The goal of U.S. technology policy is to make the best use of
technology in achieving the national goals of improved quality of
life for all Americans, continued economic growth, and national se-
curity."8 U.S. policy excludes U.S. technology pre-eminence as part
of its goals. In implementing this policy, the Federal Government
maintains that all parts of the economy, including federal, state, and
local governments, industry and academia have roles to play.9 In
addition, U.S. technology policy provides that the U.S. system of
free enterprise should not be tampered with, nor should U.S. policy
favor one industry over another.10 Yet, the federal government
wields power that interferes with free enterprise.
The U.S. government spends large amounts of money funding
research and development. Such funding aids those private busi-
nesses that are able to commercialize this basic research.
Macroeconomic policy such as tax policy indirectly influences the
success of certain industries. Similarly, the lack of coordination of a
technology policy among the various departments and agencies of
government has an indirect effect on technological advancement in
the private sector.
In the post-World War II era, the framework for the U.S. gov-
ernment's support for science and technology can be traced to Van-
6. Id.
7. Id. at 6 (citing John M. Marcum, Technology Leadership: Co-operation, Competi.
tion, and Interdependency, SCI. AND PUB. POL'Y, Dec. 1985, at 319).
8. OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, U.S. TECHNOLOGY POLICY 2 (1990).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1-2.
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nevar Bush's report "Science, the Endless Frontier."'1 The report
argued that science could yield an infinite stream of benefits to soci-
ety.12 The report concluded that support for science and technol-
ogy is an appropriate role for the government, but that the applied
or developmental aspect should be left to private industry. 13
Traditionally, U.S. government support of science and technol-
ogy focused on basic research and the application and development
of technology to meet the needs of specific national missions, such
as defense, health, and space exploration. 4 The thrust for federally
funding basic research is premised on the assumption that private
industry will underinvest in basic research because of industry's in-
ability to capture all of its benefits. 1 Due to basic research's signifi-
cant long term potential benefits to the economy and society,
policymakers have deemed it necessary and proper for the govern-
ment to strongly support and federally fund basic research.' 6
Industries have relied on revolutionary breakthroughs and in-
novations based upon discoveries and advances derived from basic
research. The typical innovation process in the U.S. has begun with
a major scientific breakthrough, progressed through design, devel-
opment and production, and ended with marketplace distribution.'7
The U.S. excelled in this method of innovation and achieved preem-
inence in science and technology in the post-World War II era.',
In the 1980s, a shift occurred in three aspects of the United
States' science and technology policy. First, changes occurred in
the organization and funding of civilian research programs in an
attempt to "improve the ability of U.S. firms to realize the commer-
cial profits from the innovations spawned by such research."' 9 Sec-
ond, defense research funding began to be used "to support
advances in civilian technologies in order to [promote] eventual
technological improvements for the military."2 ° Third, "the new
11. VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE, THE ENDLESS FRONTIER: A REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT ON A PROGRAM FOR POSTWAR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (1945).
12. See id. at 5, 10-11.
13. Id. at 22.
14. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, GAINING NEW GROUND: TECHNOLOGY PRIORI-
TIES FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE 13 (1991).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, PICKING UP THE PACE: THE COMMERCIAL
CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN INNOVATION 10 (1988).
18. Id.
19. David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, New Developments in U.S. Technology Pol-
icy: Implications for Competitiveness and International Trade Policy, CAL. MGMT. REV., Fall
1989, at 107, 107.
20. Id.
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science and technology policy priorities of the U.S. government and
the increased salience of these issues for foreign governments have
elevated the importance of science and technology issues within
trade policy."21 Some fear that these shifts could have a "chilling
effect on the international scientific and engineering cooperation
and communication," and that policies are being proposed "with
little apparent recognition of their implications for other foreign
and domestic policy goals."22
At the present time, the U.S. government does not have a for-
mal delineated national policy for innovation and high technology
development. The United States appears to be the only major in-
dustrialized country that does not have a national policy in this
area, although the federal government does have certain technology
programs. An ad hoc, uncoordinated approach may be unwise,
however, since the relationship between government and industry is
one of the most significant factors affecting innovation and the envi-
ronment where technological development occurs. The absence of
cooperation can be detrimental to the long-term economic health of
the U.S. as it faces increasing competition from foreign companies
where close government-industry collaboration is the norm, not the
exception.23
A. Federal Funding of Research and Development (R&D)
Federal funding of R&D is extremely critical for U.S. eco-
nomic stability and strength because the commercial marketplace
has failed to channel enough resources into R&D. The U.S. high
technology industries have tended to underinvest in R&D because
they cannot capture all the benefits from their investments. Most
private industry R&D goes to projects that are highly likely to bring
short term success, while the long term research projects are ne-
glected although they may be worth more to the nation as a whole.
Therefore federal funding needs not only to increase its aggregate
level of spending, but also shift it toward long term projects in
which social returns may exceed private ones.24
Government funding of R&D can be broken down into two
main components: defense and non-defense. In 1980, "[flederal
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Wendy H. Schacht, Industrial Innovation: Debate Over Government Policy, CONG.
REP. SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, August 2, 1991, at 4-5.
24. UNITED STATES CONGRESS BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR
HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 2 (1985).
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R&D spending was evenly divided between defense and non-de-
fense."25 By 1990, federal defense R&D expenditures reached 61%
of federal R&D spending, while non-defense R&D expenditures
plummeted to 39%.26 Comparing federal R&D funding of defense
and civilian sectors provides a stark contrast. Of civilian R&D
funding in 1990, basic research comprised 45%, development 27%
and applied research 29%. Of defense R&D funding in 1990, 2%
was used for basic research, 90% for development, and 8% for ap-
plied research. 27
A significant distinction now exists between defense and non-
defense R&D. In the past, defense related R&D has benefitted U.S.
private sector commercial technological capabilities.2  Research
derived from defense-related R&D could be "spun off" to create
commercially marketable products.29 Examples of defense related
spinoffs include commercial jet airplanes and computers.
Current evidence shows that spinoffs associated with defense-
related R&D are no longer widespread. 30 The research necessary to
develop defense equipment differs widely from the research needed
for civilian products.31 For example, the research involved in the
development of the B-2 Stealth bomber is not compatible with the
needs of Boeing in developing a new jet or improving an old jet.
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the commercial sec-
tor will drive future strategic technologies. 32 Today's leading-edge
technology in microelectronics, computers, and telecommunica-
tions is found in the private sector.33 Yet, federal R&D spending
continues to favor defense R&D expenditures over the increasingly
more important non-defense R&D expenditures.34
One federal agency that has engaged in both defense and non-
defense oriented R&D is the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency or DARPA.35 Originally named ARPA, it was created as a
25. Michael E. Davey, Science and the Budget: 1990 Update, CONG. RES. SERVICE
REV., July-August 1990, at 37, 37.
26. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 15.
27. Michael E. Davey, Research and Development Funding: FY1990, CONG. RES. SER-
VICE ISSUE BRIEF, Jan. 2, 1990.
28. Davey, supra note 25, at 37.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 20.
33. Id.
34. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
35. Marc S. Miller, The Government's Guiding Hand, TECH. REV., Feb.-March 1991,
at 35, 35.
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small office in the Pentagon in response to the Soviet launching of
Sputnik.36 After the National Air and Space Administration
(NASA) took over the space program, DARPA became the "tech-
nology mission agency" involved in R&D since it gave out military
contracts in civilian science and engineering. 7
This small, "little-known band of maverick scientists and engi-
neers" are officially charged with preventing technology surprises
from abroad and dealing with them when they occur.38 They do
this by "advancing seed money and nurturing promising research at
universities, national laboratories and leading edge industries."3 9
By funding the exploration of the outer limits of technology,
DARPA has been credited with the creation of the field of com-
puter science in the United States.4
DARPA acts independently from the armed services R&D
communities and apart from the national laboratories, thereby elim-
inating the bureaucratic layers.41 It has not confined itself to acting
within the dominating paradigm of minimal government involve-
ment in commercial technologies, but instead has focused on the
technologies, whether military or commercial, that it has seen as
necessary for the future competitiveness of the United States.
DARPA has operated on the assumption that national defense
means both developing new weapons and supporting basic research
in commercial technologies.42 This became easier when Congress, in
November of 1989 expanded DARPA's authority to allow it to pro-
vide venture capital to private companies.43
DARPA quickly became active using its new authority to sup-
port research in areas such as high-definition television (HDTV),
superconductivity, and artificial intelligence.' As the free market
debate intensified, the proponents of government intervention
sought to use DARPA to guide national high technology industries.
This has made DARPA the "lightning rod" in the storm of "debate
about the role of long-term defense research in an era of lessening
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. James Kitfield, Walking a High-Tech Tightrope, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, May 1990, at
22, 22.
39. Id. at 23.
40. John Markoff, Making Industrial Policy at the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1989, at § 4, 4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Industrial Policy; Beheaded, THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER, April 28, 1990, at 27,
27.
44. Id.
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military tensions" and "the future of U.S. high tech[nology] com-
petitiveness.""a DARPA's "industrial policy" has been extremely
successful at doing what the free market purists said would not
work; it was meddling in the private sector as a high tech venture
capitalist and getting results. With the controversial firing of the
Director of DARPA, Craig Fields, an industrial policy advocate, in
May of 1990, outsiders think the agency will return to funding spe-
cific military projects.46
Although the United States spends more in absolute terms on
R&D, U.S. non-defense R&D, which is more important than de-
fense R&D for economic competitiveness, has failed to keep pace
with that of other industrialized countries.4 7 For example, Japan
spends approximately 50% more on non-defense R&D as a percent-
age of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than the United States.4"
Furthermore, the United States non-defense R&D expenditures are
growing at a slower pace in comparison to Japan and other industri-
alized countries.49 While the other countries have increased their
non-defense expenditures by approximately 50% since 1972, the
United States has only slightly increased the percentage of Gross
National Product (GNP) spent on non-defense R&D. 0
Also, as a percentage of total federal and private spending in
non-defense R&D, federal spending has dropped sharply in recent
decades.5' From 1970 to 1990, federal funding dropped from 31%
of total U.S. public sector expenditures in non-defense R&D to only
17% of the total.5 2
The United States spends a large portion of its non-defense
R&D budget on "big science" projects such as the space station, the
superconducting super collider 3 and the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive (Star Wars). Major increases in funding for these "big science"
projects continue to be sought at the expense of other smaller
projects that could develop commercially applicable technology. 4
In 1990, estimates indicated that in the coming decade, all "big sci-
ence" projects planned by the federal government will require over
45. Kitfield, supra note 38, at 23.
46. Evelyn Richards, Uncle Sam as a Venture Capitalist, WASH. POST, April 29, 1990,
at HI, H5.
47. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 15.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 15.
53. Davey, supra note 25, at 38.
54. See id.
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$60 billion to complete and another $100 billion to operate and
maintain."5 Critics of these projects assert that the financial com-
mitment required to complete these "big science" projects will seri-
ously jeopardize federal R&D spending in the future, thereby
limiting the country's ability to respond to future technological
challenges.5 6
In the post-World War II era, policy makers proceeded on the
assumption that funding basic scientific research adequately pro-
vides a foundation for technological development and commerciali-
zation. Unfortunately, basic research, without more, often is
insufficient in leading commercially viable technology. According
to the National Science Foundation (NSF), the U.S. targets less
than 1% of federal R&D funding at improving our commercial de-
velopment capabilities." In contrast, Japan spends 4.8% of govern-
ment R&D funds to advance its commercial capabilities."8
In Congressional appropriations for fiscal year 1991, the DoD
funding level for R&D decreased from $36.7 billion to $36 billion
although an increase of $1.4 billion was requested. 9 The unwilling-
ness of the U.S. to fund more non-defense R&D, generally, and de-
velopmental research, specifically, may lie at the heart of why the
U.S. has lost much of its technologic and economic preeminence in
the past several decades.
B. US. Macroeconomic Policy and Government Structure
Governmental organization and procedures have a significant
impact on the effective development of commercially viable technol-
ogy.' Lack of coordination and inability to implement policies can
undermine the best technology policies.6" No one federal agency
exists that has broad responsibility for the research and other neces-
sary activities related to the private sector technology or for the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Davey, supra note 25, at 38; see also, COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note
14, at 13.
59. See Michael E. Davey, Research and Development Funding: FY1991, CONG. RES.
SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, Jan. 14, 1991, at 7. DARPA's funding however, was increased 14%
to $1.4 billion in FY '91. Id. at 6. Within the DOC, the NIST R&D budget increased from
$164 million in FY '90 to $215 million in FY '91. Id. at 15. Within the 1991 funding, $35.9
million was appropriated for the ATP and $11.9 million for the Centers for Transfer of Man-
ufacturing Technology. Id. at 13.
60. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 17, at 26.
61. Id.
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strategic coordination of technology policy at the national level.62
Only the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(the Office) provides an overview of R&D and other activities re-
lated to economic performance.63 However, the Office fumctions
primarily as an advisory body to the President.6" The Office has a
small budget and its staff consists primarily of personnel on tempo-
rary loan from other agencies.65
The Department of Commerce (DoC) operates the only federal
laboratory explicitly charged with serving the needs of U.S. indus-
try;66 [it was originally named the National Bureau of Standards,
and is now called the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST)]. The small office of Productivity, Technology and In-
novation within NIST works to create a climate favorable for
innovation and technology, and its National Technical Information
Service serves as a resource for the private sector to receive scientific
and technical information. 67 The NIST also administers the Ad-
vanced Technology Program (ATP).68 The purpose of the ATP is
to assist U.S. businesses in creating and applying generic technology
and research results.69 The money is provided in the form of
matching funds for small companies or consortiums. 70 Yet this ef-
fort to fund the cutting edge technologies has only been appropri-
ated $10 million in fiscal year 1991, although the budget is likely to
increase if the Program maintains its role of development of generic
technologies through the pre-competitive phase.71
The National Science Foundation (NSF) has the responsibility
to support education, transfer research and information, as well as
to serve as the general science and engineering agency of the federal
government. Federal R&D spending by the NSF is slowly increas-
ing. Its budget was $2.1 billion in 1990 and $2.3 billion in 1991.72
In short, the United States currently lacks the necessary gov-
ernmental organization to effectively create and implement strategic
technology policy on a national scale. Poor coordination, lack of
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 17, at 27.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Elizabeth Corcoran, Talking Policy; The Administration Devises An Industrial Pol-
icy-Sort Of, Sci. AM., June 1990, at 82, 82.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 82, 84.
72. Davey, supra note 59, at 9-10.
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power, and inadequate funding are among the major problems that
prevent the federal agencies from effectively promoting the com-
mercialization of technology.
C. Recent Federal Initiatives
In the 1980s the federal government recognized the impact of
technology development on the competitiveness of the American
economy. The federal government began to promote policies and
programs designed to address the issue. During the 1980s, the U.S.
government launched several significant technology initiatives in-
cluding: (1) support for technological innovation; (2) tax credit for
R&D expenditures; (3) revisions of U.S. antitrust laws; (4) enact-
ment of and support for the Semiconductor Manufacturing Tech-
nology Proposal (SEMATECH); and (5) other miscellaneous
technology policy initiatives.
First, the decade began with legislation to promote the transfer
of technology from federal laboratories to the private sector. In
1980, Congress passed the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innova-
tion Act7" (1980 Act) which emphasized broad support of techno-
logical innovation.7 4 The 1980 Act mandates a government-wide
program for the transfer of technology from the federal laboratories
to the private sector and authorized a network of centers for indus-
trial technology.75 Unfortunately, the federal government never
fully implemented the 1980 Act, largely due to lack of adequate
funding.
In 1986, Congress passed the Federal Technology Transfer
Act,7 6 known as the Stevenson-Wydler Amendments. The 1986
Amendments essentially reaffirmed the 1980 Act and strengthened
some of its provisions. The 1980 Act required each of the nation's
more than seven hundred federal laboratories to establish an Office
of Research and Technology Applications which would be responsi-
ble for technology transfers from the federal laboratories to the pri-
vate sector.77 The 1980 Act also required each laboratory to
participate in the Federal Laboratory Consortium, which "operates
73. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94
Stat. 2311 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 3701-15 (1988)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at § 6 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C § 3705 (1988)).
76. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(1986).
77. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 § 11 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 3710 (1988)); see also John H. Moore, Innovation, Technology and Knowledge
Transfers, East and West, 32 EUR. ECON. RaV., 591, 594.
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as an information clearinghouse for Federal laboratories and poten-
tial technology users."" The 1986 Amendments expanded the Fed-
eral Laboratory Consortium to include all federally owned and
financed laboratories.79
Second, Congress used the Internal Revenue Code to promote
technological innovation. In 1981, the Economic Recovery Tax
Act"0 was enacted in which Congress created a temporary 25% tax
credit for R&D expenditures in excess of the firm's expenditures in
the base period, which generally encompassed the firm's previous
three years." The Act also contained a sunset provision under
which the credit would expire at the end of 1985,82 the credit how-
ever has been extended.
Congress intended the tax credit to encourage the private sec-
tor to increase its R&D spending. However, evidence tends to indi-
cate that the tax credit did little to increase private sector R&D
expenditure.3 R&D tax credits may have raised R&D expendi-
tures as little as 1%.84 The reason for the small impact of the tax
credit on R&D expenditures may be due to the restrictive nature of
the "base amount" used in calculating the tax credit.8 5
Congress further diminished the effectiveness of the R&D tax
credit by cutting the amount of the credit from 25% to 20% in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986.86 Furthermore, by reducing the R&D tax
credit, Congress demonstrated to the private sector that the tax in-
centive could not be relied upon and could be reduced or discarded
by Congress on short notice. However, R&D is inherently a long
term investment, and firms must engage in advance R&D planning
in order to use it successfully.
Changes in the method by which the credit is calculated oc-
curred in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.87 The
78. Moore, supra note 77, at 594; see also Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation
Act of 1980 § 11 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (1988)).
79. Moore, supra note 77, at 594.
80. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
81. Id. § 221, 95 Stat. at 241. See also Edwin Mansfield, The R&D Tax Credit and
Other Technology Policy Issues, (Papers and Proceedings of the 98th Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association) 76 THE AM. ECON. REV., No. 2, at 190, 190 (1986).
82. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 221, 95 Stat. at 247.
83. See Mansfield, supra note 81, at 190.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 191.
86. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 231(c), 100 Stat. 2085, 2175 (1986)
(codified as amended at IRC § 41 (1988)).
87. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7110, 103 Stat.
2106, 2322-26 (1989); see also David L. Brumbaugh, The Research and Experimentation Tax
Credit, CONG. REs. SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, May 9, 1991, at 4.
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changes focused on the base amount which was designed to improve
the incentive effect of the credit. 8 An additional change extended
"credit eligibility to R&D related to a firm's prospective line of
business."89 The fiscal year 1992 budget includes a proposal to
make the R&D tax credit permanent at its current 20% rate,90
although at the present time, the uncertainty of the tax credit's fu-
ture inhibits its use by the private sector.
Third, antitrust laws have traditionally served to encourage in-
novative behavior, but they have also engendered hesitancy on the
part of business to engage in joint research and development ven-
tures that would permit the most efficient use of human and capital
resources. In the past, even the threat of antitrust action would
likely have ended any joint R&D project. Congress enacted the Na-
tional Cooperative Research Act91 in 1984 to remedy this situation.
The law takes the approach that joint research ventures are not to
be judged illegal "per se."92 Rather, each venture is judged on a
reasonableness basis, taking into account all relevant factors affect-
ing competition.93 The 1984 Act also eliminates treble damages
awards for joint research ventures found in violation of the antitrust
laws94 if prior disclosure has been made to the Department of Jus-
tice and the Federal Trade Commission." The law explicitly ex-
cludes production activities in order to maintain compliance with
the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.96
Despite these changes, firms are still wary of being involved in
joint activities for fear of unknown consequences which may arise if
the government decides that the joint ventures engage in produc-
tion, as opposed to research activities. The U.S. Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment has stated:
Whether modifying the antitrust laws or their enforcement
would unleash a great deal of cooperative work, and whether
such changes would substantially improve manufacturing com-
petitiveness, is unknown .... Changes in antitrust law and en-
88. Brumbaugh, supra note 87, at 4.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815
(1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (1988)).
92. Schacht, supra note 23, at 9; see also National Cooperative Research Act of 1984
§ 4302.
93. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 § 4302.
94. Id. at § 4303.
95. Id. at § 4305.
96. S. REP. NO. 427, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12-13 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.N
3105, 3109.
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forcement should be made cautiously, but they deserve serious
consideration.9
7
The semiconductor companies that need collective action in or-
der to compete with the Japanese are particularly concerned with
the antitrust aspects of joint ventures. These cutting edge compa-
nies wish to band together to manufacture memory chips, but this
would still violate the antitrust laws.
The newest answer is the proposed National Cooperative Pro-
duction Act which goes farther than the National Cooperative Re-
search Act of 1984 since it allows for joint production of
innovations among companies.9 8 This bill has two key provisions:
(1) "[ilt would relieve government sanctioned joint ventures from
treble-damage phobia;" and (2) it would incorporate into law court
decisions that "cast a warmer eye on joint-production accords." 99
However, a dispute over the exclusion of co-production ventures
with more than 30% foreign ownership has delayed passage of the
bill.1  The problem with this restriction is that often it is the for-
eign firms that not only have the technology, but also the capital
needed to ensure the success of a venture. 101 The main beneficiaries
of this bill would be the high technology industries that spawn the
critical innovations."0 2
Fourth, in 1987, Congress enacted the Semiconductor Manu-
facturing Technology, or SEMATECH, initiative "to assist its U.S.
member companies to develop new processes for semiconductor
manufacturing."1 0 3 The initial impetus for the SEMATECH pro-
posal was provided by a DoD Defense Science Board study, Report
of Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Semiconductor De-
pendency."m The report highlighted the increasing foreign control
of the semiconductor market and ramifications for the U.S. military
if the primary source of this technology was foreign.105 The study
provided two justifications for a federal government role in the
97. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. Congress, Making Things Better:
Competing in Manufacturing 30 (1990).
98. Paul Magnusson, The Antitrust Ball and Chain Hobbling High Tech, Bus. WK.,
July 29, 1991, at 34, 34.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Glenn J. McLoughlin, SEMATECH: The Semiconductor Manufacturing Technol-
ogy Initiative, CONG. RES. SERVICE REP., Feb. 7, 1991 at 1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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manufacturing of commercial semiconductor chips. 10 6
First, the pressure of rapid technological innovation and short
product life cycles had worked "against longer-term R&D for next
generation manufacturing equipment."' 1 7  The government,
through DARPA, would be able to provide the industry with the
funding stability necessary for long term growth. 08 Second, the
study recognized that semiconductor technologies are a vital ele-
ment of the U.S. electronics industry, and the demise of these tech-
nologies could undermine a significant part of the entire U.S.
electronics industry."°9
Legislation to fund SEMATECH was included in the Defense
Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1988110 which calls for joint
federal-industry funding of $100 million each year through 1992.111
Fourteen U.S. companies became charter members of SEMATECH
while federal management responsibilities fell to DARPA which
acts as the "silent" fifteenth partner.112
Most assessments of SEMATECH have been positive, but the
idea of consortia has not been without critics. Consortia have often
failed due to seven generic problems: recruiting personnel, obtaining
resources, obtaining new partners, confused decision making, com-
plex legal issues, membership turnover, and evaluating and produc-
ing outputs." 13 SEMATECH has managed to avoid these problems
and build a clean room and chip fabrication line in only thirty-two
weeks, an impressive accomplishment. 1 4
Federal funding for SEMATECH is about to run dry. SE-
MATECH II has been proposed as a "second five-year plan that
will broaden SEMATECH's mission and its role within the U.S.
semiconductor industry.""' 5 The federal role in this second project
is still unclear, although it is certain some federal support will be
requested by the consortium." 16
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. McLoughlin, supra note 103, at 1.
109. Id. at 1-2.
110. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No.
100-180, 101 Stat. 1019 (1987).
111. Glenn J. McLoughlin, Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Proposal: SE-
MA TECH, CONG. RES. SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, Dec. 19, 1991, at 4; see also 15 U.S.C. § 4602
(1988).
112. McLoughlin, supra note 111, at 4.
113. William M. Evan & Paul Olk, R&D Consortia: A New U.S. Organizational Form,
SLOAN MGmT. REV., Spring 1990, at 37, 41.
114. Lee Smith, Can Consortiums Defeat Japan?, FORTUNE, June 5, 1989, at 245, 254.
115. McLoughlin, supra note 111, at 7.
116. Id.
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Fifth, the United States has undertaken a variety of technology
policy initiatives. Other noteworthy federal initiatives include the
creation of the annual Malcom Baldridge Quality Award,"1 7 the ele-
vation of the National Science Advisor to the Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Science and Technology Policy,1 ' and the establishment of
the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) within the DoC." 9
III. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
In 1992, the United States is at a technology policy crossroads.
Free market advocates argue that government has no role in tech-
nology and industry as a venture capitalist, believing that such a
role will only result in supporting dying industries. Private sector
plans envision a partnership between government and business with
government taking the lead in the early stages where business is
unable to maintain long term funding. The U.S. government has
taken tentative steps toward adopting an industrial and technology
policy by formulating lists of critical technologies. Nevertheless, in
the face of a lagging economy, it is evident that some action beyond
list-making is necessary. This section explains the alternative view-
points of free market advocates, and private sector planners.
A. Free Market Position
Since the birth of this country, an ongoing debate has existed
over whether the federal government should formulate an industrial
policy and play an active role in it.120 Indeed, the debate can be
dated to the disagreements between Alexander Hamilton and
Thomas Jefferson. 2' The mercantilism of Hamilton, denounced by
Jefferson, advocated "protectionist tariffs, bounties, and premiums
to nurture its infant industries."' 22 Since that time, the free market
position has been the federal government's stated policy, but as the
industrial and technological sector weakens, these free marketers
are finding it necessary to defend their position and decry the perils
of a national industrial policy.'23
Free market advocates take the view that the federal govern-
ment should not get involved in promoting the commercialization
117. COUNCIL ON COMPETrIVENESS, supra note 14, at 17.
118. Id.
119. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5131,
102 Stat. 1107, 1439-41 (1988); see also 15 U.S.C. § 278n (1988).
120. Industrial Policy: Is it the answer?, Bus. WK., July 4, 1983, at 54, 54.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
19931
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LW JOURNAL
of technology.124 Specifically, they assert that any type of industrial
policy will stifle economic growth, slow down the shift of resources
to productive industries by trying to shore up declining industries,
and waste money on "targeted growth" industries that may have no
commercial future.'25 An industrial policy would also create many
layers of bureaucrats who will tinker with planning, bailouts, and
loan guarantees.
126
One of the main objectives of the free market advocates to an
industrial policy focuses on politicization. Free marketers assert
that Congress will not invest any group with authority to make pol-
icy because the new administrative body would cut into the prerog-
atives of the professional politicians. Politicians are greatly
influenced by the entrenched management of big industries and in-
terest groups who "will manipulate any industrial policy to promote
their own interests rather than those of the whole country."'
1 27
Many free market advocates vow that the government as entrepre-
neur is destined for failure. 128 They point to the government's su-
pervision of the railroads into bankruptcy, regulatory destruction of
interurban transportation, and regulation of thousands of banks out
of existence in the 1930s.129
One of the key advocates of the free market position is Charles
L. Schultze, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
under President Jimmy Carter.131 Schultze claims that the phrase
"industrial policy" refers to "a loose collection of similar diagnoses
and proposals" that rely on two explicit propositions: (1) "the U.S.
has been de-industrializing;" and (2) "some other countries - Japan
being the preeminent example - have developed governmental poli-
cies that successfully promote vigorous industrial growth."'' Ac-
cording to Schultze, the need for industrial policy rests upon two
implicit propositions: (1) "the government [possesses] the analytical
capability to determine with greater success than market forces
what industrial structure is appropriate, who the potential winners
are, which of the losers should be saved, and how they should be
restructured;" and (2) "the American political system [can] make
124. See id. at 57.
125. Industrial Policy, supra note 120, at 57.
126. Id.
127. Gary S. Becker, The Best Industrial Policy is None at All, Bus. WK., August 5,
1985, at 14, 14.
128. See Industrial Policy, supra note 120, at 57.
129. Id.
130. Charles L. Schultze, Industrial Policy: A Dissent, THE BROOKINOS REV., Fall 1983,
at 3, 3.
131. Id. at 3-4.
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such critical choices among firms, individuals, and regions on the
basis of economic criteria rather than political pressures." 132
Schultze concludes that none of these propositions reflect real-
ity.133 "America has not been de-industrializing." 134  Although
economic performance has faltered at times, relative to the indus-
tries of other countries, U.S. industry has performed well by most
standards.1 35 Schultze maintains that there is no evidence that the
sharp decline in productivity growth "stems from a tendency for the
private market system to allocate investment to the 'wrong' places[,]
away from the manufacturing sector or, within manufacturing, to
the wrong firms or industries. 136  .
Examining the flourishing of the post-war Japanese economy,
Schultze downplays the role of industrial policy under the leader-
ship of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).137
He asserts that the "huge savings rate, aggressive business leaders,
and... backlog of modem technology waiting to be exploited" are
the main reasons that Japan has prospered.1 38 Outside of Japan, the
failures of industrial policy are more evident; the Concorde in
France and Britain, 139 and the French state-sponsored computer
grant to the French company Groupe Bull SA 14 "are examples of
costly, futile government investments in [R&D]."1 41
Schultze flatly concludes that it is impossible to plan a success-
ful industrial structure 42 because "a set of economic criteria that
determine what gives different countries preeminence in particular
lines of business" simply does not exist.1 43 Also, the American
political system was not designed to bring order and authority
needed by an industrial policy, but to "constrain legislative and ex-
ecutive authorities so that they could not make arbitrary and invidi-
ous choices among individuals" and groups. 1" If attempted, the
end result would be misallocated resources, reduced industrial effi-
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Schultze, supra note 130, at 4.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Industrial Policy, supra note 120, at 61.
140. Michael Schrage, Lessons in How Not To Develop an Industrial Policy, WASH. POST,
April 5, 1991, at F3.
141. Industrial Policy, supra note 120, at 61.
142. Schultze, supra note 130, at 9.
143. Id. at 7.
144. Id. at 10.
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ciency incentives, and blunted competitive forces.' 45
For the free market believers, any industrial policy will be re-
duced to the government picking winners and losers.'46 They em-
phasize government's present inability to be effective through its
"patchwork mess" of "existing tax policy, antitrust regulation, and
all the other elements which have become a kind of de facto indus-
trial policy."147 For them, "American grit and determination" will
be the force that drives U.S. industry, not government policy.148
Despite the naysayers, the beginnings of a national industrial
policy for the 1990s are becoming visible. This section next ana-
lyzes (1) private sector plans offered by the Council on Competi-
tiveness and the Carnegie Commission, (2) governmental efforts
focusing on efforts by the DoD, DoC, and the National Critical
Technologies Panel to identify critical technologies and (3) more far
reaching Congressional proposals for governmental involvement.
B. Private Sector Plans
Two private organizations that have greatly influenced govern-
mental policymakers to reevaluate the role of the public sector in
helping U.S. industry are the Council on Competitiveness and the
Carnegie Commission. These two diverse and well-respected
groups have focused attention on critical problems that face this
nation's industries.
1. Council on Competitiveness
In 1986, John Young, CEO of Hewlett-Packard, founded the
Council on Competitiveness as a non-profit, nonpartisan organiza-
tion of chief executives from business, higher education and organ-
ized labor. The Council's goal focuses on improving the ability of
American companies to compete effectively in world markets. The
Council has a three part agenda: to increase public awareness of the
breadth and severity of America's economic problems; to mobilize
the political will required to set the United States on a new and
positive economic course; and to assist in the development of spe-
cific public policies and private initiatives. "' The Council's policy
positions are based on the assumption that improving competitive-
145. Id.
146. John S. McClenahen, Now Do We Need a National Industrial Policy?, INDUSTRY
WK., March 18, 1991, at 56, 57.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 58.
149. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14.
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ness will only occur through a series of incremental steps that in-
volve all sectors, including business, labor, academia, and
government. The Council has issued a series of pragmatic, action-
oriented recommendations upon which practical policies can be
built.
One of the Council's first reports, America's Competitive Crisis:
Confronting the New Reality,150 played an important role in struc-
turing the initial competitiveness debate. The Council continued its
study of the competitiveness crisis with Picking Up the Pace: The
Commercial Challenge to American Innovation.15 1 This report dis-
cussed how and to what extent America's once commanding tech-
nological lead has disappeared. Its policy recommendations
address ways the federal government can facilitate the commerciali-
zation of technology.
The Council made four broad recommendations in Picking Up
the Pace, each addressing a key policy issue." 2 First, "the federal
government should improve the macroeconomic environment that
affects the private sector's ability to develop and apply technol-
ogy."115 3 Such an improvement could be made by making "fiscal
policy more supportive of private sector efforts to commercialize
technology" and by strengthening U.S. trade policy for technol-
ogy.1 54 Fiscal policy should be directed at credible multi-year deficit
reduction and the promotion of savings and long term invest-
ment.15 ' Trade policy should focus on opening foreign high-tech-
nology markets and improving protection of intellectual property
abroad. 156
Second, the Council recommended that "the federal govern-
ment should improve the machinery for making technology pol-
icy."'1 57 Specifically, an Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology should be appointed as a cabinet level position.
158
Technology policy should also "rationalize the involvement of Con-
gress in technology-related issues" by making R&D tax provisions
consistent, increasing "funding for government agencies that con-
tribute to the commercial application of technology," and creating
150. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AMERICA'S COMPETITIVENESS CRISIS: CON-
FRONTING THE NEw REALITY (1987).
151. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 17.
152. Id. at 4-7.
153. Id. at 4.
154. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 17.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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"a legal and regulatory environment more conducive to the com-
mercial application of technology."'5'
9
Third, the Council recommended that "the federal government
should increase its investment in the education, facilities and equip-
ment that constitute the nation's technological infrastructure" by
initiating a faculty-development program for science and engineer-
ing and modernizing university research facilities with a $10 billion
dollar program. 160
Fourth, the Council concluded by recommending that "the
federal government... widen the focus of national research and
development efforts."' 16 Specifically, the Council indicated that the
federal government should re-evaluate "the agenda and purpose of
the federal laboratories and their relationship with industry," facili-
tate "cooperative generic manufacturing technology," improve
"federal coordination with state technology programs," and en-
courage Defense Department efforts to strengthen the U.S. indus-
trial base. 6
In March, 1991, the Council published Gaining New Ground:
Technology Priorities for America's Future.1 63 This report repre-
sents a pioneering effort to examine the U.S. strategic technology
needs for the 1990s. The report identifies, on a sector by sector
basis, strategic industrial priorities in science and technology. The
Council worked closely with senior technology experts from nine
sectors of U.S. industry to identify the technologies deemed critical
to each industry.161 The Council verified the list of critical technol-
ogies with leading executives from universities, labor unions, and
other specialists. 16 The analysis of each sector focused on the sec-
tor's competitive position, the technologies that are important to it,
how it develops and uses technology, its performance in developing
technology, and the factors supporting and inhibiting its technology
development. 166 As a result of this exhaustive analysis, the Council
determined the critical technologies that need to be developed and
assessed the impact of government policies on the various sectors'
competitiveness. The Council compiled the findings and made pol-
159. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 17, at 5-6.
160. Id. at 6-7.
161. Id. at 7.
162. Id.
163. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14.
164. Id. at i.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 55.
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icy recommendations to the government on how to better facilitate
technology development in the nation.
In its March 1991 report, the Council listed six key findings:
1) "there [exists] a broad domestic and international consensus
about the critical generic technologies driving economic growth
and competitiveness;"' 167
2) "the U.S. position in many critical technologies is slipping
and, in some cases, has been lost altogether[,]" with future trends
not looking encouraging; 6 '
3) "foreign governments are systematically pursuing leadership
in critical technologies;"'169
4) "U.S. public policy does not adequately support American
leadership in [these] technologies, and U.S. national priorities do
not sufficiently address issues related to the role of technology in
U.S. competitiveness;"' 170
5) "most of the technologies that will drive economic growth
over the next decade already exist, and industry needs to improve
its ability to convert them into marketable products and
servics;'
17 1
6) "America's research universities constitute a great national
asset, but their focus on technology and competitiveness is
imited;" 172
Based upon these findings, the 1991 report concluded that "in order
to create quality jobs, generate strong economic growth and safe-
guard national security, the U.S. government and private sector
should work together to develop coherent policies to ensure U.S.
leadership in the development, use and commercialization of
technology."' 17
3
The Council recommended that the President make technology
leadership a national priority in order to enhance U.S. economic
competitiveness. 74 The Council asserted that the federal and state
governments should "develop policies and implement programs to
ensure that America has a world-class technology infrastruc-
ture." 17 1 In addition, because technological advancements require
vigorous private sector efforts, the Council argued that "U.S. indus-
167. Id. at 1.
168. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 2.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 3.
172. Id.
173. COUNCIL ON COMPETIVENESS, supra note 14, at 3.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 4.
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try should establish more effective technology networks to help it
compete in the international marketplace."' 76 The Council further
argued that "U.S. firms should set a goal to meet and surpass the
best commercialization practices of their competitors."' 77 Finally,
the Council recommended that, "while keeping their basic research
programs strong, universities should develop closer ties to industry
so that education and research programs contribute more effectively
to the real.., needs of the manufacturing and service sectors."' 178
2. The Carnegie Commission
In 1988, the Carnegie Corporation of New York created the
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government. 179
The Commission's purpose focuses on helping government institu-
tions respond to advances in science and technology and seek out
ways to make this relationship more effective.' 80
In September, 1991, the Commission published Technology
and Economic Performance: Organizing the Executive Branch for a
Stronger National Technology Base,' a "how-to" manual for the
government to provide better support for technology develop-
ment. "2 While emphasizing that the primary responsibility for the
advancement of commercial technology rests with private industry,
the Commission called for a greater federal role in supporting "ge-
neric" technologies that contribute to both commercial and military
uses. '3 Through this report, the Commission attempts to provide
the executive branch with some "first steps" toward implementing a
technology poliey.' 84
The Commission offered four specific proposals. First, the
Commission recommended the transformation of DARPA into
NARPA, the National Advanced Research Projects Agency.18 5
The "renamed agency would focus more on dual-use technolog[ies],
those technologies that are useful both in defense and commercial
176. Id. at 5.
177. Id.
178. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 6.
179. Council on Competitiveness, Technology Policy: Blueprint Provided for Government,
CHALLENGES, October 1991, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Technology Policy].
180. Id.
181. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, TECH-
NOLOGY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: ORGANIZING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH FOR A
STRONGER NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY BASE (1991) [hereinafter CARNEGIE COMMISSION].
182. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 1.
183. Id. at 1, 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 181, at 6.
184. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4.
185. Id.; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 181, at 7.
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markets." 18 6 Because defense budgets are likely to decrease during
the 1990s, NARPA would have to collaborate extensively with
commercial industry. 18 7 The agency would still support purely mil-
itary technologies, but it would also enter into cooperative ventures
and develop techniques for commercial diffusion of technology.'88
Second, the Commission suggested designating the President's
Office of Science and Technology Policy "as the focal point for iden-
tifying and formulating technology policy issues." 18 9 The Office of
Science and Technology Policy, the Commission concluded, should
also provide support for technology program development and
evaluation.190
Third, the Commission concluded that the National Security
Council should take the lead within the executive branch "in coor-
dinating and integrating the various policy perspectives on matters
that link national security, economic performance and technology
strength."19 1
Fourth, within the Commerce Department, NIST "would have
the central responsibility for supporting pre-competitive, generic re-
search and development not within the purview of other govern-
ment agencies or departments."' 1
92
These two private groups, the Council on Competitiveness and
the Carnegie Commission, have taken the lead in propelling the fed-
eral government into action. In their reports, they focused on the
deteriorating areas of U.S. competitiveness and suggested ways to
change the current course. The alarm that these groups sounded
led the government to begin to study the problems. This eventually
resulted in reports by the Department of Defense, the Department
of Commerce and the National Critical Technologies Panel.
C. Government Plans
Efforts in the early 1980s to cut back the role of government
resulted from the widespread view that strong government and effi-
186. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMIssION, supra note
181, at 40.
187. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note
181, at 40.
188. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note
181 at 40.
189. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note
181, at 25.
190. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note
181, at 25.
191. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4.
192. Id.; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 181, at 7.
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cient private business are adversaries. 193 After ten years of de-
creased market share, lower educational performance, and declining
productivity, many have realized that cutting back on government
intervention may have not helped U.S. industry. In short, a need
exists to reinvest and refocus government's involvement in business
and technology.
Beginning in the late 1980s, this view of a new role for govern-
ment found fruition in the concept of critical technologies. The ad-
vocates of massive federal funding for commercial R&D put
pressure on the government to help U.S. firms improve their ability
to reach out and bring technology to the market rapidly. Govern-
ment already spends $70 billion a year on science and technology,
but as noted, the foc, has been mostly military. In the past, com-
mercial industries were able to rely on defense spinoffs, but that is
no longer feasible. The supporters of a technology policy want to
shift federal spending from defense to commercial applications,
change the mission of national laboratories from defense to indus-
trial technology, have the President make competitiveness a top pri-
ority, and increase efforts to spread advanced manufacturing
methods to all U.S. firms. 19 4
In 1988, the government, through the Defense Department,
took its first step in becoming involved in facilitating the develop-
ment of critical technology. Since that year, the Department of
Commerce and the National Critical Technologies Panel, along
with the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy, have
also developed critical technologies reports. Each report reviews the
current situation, future trends, and makes suggestions on the direc-
tion both government and industry should take.
The aim of governmental intervention in critical technologies is
to increase U.S. competitiveness. The Bush administration is not
advocating an industrial policy, but is supporting pre-competitive,
generic technology. 195
1. Department of Defense
Since 1989, the Department of Defense has released annual
critical technologies plans.1 96 The purpose of these reports is to
193. See Robert Kuttner, Why Business Needs a Stronger - and Wiser - Uncle Sam, Bus.
Wic., June 3, 1991, at 16, 16.
194. Id.
195. Bush Science Aide Issues a Statement to Quell Criticism, WALL ST. J., May 17,
1991, at All.
196. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN ES-I (1989).
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identify the technologies that will maintain U.S. military superior-
ity.197 These reports also attempt to provide guidelines for long
term investment planning. 198 Examining the progression of the
plans, it is evident that the amount of information and participation
has drastically increased. These plans were the first plans mandated
by Congress that focus primarily on critical technologies.
In response to the requirements contained in the National De-
fense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989,199" the DoD released its
first Critical Technologies Plan in March,' 1989.20 The Act re-
quired the Defense Department, with the assistance of the Depart-
ment of Energy, to annually provide Congress with a critical
technology plan.2 ' According to Congress, critical technologies
are "'the technologies most essential to develop in order to ensure
the long term qualitative superiority of the United States weapon
system.' ,,202
The Department of Defense's 1989 report contained considera-
ble information about the procedural aspects of formulating the
plan.203 The plan resulted from a series of meetings involving repre-
sentatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of En-
ergy, and the agencies within these departments responsible for
science and technology programs.
In the 1989 report, the DoD defined critical technologies as
"technologies with great promise of ensuring the long-term superi-
ority of the United States weapon systems. ' 205 Nuclear weapons
were purposely excluded.20 6 The report emphasized that the mere
promotion of critical technologies will not suffice; critical technolo-
gies must be "integrated into a balanced science and technology
program.) 20 7
The Department of Defense already had a science and technol-
ogy (S&T) investment strategy which shared and continues to share
the same objectives as the Critical Technologies Plan, namely, plan-
197. See id.
198. See id. at ES-2.
199. National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, 102
Stat. 1918 (1988).
200. U.S. DEPARTMENT oF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at I.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1.
203. Id. at 2-3.
204. Id. at 1.
205. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at ES-1.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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ning technology to meet defense needs.20  The difference is that the
Critical Technologies Plan focuses on the "star performers" while
the S&T investment strategy takes into account the "whole
team."2"9 The Critical Technologies Plan, however, emphasized
that stability and perseverance in the overall program are vital to
ensure yearly improvements.210
The 1989 Plan selected twenty-two critical technologies211
based upon their potential in the performance and quality design
criteria.212 Under the performance criteria, critical technologies
must either "enhance performance of conventional weapons sys-
tems" or "provide new military capabilities. ' 213 Under the quality
design criteria, critical technologies must either "improve weapon
systems availability and dependability" or "improve weapon sys-
tems affordability. 214
Some of the critical technologies chosen have high potential for
rewards, but are also high risk.215 To reduce this risk, the 1989
report recommended that a technology in its conceptual stage fol-
low several alternative approaches.2" 6 At the "proof-of-feasibility"
stage, the most promising approaches can be identified and future
development options can be narrowed.21 7 While at the "demonstra-
tion" stage of development, a particular approach can be brought to
the point of transitioning into a system.218
In the Department's overall assessment, the 1989 report con-
cluded that the then present defense programs emphasized direct
support of research and development in universities and indus-
tries.219 The 1989 report optimistically maintained that, as of 1989,
the United States continued to be the world leader in technological
208. Id. at ES-2.
209. Id.
210. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at ES-2.
211. Id. at ES-I, ES-2. The technologies were: Microelectronic Circuits and Their
Fabrication, Preparation of GaAs and Other Compound Semi-Conductors, Software
Producibility, Parallel Computer Architectures, Machine Intelligence/Robotics, Simulation
and Modeling, Integrated Optics, Fiber Optics, Sensitive Radars, Passive Sensors, Automatic
Target Recognition, Phased Arrays, Data Fusion, Signature Control, Computational Fluid
Dynamics, Air Breathing Propulsion, High Power Microwaves, Pulsed Power, Hypervelocity
Projectiles, High-Temperature/High-Strength/Light-Weight Composite Materials, Super-
conductivity, and Biotechnology Materials and Processing. Id.
212. Id. at 5.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 9.
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development, but conceded that in key niches of technology, other
countries were aggressively moving ahead.220
The 1990 Defense Department Critical Technologies Plan,221
required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991222 expanded upon the 1989 plan. The 1990
plan was prepared by a group chaired by the Secretary of Defense
with representatives from, among others, the Army, Navy, Air
Force, DARPA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department
of Energy (DoE), and the National Laboratories in Los Alamo,
Livermore, and Sandia.223
The 1990 Plan reduced the number of critical technologies
from twenty-two to twenty.224 From the 1989 Plan's list, fifteen
titles remained the same, two technologies (integrated optics and
fiber optics) were combined under one title, two titles (high power
microwaves and phased arrays) were removed, although aspects of
these were included under pulsed power, signal processing, and sen-
sitive radars, and two new technologies (high energy density materi-
als and weapon system environment) were introduced.225
In choosing critical technologies, the 1990 report enlarged the
selection criteria, adding "multiple use. ' ' 226 Under multiple use cri-
teria, the technologies were judged on their "pervasiveness in major
weapon systems" and their "strengthening [of] the industrial
base.
227
The 1990 Plan prioritized the twenty critical technologies into
three categories. 2 28  Group A consisted of technologies that were
the most pervasive and judged to be of top priority.229 Included in
group A were composite materials, computational fluid dynamics,
220. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 10.
221. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN
(1990).
222. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-189, see 842, § 2508, 103 Stat. 1352, 1512-14 (1989).
223. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 1.
224. Id. at ES-1. The technologies were: Semiconductor Materials and Microelectronic
Circuits, Software Producibility, Parallel Computer Architectures, Machine Intelligence and
Robotics, Simulation and Modeling, Photonics, Sensitive Radars, Passive Sensors, Signal
Processing, Signature Control, Weapon System Environment, Data Fusion, Computational
Fluid Dynamics, Air-Breathing Propulsion, Pulsed Power, Hypervelocity Projectiles, High
Energy Density Materials, Composite Materials, Superconductivity, and Biotechnology
Materials and Processes. Id.
225. Id. at 6.
226. Id. at 5. The 1989 selection criteria were performance and quality design. See
supra note 137 and accompanying text.
227. Id.
228. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 6.
229. Id. at 6-7.
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data fusion, passive sensors, photonics, semiconductor materials
and microelectronic circuits, signal processing and software
producibility.230
Group B included "enabling technologies [that] offer[ed] the
most immediate advances in weapon systems capabilities., 23 1 In-
cluded in group B were air-breathing propulsion, machine intelli-
gence and robotics, parallel computer architectures, sensitive
radars, signature control, simulation and modeling and weapon sys-
tem environment.232
Selected for Group C were "principally emerging technologies
whose applications [were] farthest in the future and most difficult to
identify in detail.' 23 3 Included in group C were biotechnology
materials and processes, high-energy density materials, hyper-
velocity projectiles, pulsed power and superconductivity.234
The 1991 Critical Technologies Plan231 was more comprehen-
sive than earlier plans. Congressional mandaie required the Plan to
outline the twenty-one technologies236 and to document funding
levels necessary for the advancement of each technology.237 The
1991 Plan represented an increased level of participation with input
from DoE, DoC, National Science Foundation, and other interested
private sector groups, including the Aerospace Industries Associa-
tion, the Electronic Industries Association, and the National Secur-
ity Industrial Assobiation. 238 The Plan also included a 1992 budget
request and a proposed five year budget with $232 million for
DARPA to pursue technology objectives. The report formulated a
"twenty-year view" for the DoD to provide for orderly, evolution-
ary improvements in weapon systems, generate innovative, highly
leveraged breakthrough technologies and insert them into our mili-
230. Id. at 7.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 7.
234. Id.
235. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN
(1991).
236. Id. at 1-3. The technologies chosen were: Semiconductor Materials and Microelec-
tronic Circuits, Software Engineering, High Performance Computing, Machine Intelligence
and Robotics, Simulation and Modeling, Photonics, Sensitive Radar, Passive Sensors, Signal
and Image Processing, Signature Control, Weapon System Environment, Data Fusion, Com-
putational Fluid Dynamics, Air Breathing Propulsion, Pulsed Power, Hypervelocity Projec-
tiles and Propulsion, High Energy Density Materials, Composite Materials, Superconductiv-
ity, Biotechnology, and Flexible Manufacturing. Id.
237. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991 sec 605, § 2508,
103 Stat. at 1512-13.
238. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 1-1.
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tary capability, and seek technological "trump cards" to sustain
long-term dominance in the technological arms race.2 39 The 1991
report also contained what the Department called "themes" which
were really broad goals such as producing quality products at an
affordable cost, modernizing the Research, Development, Testing
and Evaluation (RDT&E) establishment, and radically accelerating
the development and use of flexible manufacturing and training
technology.2 °
The 1991 report contained brief descriptions of each of the
twenty-one critical technologies, its applications, and future poten-
tial.24 The list of technologies changed little from the previous
year. The 1991 Plan differs from the 1990 Plan in that it makes no
effort to explicitly assign higher or lower priorities to any of the
critical technologies.242
The 1991 report placed twenty-one critical technologies into
five clusters:
(1) computing/information,
(2) sensing,
(3) materials and manufacturing,
(4) energy and material flow management, and
(5) infrastructure.
The 1991 report used the cluster approach to demonstrate the high
degree of technological interdependence. 243
The 1991 report was the first defense report which emphasized
dual-use technologies, noting that only six of the listed critical tech-
nologies were military-specific technologies. 2' The remaining fif-
teen technologies have significant commercial application or
potential in addition to their military significance.245
The 1989, 1990 and 1991 Critical Technologies Plans estab-
lished a consistent need for development of certain technologies for
military superiority. The progression of the plans demonstrate a
widening focus, concentrating not only on military use, but also on
commercial potential. These plans represent a pioneering Federal
government effort toward identifying critical technologies.
239. Id. at HI-1.
240. Id. at HI-2.
241. Id. at III-1 - 111-21.
242. DoD Lists 21 Critical Technologies, includes Flexible Manufacturing, Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs, April 8, 1991, at A16.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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2. Department of Commerce (DoC)
In the spring of 1990, the Technology Administration within
the Department of Commerce published Emerging Technologies, A
Survey of Technological and Economic Opportunities.246 The report
sought to "provide a source of information to be used by industry,
government and academia as programs and policies are developed
to exploit new, emerging technologies. 247
The DoC report defined an emerging technology as one having
"a high probability of techn[ological] success for new products and
applications that might have substantial markets within approxi-
mately ten years."" An emerging technology might also considera-
bly advance the quality of goods produced by existing industries
that supply major markets.249
The report identified twelve emerging technologies.250 These
emerging technologies were divided into four categories: 1) materi-
als (advanced materials and superconductors); 2) electronic and in-
formation systems (advanced semiconductor devices, digital
imaging technology, high-density data storage, high-performance
computing, and optoelectronics); 3) manufacturing systems (artifi-
cial intelligence, flexible computer-integrated manufacturing, and
sensor technology); and 4) life-sciences applications (biotechnology
and medical devises and diagnostics).251
The report contained information on areas for future govern-
ment technological leadership, 252 areas for government-industry co-
operation,253 and comparisons with Japan and the European
Community.254 The report also focused on areas where opportuni-
ties existed to modify the business, educational and governmental
environments so as to lower barriers to the effective development
and commercialization of emerging technologies.2 55 The report of-
246. TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: A SURVEY OF TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES
(1990).
247. Id. at 3.
248. Id. at 5.
249. Id. at iii.
250. Id. at 9. The technologies were: Advanced Materials, Superconductors, Advanced
Semiconductor Devises, Digital Imaging Technology, High-Density Data Storage, High-Per-
formance Computing, Optoelectronics, Artificial Intelligence, Flexible Computer-Integrated
Manufacturing, Sensor Technology, Biotechnology, and Medical Devises and Diagnostics.
Id.
251. TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 246, at 9.
252. Id. at xv.
253. Id. at xvii-xix.
254. Id. at ix-xii.
255. Id. at 15-24.
[Vol. 9
DEVELOPING CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
fered thirteen conclusions with respect to modifying the environ-
ment so as to promote emerging technologies:
(i) lowering the cost of research and market introduction;
(ii) improving engineering training and education;
(iii) integrating R&D, design, and manufacturing;
(iv) improving the quality of products and services;
(v) improving the technology infrastructure;
(vi) emphasizing the adoption of international standards;
(vii) accepting technological innovation from abroad;
(viii) increasing U.S. industrial cooperation;
(ix) encouraging protection of intellectual property rights;
(x) enacting uniform and limited product liability laws;
(xi) reducing regulatory constraints;
(xii) removing restrictions on export policy; and
(xiii) removing restrictive foreign trade practices.256
The DoC report addressed the failure of U.S. industry to cap-
ture the majority of benefits from emerging technologies.257 Since
there is a strong interest in all sectors of the economy to take action
to improve U.S. competitiveness, drafters of the report hoped the
document would be used as a tool in pursuit of that goal.25 8 Specifi-
cally, DoC hoped the report would start a dialogue among industry,
labor, academia, and government which would lead to concerted
actions to improve U.S. competitiveness and strengthen U.S. sci-
ence and technology options.259
3. National Critical Technologies Panel (NCTP)
The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization,
and Priorities Act of 1976 established the Office of Science and
Technology Policy within the Executive Branch of the U.S. govern-
ment.2 6 The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Pol-
icy also serves as the President's personal science advisor.
261
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990
and 1991 established a National Critical Technologies Panel within
the Office of Science and Technology Policy.2 62 The Panel consists
of thirteen members who are required to prepare a biennial re-
256. TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 246, at 15-24.
257. Id. at 25.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-282, § 201, 90 Stat. 459, 463 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C § 6601, 6611).
261. Id. at § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 6613.
262. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-189, § 601-5, 103 Stat. at 1511-12 (1989)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6681-85).
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port. 26 3 The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Pol-
icy appoints nine members, three from the federal government and
the remaining six from private industry and higher education. 2
The Secretaries of Defense, Energy and Commerce each appoint
one member, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautic and
Space Administration appoints the remaining member, for a total of
thirteen.265 The Act authorizes the Panel to identify product and
process technologies, not to exceed thirty, which they consider to be
technologies that are essential to the further development of the
long term national security and economic prosperity of the U.S. 266
In preparing its March, 1991 report, the Panel reviewed recent
studies on critical technologies, had briefings with various organiza-
tions that have examined the issues, such as the Council on Com-
petitiveness, the National Academy of Engineering, and the
National Academy of Sciences, screened a number of technologies
against a set of criteria, and placed the selected technologies within
a hierarchy which highlighted the interrelationships among
them. 267 The criteria used for selection by the Panel consisted of
national needs, importance/criticality, and market size/diversity.268
The Panel selected twenty-two technologies 269 from over one
hundred nominees.270 These technologies were divided into six
broad areas: materials; manufacturing; information and communi-
cations; biotechnology and life sciences; aeronautics and surface
transportation; and energy and the environment.27 In comparing
the critical technologies chosen by the National Critical Technolo-
gies Panel with those chosen by the DoC as emerging technologies,
all were the same, -except the DoC added technologies in the areas
263. Id. at § 601-602, 42 U.S.C. § 6681-82.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at § 603, 42 U.S.C. § 6683.
267. NATIONAL CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PANEL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRITI-
CAL TECHNOLOGIES PANEL 122 (1991).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 3. The technologies chosen were: Materials Synthesis and Processing, Elec-
tronic and Photonic Materials, Ceramics, Composites, High-Performance Metals and Alloys,
Flexible Computer Integrated Manufacturing, Intelligent Processing Equipment, Micro-and
Nanofabrication, Systems Management Technologies, Software, Microelectronics and
Optoelectronics, High-Performance Computing and Networking, High-Definition Imaging
and Displays, Sensors and Signal Processing, Data Storage and Peripherals, Computer Simu-
lation and Modeling, Applied Molecular Biology, Medical Technology, Aeronautics, Surface
Transportation Technologies, Pollution Minimization, Remediation and Waste Management,
and Energy Technologies. Id.
270. Id. at 2.
271. Id.
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of aeronautics, surface transportation, and energy and the
environment.272
The Panel's report described each technology and highlighted
the reasons for selecting each technology, together with a notation
about its current status and emerging international trends.273
The Panel argued that the success of many firms rests on their
ability to bring associated products of generic technology to the
market swiftly. 274 By showing that it is not necessary for these
companies to be the discovers and developers of the latest innova-
tion, the panel illustrated the importance of integration and short
product cycles.275
The Panel concluded by challenging the U.S. to develop and
deploy technologies swiftly and strategically, but stressed that our
ability to reap benefits will depend upon the quality of our science
and mathematics education.2 76 No advances will be made without a
new generation of technologically literate workers.277 The Panel
further concluded that technology can be an important contribution
to U.S. defense superiority and economic prosperity, but only if the
country learns to utilize it more effectively.278
Although the Department of Defense, the Department of
Commerce and the National Critical Technologies Panel studies
differ, particularly in their scope, there is an extensive overlap
among them. The Defense reports concentrated on military ad-
vancement and the Commerce study focused on the commercial ap-
plications of some of the same technologies. The Panel used both
the Defense reports and the Commerce study as source material,
but added new areas. All of these reports had the purpose of identi-
fying critical technologies to help in the establishment of policy, but
none of these reports had any immediate legal or regulatory signifi-
cance. The reports merely laid the foundation for the action that
now must be taken.
4. Congressional Proposals
Many members of Congress remain dissatisfied with the efforts
of the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce and
the Panel. One of the most outspoken is Senator Jeff Bingaman, (D.-
272. NATIONAL CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PANEL, supra note 267, at 5.
273. Id. at 9-116.
274. Id. at 1.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 6.
277. NATIONAL CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PANEL, supra note 267, at 6.
278. Id. at 2.
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N.M.) who heads the Senate Defense Industry and Technology Sub-
committee. Senator Bingaman criticized the National Critical
Technologies Panel report, saying that the level of progress by the
Administration had been marginal and that a number of critical
technologies had not received any funding.279 He also stressed that
after almost three years of list-making it was time to outline what
the government should do with respect to each of the technologies
to maintain or regain U.S. leadership.28 0
Senator Bingaman along with Senators Hollings (D.-S.C.),
Nunn (D.-Ga.), and Gore (D.-Tenn.) proposed four related bills
that would significantly increase and target federal spending to de-
velop generic technology helpful to U.S. industries. They cited the
numerous government and industry reports, particularly the Coun-
cil on Competitiveness' Gaining New Ground2"' as the inspiration
for these bills.
The first bill, the National Critical Technologies Act of 1991282
directs the Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop stra-
tegic road maps for critical technologies, 2 3 and authorizes more
funding for Defense, Commerce, and other departments that sup-
port partnerships to conduct high risk R&D.284 This bill would
also create regional critical technology application centers,28 5 and
improve the monitoring of foreign technological advances.286
The second bill, the Advanced Manufacturing Technology Act
of 1991287 would increase funding for R&D of manufacturing tech-
nology,288 create a manufacturing extension service,289 expand aid
for engineering and management education,290 and increase access
to foreign technology through international cooperation.291 The
bill also calls for "coordinated management of federal activities in
advanced manufacturing technology, with direct industry input into
that planning process."2 92
279. See George Leopold, Congress "Critical"List Lacks Strategy, DEF. NEWS, April 29,
1991, at 4.
280. Id.
281. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14.
282. S. 1327, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
283. Id. at § 101.
284. Id. at §§ 204, 221-24.
285. Id. at § 301.
286. Id. at § 404.
287. S. 1328, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
288. Id. at § 223.
289. Id. at § 302.
290. Id. at § 402.
291. Id. at § 501.
292. S. 1328, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. 501 (1991).
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The third bill, the Manufacturing Strategy Act of 1991293 calls
for the Commerce Department to act as the leader in development
of generic manufacturing technology and require all agencies with
R&D budgets over $50 million to earmark one-half percentage to
development of new generic technology, except for Defense, En-
ergy, and the National Science Foundation because these agencies
already have well developed existing programs.294 The bill would
expand state technology extension programs, create a National
Quality Laboratory, and establish a twelve member National Com-
mission on Industrial Modernization.295
The fourth bill, the Federal Technology Strategy Act of
1991296 directs federal agencies to fund private industry projects
under the Commerce Department's Advanced Technology Pro-
gram,2 97 and requires the Commerce Secretary to submit a report
on private investment and commercialization of new technology.2 98
The Office of Science and Technology Policy would be required to
prepare a five year federal technology development plan.299
These bills attempt to further the government's involvement in
critical technologies. The thrust of the pending legislation primar-
ily focuses on allocating more funding for R&D and expanding pro-
grams within existing agencies or creating new programs and
centers in an effort to regain U.S. leadership in technology commer-
cialization of technology.
IV. CONCLUSION
The remaining question is where does the United States go
from here? A general consensus exists that the list-making process
is at its conclusion and that some type of action must be forthcom-
ing. One of the basic problems turns on coordinating the many
plans so that the best proposals of each are implemented by govern-
ment and industry.
In their effort to improve the commercialization of technol-
ogy, the federal government can also learn from successful state
programs. These programs have focused on linking the state's aca-
demic resources with its businesses, thereby improving technology
293. S. 1330, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
294. Id. at § 3.
295. Id.
296. S. 1329, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
297. Id. at § 3.
298. Id. at § 4.
299. Id. at § 3.
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transfer.3°°
One of the biggest obstacles the state programs have faced is
gaining accountability in the face of the prevailing sentiment that
government, whether federal or state, is incapable of making intelli-
gent investment decisions. The states which have successful pro-
grams, among them Pennsylvania and Ohio, faced an initial
struggle since they attempted to challenge the current economic de-
velopment thinking. As the economies of these rust belt states were
rapidly declining, it was necessary to develop new technologies to
replace dying industries, such as coal and steel. These state govern-
ments realized that it was necessary not only to bring in new indus-
tries but also to change existing patterns of investment and ideas
about government-industry cooperation.
In examining Pennsylvania's Ben Franklin Partnership, it is
evident that the state's goal was a successful transition from an in-
dustrial to a post-industrial economy. 30 1 The Partnership, named
after one of Pennsylvania's greatest entrepreneurs, was designed to
help business and academia work together to develop technologies
necessary to the state's economy. 302 Essentially a matching grant
program, its main success has centered on the creation of one of the
top intellectual infrastructures in the country.303 Pennsylvania, as
did other states with similar programs, struggled to gain acceptance
as it first implemented the program in 1988, but a little less than five
years later, its program has been successful in nurturing new high
tech companies, modernizing equipment, and creating high tech
jobs.3 4
The danger with all of these programs, either on the state or
federal level, is their potential to be politicized.30 5 As long as the
politicians do not interfere and let the science and technology ex-
perts decide which technologies should be developed, the programs
have a better chance of succeeding. 30 6 However, whether politiciza-
tion is truly a danger remains to be seen.
The phrase "industrial policy" has incited much debate. How-
ever, whether it is called industrial policy, a technology competi-
300. Laurent Belsie, Make a Better Bottle and People Will Beat a Path, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONIrOR, April 26, 1990, at 7..
301. DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY 45 (1988).
302. Id. at 48.
303. Id.
304. See Michael Schroeder, Small Business Has A Friend in Pennsylvania, Bus. WK.,
April 6, 1992, at 75, 75.
305. Belsie, supra note 300, at 7.
306. Id.
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tiveness plan, or something else, turning knowledge into new
technologies and products which will spur economic growth rests
on some type of comprehensive plan. Cutbacks in the large defense
budget have provided the opportunity for the federal government to
redirect these funds into civilian R&D funding and it is critical to
develop a plan.
Contrary to general belief, the federal government has played a
key role in the success of certain- industries.3" 7 Among these indus-
tries are railroads, farming, airlines, and electronics.30 The govern-
ment did not select these industries as "winning" industries; it
simply saw the importance of these industries to the national econ-
omy and used the government structure in the form of tax breaks
and land grants to aid in their development.30 9
Generally, agreement exists on the elements needed to create a
successful technology growth policy. First, federal spending on ci-
vilian R&D needs to be dramatically increased with the money allo-
cated spread over many ideas from basic research to new
manufacturing technologies. 1 Economic studies have documented
that the rate of return, both direct and indirect, from R&D can be
as high as 50% of the money spent, illustrating the importance of
continuing to explore new ideas.31I That return however, is usually
not immediate. Researchers are typically unable to predict the
technologies that will be developed from the basic research. Hence
government investment in basic research must be encouraged.
The second element in creating a successful technology policy
is to provide technical assistance to industry in order to diffuse new
technology to manufacturers, particularly the smaller ones.312 A
major problem faced by' American companies is their outdated
practices and equipment.313 To help these firms, the federal govern-
ment needs to increase funding for existing state technology exten-
sion centers and create more of these centers to handle the needs of
struggling manufacturers who have received little assistance.314
Another deteriorating, but important element is public infra-
307. Christopher Farrell & Michael G. Mandel, Industrial Policy - Call It What You
Will, The Nation Needs a Plan to Nurture Growth, Bus. WK., April 6, 1992, at 70, 70.
308. Id.
309. See id.
310. Id. at 70-72.
311. Id. at 72.
312. Farrel & Mandel, supra note 307, at 72-73.
313. Id. at 73.
314. Id.
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structure.315 In addition to making needed repair of roads, harbors,
and bridges, the federal government should build a communications
infrastructure to service the needs of "information-intensive" indus-
tries.316 Presently the federal government has not allocated enough
money to help private sector businesses develop an information sys-
tem that is able to transfer large amounts of data rapidly between
research centers and business.317 To do this, the government needs
to offer incentives to the telecommunications industry to construct
high-speed data links which will ensure that data is available to
small critical technology companies.318
Technology education is another fundamental element in the
nurturing of economic growth.319 Occupation choices of college
graduates affect the growth of the economy. Recent concern has
focused on poor performance of students in math and science at the
primary and secondary levels, as well as on the insufficient number
of graduating scientists and engineers.320 Increased numbers of
scientists and engineers increase the likelihood of new technology
and product development, thereby furthering economic growth.321
Many technology innovators will establish their own companies,
helping the economy by creating new jobs. 322 The federal govern-
ment can play a key role by subsidizing the higher education of
students pursuing science and engineering degrees and by improv-
ing basic education in science and math.323
Finally, the federal government should encourage investment
in new technologies by making the research and investment tax
credits permanent.324 The private sector should take the initiative
by changing the focus from short term profits to long range plan-
ning, but the government can improve the climate for investment
through the tax incentives.
The Council on Competitiveness's Gaining New Ground 325 ap-
pears to be the most comprehensive and influential plan. This
plan's strength derives from the fact that it addresses every sector of
the economy that must be involved, making recommendations with
315. Id. at 73-74.
316. Id. at 73.
317. Farrell & Mandel, supra note 307, at 74.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Farrell & Mandel, supra note 307, at 74.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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respect to each.3 26 What makes this plan the most appealing is its
effort to effectuate widespread participation, ensuring that the most
important needs of the various sectors are considered in the formu-
lation of the plan. Although every sector, whether it be business,
labor, government, or academia, needs to improve, it appears to be
the federal government which has the most changes to make.
The federal government could undertake steps to restructure
parts of itself based on some of the initiatives implemented by suc-
cessful U.S. companies. Specifically, the federal government needs
to delegate authority, foster teamwork, pursue quality relentlessly,
and pay keen attention to its customers. The federal government
also needs to have a two year budget so that its many agencies have
a greater ability to plan for future spending.32 7
Another growing problem is the micromanagement by Con-
gress.328 Historically, the role of Congress was to help set the over-
all direction for the nation, but many view Congress today, as
meddling in the daily affairs of the executive agencies.329 A solution
lies in improving the consultative process and defusing the increas-
ingly heated partisan debates.330
A tendency exists in government to ignore problems, including
structural ones, that are not seen as urgent. Now, as U.S. industries
are faltering, the federal government finds itself unable and unpre-
pared to help. The federal government is not organized efficiently
to quickly assemble a qualified group of government agents to de-
velop a technology program to deal with the competitive crisis. The
plight of United States critical technologies must be a major na-
tional concern.
But creating economic growth is merely the first step. The ulti-
mate success will be achieved when the urban poor are brought into
the growth process through education and when they share in the
fruits of growth. If our industrial and technological base is to re-
main strong, knowledge must be passed down through our educa-
tional system, providing the foundation for technological leadership
in the United States for years to come.
326. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
327. David Kirkpatrick, It's Simply Not Working, FORTUNE, November 19, 1990, at
179, 180.
328. Id. at 182.
329. Id.
330. See Id.
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LAW OF THE LAN
Diane W. Savaget
Just when we were getting comfortable with the lingo of the
PC era - filled with bits, bytes, RAM, ROM, MS-DOS, and PC-
DOS - computing has moved into a new age. Local area net-
works, or LANs, define this new era in which the LAN is the com-
puter, and the vocabulary is a virtual alphabet soup of acronyms
such as LAN, WAN, CMIP, SNMP, OSI, TCP/IP, and SNA
among others. The growing use of LANs is having a dramatic ef-
fect on the manner in which computer software is licensed.
Although a basic understanding of LANs is necessary in order to
draft an appropriate network software license, it has proved difficult
for lawyers to develop an understanding of this complicated and
evolving technology. Glossaries of LAN terms are widely available;
however, there is a dearth of lay-oriented literature tying these
many terms together.
The purpose of this article is to use these terms interactively to
define what constitutes a LAN, outline the history of the LAN, de-
scribe the hardware "regions" which comprise the LAN, and its
software "governance." Since it has become necessary for LANs to
communicate with other LANs, this article will also describe the
rudiments of the "international law" of interconnectivity. This arti-
cle will also address three legal issues which become critical in the
context of network licensing because of their economic impact.
First, the time honored method of licensing software per CPU is
inadequate for networked environments and the growth of networks
has given rise to a variety of alternative methods of licensing
software for use on LANs. Second, increased reliance on LANs to
run mission critical applications, coupled with the rapid growth in
computer viruses, has created a new software warranty, known as
the computer virus warranty, which is increasingly required by so-
phisticated software customers. Finally, writing a software pro-
gram for use on a LAN is more complicated than writing the single
user version of the same software, and its proliferation over a LAN
dramatically increases the potential economic consequences of an
Copyright © 1993 by Diane W. Savage.
t Ware and Freidenrich, Palo Alto, CA.; J.D., 1974 Georgetown Univesity Law
Center; B.A. English, 1971 Emory University.
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error, or "bug," in the software. Just as software developers are
learning how to develop, install and maintain "network aware"
software programs, their lawyers need to learn how to draft "net-
work aware" licenses which responsibly address these issues. The
attached appendix will provide examples of "network aware" con-
tract provisions which address these legal issues.
WHAT IS A LAN?
A LAN is a data communications facility that interconnects a
number of data transmitting devices, like computers and terminals
(these transmitting devices are frequently referred to as "nodes"),
and allows for the exchange of data.1 A LAN is confined to a rela-
tively small area, such as a building or a group of buildings, in con-
trast to a wide area network (WAN) which may span a large area
such as a continent, or a metropolitan area network (MAN) which
may span a small city or a town.2
The three key elements of a LAN are its: (1) topology, (2)
transmission medium, and (3) access technique.
"Topology" refers to the LAN's physical layout, or the way in
which the nodes in a network are connected together. There are
three major LAN topologies. These are:
the bus topology;
the ring topology; and
the star topology.
There are also a number of hybrid network topologies which com-
bine features of the above topologies.
In a bus topology, the communications network is a single
length of the transmission medium onto which the various nodes
are directly connected. This topology is used in traditional data
communications networks where the host at one end of the bus
communicates with several terminals along its length.
1. The global telephone network is the largest communications network in the world.
It serves the needs of voice users well, but is an expensive and inflexible system for data
communications. As the proportion of interoffice communication accounted for by data in-
creases vis-a-vis voice, the need for an integrated voice and data service also increases. The
change to an integrated service is also outside of the scope of this article, but it involves two
approaches. First, the traditional telephone network is evolving into a network known as the
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN). This standard specifies the interface through
which a user may transmit voice and data using telephone switches. Second, integrated serv-
ices may be offered by an Integrated Service Local Network (ISLN), in which the underlying
network is a LAN with interfaces which can carry voice traffic.
2. This article will not address WANs or MANs, which are also outside its scope.
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In a ring topology, the nodes are connected on a single trans-
mission medium which forms a closed loop. Each node on the
LAN acts as a repeater, and data travels through each node. The
IBM Token Ring is a star ring or a star-shaped ring and is the most
common example of this topology. Because of IBM's Token Ring
Network, this topology is expected to gain at least 70% of the local
area network market in the next few years.3
3. STAN SCHATT, UNDERSTANDING LOCAL AREA NETWORKS, 44-45 (1990).
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Star topology uses individual data paths from a central hub or
concentration point to each node. All data must pass through the
hub, just as all telephone calls pass through a central switching sta-
tion. The pure star topology is not used frequently in data commu-
nications, but it is used in IBM 370 installations and in office
PBXs.4
4. BRENDAN TANGNEY, DONALD O'MAHONY, LOCAL AREA NETWORKS AND
THEIR APPLICATIONS, 16 (1988).
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LANs must also have a connecting medium of some sort to
carry the information from node to node. Many different types of
media may be used. The most common forms of transmission me-
dia are twisted pair, coaxial cable and optical fibers, although mi-
crowave transmission, infrared transmission, and telephone lines
may also be used.'
Bus and ring topologies require that the transmission medium
is shared between a number of nodes. This means that there must
be a mechanism for transferring chunks of data from one node to
another and another mechanism which ensures that one node's
transmission does not interfere with any other node's transmissions.
The first mechanism is packet sharing and the second is access con-
trol. In packet sharing, data is collected in packets which are
launched into the network. The common elements that make up a
typical packet are: (1) the start of packet indicator which informs
other nodes that a packet is being transmitted; (2) the address of the
sender and the receiver; (3) the control field which states the pur-
5. Id. at 9.
19931
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LW JOURNAL
pose of the packet; (4) the data field which contains the data to be
transferred; and (5) the error check field, which allows the network
hardware to detect transmission errors.6
In access control, the many nodes on a LAN which may wish
to transmit data simultaneously are regulated by following a com-
mon access method; all nodes observe the same procedures in order
to send data. Access control methods can be divided into conten-
tion and non-contention methods. In a contention-based access
method, a node seizes the opportunity to transmit when the net-
work becomes idle. The most common contention method is Car-
rier-Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD).
With CSMA, the physical layer of a user's workstation generates a
carrier-sense signal and listens to detect any other carrier-sense sig-
nals from other nodes. If no other signal is detected, the user sends
his or her message. However, if two nodes are located far apart, the
first node may not detect signals from the second node, with the
result that the two nodes commence transmission simultaneously
and a data collision occurs. Collision Detection (CD) means that
the two nodes listen while they transmit a message. If they detect a
data collision, each node waits a different random amount of time
before sending the message again.7
In a non-contention based access system, a node that wants to
transmit data must wait to receive "permission." With one popular
non-contention based system called token passing, a free token is
passed from one node to another. When a node has taken posses-
sion of the token, it has permission to transmit a data packet, and
then it passes the token to the next node in the sequence. As Stan
Schatt explains in his book Understanding Local Area Networks:
To understand how this token approach contrasts sharply with
the CSMA/CD bus approach, imagine a public forum on a con-
troversial issue. Under the CSMA/CD method, several people
might try to speak simultaneously only to stop speaking when
they hear another speaker begin. With dozens of speakers trying
to speak yet not wanting to interrupt each other, the process
would become chaotic and inefficient. With the token approach,
a token would be accepted as a symbol of authority giving a per-
son a right to speak. Whoever held the token would stand and
make a speech. When finished, he would pass this symbol of au-
thority to the next person who desired to speak. No one would
attempt to speak without physically possessing the token.
8
6. Id. at 27-29.
7. SCHATr, supra note 3, at 41.
8. Id. at 41-42.
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The first computers in the 1940's and 1950's were mainframes
which occupied entire buildings. Because they were so expensive,
they were available to only a limited number of users. In the 1960's,
groups within organizations began to share these high-priced main-
frame computers through the use of a primitive network consisting
of "dumb" terminals connected with a mainframe computer
through telephone lines. Through time-sharing, these various
groups within an organization could enjoy the benefits of the main-
frame computer without massive capital expenditures, although this
time-sharing arrangement could be quite slow.
During the 1970's, minicomputers became available at dramat-
ically reduced prices which enabled work groups to purchase their
own computers. This concept of distributing computers throughout
an organization by providing groups with their own minicomputers
was known as "distributed processing." However, these distributed
minicomputers needed to communicate with each other, thus orga-
nizations began cabling them together and writing software to en-
able such communications.
These first experimental local area networks appeared in the
1970's. In 1974, IBM announced its System Network Architecture
(SNA) and in 1975 Digital Equipment announced its Digital Net-
work Architecture (DNA). The establishment by major computer
manufacturers of their own proprietary network architectures led to
a situation where a major manufacturer's computers could commu-
nicate easily with each other, but communication among multiple
manufacturers' computers was difficult or infeasible. This meant
that smaller companies were at the whim of larger manufacturers,
who could change their architecture at any time, leading to a de-
mand within the industry for a standard communications
architecture.9
In 1978, the International Standards Organization (ISO),
based in Geneva, Switzerland, released a reference model for com-
puter networking known as the Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) Model.10 The OSI Model represents a standard approach to
communicate information throughout a network, so that a variety
9. TANGNEY & O'MAHoNY, supra note 4, at 87-88.
10. The OSI, SNA and TCP/IP architectures are the most popular LAN architectures
today and can be used on top of any LAN. The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and
Internal Protocol (1P) issued by the U.S. Department of Defense is currently the most widely
available architecture. Like the OSI model, the TCP/IP architecture is layered, but it con-
tains only the following four layers:
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of independently developed computer devices can operate on the
network. In 1984, ISO released a revised version of the OSI Model
which has become an international standard. The OS Model sepa-
rates the communications and computing functions provided by
LANs into the following seven layers:
OSI MODEL
Application
Presentation
Session Higher Layer
Protocols
Transport
Network
Logical Link Control Ethernet,
Data Link Token Ring
Media Access Control
Physical
The Physical and Data Link layers of the OSI Model establish
rules for cabling media, transmission speed, physical topology, and
access method of the LAN. The five higher layers provide the
methods by which information is reliably transmitted between send-
ing and receiving nodes on LANs and other attached networks, and
the way such information is processed and presented to the user.
Each layer performs its functions by invoking the services provided
by the layers below it, then it returns the results to the invoking
layer above. This layering of protocols is a basic principle of stan-
dards-based networking.1
Layer Name
4 Application
3 Transport
2 Internet
1 Network Access
WILLIAM STALLINGS, THE BUSINESS GUIDE TO LOCAL AREA NETWORKS, 100-101 (1990).
11. In Understanding Local Area Networks, Stan Schatt uses a citizens band radio to
illustrate the principle behind the OS layers. The CB user first presses his send button and
announces, "Breaker, breaker" to indicate that he wants to send a message. He then identi-
fies himself with his nickname before asking his friend for her nickname: "This is Happy
Hacker, can you read me PC Woman?" After making contact, he asks his friend to switch
over to another channel because it is clearer, and his friend acknowledges by replying,
"That's 10-4, Happy Hacker." At the physical layer, Happy Hacker pressed certain buttons
to broadcast his message. His use of nicknames constituted the second communication layer,
established a concrete address for the recipient, and identified himself as the sender. The
third layer of communication occurred when he determined the quality of the transmission
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In 1980, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
(IEEE), a U.S. standards making organization, formed a committee
known as Project 802, whose task was to work within the scope of
the OSI Model to develop a set of standards for local area network
topologies and medium access control methods.12 Project 802 di-
vided the Data Link layer of the OSI Model into two sublayers: a
Logical Link Control sublayer (LLC) and a Media Access Control
sublayer (MAC). The LLC is concerned with providing a data link
service to the higher layers, while the MAC concentrates on provid-
ing shared access to the Physical Layer.
Project 802 also produced three IEEE 802 standards of partic-
ular interest. The IEEE 802.3 subcommittee established an
Ethernet standard for LANs. 3 It also established the CSMA/CD
protocol referred to earlier, which specifies the way that a LAN
using bus technology should construct its data packets and send
them over the network to avoid collisions. The IEEE 802.4 sub-
committee developed Token Bus, a token passing collision preven-
tion standard for a different type of bus network which is frequently
used in factory automation. The IEEE 802.5 subcommittee estab-
lished another standard, Token Ring, to cover networks with ring
topologies that use a token to pass information from one worksta-
tion to another. Token Ring is the principal PC LAN technology
supported by IBM. Ethernet and Token Ring have become the
dominant Physical and Data Link layers for LANs.
The growth of the use of PCs and workstations in the 1980's
resulted in the need for users to communicate with each other
through their common databases and software and to share per-
ipherals. By the late 1980's, the need for LANs was universally
accepted. Today, networking is the fastest growing segment of the
computer market, according to Doug Gold, an analyst with Inter-
and after switching to an error-free channel, began talking to PC Woman. At each layer PC
Woman followed the same rules to respond to Happy Hacker. Similarly, the OSI layers work
only when all vendors adhere to them. SCHATr, supra note 3, at 34-35.
12. The OSI model originally focused on providing WAN type facilities, but later the
scope of the OSI standard was expanded to include LANs and other devices. Since this
article is concerned only with LANs, however, it will focus on how the lower Physical and
Data Link levels have been standardized in the LAN area by IEEE.
13. During the mid-1970's, Xerox Corporation developed the Ethernet LAN with the
announced purpose of creating an industry standard which it would license to third parties.
Ethernet was the first major LAN with nonproprietary communications interfaces and proto-
cols, and operates at the Physical and Data Link layers of the OSI Model. By 1980, Intel and
Digital Equipment Corporation joined Xerox to announce that their products would be com-
patible with Ethernet.
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national Data Corp. in Framingham, Mass. 14 The shipment value
of complex LAN and internetworking products, software, and re-
lated services totalled $4.7 billion in 1989 and is expected to in-
crease to $11 billion per year by 1993.15 With this rapid growth of
LANs, experts estimate that the percentage of terminals, personal
computers, and workstations which are interconnected by LANs
will grow from 15% in 1989 to 83% in 1993.16
COMPONENTS OF THE LAN
LAN Hardware
A LAN is built from the following hardware devices: (1) serv-
ers; (2) workstations; (3) transmission media; (4) network interface
units (NIUs); and (5) a hub, concentrator, or wiring center. Just as
each state has a governor, each workstation has its own operating
system software to control local activities. Each country has a chief
executive officer, and each LAN has a network operating system,
which typically resides in the central file server (the "national capi-
tal" of the LAN), to control the activities of the LAN.
Most LANs start out as a homogeneous set of equipment from
a single vendor which share a common set of rules, which are fre-
quently referred to as "protocols." As the network grows, however,
hardware and software from different vendors using different proto-
cols are added, and the management of the LAN grows more com-
plex. The Network Management System discussed in this article
mediates between the protocols of various hardware on the LAN by
focusing on standards.
Servers. The network operating system, shared data, and
.shared applications reside in the server, which is the electronic
equivalent of an office filing cabinet. There are two types of servers:
0 In client/server LANs, a dedicated "file server" provides a
common service to all other workstations, also referred to as
"clients," on the LAN. For example, one or more computers
might be dedicated to storing files of infbrmation for all other
computers on the LAN, which can ask these file servers to
deliver copies of files on command. Another set of computers
might be dedicated to providing laser printing services ("print
servers") or access to catalogued information in on-line
14. Stephanie Wilkinson, Low End LANs Satisfy Users'Simpler Needs, 11 MIS WEEK,
1990, at 1.
15. Network Computing Forum to be Launched in January 1991, PR NEWSWIRE, May
29, 1990.
16. Howard Anderson, Worth Noting, NETWORK WORLD, Oct. 14, 1991 at 21, col. 1.
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databases ("database servers"). A dedicated server is not
available for running programs. 17
In server-less, or peer-to-peer LANs, each workstation can
also be both a client and a "mini-file server" for all other cli-
ents on the LAN. Each user can decide which disks or files to
make available or publish. Other clients can then access that
information across the distributed network. Some believe dis-
tributed systems enhance reliability because they theoretically
allow multiple repositories for shared data rather than a single
main file server as in a client/server LAN.
18
Workstations. Workstations may include IBM computers or
compatibles, Apple Macintosh computers, Unix-based and other
engineering workstations, and diskless workstations. The worksta-
tion is provided with data from the file server, and the actual execu-
tion of the application programs occurs at the workstation.
Transmission Media. Transmission media connect the nodes
on the LAN.19 There are three commonly used forms of transmis-
sion media:
(1) Twisted pair cabling, the most common form of wiring in
data communications consisting of two insulated copper wires ar-
ranged in a regular spiral pattern, is the least expensive type of net-
work cabling. Twisted pair comes in unshielded (ordinary
telephone wire) and shielded (shielding with metallic braid that
reduces interference). Shielded twisted pair provides better per-
formance at lower data rates than unshielded twisted pair, but it is
more expensive and more difficult to work with.20
(2) Coaxial cable, composed of a single inner wire conductor
surrounded by insulation with an outer jacket of aluminum or cop-
per, is more expensive than twisted pair, but supports both broad-
band and baseband LANs. Baseband coaxial cable has one channel
that carries a single message at a very high speed. Broadband coax-
ial cable can carry several different signals broadcast at several dif-
ferent frequencies at the same time, and therefore can accommodate
integrated voice, data, and video signals. This type of cable is fre-
quently found in homes as a part of cable television.21
17. Vinton Cerf, Networks, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Sept. 1991, at 72, 74.
18. Ruthann Quindlen, Why Go Client/Server When You Can Network Peer-to-Peer?,
April 15, 1991, INFOWORLD, at 90.
19. An alternative to transmitting the information over cables is to transmit it using
infrared or microwave radiation. Although it is impractical in the usual office situation, it
can be useful for communicating between buildings. TANGNEY & O'MAHONY, supra note 4,
at 12-13.
20. STALLINGS, supra note 10, at 46.
21. SCHATT, supra note 3, at 26-27.
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(3) Optical fiber, consisting of a pure glass cable drawn into a
very thin fiber to form a core, is the most expensive type of network
cabling, based on media and installation cost. Optical fiber uses an-
alog signaling to carry data in the form of modulated light beams.
Optical fiber is used for very high speed and/or high capacity data
communications needs. One type of network that uses fiber optics
is Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI).22
Network Interface Units. Network Interface Units (NIUs) are
the cards that plug into a workstation or server to connect it to the
transmission medium. The NIU contains logic for accessing the
LAN and for sending and receiving data packets on the LAN.23
The main task of the NIU is to form these data packets from the
workstation and transmit them onto the transmission medium. The
NIU also receives data packets from the transmission medium and
translates them into bytes which the workstations can understand.
The Hub, Concentrator or Wiring Center. Each workstation on
a network needs access to the file server. However, it is usually not
possible to have every workstation directly attached to the file
server. To accommodate multiple workstations, a hub or central
wiring center may be used, although certain network architectures
(like ring topology) do not require hubs.2'
LAN Software
The Workstation Operating System. The operating system for
each workstation is loaded at the workstation and acts as the "gov-
ernor" for the workstation, controlling the execution of other
software on the workstation. The workstation operating system
also includes, or works in conjunction with, software created by the
network operating system which is loaded on the workstation.
Each network operating system has a different name for this piece
of software, which is sometimes referred to as a "requestor" or
"redirector," and which determines whether the requests made by
the workstation are for local processing or network processing. If
the request is one for local processing, like copying of local files or
formatting of local media, it is serviced by the workstation operat-
ing system. If the request is one for network processing, it is ser-
viced by the network operating system. The workstation operating
system is essential for the workstation to operate, even if it is not a
part of a network. The workstation operating system conceptually
22. STALLINGS, supra note 10, at 48.
23. Id. at 6.
24. GREG NUNEMACHER, LAN PRIMER, 59 (1990).
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resides in the Presentation Layer of the OSI Model.2"
The most popular workstation operating system today is MS-
DOS from Microsoft, which is found on IBM PCs and compatibles.
Because DOS was originally designed as a single user operating sys-
tem, most PC LAN implementations have been forced to take a
three-tiered approach to network governance consisting of DOS,
NIUs and a separate network operating system. However, IBM's
newer OS/2 operating system is an integrated operating system
which includes both workstation and network operating system
components. As a result, OS/2 eliminates the need for a separate
network operating system.
The Network Operating System. The network operating system
controls all network activity. The network operating system man-
ages access to the data on the hard disks of the file server, handles
security of the data on the fie server's storage devices, communi-
cates between the user and the network, accesses network services,
accesses shared printers and other servers, and accesses shared
outside services such as gateways and bridges. The most common
network operating system on the market today is NetWare from
Novell.26 NetWare offers a fairly complete suite of network proto-
cols, and there are more products available for NetWare than any
other LAN operating system.2" The network operating system con-
ceptually operates at the Application Layer of the OSI Model.
Network Applications Software. The challenge for the 1990's is
for software companies to develop a new type of LAN applications
software. The packaged software of the 1980's, primarily designed
for use on standalone computers, is inadequate because it cannot
anticipate all of the combinations of hardware and software on
which an application must operate in a network and because it is
not designed to take full advantage of the communications features
of the network. According to Patricia Seybold, president of Office
Computing Group, a Boston consulting firm, new network applica-
tion software is "where all the action is, and where it's going to be
for the next 10 years."
28
The development of network applications software requires a
25. Id. at 23-24.
26. Netware has a 63% share of the network operating system market. Sandra Atchi-
son, Evan I. Schwartz, Can LAN Lord Novell Extend its Territory? BUSNISS WEEK, Septem-
ber 2, 1991, at 78.
27. Paul Korzeniowski, Everything to Everything in a Network of Networks, SoFrWARE
MAGAZINE, June 1990, at 69.
28. Richard Brandt, Software: It's A New Game, BusINESS WEEK, June 4, 1990, at 102,
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radical change in the software which software suppliers develop, as
well as the way they market, distribute and support software.
Although most standalone software today is "networkable" (which
means that it is able to function on a network without additional
changes), there is an increasing demand for "network aware"
software - software which is designed from the ground up to run
efficiently in a networked environment. Both networkable and net-
work aware software generally include file locking functions,29 and
may include a license manager utility to restrict software usage.
However, network aware versions generally include additional fea-
tures which make them more adept at handling the hardware and
software configurations of multiple users, such as record-locking, 30
customized start-up files which let users call the application from a
server using appropriate device drivers for their particular worksta-
tion confignration, fie transfer facilities, and facilities to access
other remote peripherals. Network aware software frequently takes
the form of groupware, which includes office automation type func-
tions like group calendaring, project management, voice messaging,
e-mail, and call tracking.31
Writing network aware software is an order of magnitude more
complicated than creating the single user version of the same pro-
gram. 32 An example of a problem conversion of a single user
software system to a network specific version was Ashton-Tate's
Multiuser dBASE II, which Ashton-Tate withdrew from the mar-
ket. According to Ashton-Tate's public relations manager, "it
could have corrupted some data," although "it was not a major
33bug" that stopped shipment of the network specific version. More
recently, DSC Communications Corporation reported that three bi-
nary digits set incorrectly in minor software updates to its call-rout-
ing switches knocked out telephone service to ten million people in
29. A "file lock" provides the ability to lock a file so that only one user may use it at a
time.
30. A "record lock" provides the ability to lock a record so that several users can share
the same file at one time, but cannot share the same record within a file.
31. SOFrWARE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, NETWORK LICENSE SURVEY, 1-2 (1990).
32. "People who have been around the computer track a few times think all LAN prod-
ucts should carry a label: WARNING! Use of this product could be hazardous and possibly
fatal to your business health! Like alcohol, chocolate and television, networks carry a large
potential for abuse. Your level of involvement must be balanced against the wisdom of keep-
ig a safe distance away from any volatile, unstable substance. Think of LANs as nitroglyc-
erine: this would give you just the right amount of respect for their exposure potential." John
Hawkins, Networks: the creatures with two heads; the perils of being a network consultant,
DATA BASED ADVISOR, November 1989, at 12.
33. Keith Yocum, Software Shortage Has LAN Industry Tied Up, PC WEEK, April 2,
1985, at 52.
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five states and the District of Columbia. Congressmen and wit-
nesses testifying at a hearing on the outages stressed that telephone
companies should have better contingency plans for dealing with
disruptions "that are certain to occur as network software becomes
more complex."13 4
Network aware software also involves substantially more sup-
port from the vendor to customize the software for the users' needs
and to install the software on the network. As a result, Patricia
Seybold estimates that for each dollar which a company spends on
software for networks, it spends five dollars on consulting systems,
integration and custom programming.35 An example of this is Lo-
tus Notes, a groupware program that runs on PCs and enables
workers on a network to communicate more effectively. Notes cus-
tomers who pay $62,500 receive a programming system, 200 copies
of Notes, five days of consulting and six months of technical
support.3 6
This move to consulting is something of a "back to the future"
strategy. Thirty years ago, computer companies sent teams of pro-
grammers to their customer's sites to develop custom software for
their new mainframe computers. This changed in the 1980s, when
independent software companies emerged to supply prepackaged
software for use on PCs. In the new networking era, software com-
panies are discovering that demand for consulting and custom
software development is growing rapidly as corporate customers be-
gin to move large applications from mainframes to PC-based LANs.
For example in 1991, one year after Microsoft launched its consult-
ing unit, it had 200 consultants in seven countries working for over
150 clients to meet their needs for consulting and custom software
development.37
The Network Management System
The Network Management System consists of hardware and
software additions which are implemented among the network com-
ponents described above. The Network Management System views
the LAN as a unified architecture, with addresses and labels as-
signed to each node, and the specific attributes of each node known
34. Gary H. Anthes, Phone Outages Traced to Software Updates, COMPUTERWORLD,
July 15, 1991, at 4.
35. Brandt, supra note 28, at 105.
36. Id. at 104.
37. Stacey Peterson and Amy Cortese, Microsoft Smooths Partners' Feathers, SYSTEMS
AND NETWORK INTEGRATION, Dec. 2, 1991, at 76.
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to the system. ISO has suggested the following five key areas of
network management:
(1) Fault Management. When fault occurs, the Network
Management System should be able to determine the location of the
fault, isolate the rest of the network from the failure, modify the
network to minimize the impact of operation without the failed
components and repair or replace a failed component to restore the
network to its initial state.
(2) Accounting Management: The Network Management
System should be able to track the use of network resources by user
and user class for planning network growth, as well as for internal
accounting purposes, to determine whether a user or group is abus-
ing access privileges or whether users are making inefficient use of
the network.
(3) Configuration and Name Management. The Network
Management System should control initializing a network and shut-
ting down part or all of the network, as well as maintaining, adding
and updating the relationship among its components and the status
of components during network operation.
(4) Performance Management. The Network Management
System should be capable of tracking activities on the network and
enabling performance management to make adjustments to improve
network performance (e.g., by controlling capacity use level, exces-
sive traffic and response time).
(5) Security Management. The Network Management Sys-
tem should monitor and control access to the network and to all or
part of the network management information from network
nodes.38
The Network Management System is typically comprised of
one or more Network Control Hosts and associated software com-
monly known as the Network Control Center and the Network
Management Entities.
Network Management Hardware. In today's world, each ven-
dor's equipment may be managed by a different workstation (com-
monly called an "element manager"). However, in an Integrated
Network Management System (INMS) that manages many types of
LAN to WAN connections and devices, one or more workstations
are designated as the Network Control Host.
Network Control Center. The Network Control Center is a col-
lection of software which resides on the Network Control Host.
38. STALLINGS, supra note 10, at 251-255.
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The Network Control Center includes an operator interface so that
the designated administrator can manage the network. The Net-
work Control Center responds to user requests concerning the LAN
by displaying information and issuing requests for information to
Network Management Entities, described below. This communica-
tion is carried out with an Application Layer network management
protocol that uses the communications architecture in the same
fashion as any other distributed application. 39
Network Management Entities. Each network node contains a
collection of software known as the Network Management Entity,
which is dedicated to certain network management tasks. The Net-
work Management Entity collects and stores statistics on network
related activities, and responds to requests and commands from the
Network Control Center.
Because network management software relies on the host oper-
ating system and communications architecture, most Network
Management Systems today are designed for use on a single ven-
dor's equipment. However, vendors of Network Management Sys-
tems are focusing on two protocols that are emerging as open
network management standards to permit these systems to manage
multivendor networks - TCP/IP based simple network manage-
ment protocol (SNMP), which is maintained by the Internet Activi-
ties Board, and common management information protocol
(CMIP), which is based on standards set by ISO. These protocols
provide a common format for network devices such as bridges,
routers, concentrators and modems to communicate management
data via an "agent" to the Network Control Host. In addition,
CMIP allows communications among different Network Manage-
ment Systems. The move toward multivendor support will provide
administrators of large heterogeneous networks with critical long
term advantages. For example, network administrators will be able
to monitor and control multivendor networks from a single point in
the network.
All Network Management Systems handle multiple protocols
in the same way. SNMP management information bases (MIBs),
CMIP objects and attributes, and the proprietary definitions of
managed objects in the network are grouped together in the Net-
work Management System's memory according to the types of de-
vices that the system handles. Translation routines, which match
the object definitions with what they manage in the network, are
39. Id. at 259-262.
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handled in one of three ways. The first approach is to handle this
translation on the Network Management System, whether it is an
Integrated Network Management System (INMS) that manages
many types of LAN to WAN connections and devices, or an ele-
ment manager that handles just one kind of device. The second
approach, used by IBM and AT&T, is to use an application pro-
gram interface (API) to handle conversions between standard and
proprietary protocols. The API is provided to third party vendors,
including other network management vendors and companies that
manufacture element management stations, which can then map
their proprietary routines to the API.4 The third approach is to
put the burden of protocol translation on the applications that run
on the managed devices in the network. Using this approach, each
managed device contains a software protocol gateway that converts
incoming messages from the Network Control Center to its own
protocol.41
INTERCONNECTIVITY: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF LANS
As LANs become more prevalent, the need for LANs to com-
municate with each other becomes more pronounced. The underly-
ing objective of interoperable products is to facilitate a union of a
number of LANs through the establishment of protocols which
govern the exchange of information among participating LANs.42
To carry out this objective, four major components are used: re-
peaters, bridges, routers, and gateways (or backbones). These prod-
ucts perform tasks to achieve compatibility among LANs at
different levels of the OSI Model as follows:
40. Mary Jander, Net Management Enters the Multivendor Era, DATA COMMUNICA-
TIONS, Feb. 1991, at 49-51.
41. Id. at 51.
42. Richard Pastore used a similar metaphor to point out the need for such protocols:
"An archipelago of isolated islands, each with its own native language and
customs. It sounds idyllic - unless you're talking about islands of data dis-
tributed across several local-area networks. Then the image becomes a Ber-
muda triangle of lost data integrity, data inconsistency and incompatible
security protocols." Richard Pastore, LAN Ho! Navigating Downsized Data,
COMPUTERWORLD, June 4, 1990, at 67.
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Device OSI Model Layer
Gateway/Backbone Level 7 Application Services
Gateway/Backbone Level 6 Presentation
Gateway/Backbone Level 5 Session Control
Gateway/Backbone Level 4 Transport
Router Level 3 Network
Bridge Level 2 Data Link
Repeater Level 1 Physical43
Repeaters. Although repeaters are categorized as in-
ternetworking devices, they actually connect segments of the same
network to form an extended network. In other words, repeaters
are used when a LAN wants to expand its own boundaries rather
than to govern the relationships between two LANs. A repeater is
not used to interconnect different networks: it is used to "repeat"
the electrical signal between cable segments and physically extend a
single network.' The repeater functions at the lowest level of the
OSI Model, the Physical Layer, and its sole function is to extend
the maximum length that a signal can travel, thereby extending the
physical size of the network.
Bridges. Bridges connect two similar LANs that use identical
protocols. Bridges are divided into those that connect LANs in the
same site (local bridges) and those that make use of telecommunica-
tions facilities to interconnect LANs at different sites (remote
bridges). 4' The bridge picks up data packets from one LAN that
are intended for a destination on another LAN and passes these
packets on. Each time the bridge transfers packets between net-
works, it also acts as a repeater to regenerate the signals. The
bridge does not modify the packet or add anything to it. The bridge
is more intelligent than a repeater in that it can look at the header
of a data packet and determine to which of the two networks the
packet belongs. Bridges operate at level two of the OSI Model, the
Data Link Layer, so layers three and above must be identical in the
two systems for successful communications in a bridge.4 6
Routers. Routers are used to interconnect networks that may
or may not be similar. The router operates at level three of the OSI
Model, the Network Layer, sometimes known as the internet proto-
43. Michael Grimshaw, LAN Interconnections Technology, TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
February 1991, at 25.
44. Kurt Vandersluis, Paul Kent, MacUser Labs Staff, Building a Better Network with
EtherTalk-to-LocalTalk Routers, MACUSER, April 1991, at 156, 158.
45. STALLINGS, supra note 10, at 187.
46. Id. at 187-191.
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col. This internet protocol is present in each router and in each
host on the network. In addition, as with the bridge, each host
must have compatible protocols at layers four and above in order to
communicate successfully.4 7
Gateways and Backbones. Gateways are the most complex in-
terconnectivity devices. The gateway is used to connect computers
that use different communications architectures. The gateway func-
tions on all seven layers of the OSI Model so it can be used to con-
nect OSI-based products with proprietary products, like a LAN
using IBM's SNA architecture. The gateway maps from an appli-
cation on one computer to an application that is similar in function,
but which differs in detail, on another computer.48
Networks with different communication architectures can also
be connected via a backbone network. A backbone network is a
control network to which other LANs are attached. Fiber optics
are usually used for backbone networks because backbones require
a larger bandwidth and need to be able to transmit across long dis-
tances. The LANs are attached to the backbone network via
bridges, routers, or gateways, depending on the architectures of the
LANs and of the backbone.49
"NETWORK AWARE" LICENSE ISSUES
Methods of Licensing Software For Use on LANs
Software companies are changing the way they do business be-
cause computer networks are changing the way companies handle
information. The use of mainframes in the 1960's did not provide
individual workers with the tools they needed to do their jobs. PCs,
on the other hand, provided job-specific tools, but did not let work-
ers share information or work collaboratively with each other.
Groupware on LANs is allowing workers to coordinate their activi-
ties through e-mail and office automation-type functions like voice
messaging, project management, group calendaring and call
tracking.
The increasing use of software on LANs has resulted in a de-
mand by users for a consistent, common way to license, distribute
and administer applications software across a network. The time-
honored licensing practices of licensing shrinkwrapped software
either per processor or via a by-site license are inadequate for
47. Id. at 207.
48. Id. at 210.
49. NUNEMACHER, supra note 24, at 142-144.
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networked environments where applications are shared by users on
heterogeneous computers and where the network itself is constantly
changing size and configuration. 0
Software companies, on the other hand, are concerned that
LANs present a real threat to their economic survival. When a net-
work administrator buys a single-use copy of a software program
and lets ten people on the network access that program simultane-
ously, the software company loses a lot of money. As a result,
software companies which were forced by the marketplace to drop
copy protection schemes during the mid-1980's are now implement-
ing such schemes again in the context of LAN licensing.
Rather than balking at such schemes, sophisticated computer
users are asking for them. The network administrators in a recent
Software Publishers Survey unanimously favored lock-out systems.
The Survey reported that:
One administrator complained adamantly about publishers that
do not provide this utility in network versions of software:
"They provide a LAN edition and then basically say 'you control
it,' without giving you the tools to do it. It's asking for
problems."51
The growth in LANs has resulted in a plethora of license ap-
proaches. "We get a lot of calls from network administrators who
have some problem where they're running 10 different packages and
they are licensed in all sorts of different ways," says Ann Stephens,
research director for the Software Publishers Association. "It can
make for all sorts of headaches as far as controls go." 52 The follow-
ing example illustrates the problem.
A company with 200 employees, 100 workstations and three
file servers, loads an application program on all the three file serv-
ers. No more than 80 employees ever use the program, and there
are never more than 60 users at one time. However, the amount
charged for such use will vary based on the license model which the
software supplier has adopted.
Per CPU licensing - the customer pays for 100 licenses.
Per User licensing - the customer pays for 80 licenses.
Server-based licensing - the customer pays for three server
licenses.
50. Jeff Moad, IS Shops Push for a Consistent, Networked Software Plan, DATAMATION,
Feb. 15, 1988, at 17.
51. SoFrwARE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 31, at 4.
52. Sharon Fisher, The Licensing Game, LAN TIMES, April 1, 1991, at 65.
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Site licensing - the customer pays a negotiated fee for unlim-
ited use within a defined site.
Concurrent Use licensing - the customer pays for 60 licenses.
1. Per CPU licensing. Some software suppliers license their
software for use on a single CPU. 3 This license scheme is easier for
network administrators to manage than per user licensing. How-
ever, it may be uneconomic for users if some workstations require
only occasional access to the software program. In addition, users
may have files on unlicensed CPUs which require complicated file
transfers to use with the software programs on the licensed CPUs.
Some software suppliers enforce their per CPU licensing ap-
proach with node-locking. A node-locked license ties an applica-
tion to a specific machine by way of special hardware or software so
that the software will execute only on that machine.-4 This is typi-
cally accomplished via a hardware serialization scheme. In hard-
ware serialization, when the user installs a software program on a
CPU, the program copies the unique serial number of the CPU into
itself and thereafter cannot be run on any hardware containing a
different serial number. Node-locking can create problems when
the licensed node is out of service since the CPU-locked software
cannot be easily moved to a back-up CPU.
These problems can be avoided with a token-based scheme or
an RS232 25-pin connector. In a token-based scheme, the software
program cannot be run unless the original software diskette is in-
serted in the disk drive of the CPU. This mechanism ensures that
the program can only be run in one CPU at a time, but does not
"lock" the program to a single designated CPU. Alternatively, a
hardware serialization scheme can be used to lock use of a software
program to a particular RS232 25-pin connector, which the user
can nevertheless move from one CPU to another. Other software
suppliers put a serial number in each copy of the software, which
53. The Software Publishers Survey reported that WordPerfect licensed its software on
a single machine. However, a more recent publication indicates that WordPerfect may have
adopted a compromise between the per CPU and concurrent use licensing approaches. IN-
FOWORLD reported in October 1991, that WordPerfect "took an unexpected tack" when it
announced at Comdex that it would offer concurrent use licensing for its PC programs; how-
ever, if users choose to copy the program to their local hard disk, they must purchase an
additional license. "We ask users to find two numbers - the maximum number of users who
would use it concurrently and the number of computers that have it on their local disks -
and then license the higher number," reported Pete Peterson, Executive Vice President of
WordPerfect. Louise Fickel, WordPerfect Shifts to Concurrent-Use Licensing, INFOWORLD,
Oct. 28, 1991, at 1.
54. M. Olsen, P. Levine, Concurrent Access Licensing; Restricting the Number of Appli-
cation Users, UNIX REVIEW, Sept. 1988, at 67.
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instructs the software to check the network to be sure that software
with the same serial number is not being used elsewhere. Although
this type of serialization allows the software program to be used in
alternate or back-up CPUs, it still requires unnecessary use of mul-
tiple copies of the program on a LAN. It also does not provide the
network administrator with an easy way to find out which user is
running a duplicate copy of the software and makes software up-
grades difficult because the administrator must install the upgrade
with the same serial number on the same computer as the original
software.55
Increasingly, per CPU licenses are implemented on LANs
through "LAN packs." LAN packs are typically offered in groups
of three, five, or more. For example, a user licenses one copy of
software for the server, and then pays an additional amount for
each additional copy, or alternatively for the right to copy and use
the software for each additional group, or "pack," of CPUs. The
price per unit typically decreases as the size of the pack increases,
since the software vendor has no costs for duplicating disks or docu-
mentation. Some users dislike license packs because they may be
forced to buy more than they need. Jeff Chimbly, LAN services
administrator for Farm Bureau Insurance Companies states, "We
like to buy [additional copies] in increments of one. Paradox offers
increments of five. If you have three nodes, then you have two extra
Paradoxes lying around, and that seems like kind of a rip-off."56
2. Per User Licensing. A small number of software suppliers
license their programs to an individual, who may be designated by
name or by position. This type of license can be enforced on the
network through software control or passwords which allow only
preauthorized users to access a program. However, this type of
software control or password scheme does not work if the user also
needs access to the software on a computer at home which is not a
part of the network.
Licensing software to an individual makes it clear who is al-
lowed to run the software, but raises other questions. For example,
can the licensed user run the software on a second machine without
physically removing it from the first machine, and what happens to
the license when the licensed user leaves the company or no longer
requires access to the software? 7 Microsoft Corporation has
55. Sharon Fisher, Licensing Multiuser Software Varies by Vendor, INFOWORLD, Jan.
22, 1990, at S8.
56. Id. at S12.
57. Fisher, supra note 52, at 65.
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adopted a unique approach to the first of these issues: the "80/20
split policy." If a Microsoft program is licensed to an individual at
his place of work, he or she can use the software (without unloading
from the primary machine) for up to 20% of the time for use at
home or on a portable computer. Similarly, if the program is li-
censed to an individual at home, he or she can use it at work for up
to 20% of the time."
A LAN alternative to the per user approach is the approach
adopted by Swiss Bank, which purchases a license for every single
user on the network, including the possibility of simultaneous use.
This approach offers an administratively simple way to determine
the number of software licenses required at a given network installa-
tion, but may be expensive if every network user does not actually
require access to the same software products.5 9
3. Server-Based Licensing. Server-based licensing represents
another approach to network licensing. Server-based licenses allow
unlimited use of a program on a specific number of servers. In
server-based licensing, the "server" portion of an application resides
in the server and the "client" portion of the application resides on
each node. As a practical matter, the server and client portions of
the application could be licensed separately; however, the software
supplier typically elects to license the server portion of the program
to one or more servers and to permit an unlimited number of copies
of the client portion of the program to be made. One of the advan-
tages of server-based licensing is that it is easy to manage. How-
ever, since server-based licenses provide for unlimited use of a
program on a network with a specified number of servers, they can
be too expensive if a company has a need to use a program on only a
limited basis. As a result, server-based licensing is more appropri-
ate for programs that are inherently LAN-based, such as electronic
mail and other groupware.
A disadvantage of server-based licensing for the software sup-
plier is that server licensing could reduce potential revenue for such
programs, since the only limit to the number of users is the speed
58. SOFTWARE PUBLISHERS AssoCIATION, supra note 31, at 11. According to a recent
article, however, Microsoft may be moving to a concurrent licensing approach. Computer
World reported that Mike Maples, Vice President of Applications at Microsoft, announced at
Comdex in May 1991, that Microsoft had changed its software licensing policy to concurrent
use licensing, effective immediately. It is unclear whether this supersedes or supplements
Microsoft's earlier, per user approach. Jim Nash, Microsoft Eases LAN Licensing Policy,
COMPUTER WORLD, June 3, 1991, at 136.
59. John McMullen, What's Wrong With Network Licensing, DATAMATiON, Oct. 1,
1990, at 43.
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and capacity of the system, which is constantly increasing due to
technology advances. As a result, from the suppliers' viewpoint,
server-based licenses make the most sense for disk-intensive
software, such as multi-user database managers that limit the
number of people who can effectively use a file server because they
require more frequent interactions between the local workstations
and the database stored on the file server.
4. Site Licensing. Some companies negotiate site licenses for
large customer installations on a case-by-case basis. The term "site
licensing" has no accepted, consistently applied meaning, and site
license terms may therefore vary dramatically. A site license can
permit use of software on an unlimited number of computers at one
or more geographic sites, it can permit business use by employees of
the licensee on an unlimited number of computers at any location,
or it can permit use of software on a specified number of computers
at one or more geographic sites or at any location. A site license
can permit reproduction of the software and/or documentation by
the licensee or it can require that the licensee obtain copies of the
software and/or documentation from the software supplier. A site
license may also enable a licensee to distribute an upgrade by mak-
ing it available to all nodes via the server rather than requiring the
licensee to collect the individual copies of the old version and dis-
tribute individual copies of the upgrade, which would be required in
a per CPU-based license.
Under a site licensing model, a user typically pays a flat fee for
the right to make copies of a software program for use at a particu-
lar geographic site.' ° This fee will probably be too expensive if a
user requires only limited access to a program. As with server li-
censing, site licensing is therefore more appropriate for programs
that are inherently LAN-based. However, it may be the least popu-
lar approach for software suppliers who will be concerned about
continuing to use site licenses in network environments because
they have no way of knowing how large a network will grow and
therefore are required to guess at how much to charge for the site
license.61
60. For example, Lotus Development Corporation licenses Notes groupware that runs
on OS/2 in the server system and on Microsoft's Presentation Manager and Windows on the
client workstation, to sites of at least 200 users at a cost of $62,500. Kelly Jackson, Lotus
Buys E-Mail, COMMUNICATIONS WEEK, Feb. 18, 1991, at 2.
61. Mort Rosenthal, President of Corporate Software, Inc., a reseller in Canton, Mass.,
said a software company's size and revenues are factors in site licensing. "The only vendors
[selling on an unlimited use license] are the ones desperate for cash," he said, emphasizing the
lack of large suppliers who will site license. "This is because it cuts off the revenue stream
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As an extra-legal aid to enforcement of a site license, the
software supplier may provide the site licensee with a master dis-
kette which contains an internal counter to limit the number of cop-
ies made according to the terms of the site license. A similar type of
control includes a requirement that the customer copy protect all
copies distributed internally, even if the master copy is not copy
protected. Where there is no technical limitation on the number of
copies, the software supplier may negotiate a contractual right to
audit the site licensee's use to ensure that it does not exceed the
scope of the site license. To assist in such a situation, the supplier
may require the customer to obtain official labels from the supplier
for each copy so that the number of copies reproduced never ex-
ceeds the number of labels ordered from the publisher.
5. Concurrent Use Licensing. Most major software suppliers
have adopted the concurrent use licensing approach for network
software.62 Concurrent use licensing requires users to pay only for
the maximum number of simultaneous uses of the software program
on a network. If license manager software is used to enforce con-
current use licensing, users "check out" the software, up to the li-
censed number of simultaneous uses. When they are finished, they
"return" the software, making it available to other users. The bene-
fits of concurrent use licensing include greater flexibility in software
use for end users and simplified software distribution for the
software supplier since the user can typically increase the number of
permitted uses by placing a phone call to the software supplier. It
also streamlines distribution of updates, since installation of the up-
date on the file server is typically all that is required to update all
users on the network. Finally, it is cheaper than per CPU or per
user licensing since the number of concurrent use licenses required
will typically be less than the total number of CPUs or users which
require access to the program.
One of the disadvantages of concurrent use licensing is that it
is virtually impossible to administer without some type of metering
system. The most common method today appears to be license
manager software, which allows only a specified number of users
from the customer once the software is purchased. The only ones who are doing it this way
are small vendors and Computer Associates. The only reason to sell site licenses is if you
don't think you're going to make any other money from the customer or if you're not the
preferred vendor." Scott Kramer, Vendors, Users, Face Off In Site License Debate, Com-
PUTERWORLD, June 3, 1991, at 45.
62. SoFrWARE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 31.
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simultaneous access to the software (capacity licensing).6 3 Some of
these products will allow only a preset number of users to use a
program at one time. Other products only audit and report, but do
not lock users out. These reports show when the demand exceeds
legal supply so that the network administrator can correct the situa-
tion by purchasing additional licenses.
Although license manager software utilities are commonly
used in the Unix world, many software developers say they are not
able to develop an effective license manager program for their appli-
cations when running under Windows. This is because in the Win-
dows multitasking environment, an application is counted as being
in use when an user retrieves an application and makes it an icon on
the screen even if the application is actually not being used.64
Some network operating systems include their own license
manager software, but each application software program on the
LAN must conform to the application programming interface
(API) for the license manager software in order to be managed by
it. In contrast, the application software program may contain li-
cense manager software, but this means that different application
programs on the network will use different metering schemes. Net-
work administrators generally want the ability to choose between
use of the network license manager software and the application
specific metering software.6 5 It is therefore desirable if each appli-
cation program with license manager software checks to see if the
network operating system has its own license manager program or
if a third party license manager program has been installed. If
either exists, the network administrator should be able to turn off
the redundant application-specific metering software.
Because of the difficulty of administering a network with multi-
ple license manager software programs, the Microcomputer Manag-
ers Association in Warren, N.J., recently published a white paper
on network software licensing issues which included a call for an
63. Cheryl Currid, Windows 3.0 - Designed With Networks In Mind, PC WEEK, May
22, 1990, at S44.
64. Jim Nash, Users Seek Vendor Pact on Metering Utility, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov.
11, 1991, at 1.
65. An example of a network system is the Flexlm system from Highland Software.
Software suppliers acquire a logical lock from Highland Software and implement the lock on
their source code. Flexlm manages the licenses or "keys." The user licenses Flexlm software
along with a rack of key hooks on which to store the license keys. The user buys an applica-
tion from a software supplier, with a set of keys that define the maximum concurrent usage of
the application. A user at any node can access the software as long as a key is available. If
additional hooks or keys are needed, the user can purchase them from the software supplier.
Flexible License Manager Technical Overview, HIGHLAND SOFTWARE, April 1990.
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API which would be common to all network operating systems.
Without such a common API, software developers must build mul-
tiple metering hooks from their applications into each network op-
erating system's metering program.
After surveying the various license options and the available
license manager software, the MMA concluded:
While it is convenient to have the metering software provided
with the application, there are problems associated with this ap-
proach. First, each application'would have its own interface for
its metering software. Second, there would be multiple programs
which might require that administrative information be entered.
It makes much more sense to have a single package provide the
metering for all application software on the network.
If we concede this point, however, software publishers have a
problem: with which of the metering packages on the market
should they be compatible? To overcome this problem, the me-
tering should be done by the NOS ["Network Operating Sys-
tem"]. Users have been clamoring for more and better
management features from the NOS for sometime, and metering
is just one of the features which must be provided.66
In response to this call, representatives of Digital Equipment
Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, Novell Corporation, Highland
Software, Inc., microcomputer managers and independent software
managers met in December 1991 to discuss a preliminary specifica-
tion for a proposed API. The draft specification, developed by Dig-
ital Equipment Corporation, defined which API calls must be made
from an application program to a tracking database or metering
utility program. The API would not limit the way an independent
software vendor could implement its licenses or metering program
because extensions to the metering programs would be allowed,
although such extensions could lead to incompatibility among me-
tering utilities.67 One of the issues raised by such a common API,
however, is the "dirty metering program." With a common API,
the software developer can no longer control the metering program
which will be used by the end user to manage the concurrent use
licensing. As a result, even one defective, or "dirty," metering pro-
gram could result in hundreds, or even thousands, of unauthorized
66. Keith Herron and Joanne Witt, The MMA's White Paper on Network Software Li-
censing, INFOWORLD, Oct. 14, 1991, at 46.
67. Stuart Johnston, Group studies licensing API" DEC, Microsoft push for standard,
INFOWORLD, Dec. 9, 1991, at 1.
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uses. Even worse, a system could be developed using the API to
intentionally defeat the concurrent license scheme.
License manager software may also provide other useful infor-
mation and protection to a network administrator, such as data
concerning who has used the various resources on the LAN, how
often such resources are used, what time of day they are used, and
whether there are times when others are denied access to the re-
sources, which may be helpful in planning future expansion of the
network. Some metering systems also include virus protection and
security features.68 License manager software may also allow for
managing different licensing schemes for different software pro-
grams. For example Highland Software Inc.'s network license man-
ager software, Flexlm, can be used to meter concurrent use
licensing, but it also allows a network administrator to place reser-
vations on the system for a particular software program. This be-
comes the equivalent of a single CPU license without the problems
of node-locking.6 9
A license which does not clearly specify the scope of the license
granted can have disastrous economic consequences for the
software supplier. For example, a supplier who expects each copy
of the software to be used on a single CPU will receive significantly
less revenue if the license granted permits use of each copy of the
software on a single CPU at a time. The pricing model would pre-
sumably require a higher per copy royalty for such concurrent use,
and the supplier might be unwilling to knowingly permit such use
without an appropriate license manager program.
Allocating Liability for Viruses on the LAN
Until recently LANs did not maintain any data of real value to
a corporation. With companies downsizing from mainframe com-
puters to LANs, this has changed. Companies are now storing and
moving valuable customer files, financial information, payroll, per-
sonnel and order entry records over their LANs. The risks posed
by computer viruses increase as records move from mainframe com-
puters to LANs.70 As one network manager noted, "In your tradi-
tional [information systems] center, you wouldn't allow a stranger
to walk in, mount a tape and load programs onto a mainframe. Yet
68. Kimberly Maxwell, Building Work Group Solutions: LAN Meeting Software, PC,
Sept. 11, 1990, at 295.
69. Mike Burgard, A New Way to License Software, UNIXWORLD, Dec. 1991, at 60, 62.
70. Computer viruses are programs that hide within a personal computer and replicate
themselves, infecting floppy disks and programs transferred to other PCs.
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every day, people carry floppy disks into work and load software
onto LAN workstations. ' 71
As the number of LANs grows, the number of viruses is also
growing. Products less than a year old that search for "over 300
viruses" are almost laughable today. Security specialists cite docu-
mentation of more than 1,000 different strains of viruses. The Na-
tional Computer Association estimates that by the end of 1994,
there will be almost 40,000 different virus strains.72
A study by the Data Processing Management Association
found that 26% of the approximately 200 companies surveyed had
experienced some kind of virus in January 1990 alone. 73 In Decem-
ber, 1991, Novell sent a letter to approximately 3800 customers,
warning them that it had inadvertently allowed a destructive
software virus known as "Stoned III," which can erase or garble
everything stored on a hard disk, to invade copies of a Novell
software disk shipped that month.7'
Sophisticated computer users are now using a multifaceted ap-
proach to computer viruses, which includes updating antivirus
software regularly, backing up their records once a week and using
virus scanners every time a PC is booted. They are also seeking to
protect themselves contractually by including computer virus war-
ranties and indemnities in their license agreements with software
suppliers. Software suppliers should not lightly give such warran-
ties, since introduction of a virus to a LAN can result in huge
losses. According to John McAfee, President of McAfee & Associ-
ates, a Santa Clara antivirus firm, if Stoned III were to get into an
organization and spread to 1500 machines, it would cost millions of
dollars to clean up.75 In a real life example of the potential losses
which a virus can cause, the Computer Virus Industry Association
did a detailed breakdown of costs associated with the virus that
struck the federal Internet in November, 1988 and concluded that
the virus resulted in $98 million of damages.76
In addition, it is extremely difficult to determine the origin of a
71. Salvatore Salamone, How to Guard Nets Against Growing Virus Plague, NETWORK
WORLD, July 15, 1991, at 1, 49, 50.
72. Paul Melka, Wishful Thinking Will Not Make Publicity-Seeking Viruses Go Away,
INFOWORLD, April 27, 1992, at 47.
73. Have Computer Viruses Turned Into A Plague?, BUSINESS WEEK, June 10, 1991, at
71.
74. John Markoff, Novell Says Software Virus Invaded a Recent Product, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at D-1.
75. Id.
76. Salamone, supra note 71, at 50.
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virus, since it can be introduced into a LAN by sharing floppy
disks, using bootlegged software, or through dial-out or dial-in ac-
cess to the LAN. As a result, if the software supplier gives such a
warranty, it should require that its licensee be able to demonstrate
that supplier's media was the source of the virus.
Warranting Software In a Networked Environment
Networks are becoming the lifeline of business as companies
move their mission-critical applications to multiplatform networks.
Network downtime, the time that the network is either down or
degraded, can cause extreme monetary loss, particularly when it af-
fects mission-critical data. In recent studies, major corporations
have reported capital losses of astounding magnitude when they
have had problems with their networks. One study indicated the
average lost productivity resulting from network problems to be in
excess of three million dollars per year.7 7 Errors, or "bugs," in
computer programs which cause minor problems when used on a
standalone PC can cause major disruptions in a LAN by destroying
shared data files, crashing the network, or producing wrong results
which are quickly replicated and relied upon throughout the organi-
zation. The frequency of bugs also increases due to the increased
complexity of network aware software and the inability of software
developers to test their programs on the multitude of possible com-
binations of hardware and operating system environments which
may be found in a LAN. Isolation of the cause of faults on a LAN
also becomes difficult as the LAN grows in size and complexity.
The typical warranty included in a shrinkwrap license for
prepackaged software does not adequately address the increasingly
complicated environment in which the software will be used. It is
difficult to imagine that a court will uphold a warranty offered by
many suppliers of shrinkwrapped applications, which is limited to
defects in the media, when the user is paying thousands of dollars to
use the program on multiple nodes. Yet, the software supplier
should be hesitant to provide the other typical warranty for shrink-
wrapped applications - that the software will perform substantially
in accordance with the end user documentation - without clearly
specifying the hardware and software environment in which the ap-
plication will be run. Because a supplier may be forced to spend
hours trying to isolate the bug in its software only to discover that
the fault has occurred in another component of the network, the
77. Steven M. Dauber, Finding Fault, BYTE, March 1991, at 207.
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prudent software supplier may wish to include a provision in its
warranty that allows it to be compensated at its then current con-
sulting rates for time expended to identify a bug if it is subsequently
determined that the reported problem was not caused by the sup-
plier's program. Because destruction of mission-critical data may
result in damage to the licensee far in excess of the license fee for its
program, the software supplier should also include a disclaimer of
any liability for such destruction or loss.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to provide a basic understanding of
LANs in order to assist in the development of "network aware"
licenses which recognize and proactively deal with the movement of
software from standalone computers to multiple computers in a
networked environment.
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APPENDIX
Licensing Methods
1. Per CPU Licensing.
a. Single CPU at a time (Use in a LAN is not permitted): Li-
censee may use the Software on a single central processing unit at a
time. Licensee agrees to treat this Software just like a book, except
that Licensee may not rent, lease, or license the Software to others.
This means that, like a book, any number of people may use the
Software sequentially, and it may be moved freely from one com-
puter to another, so long as there is no possibility of it b~ing used at
two different locations at a time. Thus, for example, Licensee can-
not share this Software on a local area network. If Licensee wishes
to use the Software on more than one computer at a time, Licensee
must license such rights from Licensor. Licensee may not electroni-
cally transfer the Software from one computer to another over a
network.
b. Single Designated CPU (Use in a LAN is not permitted):
Licensee may use the Software on a single designated central
processing unit [at a designated site] [and in connection with a des-
ignated segment of Licensee's business]. "Designated CPU" means
the complete equipment listed in Exhibit A hereto or any substi-
tuted or backup equipment designated in writing by Licensee and
approved by Licensor. Licensee may move the Software to another
site which physically replaces the original site upon prior written
notice to Licensor [and approval thereof by Licensor]. Licensee
agrees to refrain from using the Software on a network or for other
sites or premises or on a timeshare or other service basis.
c. Single CPU at a time (Use in a LAN is permitted): Licen-
see may use the Software on a single central processing unit at a
time, except that the Software may be executed from a common
disk shared by multiple CPUs provided that one authorized copy of
the Software has been licensed from Licensor for each CPU execut-
ing the Software. Licensee agrees to treat this Software just like a
book, except that Licensee may not rent, lease, or license the
Software to others. If the single computer on which Licensee uses
the Software is a multiuser system, the license limits use to a single
user at a time on that single system. This license allows you to
copy the Software over a network for use on a single CPU, provided
that the network is only accessible to your organization.
d. Single Designated CPU (Use in a LAN is permitted): Li-
censee may use the Software on any single personal computer sys-
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tern (whether a standard computer or a workstation component of a
multi-user network) (the "Designated CPU") and copy the
Software solely for the purpose of installing it on the Designated
CPU (hard disk or other device), loading the Software into RAM,
or creating a backup or archival copy. An alternate CPU may be
submitted for the Designated CPU in the event that the Designated
CPU becomes inoperable or may replace the Designated CPU, pro-
vided that use of the Software on the Designated CPU is terminated
and Licensor is immediately notified in writing of the identity and
of the successor CPU. Licensee may not copy the related documen-
tation or supporting materials accompanying the Software.
e. Description of Node-Locked Mechanism: Licensor shall
provide Licensee with a password corresponding to the equipment
Host ID number ("Authorized Equipment") listed on Licensee's
purchase order or Licensor's sales order or invoice. This password
enables the "Save" feature of the Software when the Software is
used on the Authorized Equipment. Otherwise, the "Save" feature
is disabled and what shows on the screen may not be stored. If
Licensee desires to enable the "Save" feature on other pieces of
equipment in addition to the Authorized Equipment, then Licensee
may do so by notifying Licensor of the Host ID Number of such
equipment and paying to Licensor the amount listed on the then-
current price list. Licensor will then provide Licensee with a pass-
word which will enable the "Save" feature on such equipment and
the list of Authorized Equipment will be accordingly expanded.
2. Per User Licensing.
a. Per User/Single Computer (Use in a LAN is not permitted):
Licensee may use the Software on a single computer at a time pro-
vided that access to the Software is limited to a single user. Licen-
see cannot share the Software on a local area network; if more than
one user wishes to use the Software or if Licensee wishes to use the
Software on a network, Licensee must license such rights from
Licensor.
b. Per User (Use in a LAN is permitted): Licensor grants Li-
censee the right to use one copy of the Software on a single terminal
connected to a single computer (i.e. with a single CPU), or on a
Licensed Computer Network. A Computer Network is any combi-
nation of two or more terminals that are electronically linked and
capable of sharing the use of a single software program. A Licensed
Computer Network is a computer network for which Licensee has
purchased and dedicated at least one (1) Software manual (which
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can include an instruction manual or manuals for the single-user of
the Software) for each user of the Software on the network. Each
user of the Software must have exclusive access to a Software man-
ual during his use.
c. Per User (Use in a LAN is permitted/Home Use permitted):
Licensee may use the Software on a single networked group of com-
puters which share a common disk drive on which the Software is
stored, provided that access to the Software is limited to a single
user. Provided that each user uses the Software more than 80% of
the time on a system located within Licensee's faculty, then that
user may also use the Software on a portable and/or home
computer.
3. Server-Based Licensing. If this Software is a network ver-
sion, Licensee may install one copy of the Software on a Network
Server for use on a single local area network and may only copy
such Software for backup or archival purposes. For purposes of
this Agreement, a workstation may include a server. A "Network
Server" is a computer managing access to shared resources includ-
ing files, disks, printers, or other peripherals, used by other worksta-
tions connected to the network.
4. Site Licensing. Subject to the terms and conditions of this
Agreement, Licensor hereby grants to Licensee the following li-
cense and rights:
a. A perpetual, nonexclusive license to use the Software for
its own administrative and accounting purposes in the United States
on any CPU located at a Site for which the License Fees for the
Software have been paid. An alternate Site may be substituted for a
Site provided that use of the Software at the original Site is termi-
nated and Licensor is immediately notified in writing of the location
of the successor Site. This license [does not] include[s] the right to
download portions of the Software for use on computers located at
Remote Access Locations and to provide remote access to the Li-
censed Software from terminals located at such Remote Access
Software [solely for Licensee's internal business purposes]. In the
event of an equipment malfunction causing the Software to become
inoperable at a Site, Licensee may use the Software at back-up Site
on a temporary basis until the malfunction is corrected.
b. Licensee understands and agrees that use of the Software
for the purposes of providing data processing services to third par-
ties, such as commercial use in a service bureau or timesharing ar-
rangement, or its transfer to any person or entity outside the
country, or its use at any Site other than those Sites for which the
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License Fees for the Software have been paid or their successors
(other than its use at Remote Access Locations pursuant to subpar-
agraph a. above), is strictly prohibited.
5. Concurrent Use Licensing.
a. Concurrent Use, No Metering Utility Required: Licensee
may use the Software on a series of single computers or a single
networked group of computers, not to exceed the License Limit
purchased. Licensee may physically transfer the Software from one
computer to another' computer owned or leased by Licensee pro-
vided that the maximum number of copies of the software that are
used at any one time does not exceed the License Limit.
b. Concurrent Use, Metering Utility Required: Licensee may
use the Software on a Licensed Computer Network provided that
Licensee has purchased the Server edition of the Software and in-
stalled the license manager software program included with the
Server edition. A "Computer Network" is any combination of two
or more terminals that are electronically linked and capable of shar-
ing a single software program. A "Licensed Computer Network" is
a Computer Network on which Licensee has installed the license
manager software program. The license manager software program
restricts the concurrent use of the Software to the number of
licenses which Licensee has purchased. For example, if there are
three (3) computers which are concurrently using the Software on
the server, then Licensee must purchase a minimum of three con-
current use licenses.
c. Multi-Pack License Grant: A registration number which
enables the Software is included, which corresponds to the number
("Number") of concurrent users listed on Licensee's purchase or-
der. If a Number greater than one applies to the Software, and Li-
censee desires to increase the size of'the Number, then Licensee
may do so by notifying its place of purchase of the desired Number
increase, and paying the applicable purchase price to Licensee's
place of purchase. The place of purchase will provide Licensee with
a registration number which will effect the Number.
d. Multi-Pack License Grant with License Manager Program:
Each single user software package permits one user to access the
Software at a time, and each five-pack authorizes five additional si-
multaneous users. Licensee can increase the number of authorized
concurrent users by purchasing additional single-user or five-pack
packages. The five-pack comes with an extra disk containing a li-
cense manager software program. If Licensee wishes to increase its
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user count, Licensee may run the license manager software program
and type in the five-count serial number allotted with the five-pack.
The five-pack can be installed only in a network shared hard disk,
and it operates only in conjunction with an installed single user
package. Licensee cannot operate the five-pack by itself.
COMPUTER VIRUS PROVISIONS
1. Definition of Computer Virus: A "Computer Virus" is an
undocumented and unauthorized program designed to cause loss of,
or damage to, data files; or gain access to, and/or interfere with, the
operation of, other programs or computer resources, or any other
results not intended by the user of the computer system on which
the virus program resides.
2. Computer Virus Warranty: Licensor represents and war-
rants that there are no Computer Viruses in the software.
3. Computer Virus Screening Provision: Licensor shall use
due diligence in screening all Software to be delivered to Licensee in
order to minimize the possibility of the introduction of a Computer
Virus. If Licensor fails to perform such screening with the result
that an identified and acknowledged Computer Virus is introduced
into the Licensee's systems, Licensor shall be responsible for any
loss, damage or liability caused by such Computer Virus. If Licen-
sor performs such screening, but a new or unidentified Computer
Virus is nevertheless introduced into Licensee's systems through Li-
censor's Software, Licensor shall only be liable for the value of the
Software that Licensor supplied.
4. Computer Virus Screening Provision and Disclaimer of
Computer Virus Warranty: The parties acknowledge the need to
cooperate to reduce the risk that a Computer Virus will be intro-
duced into Licensee's computing environment on media supplied by
Licensor. Licensor agrees to use a commercially-available anti-vi-
rus screening program to screen all media containing the Software
before such media are delivered to Licensee. Licensee acknowl-
edges that Licensor does not represent or warrant that the media
delivered by Licensor will be Computer Virus-free. Licensee agrees
to employ a commercially available anti-virus screening program to
screen all media delivered by Licensor to Licensee. Licensor's sole
liability, if Licensee's screening procedure detects a Computer Virus
or such media or if Licensee is otherwise able to demonstrate that
media supplied by Licensor is the source of a Computer Virus intro-
duced into Licensee's computing environment, will be to deliver
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new copies of the Software on media free of the identified Computer
Virus, at no charge to Licensee.
Network Aware Warranty
Express Warranty: Licensor warrants that the Software will
perform substantially in accordance with the published documenta-
tion for such Software (the "Documentation"), only when operated
on or in conjunction with the hardware and software with which
the Software was designed to be used as described in the Documen-
tation, during the ninety (90) day period following delivery of the
Software Licensee (the "Warranty Period").
Exclusive Remedies: Licensee's exclusive remedy, and Licen-
sor's entire liability in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be to use its
best efforts to provide a correction or workaround for any substan-
tial nonconformity of the Software with the Documentation ("Er-
ror") which is (a) reported to Licensor by Licensee during the
Warranty Period and (b) reproducible by Licensor in the execution
environment. If, however, after repeated efforts, Licensor is unable
to provide a correction or workaround for any reported Error, then
Licensee's exclusive remedy and Licensor's entire liability in con-
tract, tort, or otherwise shall be for licensor to refund the amounts
paid by Licensee for the Software upon Licensee's return of the
original and all copies of the Software in its possession, together
with its certification that it has ceased all use and distribution of the
Software.
Exceptions from Warranty: The warranties set forth above
shall not apply to any defects or problems caused in whole or in
part by (i) any defect in any portion of any hardware or equipment,
(ii) the failure of any portion of any hardware or software to func-
tion in accordance with applicable manufacturer's specifications,
(iii) any modification or enhancement to the Software by Licensee
or any third person or entity other than Licensor; (iv) the failure of
Licensee or any third person or entity to follow the most current
instructions promulgated by Licensor from time to time with re-
spect to the Software; or (v) the negligence of Licensee or any other
third party or entity. Licensor shall not be responsible in any man-
ner for errors or failures in proprietary systems, hardware or
software other than those of Licensor. It is Licensee's responsibility
to maintain backup data to be able to regenerate or duplicate data
in the event of loss. In the event that Licensor determines that any
warranty claim reported by Licensee falls within any of the forego-
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ing exceptions, Licensee shall pay Licensor for its services at Licen-
sor's hourly rates than in effect.
Disclaimer of Express or Implied Warranties: EXCEPT FOR
THE EXPRESS WARRANTIES STATED IN THIS AGREE-
MENT, LICENSOR MAKES NO ADDITIONAL WARRAN-
TIES EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO ANY
MATTER WHATSOEVER. IN PARTICULAR, ANY AND
ALL WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND NONINFRINGE-
MENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS ARE EXPRESSLY EX-
CLUDED. LICENSOR DOES NOT WARRANT THAT THE
FUNCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE SOFTWARE WILL
MEET LICENSEE'S REQUIREMENTS OR THAT THE OPER-
ATION OF THE SOFTWARE WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED
OR ERROR FREE.

THE PATENTABILITY OF ALGORITHMS: AN
UPDATE ON THE STATUS OF THE
CURRENT DOCTRINE
Alan D. Minsk*
INTRODUCTION
In a previous article I discussed the development of the legal
doctrine regarding the patentability of algorithms.1 I also at-
tempted to indicate some of the problems with the current formula-
tion of the doctrine, as well as issues which might benefit from
further judicial clarification. This article is intended to discuss de-
velopments that have occurred since the writing of that article
which have an impact on the status of the doctrine.
In general terms, these developments can be divided into three
categories: 1) a decision of the Federal Circuit discussing whether
particular patent claims were directed to statutory subject matter as
defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101 and addressing an issue left open by the
previous decisions; 2) a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences directed to further defining, or clarifying previous def-
initions of the term "mathematical algorithm"; and 3) decisions ad-
dressing the apparent conflict between the Federal Circuit and the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as to the proper interpretation
and application of 35 U.S.C. § 112, Paragraph 6.2 This article dis-
cusses the recent cases which are relevant to each of these develop-
ments and concludes with some comments on the doctrine as it now
stands.
Copyright @ 1993 by Alan D. Minsk.
* Associate, Limbach & Limbach, San Francisco, CA.; J.D. 1991, Harvard Law
School; M.A. 1981, University of California at Berkeley; A.B. 1979, University of California
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1. Alan D. Minsk, The Patentability of Algorithms: A Review and Critical Analysis of
the Current Doctrine, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 251.
2. The text of the cited paragraph is:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corre-
sponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112, % 6.
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1. The Federal Circuit Decision
Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp. 3 is
the most recent Federal Circuit decision involving the patentability
of algorithms. Arrhythmia involved claims directed to an apparatus
and method for analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine
certain characteristics of the heart function as evidenced by those
signals.4 The purpose of the claimed invention was to determine
which heart attack victims were at a high risk for developing an
acute type of heart arrhythmia known as ventricular tachycardia.5
This was done in order that those patients at risk could be carefully
monitored and given the appropriate treatment.6
A patent containing the apparatus and method claims had is-
sued and was the subject of an infringement suit in which its valid-
ity was challenged.7 The lower court granted a motion for
summary judgment declaring the patent invalid for failure to claim
statutory subject matter because the claims were directed to a math-
ematical algorithm.' The patentee appealed to the Federal Circuit,
which reversed the judgment of the lower court.9
The claimed invention involved obtaining certain of the heart
attack patient's electrocardiograph signals, converting them from
analog to digital values, forming a digital representation of the rele-
vant portion of the signals by averaging a large number of the
waveforms, processing the composite waveform by a digital high
pass filter in reverse time order, determining the average magnitude
of the processed waveform, and comparing the magnitude of the
processed waveform to a predetermined value. 0 The result of the
comparison step was an indication of whether the patient was at
higher risk for the onset of ventricular tachycardia."1
Certain steps of the invention were described in the specifica-
tion section of the patent application as being conducted with the
aid of a digital computer. 2 The mathematical formulae used to
program the computer were also indicated. 3 The specification
3. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
4. Id. at 1054.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1058.
8. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1054.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1055.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1055.
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stated that dedicated, specific purpose equipment or hard wired
logic circuitry could also be used.14 The Patent and Trademark Of-
fice (PTO) had granted the patent without raising the issue of
whether its claims were directed to statutory subject matter.15
The Court began its opinion by recognizing the presumption of
validity which attaches to a duly issued United States patent. 6 The
Court then recited the text of 35 U.S.C. § 101.17 The Court fol-
lowed by reviewing the development and current status of the doc-
trine regarding the patentability of algorithms, citing the relevant
Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, and Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals decisions. 8 The Court summarized the doctrine by stat-
ing: The law crystallized about the principle that claims directed
solely to an abstract mathematical formula or equation, including
the mathematical expression of scientific truth or a law of nature,
whether directly or indirectly stated, are nonstatutory under section
101; whereas claims to a specific process or apparatus that is imple-
mented in accordance with a mathematical algorithm will generally
satisfy section 101.19
The Court then referred to the two-stage analysis which had
been adopted for use when determining whether patent claims in-
volving algorithms were directed to statutory subject matter, (i.e.,
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test).20 The Court then applied the two
stage analysis separately to the group of process claims and to the
group of apparatus claims.21
Beginning with the process claims, the Court stated, "[W]e ac-
cept for the purposes of this analysis that a mathematical algorithm
is included in the subject matter of the process claims in that some
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. "Thus we give plenary review to the question [of whether the claims are directed to
statutory subject matter], with appropriate recognition of the burdens on the challenger of a
duly issued United States patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 282." Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1056.
17. Id.
18. The interested reader will find a discussion of these cases and a critical analysis of
their content in my previous paper.
19. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058.
20. The Freeman-Walter-Abele test is a two-part test designed to assist courts with their
analysis of patent claims reciting algorithms. It can be briefly stated as: 1) Does the claim
directly or indirectly recite an "algorithm" in the Benson sense of that term? Here the refer-
ence is to the definition of an algorithm cited in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972),
(i.e., "a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem"); and 2) Is the al-
gorithm applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps, provided that its appli-
cation is circumscribed by more than a field of use limitation or non-essential post-solution
activity?
21. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058-60.
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claimed steps are described in the specification by mathematical for-
mulae."22 With the first stage of the analysis completed, the Court
proceeded to the second stage. The Court noted that the process
claims included a limitation to a particular field of use, i.e., analysis
of electrocardiograph signals for a specific purpose.23 The Court
indicated that this limitation was of some importance as it "is not
ignored in determining whether the subject matter as a whole is
statutory, for all of the claim steps are in implementation of this
method. ' '2
4
It is worth noting that the claim language cited by the Court is
found in the preamble to the claims.25 This raises the separate issue
of whether such a limitation is of patentable weight. The use of a
field of use limitation in the preamble to a claim was addressed in
the context of algorithms in an earlier decision of the Supreme
Court, where it was found to be insufficient, by itself, to confer
patentability.26
In Arrhythmia, the Court's later comments suggest that what
was of the most significance to the patentability determination in
the case was that something physical was being operated upon.27 In
addressing the issue of the abstractness or intangibility of the
claimed process, the Court stated, "[the resultant output [of the
process steps] is not an abstract number, but is a signal related to
the patient's heart activity."'21 The Court goes on to say "[t]hese
claimed steps of 'converting', 'applying', 'determining', and 'com-
paring' are physical process steps that transform one physical, elec-
trical signal into another. ' '29
The Court concluded its analysis of the process claims by stat-
ing, "[t]he Freeman-Walter-Abele standard is met, for the steps of
Simson's claimed method comprise an otherwise statutory process
whose mathematical procedures are applied to physical process
steps. The method claims do not wholly preempt these procedures,
but limit their application to the defined process steps. The process
22. Id. at 1058.
23. "Simson's process is claimed as a 'method for analyzing electrocardiograph signals
to determine the presence or absence of a predetermined level of high-frequency energy in the
late QRS signal'." Arrhythmia 958 F.2d at 1059.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1055.
26. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). This decision implies that limitation to a
specific field of use, without more, is insufficient, if the claims recite a mathematical
algorithm.
27. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1059-60.
28. Id. at 1059.
29. Id.
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claims comprise statutory subject matter. '30
The Court then discussed the apparatus claims, noting that
"[tihe Simson apparatus for analyzing electrocardiograph signals is
claimed in the style of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6'.31 This refers
to the practice of claiming elements of a combination by use of
means-plus-function language. The Court went on to discuss the
claim language with reference to the specific means for implement-
ing the claimed structure which was referred to in the specification.
The Court concluded that "(t]he Simson apparatus claims thus de-
fine 'a combination of interrelated means' for performing specified
functions."
32
The Court again addressed the intangibility issue by stating
"'[t]he claimed invention.., converts one physical thing into an-
other physical thing just as any electrical circuitry would do'. ' 33
The Court then commented on the Appellant's assertion that "the
final output of the claimed apparatus (and process) is simply a
number, and that Benson and Flook support the position that when
the end product is a number, the claim is nonstatutory and can not
be saved by claim limitations of the use to which this number is
put."' 3a The Court addressed this argument by emphasizing that
the result of the claimed invention was not an abstract quantity, but
represented a tangible, concrete measure.35 The Court concluded
its analysis of the apparatus claims by stating "[t]he Simson appara-
tus claims satisfy the criteria for statutory subject matter. They are
directed to a specific apparatus of practical utility and specified ap-
plication, and meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101.'36
In keeping with the earlier decisions the Arrhythmia decision
supports the patentability of applications of algorithms. It also em-
phasizes the importance of tying the operation of the algorithm to
something physical, in this case the manipulation of electrical sig-
nals which represent a physical entity. With regards to the lan-
guage of the method and apparatus claims themselves, it is worth
30. Id. at 1059-60.
31. Id. at 1060. See note 2 of this article for the text of the cited paragraph.
32. Id., citing In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
33. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060, citing In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 819 (CCPA
1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981). This citation by the Court is reminiscent of the
language from the Cochrane v. Deener case cited by the Supreme Court in Benson, although
that language referred to a process claim. See 409 U.S. 63, 70.
34. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060.
35. "[Ihe number obtained is not a mathematical abstraction; it is a measure in
microvolts of a specified heart activity, an indicator of the risk of ventricular tachycardia."
Id.
36. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060.
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noting that the broad method claim cited in the decision implicitly
claims an element of physical structure, i.e., ("high pass filter
means"), while the apparatus claim cited in the decision is written
in means plus function language, except for one element, again a
"high pass filter means"."
The use of language reciting an element of physical structure
limits the scope of the claims and avoids the intangibility and pre-
emption problems which plagued algorithm claims in other cases.
The restriction of the operation of the algorithm to electrocardio-
graph signals makes the claimed invention concrete rather than ab-
stract. The combination of these factors enable the claim language
to overcome most of the prior objections to patenting algorithms.
Thus Arrhythmia indicates how method claims drawn to an al-
gorithm can be patented. If the claims are tied to something physi-
cal, as in transforming something physical from one form to
another, the § 101 hurdle can be overcome. With regards to the
apparatus claims, the decision supports the Iwahashi approach and
further indicates that § 101 can be satisfied by claiming physical
elements which operate or are transformed in a way constrained by
the algorithm.
A final note on the decision is that it includes a lengthy concur-
ring opinion from Justice Rader.3" The concurrence, presents a
thorough commentary on the pitfalls of the doctrine, with particu-
lar emphasis on Justice Rader's opinion that the Supreme Court
opinions after Benson had strictly limited that decision, and in do-
ing so, had "refocused the patentability inquiry on the terms of the
Patent Act rather than on non-statutory, vague classifications"."
Justice Rader also mentions specific problems with the two-stageFreeman-Walter-Abele test for statutory subject matter.40
2. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
Decision Discussing the Definition of the Term
"Mathematical Algorithm"
In re Pardo41 had limited the holding in Benson to "mathemat-
ical algorithms". This meant that in order to apply Benson and the
resulting Freeman-Walter-Abele test, it was necessary to determine
what constituted such an entity. This is actually a complicated
37. Id. at 1055.
38. Id. at 1061-66.
39. Id. at 1066.
40. The interested reader is encouraged to examine the concurrence, and/or my previ-
ous article which points out similar problems with the doctrine.
41. 684 F.2d 912 (CCPA 1982).
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question, because it is difficult to reach agreement on what is meant
by the term. Earlier courts had addressed this question, although
their solutions seem overinclusive.42
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Ap-
peals and Interferences (Board) stepped into the fray with its deci-
sion in Ex Parte Logan.43 This case concerned a patent application
which contained claims drawn to "an apparatus for detecting inspi-
ration of a patient in response. to a time varying signal representa-
tive of the patient's respiration."'  In discussing the Examiner's
rejection of the claims at issue, the Board reviewed the standard
two-step test for non-statutory subject matter.45 Since application
of the test necessitates the determination of whether the claims re-
cite a mathematical algorithm, the Board included comments on
the matter.
The Board first cited the Benson definition of the term, and
then expanded on it through examples. "Mathematical algorithms
include mathematical equations and formulas for calculating a nu-
merical output value from a number of numerical input values,
whether directly or indirectly claimed."" The Board then men-
tioned that mathematical algorithms were not limited to those cate-
gories it had previously listed, but included "methods of
calculation".47 In discussing this category of non-statutory algo-
rithms, the Board stated "the essence of a method of calculation in
the § 101 sense, whether it is in the form of mathematical formula
or equation or some other form, is the computation of one or more
numbers from a different set of numbers by performing a series of
mathematical computations.""
The Board then presented a summary of its interpretation of
the appropriate definition of a mathematical algorithm. "[W]e be-
lieve a claim should be considered as reciting a mathematical al-
gorithm, only if it essentially recites, directly or indirectly, a method
of computing one or more numbers from a different set of numbers
by performing a series of mathematical computations."49
42. See In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 764 n. 4 (CCPA 1980) (methods of calculation,
mathematical formulas, and mathematical procedures). See also In re Pardo, 684 F.2d at 916
(mathematical formula, calculation, or algorithm).
43. 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1465 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991).
44. Id. at 1466, citing claim 1 of the application.
45. Id. at 1467.
46. Logan, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1467.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1467-68 (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 1468 (emphasis in original). The Board followed this statement with the
comment, "[c]onsequently, a claim which essentially recites another type of method does not
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One way of interpreting the Board's definition of a mathemati-
cal algorithm is that it focuses on whether the claims at issue are
essentially attempting to protect the mathematical operations in-
volved in "computing one or more numbers from a different set of
numbers." This can be viewed as providing a better definition of
what the Court in Benson was referring to in its definition of an
algorithm. The "procedure for solving a given type of mathemati-
cal problem" referred to in Benson may simply mean those compu-
tations or operations used to produce a final output (the solution of
the problem) from a set of inputs.
One commentator has interpreted the Board's decision as "se-
verely limit[ing] the definition of unpatentable subject matter" and
that the Board "narrow[ed] the scope of the definition of a mathe-
matical algorithm".50 Whether this is true remains to be seen. It is
also not clear what influence, if any, the Board's decision will have
on the courts. However, this decision may become significant if it
affects how examiners in the Patent and Trademark Office view
claims which recite mathematical computations.
3. The Conflict Between the Federal Circuit and the
Patent and Trademark Office Over the Proper
Interpretation and Applicaiton of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, 16
In my previous article, I referred to the possibility of a differ-
ence in opinion between the Federal Circuit and the Patent and
Trademark Office as to the proper interpretation and application of
35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.51 As subsequent decisions of the Federal Cir-
cuit and Board have indicated, this is indeed a fertile area for disa-
greement, or at least heated discussion.
The current round of the argument between the Federal Cir-
cuit and the PTO over the appropriate interpretation of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, 6, at least in the context of a patent examiner's review of the
claims in a patent application, was initiated by the Federal Circuit's
decision in In re Iwahashi.52 Although the Court's comments in
that case regarding 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 were dicta, it is apparent
that the Court favors a literal interpretation of that portion of the
statute, both in the context of ex parte proceedings before the PTO
recite a mathematical algorithm, even though it incidentally requires, either directly or indi-
rectly, the performance of some mathematical computations." Id.
50. Irah Donner, Patenting Mathematical Algorithms That 'Embrace' Mother Nature, 9
THE COMPUTER LAWYER 10 (May 1992).
51. See 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 251 at 279-80.
52. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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and inter partes proceedings before a court.5"
The Court took the opportunity to formalize its dicta in
Iwahashi in the case of In re Bond.5 4 Bond concerned a patent ap-
plication directed to a specific remote control feature of a telephone
answering machine, the remote turn-on feature.5 5 The inventor had
claimed a combination of prior art technology (which enabled an
owner of the machine to remotely set it to answer incoming calls)
with a delay means which would prevent the machine from answer-
ing the owner's initial call for a predetermined period after being set
to answer incoming calls.56 This was designed to prevent the owner
from incurring any toll charges while setting the machine.57 The
claims of the application were rejected by an examiner under 35
U.S.C. § 102 and § 103 over two prior art patents.58
In comparing the prior art to the claims at issue, the Court
stated:
The disclosed and prior art structures are not identical, but the
claim may nonetheless be anticipated. While a "means-plus-
function limitation" may appear to include all means capable of
achieving the desired function, the statute requires that it be
"construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof'.59
Thus, the Court left no doubt as to how it viewed the PTO's obliga-
tions where section 112 6 was concerned. During the examination
of patent applications, PTO examiners were to limit the scope of
claims phrased in means-plus-function language based on the con-
53. "In the Solicitor's brief the summary of argument states that the claim [at issue in
the case] 'encompasses any and every means for performing the functions recited therein'.
We point out that... [t]he claim is... subject to the limitation stated in 35 U.S.C. § 112 6
... This provision precludes the Solicitor's interpretation of the claim." 888 F.2d at 1375.
In an accompanying footnote the Court further stated, "Section 112 16 cannot be ignored
when a claim is before the PTO any more than when it is before the courts in an issued
patent." Id. at n. 1. The PTO responded to the Court's dicta in Notice Interpreting In re
Iwahashi, 1112 OG 18 (1990). The PTO expressed concern that a claim expressed entirely in
means-plus-function language would, under the Court's dicta, be distinguishable from a
method claim if the content of the specification (as suggested by application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, 6), rather than the literal claim language was determinative when undertaking a stat-
utory subject matter analysis. This, the PTO stated, "would be directly contrary to prece-
dent." 1112 OG at 19.
54. 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990), reh. denied Nov. 1, 1990.
55. Id. at 832.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Bond, 910 F.2d at 833 (emphasis in original), citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6, Iwahashi,
and Johnston v. Ivac Corp., 885 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1989)(section 112 6 operates to cut
back on the types of means which could literally satisfy the claim language).
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tent of the specification. This precludes an expansive interpretation
of such claim language and can act to prevent the rejection of such
claims based on prior art.
The PTO responded to Bond in Notice, Applicability of the Last
Paragraph of 35 U.S. C. § 112 to Patentability Determinations Before
the Patent and Trademark Office." In the Notice, the PTO re-
viewed the applicability of § 112, 16 to ex parte patentability deter-
minations based on the statutory language, legislative history,
CCPA decisions, long-standing PTO interpretations, legislative re-
enactment, and Federal Circuit cases.61 Having done so, the PTO
concluded that "the clause does not apply."62
Without going into detail, it appears that the PTO's argument
is based on two primary considerations, and several secondary
ones.63 The primary considerations are the binding precedent of In
re Lundberg', and the PTO's assertion that the language used in
§ 112, 6 has been interpreted by courts, including the U.S.
Supreme Court, to refer to the context of infringement actions and
not to patentability determinations by the PTO.65 The secondary
considerations include Congressional reenactment of § 112, 6
which "implicitly adopted and re-adopted the PTO/CCPA inter-
pretation", the assertion that § 112, 6 acts like the reverse doctrine
of equivalents, the presumption of validity conferred on an issued
patent, and policy considerations related to the PTO's workload
and the clarity of claims incorporating means-plus-function lan-
guage if § 112, 6 were read literally.66
While some of the PTO's arguments are persuasive, they do
not directly address the issue of whether Bond is now binding prece-
dent, or perhaps more accurately, why it is not. Bond arose in the
60. 1334 OG 631, [hereinafter the Notice] (Jan. 1992). The content of the Notice is
reprinted, largely verbatim, in Ex parte Isaksen, 23 USPQ2d 1001 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1991).
61. 1334 OG at 631.
62. Id. at 631.
63. A thorough review and critical analysis of the Notice is presented in Adamo, Do the
Means Justify the End - A Matter of Bond, Bowles, The Office and 35 US. C. § 112, Paragraph
6, 74 JPTOS No. 8, pp. 566-596 (August 1992). The same author provides an updated inter-
pretation and slightly different conclusion as to the status of the conflict between the Federal
Circuit and the PTO in The Double Standard - In re Bond, The Office, 35 U.S. C. § 112, f6
and Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., 2 FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR JOURNAL No. 2, pp. 137-179
(Summer 1992).
64. 244 F.2d 543 (CCPA 1957).
65. The PTO maintains that courts have used the language 'construed to cover' from
§ 112, 6 "only to refer to post-issuance court matters and not to PTO patentability determi-
nations". 1134 OG at 633.
66. 1134 OG at 634-35.
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context of claim rejections during PTO review of a patent applica-
tion based on prior art cited by the examiner.67 Thus, Bond appears
to be directly contrary to the "binding precedent" cited by the PTO.
Even if in a later case the Federal Circuit were to explicitly overturn
Lundberg, the PTO's comments suggest that it would still be reluc-
tant to adopt the literal interpretation of § 112, 6 in patentability
determinations.
To make its position clear, the PTO followed Bond with its
own decision on the issue, Ex parte Bowles.68 Bowles involved an
appeal from a final rejection by the examiner in a reexamination
proceeding of a patent containing claims drawn to a fluid amplifier
system.69 The Board first stated its opinion of what the proper role
of the specification was in the context of claim interpretation, citing
the Federal Circuit.70 The Board then concluded, "while we have
made every effort to liberally interpret the claims in light of the
specification, it would be error on our part to infer or read into
these claims any limitations from the specification., 71
The Board then noted that the Appellants had argued that
"'means plus function' limitations in the claims on appeal must as a
matter of law be interpreted [in accordance with a literal reading of
35 U.S.C. § 112, 16]. "172 The Board cited Lundberg and noted that
"[a]t this time we are unable to reconcile the holding of Lundberg
with that of Bond. We merely point out that Lundberg is regarded
as binding precedent by our reviewing court. If a conflict exists be-
tween Lundberg and the panel decision in Bond, the earlier Lund-
berg decision is binding."7 3
A still further twist to the controversy has been noted by a
commentator. 74 The central issue seems to be whether claim lan-
guage is to be interpreted in a different manner depending upon the
context in which that interpretation is being made, (i.e., a patenta-
bility determination by the PTO versus a validity decision or in-
67. Bond, 910 F.2d at 832.
68. 23 USPQ2d 1015 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991).
69. Id. at 1016.
70. "It is entirely proper to use the specification to interpret what the Patentee mean by
a word of phrase in the claim. But this is not to be confused with adding an extraneous
limitation appearing in the specification, which is improper. Where a specification does not
require a limitation, that limitation should not be read from the specification into the claims."
23 USPQ2d at 1017, citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849
F.2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 542 (1988).
71. Bowles, 23 USPQ2d at 1017.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1017-18.
74. See Adamo, supra note 63, at p. 162-174.
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fringement case before a court). In Atlantic Thermoplastics Co.,
Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 5 the Federal Circuit was concerned with the
language construction in product-by-process claims in the context
of an infringement case.76 The issue was whether process limita-
tions stated in patent claims were to be treated in the same manner
when interpreting the scope of the claims in both a patentability
determination before the PTO or an infringement proceeding before
a court, or were to be applied (or not) depending on the setting.77
The Court in Atlantic supported the use of a double standard
in which claim language would be read differently depending upon
the context of the proceeding.78 While this is significant, it is not
clear if this reasoning can be carried over to the situation of decid-
ing whether the statutory language contained in § 112, 16 is to be
read literally when determining patentability.
The claims at issue in Atlantic contained specific language,
which was either serving as a limitation on or was not being applied
to limit the claimed subject matter. The claims were also of a par-
ticular type which has its own history of court interpretation. This
argues for restricting the impact of Atlantic to the category of prod-
uct-by-process claims.
The current means-plus-function language controversy can be
viewed from several perspectives. In one sense, there is a disagree-
ment between two branches of the government as to the appropriate
interpretation of the actions of the third branch. The PTO is an
administrative body, and hence part of the executive branch. Its
duty is to implement the statutes passed by the legislature and
signed into law by the chief executive. Its interpretative role is
therefore limited. The Federal Circuit is a part of the judicial
branch, specifically charged by Congress with bringing a measure of
consistency to the operation of the patent laws. This favors the
Court's interpretation of the statutory language.
However, it should be noted that the PTO position is not with-
out merit. As Congress enacted and reenacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6
without modification, it is possible to view this as an implicit recog-
nition of and agreement with the PTO's interpretation. Further,
because Lundberg has not been explicitly overturned by an en banc
decision of the Federal Circuit, the PTO can continue to maintain
75. 23 USPQ2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
76. Id. at 1484-91.
77. Id. at 1490-91.
78. Id.
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that there is no binding precedent which requires it to alter the
manner in which it examines patent applications.
Another way to view the controversy is from the perspective of
general principles of statutory interpretation. As statutes are gener-
ally to be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary, common
meaning of their words, this argues for a literal application of the
words of the statute. This would impose an explicit limitation on
the scope of a means-plus-function claim, (i.e., the "corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof"). Such an interpretation would not, as the
PTO suggests, place a burden on its examiners because the specifi-
cation could be referred to as the source for any structure-which
would be used to bound the scope of the means language.
The issue would then relate to interpretation of the meaning of
the term "equivalents". Is this term to be equated to its meaning in
the doctrine of equivalents (or reverse doctrine of equivalents)
sense, or does it have some other meaning? Is the equivalent meant
to be a straight structural equivalent, or one determined by refer-
ence to the claimed function? One commentator has suggested that
the inability of the PTO and the Court to agree that two meanings
may exist for the use of the term "equivalents" is at the root of the
problem. 79
It is also possible that the difference between the positions of
the PTO and the Federal Circuit may end up being relevant only to
the situation in which claims are being examined for purposes of
determining whether they satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101, (i.e., whether
they claim statutory subject matter). This is supported by two re-
cent decisions of the Board.80 However, such a restriction of the
context of the disagreement between the PTO and the Federal Cir-
cuit is not supported by the statutory language, or by the facts of
Iwahashi, Bowles, and Bond.
The current disagreement between the PTO and the Federal
Circuit may end up being resolved by a later decision in which the
Court explicitly overturns Lundberg and sets the future course for
how the language of § 112 is to be interpreted. It may also end up
being addressed by Congress upon the next reenactment of the pat-
ent laws. This would allow Congress to make sure that the PTO's
79. See Adamo articles cited at n. 63.
80. See Ex parte Akamatsu, 22 USPQ2d 1915 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992) and Ex parte
Alappat, 23 USPQ2d 1340 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992), both of which discuss the interpreta-
tion of the language of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 16 in the context of § 101 statutory subject matter
determinations, and both of which curiously neglect any mention of Bond or the Notice.
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interpretation of the statute is in conformity with the intended poli-
cies behind the patent laws. No matter what happens in the future,
for the present time we are in the midst of a battle.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine regarding the patentability of algorithms has been
refined but not substantially altered by the most recent Federal Cir-
cuit decision. The Freeman- Walter-Abele two-part test is still ap-
plied by both the PTO and the courts. The Arrhythmia decision
further supports the idea of tying the operation of an algorithm to
something physical, and confining it to a specific field of use in or-
der to satisfy the § 101 inquiry. The disagreement between the
PTO and the Federal Circuit as to the interpretation of § 112, 6 is
more significant, at least for the present time. Whether it will re-
main so will depend upon the actions of the players.
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR REVERSE
ENGINEERING COMPUTER PROGRAMS IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The European Community (EC) Council of Ministers finally
adopted the controversial Directive on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs ("the Directive") on May 14, 1991.1 Sparks
flew during the last months of debate before the European Parlia-
ment's approval of the draft Directive.2 The debate centered on the
"decompilation," or "reverse engineering," issue.3 The reverse en-
gineering of a computer program is a process by which the pro-
gram's structure and code may be derived and analyzed.4 The
program is unraveled to learn how it works. The knowledge gained
may provide sufficient technical information to connect new
software or hardware with the program, or to develop a similar
program.
The Directive as adopted authorizes decompilation under lim-
ited conditions. As a result, European software producers may
have greater access to the inner workings of American computer
programs without the risk of facing an injunction aimed at prevent-
ing the European product from being marketed. For example, the
Directive permits decompiling a computer program where repro-
ducing the code is "indispensable" to figuring out how to connect a
compatible product.5 Exactly what information is indispensable
may be left to the interpretation of the courts in years to come when
a product created with the help of reverse engineering analysis com-
1. Council Directive 91/250, 1991 0. J. (L 122) [hereinafter Council Directive].
2. The Directive attracted more debate and lobbying than any other item on the
agenda for the program to establish a single European Market by the end of 1992. See Chris
Reed, Reverse Engineering Computer Programs Without Infringing Copyright, 2 EUR. IN-
TELL. PROP. REv. 53 (1991).
3. The terms "reverse engineering," "reverse analysis" and "decompilation" are often
used interchangeably. It should be noted, however, that the definitions of the terms are not
yet firmly established. Sometimes the term, "reverse engineering," is taken to mean a two-
step process: reverse analysis plus forward programming. The reverse analysis step includes
disassembling the program to analyze how it works. The forward programming step applies
the analysis to building a new program. Interview with Frederick M. Gonzalez, Asst. Corp.
Counsel & Chief Counsel Operations, Amdahl Corp., in Sunnyvale, CA (Dec. 15, 1992). Also
see, Angelika Schnell & Anna M. Freska, SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 59,
59 n.1 (1990).
4. Reverse engineering has been described as "software archaeology." It requires "ex-
tracting the software's functionality (what the software does) and the design (how it does it)
by analysing the software's implementation - that is, programming code, data structures, files
and databases." Alan Cane, FIN. TIMEs, April 23, 1991, at 10, col. 1 (quoting Gilles Lafue).
5. Council Directive, supra note 1, art.1.
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petes too fiercely with or replaces an established product in the
marketplace.
The Directive is not effective law by itself; each member coun-
try of the EC must enact the terms of the Directive in its national
laws.6 After the Directive is implemented and its effects have been
assessed in practice, new provisions may be brought before the
Commission to improve European law on the reverse engineering of
software.
This comment reviews the purpose of the EC Directive and its
reverse engineering provision. A brief review of the EC legislative
process and an analysis of the lively debate on the Directive pro-
vides a background for the comment's discussion of issues in inter-
preting the reverse engineering provision. Finally, this comment
suggests that the provision is too restrictive and permissible reverse
engineering should be interpreted broadly.
I. INTRODUCTION OF THE EC COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON LEGAL
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFIWARE
A. Purpose of the Directive
The goal of a single European market within the EC by 1993
increased the urgency to harmonize legislation among Member
States' intellectual property laws. Differences in the laws of the var-
ious EC countries to protect computer programs have "direct and
negative effects" on the functioning of the common market.7 Such
differences are likely to continue without uniform laws among the
Member States as they introduce new computer-related legislation.'
The inconsistent and, in some cases, absence of legislation protect-
ing computer software across the EC has probably suppressed
growth of the software industry in Europe. Commercial software
sales in Europe have been substantial,9 but losses due to piracy of
6. If a directive has any direct effect on the law, it is only minor and depends on the
degree to which national courts lean toward the language of the directive in interpreting
existing law.
7. Council Directive, supra note 1, at 42. The lack of uniformity of legal protection for
software discourages sellers of software to treat the EC as a large, single market. Countries
with little or no protection for software are likely to be ignored altogether as good potential
markets. The diffusion of high technology is then limited and the European economy as a
whole may suffer.
8. Id.
9. Information technology spending in Europe, including hardware, software, serv-
ices-maintenance systems, integration, and consulting has been estimated at more than $140
billion in 1990. Freiburger, U.S. High Tech Eyes Europe, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Dec.
8, 1991, at El, col. 6. In 1985 the Western European software market was estimated at $9.5
billion with the sales of packaged software for personal computers growing at more than 30%
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software have also been high. 10  The Directive now provides a
basis for uniform protection of computer programs in the EC. An
analysis of the Directive and the surrounding controversy reveals an
effort to find the delicate balance among the interests of large
software companies, their smaller competitors, and users. At the
center of the balancing act is the extent to which computer pro-
grams may be "reverse engineered" to create interoperable prod-
ucts. Large companies such as International Business Machines
(IBM) prefer limited provisions for reverse engineering to protect
their substantial foothold in the European computer market."1
Smaller competitors, including European computer software com-
panies, want broad rights to use reverse engineering in order to
build systems and software to be compatible with the software of
the giant computer companies."
Traditionally, computer programs have been characterized as
fitting more neatly into the subject matter of copyright than patent.
Early programs were usually written in a textual form and appeared
more similar to literary works, the subject of copyright law, than to
useful inventions, the subject of patent law. In the United States, a
Congressional study of the legal protection of software resulted in
the proposition that computer programs should be protected under
copyright statutes." Copyright seemed to afford the necessary pro-
tection with low cost.
Patent protection is expensive and more difficult to obtain.
The impetus to restrict, even forbid, patent protection for computer
programs came, ironically, from the United States in the late
1960s.14 Courts in the United States, however, have found it diffi-
cult to resolve copyright questions about protection of computer
programs and computer companies have been seeking software pat-
per year. James Warnot, Software Copyright Protection in the European Community: Ex-
isting Law and an Analysis of the Proposed Council Directive, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 355, 356 (1991) (citing Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of
Technology, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM NO. 88) 1, 171 (1988)).
10. It has been estimated that software manufacturers lost more than 4.5 billion dollars
in 1989 due to piracy. See Software Protection: EEC Adopts Directive, Monthly Report on
Eur., (Eur. Info. Serv.), § 3, at 7, (June, 1991). Such figures are highly speculative, however,
and are calculated as if each "pirated" program would have been a sale. It is not clear that
every copied program is equivalent to a lost sale.
11. See, eg., A. B. Cleaver, Reverse Engineering Could Be Misused, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
17, 1990, at 19, col. 1.
12. See, eg., Alan Cane, Computer Users Fight EC Software Directive, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
13. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEw TECHNOLIGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1978).
14. COLIN TAPPER, COMPUTER LAW 9 (4th ed. 1989).
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ents in the United States in growing numbers.1 5
Not foreseeing the difficulties with copyright protection, indi-
vidual European countries quickly adopted the anti-patent stance
promoted by the United States for computer programs.1" Article 1
of the EC Directive provides for protecting computer programs by
copyright as literary works within the meaning of the Berne Con-
vention. 7 Copyright is the preferred form of protection in the EC
because it is most consistent with the existing laws in the Member
States and conforms to the trends among its trading partners. 8
B. Reverse Engineering Issue in Article 6
Article 6 on "decompilation" (reverse engineering) did not ap-
pear in the initial drafts of the Directive. It first appeared formally
in the Directive in the common position 19 adopted by the Council a
few months before final adoption after intense lobbying and debate.
Decompilation of a computer program under the Directive is per-
mitted without authorization when it is "indispensable to obtain the
information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an indepen-
dently created computer program with other programs" under
some limiting conditions. Those conditions include that: (i) the re-
verse engineering be performed by the licensee; (ii) the information
necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously been readily
available to the licensee; and (iii) the reverse engineering will be
confined to the parts of the program necessary to achieve interoper-
ability.20 Reverse engineering is not to be used for goals other than
to achieve interoperability of the independently created program.
Neither is it permitted for reverse engineering to be used for the
development of any computer program "substantially similar in its
expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright.12
There has been controversy over the meaning of "interoper-
15. See, eg., John H. Barton, Adapting the Intellectual Property System to New Tech-
nologies, (Dec. 13, 1991) (paper prepared for the Nat'l Res. Council Conference on the
Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, Wash. D.C.,
Jan. 8-9, 1992).
16. TAPPER, supra note 14, at 9.
17. The Berne Convention is a series of acts, not a single document. Most EC Member
States adhere to the Paris Act of 1971, reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT app. 27 (1988).
18. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, pt. 1(3.6), 1989 O.J. (C 91/4) 5, 7.
19. The common position is the draft form of the proposal which the Council of Minis-
ters is willing to adopt before the draft is returned to the European Parliament for a second
reading. See discussion infra part II.A. for an overview of the EC legislative process.
20. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
21. Id., art. 6(2).
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ability." The Directive defines "interoperability" as "the ability to
exchange information and mutually to use the information which
has been exchanged."22 Whether or not this means reverse engi-
neering can be allowed for creating replacement products, not
merely attaching or "interfacing" products, was much debated. An
attempt to clarify the issue was made by a communication to the
European Parliament from the Commission: "Decompilation is
permitted by Article 6 to the extent necessary to ensure the inter-
operability of an independently created computer program. Such a
program may connect to the program subject to decompilation. Al-
ternatively it may compete with the decompiled program and in
such cases will not normally connect to it.. ."2 In other words,
decompilation may not be used to reproduce pieces of a program
that are unrelated to the interoperability of the original program.
However, decompilation may be used to create a competing pro-
gram as long as the only "reverse engineered" parts of the original
program are those that affect the program's interfaces with other
programs and computer systems.24
A goal of Article 6, in its attempt to loosen restrictions on
decompilation, is to move the EC in the direction of open systems.25
Open systems, in the broad sense, provide the capability to use the
same software on different kinds of computers and to exchange data
on a wide variety of computer networks.26 Yet in reality, the nar-
rowness of the Directive's provisions and the tight circle drawn
around permissible reverse engineering only for purposes of inter-
operability may have only a minor effect on the EC's movement
22. Id., at 43.
23. SEC 91 final - SYN 183, quoted in Mark Powell, 8 COMPUTER LAW. 13, 16 (1991).
Further support was given to the interpretation that reverse engineering may be used both for
attaching and competing products during a conference on the Directive in March, 1991. H.
C. Overbury, Head of the Merger Task Force, said in a speech, "The Commission believes
that where necessary ... it will be possible for competitors to extract interface information
which is not covered by copyright by analysis techniques so as to develop interoperable prod-
ucts. These interoperable products may be attaching products or they may be competing
products." Id., fn. 12 at 15.
24. See, eg., Thomas C. Vinje, The Development of Interoperable Products Under the
EC Software Directive, COMPUTER LAW., Nov. 1991, at 1, 6.
25. BRIDGET CZARNOTA & ROBERT J. HART, LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
PROGRAMS IN EUROPE 34 (1991). The term, "open systems," is used here in the non-propri-
etary sense.
26. The definitions of "open systems" vary according to the provider of the definition.
A starting point, however, may be the definition from the Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronic Engineers: "[Open systems are] a comprehensive and consistent set of international
information technology standards and functional profiles that specify interfaces, services and
supporting formats to accomplish interoperability and portability of applications, data and
people." Quoted in IBM SYTEM USER, Feb., 1992, Vol. 13, No. 2 at 37.
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toward becoming a development center and marketplace for open
systems. The proposal in this Comment is for a broad interpreta-
tion of the Directive's Article 6 provisions to encourage technologi-
cal developments for the support of open systems.
II. HISTORY OF THE EC DIRECTIVE DEBATE
A. Overview of the EC Legislative Process
Twelve Western European countries are Member States of the
European Economic Community.27 The Community is governed
by five institutions: the European Commission, Council of Minis-
ters, European Council, European Parliament, and the 'European
Court of Justice. The Commission proposes legislation to the
Council of Ministers to implement as treaties. The Commission is
also to ensure proper implementation of the Directives adopted by
the Council of Ministers. If a Member State fails to implement a
Directive correctly or in time with its own national legislation, the
Member State may be called before the European Court of Justice
for treaty violations.
The Commission formally initiates the legislative process and
submits an initial proposal to the Council of Ministers whose mem-
bers are appointed by their respective national governments. After
the Council comes to an agreement on the proposal, it is reviewed,
debated, possibly amended, and written as draft legislation. The
European Parliament may recommend to adopt the draft and it is
returned to the Commission. The Commission then presents a
modified proposal to the Council. The Council works to reach a
common position, the draft form of the proposal the Council is will-
ing to adopt. This draft is returned to the Parliament for a second
reading. Parliament returns its final recommendations for adopt-
ing, rejecting, or amending the common position so that the Coun-
cil can officially adopt or reject the proposal. If the Parliament
rejects the common position, a unanimous vote by the Council is
required to pass the legislation.2"
In June, 1988 the Commission published the 237-page Green
27. The European Economic Community was established under the Treaty of Rome,
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 15. The current Member States are Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and the United Kingdom.
28. See EC Institutions and the Decision Making Process, EUROSCOPE, (Coopers &
Lybrand) (Jan. 9, 1992).
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Paper on Copyright.29 Chapter 5 of the Green Paper is concerned
with the protection of copyright in computer programs. It empha-
sizes the economic importance of computer software, the present
dominance of the U.S. firms in the world software market, and the
need for appropriate legal protection for software to encourage in-
vestment and innovation by Community firms, permitting the Com-
munity industry to catch up with its competitors.30
The Green Paper called for, as a matter of urgency, a proposal
for a directive for the protection of computer programs. After a
public hearing and replies to its questionnaire, the Commission sub-
mitted its first proposal in December, 1988.31 The Economic and
Social Committee, with few comments, gave overall approval to the
draft. 2 Although the reverse engineering issue was heavily debated
at this time, the draft was devoid of specific language on the topic.
It was at least arguable, however, that reverse engineering would be
prohibited.33 A milestone in consideration of the Directive was
achieved in July, 1990 when the European Parliament completed its
first reading and adopted numerous amendments to the Directive.34
A revised draft of the proposal was submitted by the Commis-
sion in October, 19903 and a common position was adopted by the
Council in that same year. Language was included that more
clearly would permit limited decompilation. The common position
was the form in which the Council was prepared to adopt the legis-
lation. In April, 1991, the proposed Directive received its second
reading by the European Parliament. Eleven amendments to the
common position were proposed. The amendments were intended
to broaden the scope of the Directive for research and analysis, as
well as to clarify the status of interfaces under copyright law. The
leading advocate promoting adoption of the amendments was the
European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS), a group of
29. Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology - Copyright Issues
Requiring Immediate Action, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 88) 1, 172 (1988).
30. Id.
31. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,
1989 O.J. (C 91) 4 (1989).
32. Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Com-
puter Programs, 1989 O.J. (C 329) 4 (1989).
33. Harry Small, The Draft Directive on the Protection of Computer Software 19 (Oct.
15, 1990) (paper presented at the Computer Law Sect. of the Santa Clara County Bar Assoc.
& the Santa Clara Univ. School of Law International Protection of Computer Technology
Seminar).
34. Colombe & Meyer, Interoperability Still Threatened by EC Software Directive: A
Status Report, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 325, 325 (1990).
35. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 1990 O.J. EUR. COMM. (C 320) 22.
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computer companies in favor of authorizing extensive reverse engi-
neering of software.36 However, the amendments failed to get suffi-
cient votes in the European Parliament and the Council formally
adopted the common position in May, 1991. EC Member States are
required to enact legislation in compliance with the Directive before
January 1, 1993.37
B. Comparison of Opposing Positions on the EC Directive
The controversy during the passage of the Directive centered
on two related provisions of the first draft: protection of interfaces
and the prohibition of reverse engineering.
1. Interfaces
The Directive defines interfaces as the parts of the program
which provide for the interconnection and interaction between ele-
ments of software and hardware. 38 A goal of the Commission,
stated in the Green Paper, is to encourage interoperability within
and among computer systems. A prerequisite to interoperability is
open interfaces, that is, published, freely available specifications or
documentation containing the information required to be able to
connect to or interact with the computer systems. The first draft of
the Directive gingerly gave access to interfaces by making inter-
operability an exception to general copyright rules, but the language
was still cloudy. 39 The final Directive substituted new language
which effectively removed some doubt, but pressure through groups
like the Business Software Association (BSA), a group of business
software producers and SAGE, a group of primarily American
hardware manufacturers, resulted in a narrower scope of allowable
access to interfaces. 4
Groups such as BSA and SAGE who wanted to prohibit analy-
sis of interfaces argued that opening the access to interfaces and
exempting these parts of computer programs from copyright pro-
tection would harm the software industry.41 They claimed that an
exception for interfaces could not be clearly drafted and so would
36. Cane, supra note 4.
37. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(l). Also see supra note 6.
38. Council Directive, supra note 1, at 43.
39. W. R. Cornish, Inter-operable Systems and Copyright, 11 EUR. INTELL PROP. REV.
391, 391 (1989).
40. See, eg., Colombe & Meyer, supra note 34.
41. See, eg., William T. Lake, John H. Harwood II, and Thomas P. Olson, Seeking
Compatibility or Avoiding Development Costs? A Reply on Software Copyright in the EC, 12
EUR. INTELL. PROP. Rv. 431 (1989).
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result in permission to copy the detailed expression of a successful
program. They argued further that the real issue raised by the ex-
emptions for interfaces, as well as reverse engineering, was whether
easy cloning should be allowed under EC copyright law. In their
view, the present system works well without exempting interfaces
from copyright protection: the software industry is flourishing and
access to interfaces, while often available by industry choice, is not
a legislated exemption under the law of any country.42
Others, primarily represented by ECIS and smaller European
computer firms, argued that the Directive should state that the
specification of interfaces to computer programs are exempt from
protection under copyright law. "The majority of people in the in-
dustry, as well as computer users throughout Europe, will be best
served by clear language in the Directive that authorises use of spec-
ifications underlying program interfaces and permits reverse analy-
sis of existing computer products ... ."I The final Directive has
clarified that ideas underlying an interface are exempt from copy-
right protection. However, the formulation contained in the Direc-
tive is general and producing a clone without infringing the
copyright in the original may still be difficult.'
2. Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering is the second major issue that dominated
debate on the Directive. It is also the issue that continues to be a
primary source of uncertainty concerning future application of the
new legislation. Under the first draft of the Directive, reverse engi-
neering was essentially prohibited. Those in favor of providing an
exemption for decompilation included the ECIS led by Fujitsu, the
Japanese computer manufacturer. They argued that without such
an exemption, it would be impossible for competitors to develop
competing software products since it is necessary to understand
how a program functions before one can develop a competitive pro-
gram, or software that will interact with the original program.45
Another argument in favor of permitting decompilation is that
decompiling computer programs is merely the discovery of rules es-
sential in the process of original programming.
42. Id. at 431, 432.
43. Colombe & Meyer, Seeking Interoperability: An Industry Response, 3 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 79, 82-3 (1990).
44. Chris Reed, Reverse Engineering Computer Programs Without Infringing Copyright,
2 EUR. INTELL. PRop. REV. 47, 53 (1991).
45. Small, supra note 33, at 19.
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[Decompilation] is not a procedure for picking apart a complex
object into its elements, so that each may be imitated and the
whole copied in an exact or closely similar imitation. Nor is it
even an identification of the elements of a product so that they
may be adapted in some improved way to a new end. It is simply
the discovery of the rules which have to be complied with when
the independent producer constructs his own program.
46
Arguments against this position, supported by BSA and
SAGE, include the following: (i) permitting reverse engineering
would be a dramatic change from existing law; (ii) reverse engineer-
ing is unnecessary to develop interoperable products because manu-
als and other documentation can be used; (iii) imitation programs
could be reproduced at much lower costs than the original; and (iv)
legalizing reverse engineering would dramatically reduce the lead
time that motivates investment in new software.4'
In adopting the final Directive, the Council voted in favor of
reverse engineering provided that: (i) it is performed by the licen-
see; (ii) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has
not previously been readily available to the licensee; and (iii) the
reverse engineering will be confined solely to the parts of the pro-
gram necessary to achieve interoperability. 4s The Directive prohib-
its any information acquired from permissible reverse engineering
to be used for any goal other than to achieve interoperability. Per-
haps reflecting the lobbying efforts of groups such as SAGE, reverse
engineering cannot be used in the development of any competing
product.
III. INTERPRETING THE REVERSE ENGINEERING PROVISION
A. Terms of Article 6
Article 6 of the Directive is under the heading "Decompila-
tion" and states its terms as follows:
46. Cornish, supra note 39, at 391.
47. Lake et aL, supra note 41. It has been suggested that authorizing reverse engineer-
ing would discourage software developers from investing in the creation of new programs.
The argument is that "the prospect of almost immediate competition from an unconsented
adaptation of his own work - which could be sold cheaply because the imitator bore little
development expense" might be sufficient to discourage "[especially] newer and smaller de-
velopers." Id. at 434. Perhaps, however, prohibiting reverse engineering is more likely to
prevent development of new products by smaller developers because they are forbidden to do
research and analysis to create products that would otherwise have been interoperable. In
reality, manuals and other written materials that fully and accurately document interface
information are rarely available.
48. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6.
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1. The authorization of the rightholder shall not be required
where reproduction of the code and translation of its form...
are indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve
the interoperability of an independently created computer pro-
gram with other programs, provided that the following condi-
tions are met:
(a) these acts are performed by the licensee or by another
person having a right to use a copy of a program, or on their
behalf by a person authorized to do so;
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability
has not previously been readily available to the persons re-
ferred to in subparagraph (a); and
(c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original pro-
gram which are necessary to achieve interoperability.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit the informa-
tion obtained through its application:
(a) to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoper-
ability of the independently created computer program;
(b) to be given to others, except when necessary for the
interoperability of the independently created computer pro-
gram; or
(c) to be used for the development, production or market-
ing of a computer program substantially similar in its ex-
pression, or for any other act which infringes copyright.49
Although the terms of Article 6 authorize some reverse engi-
neering, the range of permissible purposes is narrow. Reverse engi-
neering may be used to extract information necessary to interface
one program to another, but not for developing any computer pro-
gram that would be so similar as to result in a copyright infringe-
ment. "In practical terms, . . . it would be permissible to reverse
engineer Microsoft MS-DOS to produce a properly engineered IBM
PC compatible... application, but not in order to produce an IBM
compatible... operating system (although it would be possible to
reverse engineer the IBM BIOS [basic input-out system] to do
that)."50
Although some people fear that any degree of permissible re-
verse engineering will harm the owners of the original program, the
Directive provides those owners substantial protection. The owners
of the copyright in the original program are protected against the
reverse engineering of that program by anyone who has not bought
or licensed it. Furthermore, the Directive permits reverse engineer-
49. Id.
50. Small, supra note 33, at 20.
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ing only when the information necessary to achieve interoperability
has not already been made available." The original developer can
prevent reverse engineering of the program by making the informa-
tion necessary to achieve interoperability readily available to the
buyer or licensee. An underlying problem, however, is the determi-
nation of the factual question concerning what and how much in-
formation is necessary for a software developer to build an
interoperable program. It is not clear whether or not the standard
should be different for a small independent software producer as
compared to a large multinational computer company with sophis-
ticated technology. Also unclear is who decides whether the inter-
face information is sufficent, accurate and up-to-date. These
unanswered questions point to a potentially significant weakness of
the Directive.
The Directive emphatically protects the rightholder from mis-
appropriation of software by disallowing reverse engineering to be
used for any goal other than to achieve interoperability of the inde-
pendently created computer programs. 2 As if to underscore that
provision, two paragraphs later the Directive states that reverse en-
gineering shall not be used for developing, producing or marketing
any program53 substantially similar to the original program.
B. Competing Products
One of the chief concerns about Article 6 is that the strict con-
trol of reverse engineering could result in limiting the supply of
competitive products and seriously harm computer users' ability to
maintain and integrate systems. 4 Small software developers are
likely to be the most reluctant to undertake the reverse engineering
necessary for them to develop similar competing products. They
can least afford the risk of protracted litigation to clarify whether
their reverse engineering was, for example, "confined to the parts of
the original program which [were] necessary to achieve interoper-
ability" or "used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability
of the independently created computer program."55 Although it
appears that Article 6 allows reverse engineering in order to develop
noninfringing competing products, the reverse engineering is lim-
ited to the parts of the original program related to the interface.
51. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1)b.
52. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(2)a.
53. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(2)c.
54. Dom Pancucci, Computer Users Europe Group Aims and Objectives, PC USER, June
5, 1991, at 27, col. 1.
55. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1)b.
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The interfaces of computer programs are rarely neatly defined. Par-
adoxically, it may be difficult or impossible to determine which
parts of a computer program are technically necessary to achieve
interoperability, hence permissible for reverse analysis, without a
full analysis of the entire program.
Competition can encourage innovation in technology.56 Re-
stricting reverse engineering to only the purpose of obtaining inter-
face information will limit the diffusion of ideas and principles
underlying the original program. The Directive allows users of
computer programs to "observe, study or test the functioning of the
program in order to determine the ideas and principles which un-
derlie any element of the program if he does so while performing
any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or stor-
ing the program which he is entitled to do." 57 Denying the user the
right to engage in reverse engineering to study the ideas and princi-
ples underlying the program as a whole may reduce innovation and
inhibit competition.
Although reverse engineering is permitted for developing inde-
pendently created software under the constraints of Article 6, there
is no explicit extension to applying the same reverse engineering to
the development of hardware. The recitals preceding Article 1 of
the Directive expressly refer to hardware, however, in defining
interoperability:
Whereas the parts of the program which provide for such inter-
connection and interaction between elements of software and
hardware are generally known as 'interfaces';
Whereas this functional interconnection and interaction is gener-
ally known as 'interoperability'; whereas such interoperability
can be defined as the ability to exchange information and mutu-
ally to use the information which has been exchanged;
58
It is therefore sometimes argued that independently created hard-
ware may be produced as a result of information learned through
reverse engineering authorized under Article 6.19 On the other
hand, it is argued that the permitted reverse engineering pertains
only to the creation of the interconnecting software and not to the
creation of new hardware.' Ultimately, then, the issue of whether
or not new hardware may be built by utilizing information acquired
56. For example, the rapid development of IBM personal computer products is largely
attributable to the widespread activity of IBM clone-makers.
57. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(3).
58. Id. at 43.
59. Powell, supra note 23, at 15.
60. CZARNOTA & HART, supra note 25.
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through decompilation of software may be left to either the courts
or to the standards and customs of the industry.
C. Error Correction
Translating, adapting, or otherwise altering a computer pro-
gram to correct errors in the program where necessary for the use of
the program is permitted by the Directive without authorization of
the rightholder in the absence of contractual provisions to the con-
trary.6" It appears then that the decompilation restrictions of Arti-
cle 6 do not apply to error correction. What constitutes an error
under the Directive, however, is unclear. The user may identify a
behavior of a program as an error, while the owner may define the
behavior as an intended feature. The effect may be to diminish the
limitations of the decompilation provisions as long as the user can
show that reverse engineering was "necessary" for the intended use
of the program.
D. Trade Secret Protection
Article 6 does not override "any other legal provisions such as
those concerning patent rights, trade-marks, unfair competition,
trade secrets, protection of semi-conductor products or the law of
contract."6 A software company might then claim that it could
protect a given program against reverse engineering through a con-
tract with the licensee preventing the licensee from disclosing or
using any trade secret of the licensor. While the licensee could de-
rive information about the program under Article 6, in this exam-
ple, the software company's interpretation of the Directive implies
that the licensee could not use that information. Such a result
would be contrary to a stated objective in the Directive: "to make it
possible to connect all components of a computer system, including
those of different manufacturers, so that they can work together.
63
Article 9(1) of the Directive provides that any contract contrary to
the provisions of Article 6 shall be deemed null and void under the
Directive.' The Directive must then be interpreted to mean that
contractual restrictions based on trade-secret protection cannot be
used to retain exclusive rights to the interface information which
61. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
62. Id., art. 9(1).
63. Council Directive, supra note 1, at 43.
64. Id.
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may legitimately be obtained without infringement.65
IV. PROPOSALS TO CLARIFY THE REVERSE ENGINEERING
PROVISION
It is usually difficult to prove that reverse engineering has been
performed on a computer program unless an infringing copy is pro-
duced. In that case, the law of copyright suffices and one may ques-
tion the need for Article 6 of the Directive. Typically intellectual
property law does not prohibit the study and analysis of the ideas
and principles of the underlying product, even for those who intend
to create competing products.66 The strongest protection is given
by patent law where all the underlying ideas are disclosed to the
public after a strict review to verify that the invention is novel and
non-obvious. 67 The law of trade secrets clearly allows the analysis
of ideas once the secrets have been learned by another without a
breach of confidence. Reverse engineering is a likely way to gain
that knowledge. Neither does the law of copyright, as applied to
works other than computer programs, prevent the study of the
work's underlying ideas and principles. A person may read and an-
alyze all the ideas in a book for the purpose of creating a competing
work as long as she does not infringe the expression in the original
book. Computer programs under the EC Directive appear to be the
sole exception to these general intellectual property law principles.68
A better policy might be to revise Article 6 to permit reverse
analysis to study the underlying ideas and principles of a computer
program so long as an infringing product is not produced. Such a
provision could be similar to the reverse engineering allowed in the
semiconductor field by the Semiconductor Chip Act of 1984.69 This
legislation legitimized "the general industry practice of 'reverse en-
gineering' whereby existing chips were improved upon enough to
constitute original new designs."70
The Directive is unclear as to whether new, independently cre-
ated hardware may be developed from information acquired
65. Thomas Dreier, The Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 319, 325 (1991).
66. See, e.g., SEGA Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., No. 92-15655, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 78, at 27 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1993). The court stated that "[w]here there is a good reason
for studying or examing the unprotected aspects of a copyrighted computer program, disas-
sembly for purposes of such study or examination constitutes a fair use."
67. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988).
68. Colorribe & Meyer, supra note 34, at 327-8.
69. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-914 (1984).
70. TAPPER, supra note 14, at 43.
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through the reverse engineering of software.7 1 Contrary to argu-
ments that it is inappropriate to permit software reverse engineering
in order to create new hardware,72 this Comment proposes adding
specific language to the Directive in support of allowing reverse en-
gineering for the purpose of building new, interconnecting hard-
ware. Often the technological line between software and hardware
is blurry, if not invisible. The addition of language permitting hard-
ware development based on software interface decompilation would
simply remove concerns about that blurry line. Such language
would also expand the possibilities for applying existing information
about particular software interfaces to new technological develop-
ments in hardware.
Software developers who choose not to make interface infor-
mation available under the terms of the Directive face the risk of
their products being reverse engineered by competitors. But the Di-
rective does not make it clear whether or not the information must
be made freely available or if the developer can charge the licensee
specifically for the interface specifications. It has been suggested
that if the licensee refused to pay for the information, the original
developer could protect its rights in the program against reverse
engineering. 73 This interpretation appears to run counter to the in-
tention of the Directive to encourage interoperable systems. If orig-
inal developers are permitted to charge for interface information,
the exemption for reverse engineering in Article 6 is potentially vac-
uous. A better interpretation would be that if original developers
do not freely make interface information available, they run the risk
of their products being decompiled by others. The alternative is for
the developer to make enough information available so that another
programmer can write interface software to be fully interoperable
with the original program. The right of the developer to charge
money for the interface information should be specifically and vehe-
mently denied in the Directive and in the implementing legislation
in order to protect the fundmental intent of Article 6 in favor of
interoperable systems.
However, Article 6, as finally adopted in the Directive, has
been the subject of vigorous long-term debate and compromise. It
is unlikely that the Directive will be rewritten in the near future.
Instead, as Member States write their own legislation to implement
71. See supra, part III.B.
72. CZARNOTA & HART, supra note 25.
73. Hilary Pearson, Clifford Miller & Nigel Turtle, Commercial Implications of the Eu-
ropean Software Copyright, COMPUTER LAW. Nov. 1991, at 13, 17.
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the Directive as it stands, they should clarify some of the general
and uncertain sections with more specific language. At the same
time, wide latitude should be given for study and analysis of the
underlying ideas and principles of computer programs. For ex-
ample, the condition of "necessity" required in Article 6 to conduct
reverse engineering should be taken to mean "reasonable necessity."
As written, the provision requires reverse engineering to be "con-
fined to the parts of the original program which are necessary [em-
phasis added] to achieve interoperability.. '74 "Necessary" should be
rewritten, or interpreted, to mean "reasonably necessary." Other-
wise, in those cases where it is discovered later that a particular
well-intended reverse analysis was not necessary to achieve inter-
operability, the court may lack flexibility to apply an appropriate
standard.
Finally, as the Directive is implemented and interpreted, the
technology of computer programs will continue to change and in-
troduce new complexities. Each Member State, its legislature and
courts, should strive to balance their national goals with both the
competition and protection required for technological progress in
the EC and globally.
V. CONCLUSION
The Directive has been praised as finding a balance among the
interests and needs of the market leaders in the computer industry,
those who depend on information about the interfaces of the market
leaders' products, and legitimate program users.75 Despite some
difficulties with general wording and uncertain terms, the expected
result is that soon there will be uniform protection of computer pro-
grams throughout the EC. European software producers may be
better able to compete with the market leaders as a result of the
opening of interfaces to reverse engineering. The price the market
leaders will have to pay appears slight and they will receive the ben-
efits of widespread copyright protection for their software through-
out Europe.
74. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1)c.
75. Dreier, supra note 65, at 319.
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INDONESIA'S NEW PATENT LAW: A MOVE
IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
Fabiola M. Suwanto*
On November 1, 1991, the Indonesian Parliament passed Law
No. 6/1989 on Patents. With that, Indonesia obtained her first pat-
ent law since her independence in 1945. This new law came into
effect on August 1, 1991. Law No. 6/1989, containing sixteen sec-
tions and one hundred and thirty-four articles, is the government's
most earnest attempt to cast off Indonesia's image as one of the
world's worst protectors of intellectual property. This long-awaited
occasion was welcomed by many foreign countries and local busi-
nesses. However, several questions that should be asked are, how
tight are the laws? Will they be sufficient to create the economic
climate suited to the demands of foreign investors seeking to invest
in Indonesia? Can the laws be implemented adequately so as to pro-
vide effective protection?
This comment examines these issues in the following manner.
First, the need for a new patent law will be spelled out. The forces,
which drove the Indonesian government to institute the laws, will
also be discussed. Second, some of the sections and articles of the
patent law will be reviewed. Third, the comment will probe into the
most recent implementing regulations and decrees that address por-
tions of the patent law. Several controversial areas, which are still
causing debate, as well as confusion, will be examined to facilitate a
fuller appreciation of the problems surrounding the protection of
intellectual property in Indonesia. Fourth, some of the ways the
Indonesian government is trying to prepare for the successful imple-
mentation of the system will be highlighted. Two potential methods
which may help in this aspect will also be suggested. Finally, this
comment will speculate as to the probability of the patent law ac-
complishing its purposes.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A NEW PATENT LAW
Indonesia was a colony of The Netherlands since the 1600s.
Copyright © 1993 by Fabiola Suwanto.
* J.D./M.B.A. 1992 Santa Clara University. B.A. 1988 Phillips University. The au-
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Although Indonesia gained her independence in 1945, The Nether-
lands did not officially declare the "United States of Indonesia" as
an independent nation until 1949.1 In the interim, the Colonial
Government ratified the London version of the Paris Convention
for itself and on the behalf of Indonesia as well.2
When Indonesia finally emerged as a new state, it had to deter-
mine the status of the colonial acts on intellectual property. The
Dutch Patent Act which was enacted in July 1912 was discontinued
because it required that inventions be materially examined in The
Netherlands.3 This was in conflict with the sovereignty of an in-
dependent nation.' A ministerial regulation on patent application
registration was made on August 12, 1953. In that regulation, the
Minister of Justice proclaimed that a patent act was to be enacted
soon. As of November 1, 1953, anyone wishing to obtain a patent
was to file his application with the Ministry of Justice.6 Unfortu-
nately, the awaited patent act never materialized. As of 1989, there
have been over 13,000 applications for temporary patent registra-
tion, 96% of which were of foreign origins.7 None of the applica-
tions, foreign and local alike, were ever granted because no patent
law existed.'
Indonesia also had to deal with the status of her membership to
the Paris Convention after her independence. Sources conflict on
this issue. One source claims that "(f)ollowing independence, the
Indonesian Government declared in 1950 that Indonesia considered
itself to be the legal successor of the Dutch East Indies and there-
fore bound by this Convention." 9 Another source states that Indo-
nesian judges, "without further examining the relevant questions of
1. Christoph Antons, The Development of Intellectual Property Law in Indonesia:
From Colonial to National Law, (unpublished draft, on file with the author).
2. Id.
3. J.B. Lumenta, Indonesia Plans to Update Its Patent Law, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 1,
1989, at 4.
4. Elisabeth Uphoff, Intellectual Property Protection and the U.S. Relations with Sin-
gapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, written for the Southeast Asia Program, Cornell
University, Dec. 1988.
5. Christoph Antons, supra note 1.
6. Duane J. Gingerich, Indonesia, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Vol. 11, No. 12, Dec.
15, 1989 at 9.
7. Duane J. Gingerich, New Patent Law Under Discussion, IP ASIA, Aug. 10, 1989, at
13.
8. Only applications filed within 10 years of the effective date, i.e. August 1, 1981, can
be re-registered under the new patent law. See Duane J. Gingerich, New Patent Law, IP
ASIA, Nov. 22, 1989, at 18.
9. Christoph Antons, Intellectual Property Law in ASEAN Countries: A Survey, 3
EIPR 78, 82 (1991).
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public international law, regard the declaration of the Dutch con-
cerning the Paris Convention of 1948 as not binding on Indonesia.
Consequently, membership of the Paris Convention is denied,
although in fact only ratification of the London Revision can be
disputed."10 This matter is yet to be clearly resolved.
In 1958, Indonesia withdrew itself from the Berne Convention,
one of the oldest multilateral copyright conventions.1 Former
President Sukarno claimed that it was beyond Indonesia's capabil-
ity to pay royalties. 2 The country needed a relatively inexpensive
way to make goods it could sell to obtain revenue. Making copies
of foreign goods was convenient and lucrative. 3 The protection of
intellectual property was not an immediate concern. Before long,
Indonesia was equated with being the haven for piracy, the
nightmare of foreign investors. It had been alleged that in 1986,
United States companies lost 210 million U.S. dollars because of the
pirating of software technology alone that went on in Indonesia. 4
It was also reported that pirated music cassettes, videotapes,
pharmaceuticals and computer software were prevalent in the coun-
try and were big money makers. 5
An example of counterfeiting may be helpful to understand the
frustrations experienced by investors whose patent rights have been
infringed. It should be noted however, that this example is a rare
and extreme one. Company X was a pharmaceutical company
which had discovered that its product had been copied and sold in
Indonesia.6 Its Managing Director claimed that the counterfeit
was so good that had they not analyzed the tablets, they would not
have known the difference. An analysis of the counterfeit revealed
that it had a smaller amount of the "active ingredients" found in a
geniune tablet. This meant that the production costs of the counter-
10. Christoph Antons, supra note 1.
11. Indonesia to Enhance Copyright Protection, but Enforcement is Key, BUSINESS IN-
TERNATIONAL, Vol. XIX, No 31, August 3, 1987. The International Union for the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Works (also known as the Berne Convention) was first
established in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland. The Convention requires protection be given to
works, published or unpublished, of an author. See Marshall A. Leaffer, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW, LEGAL TEXT SERIES (1988).
12. Indonesia to Enhance Copyright Protection, supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. New Laws Will Better Protect Intellectual Property Rights of Foreign Firms, MUL-
TINATIONAL STRATEGIES, COUNTRY MONITORING SERVICE, Aug. 1987.
15. Licensing - General; Patent and Trademark Protection, BUSINESS INTERNA-
TIONAL, INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING, January, 1988. See also U.S., Indonesia in
Agreement to End Copyright Piracy, REUTERS, Mar. 22, 1989.
16. This information was obtained through an interview in Jakarta, Indonesia, with a
gentleman who requested that his name be withheld.
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feit were less. The company attempted to deal with the counterfeit
problem but eventually decided to pull its investments out of Indo-
nesia.17 This unpleasant experience was costly to both the foreign
investor as well as the country of Indonesia.
It is unfortunate that the very things which allowed Indonesia
to make money were those which caused companies in the United
States and other countries to take significant losses."8 Not surpris-
ingly, the United States and the European Economic Community
(EEC) retaliated. They threatened to withdraw the trade benefits
they had been granting Indonesia unless Indonesia revamped its
current intellectual property laws.19 This caught the attention of
the Indonesian government. On September 9, 1987, the Indonesian
Parliament finally passed amendments to the 1982 Copyright
Law.20 March 1988 saw the signing of a treaty between Indonesia
and the United States which covers all copyrights. 2 In that treaty,
both countries agreed to give foreign artists the same protection
their native artists would have in their own native lands.22 On May
27, 1988 Indonesia agreed with some of the EEC countries to end
piracy of audio cassettes.23 Pirated cassettes of foreign music were
to be cleared off the shelves by June 1988.24 That agreement was
successful in substantially decreasing the amount of pirated goods
in the consumer market.25 While these were important steps to-
wards affording better protection to intellectual property, a revised
copyright law alone would not suffice. Foreign governments
pushed for the reform of trademark laws and the establishment of
patent laws as well.
II. FACTORS WHICH LED INDONESIA TO ESTABLISH THE NEW
PATENT LAW
Several important factors finally resulted in Indonesia's enact-
ment of the patent laws. Indonesia recognized that poor protection
17. The company hired people to locate the places which sold the counterfeit products.
While they were able to seize the products, they were unable to identify the suppliers. The
company refused to sustain such losses and decided to close down its operations in Indonesia.
18. Jacques J. Gorlin, Yo, Ho, Ho, and a Gucci Bag, WORLDPAPER, Mar. 1989, at 1.
19. See Licensing - General; Patent and Trademark Protection, supra note 15.
20. Id.
21. Matthew Shears, Shops Clear Pirated Software from Shelves as U.S.-Indonesia
Treaty Goes Into Effect, PR Newswire, Aug. 2, 1989.
22. Id.
23. Mochtar Lubis, How Retaliation Works; Indonesians Face the Music After European
Threat, WORLDPAPER, Mar. 1989, at 5.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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of intellectual property is a significant deterrence to foreign invest-
ment.26 Indonesia's economy had always relied substantially on the
exports of oil and oil-related products and her dependence on for-
eign investment became increasingly evident after oil prices took a
huge dip in the mid-1980s.27 To make up for the losses incurred,
the government needed to attract more foreign capital. Hence,
since 1987, Indonesia has eased restrictions on foreign investors.28
The government deregulated finance, reduced import barriers and
altered the regulations for foreign ownership.29 However, some in-
vestors who considered patent protection of paramount importance
to their businesses were hesitant to invest without a patent law in
the country.
At the same time, improvements on patent protection by the
neighboring countries made Indonesia realize that she would be a
better competitor if armed with a better set of laws. Indonesia was
aware that her neighbors including Thailand, Singapore and Malay-
sia were keen competitors for foreign capital. Singapore established
some copyright, patent and trademark laws and she continuously
attracted foreign investors. If Indonesia wanted foreign investment,
she must offer an improved business climate, including a more tan-
gible form of protection for intellectual property.
Indonesia's decision to have a patent law was also partly a re-
action to mounting international pressure. In mid-January 1989,
Washington put trade sanctions on Thailand because the latter did
not protect United States intellectual property, particularly com-
puter software and pharmaceuticals.3 0 The United States denied
Thailand duty-free benefits on exports to the country. 1 Indonesia
could not afford to lose the duty-free benefits similar to those which
Thailand lost because the United States had always been one of In-
donesia's biggest foreign markets.32
26. See Matthew Shears, supra note 21. Mr Nico Kansil, Director General of Copy-
rights, Patents and Trademarks at the Indonesian Department of Justice acknowledged that
"(foreign investment will be promoted and transfer of technology will be encouraged by
intellectual property protection." Id.
27. 18-Month Forecasts of International Investment Restrictions, IBC USA LICENSING
INC.; POLITICAL RISK SERVICES, July 1, 1991, (Lexis, Nexis, Omni file).
28. Id.
29. Lisa Errion, Indonesia: Policies are Generating Markets for U.S. Products, BUSINESS
AMERICA, Vol. 111, No. 8, Apr. 23, 1990, at 35.
30. Bill Tarrant, Indonesia Proposes Law to Protect Foreign Patents, REUTERS, Jan 24,
1989.
31. Id.
32. Indonesia's trade with Washington is close to US$ 5 billion a year. See Jonathan
Thatcher, Suharto, Bush Talks Seen Dominated by Economic Issues, REUTERS, June 5, 1989.
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The government finally concluded that patent laws would ben-
efit Indonesia. In the words of Nico Kansil, the Director General of
Copyrights, Patent, and Trademarks at the Indonesian Department
of Justice, the protection would "induce the local Indonesian to
make innovations and generate the creativity of the Indonesian peo-
ple."33 The lack of patent laws increases piracy activities which in
reality hurts Indonesia. By allowing pirates to flourish, the govern-
ment undercuts the legitimate companies. Furthermore, many pi-
rates skirt taxes and various employment regulations. Ultimately,
the government will be forced to deal with a host of consequences
resulting from the piracy activities.
III. THE NEW PATENT LAW IN THEORY
The birth of the new patent law introduced Indonesia to a new
and somewhat unfamiliar concept: the inventor or licensor of a
product or process has exclusive rights to said product or process
and the infringement of their rights by third parties is illegal. To
better understand the workings of this patent law, it is necessary to
take a detailed look at its content. It is also important to note that
the patent law must be read in conjunction with Government Regu-
lations issued subsequently. These latter documents clarify some of
the broader language stated in the patent law. In this section of the
comment, the laws will be laid out only to give a basic knowledge
regarding the patent system that is being developed. Analyses of
specific laws will follow later.
Article 1 Section 1 of the patent law defines a patent as "a
special right granted by the State to an inventor for the result of his
invention in the field of technology, [permitting him] to implement
["work"] his own invention by himself for a certain period or to
authorize another person to implement it."34 A patent would be
granted "for a new invention containing an innovative aspect and
applicable to industry."35 To be deemed "new," the invention must
not, at the time the patent application is filed, have been published
in Indonesia or elsewhere, so as to enable the invention to be carried
out by an expert.36 An invention is innovative if it is a previously
33. Matthew Shears, supra note 21.
34. The text of the patent law that was available was an unofficial translation prepared
by the Law Firm of Hadiputranto & Hadinoto in Jakarta, Indonesia. The text appeared in
three different sections published in EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS, Vol. 12, No. 3, Mar.
15, 1990, at 20 (Articles 1-86); Vol. 12, No. 4, Apr. 15, 1990, at 26 (Articles 87-103) and Vol.
12, No. 5, May 15, 1990, at 25, (Articles 104-134). [Hereinafter Text]
35. Text, supra note 34, Article 2.
36. Text, supra note 34, Article 3.
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unexpected matter for a person with the usual technical expertise in
the particular field.37
Not all inventions are deemed patentable. Article 7 explicitly
cited five general instances for which a patent application would be
denied. 3' The five unpatentable types of inventions include:
1. A production process or product contrary to public or-
der, morality or existing laws;
2. Food and drink, including products in the form of raw
material made by chemical processes for human and animal
consumption;
3. New plant varieties or animal species, and any process
used for the breeding of plants and animals;
4. Methods of examining, nursing, medication and surgery
applied to humans and animals, but excluding the products used
with these methods;
5. Theory or methodology in the field of science or
mathematics.
39
The one special instance in which a patent may not be granted is if
the President, through a Presidential Decree, suspends the patent
application for up to five years.4' The President would likely invoke
this power when the government sees the need to protect and culti-
vate development programs in specific areas.41 This exception does
not apply to existing patent holders or a patent on a priority basis
that is pending at the time the Presidential Decree is issued.42
The Application Process
The application procedure is specified in the new patent law.
The inventor or a "subsequent recipient of the rights of the inven-
tor" is entitled to a patent.4 3 If the person seeking to fie an applica-
tion is not the inventor, a statement "with adequate supporting
evidence" is needed to show that the applicant is entitled to the said
invention.' A foreigner's application is required to go through a
37. Text, supra note 34, Article 2, Section 2. See also Text, supra note 34, Article 2,
Section 3 which states that whether an invention is an unforeseen matter must be assessed
"by assessing current knowledge at the time of the patent application or knowledge existing
at the time of the first application submitted on a priority basis."
38. Text, supra note 34, Article 7.
39. Text, supra note 34, Article 7.
40. Text, supra note 34, Article 8, Section 1.
41. Duane Gingerich, supra note 6, at 9.
42. Id.
43. Text, supra note 34, Article 11, Section 1.
44. Text, supra note 34, Article 26, Section 1:
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patent consultant registered at the Patent Office as a proxy of the
foreigner.45 The applicant or proxy must be legally domiciled in
Indonesia." The application must also contain detailed information
regarding the invention in the Indonesian language.47 The docu-
ments to be submitted as part of the application packet are: (i) a
letter of application; (ii) a description of the invention;48 (iii) one or
more claims contained in the invention ( a claim is "a written de-
scription on the core of the invention or certain parts of the inven-
tion which requires legal protection in the form of patent" 49); (iv)
one or more pictures mentioned in the description to give explana-
tion; and (v) an abstraction of the invention.50 The application
should also be accompanied by a fee of Rp. 200,000 (approximately
100 U.S. dollars).51
Once the Patent Office receives the application documents,
they will be treated as secret documents.52 If any patent consultant
or officer reveals the secrets on the application, he or she could face
a five-year penalty.53 Within six months of receiving the applica-
tion, the Patent Office will publish an abstract of the invention. 54
During this time, anyone may object to the granting of the patent.55
The Patent Office will subsequently review the objections and make
a decision.5" If there are no objections, the applicant is required to
file an application for a substantive inspection.57 This should be
done after the announcement period is over, but within thirty-six
45. Text, supra note 34, Article 26, Section 1.
46. Text, supra note 34, Article 28, Section 2.
47. Text, supra note 34, Article 30.
48. The description must be structured as follows: title of the invention, technical field,
background art, technical improvements and advantages, brief explanation of the drawing(s),
mode of carrying out the invention and working example(s) and industrial applicability. See
J.B. Lumenta, Patent Act Comes into Force; Government Issues Regulations, BNA INT'L.
Bus. DAILY, Oct. 31, 1991.
49. Government Regulation No. 34/1991 dated June 11, 1991 [hereinafter GR No. 34/
1991], Article 1, Section 3.
50. GR No. 34/1991, Article 4. An abstraction is "a brief description regarding an
invention which constitutes a resume of the main description, claim or picture." GR No. 34/
1991, Article 1, Section 5.
51. Attachment to Circular of the Minister of Justice No. M.03-HC.02.10/1991 dated
Aug. 22, 1991.
52. GR No. 34/1991, Article 34, Section 2.
53. A point emphasized by the Director General of Copyrights, Patents and Trade-
mark, Nico Kansil, RI Patent Act Takes Effect, One Request Listed, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 2,
1991.
54. Text, supra note 34, Article 47, Section 2(a); Lisa Errion, supra note 30, at 23.
55. Text, supra note 34, Article 51, Section 1.
56. Text, supra note 34, Article 51, Section 4.
57. Text, supra note 34, Article 55, Section 1.
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months after the receipt of the application.5" A fee of Rp. 750,000
(approximately 380 U.S. dollars) will be charged for the inspec-
tion. 9 Within twenty-four months from the date of the request for
a substantive examination, the Patent Office will render its ver-
dict." Should the patent application be approved, a Patent Certifi-
cation will be issued, recorded in the General Patent Register and
published in the official Patent Gazette.61 If the application is re-
jected, an appeal may be made to the Patent Appeal Commission
which, within twelve months, will hand down a final decision.62
Filing A Patent With Priority Right
The procedure for filing a patent with priority right pursuant
to an international convention joined by Indonesia is slightly un-
clear. A priority right allows foreign work to be protected in Indo-
nesia. The notion of priority right is stated in Article 4 Sections
A(2) through 1(2) of the Paris Convention.63 An author can obtain
protection of his or her work under the Convention in countries of
the Union as well as the country of his origin.' 4 Here however, the
concept is a rather confusing one because, as mentioned before, In-
donesia has yet to officially declare itself one of the signatories to
the Paris Convention. Nevertheless, the new patent law provides
for patent application with right to priority.65 Article 29, Section 1
mandates such application be filed "within 12 months commencing
from the date on which the first patent application was received by
any country belonging to said convention."66 A copy of the first
letter of patent application certified by the authorized party of the
country concerned must also be submitted.67 The fact that the gov-
ernment has not planned out the details surrounding this area is
58. Text, supra note 34, Article 56, Section 1.
59. Attachment to Circular of the Minister of Justice No. M.03.HC.02.10/1991 dated
Aug. 22, 1991.
60. Text, supra note 34, Article 61.
61. Text, supra note 34, Article 64, Sections 1 & 2.
62. Text, supra note 34, Article 71.
63. Text of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20,
1883, as Revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at the
Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1938, and
at Stockholm on July 14, 1967; this was a reprint from Konrad Zweigert & Jan Kropholler,
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW, Vol. III, A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1973, at 129-
146.
64. Id.
65. The Elucidation also refers to the Paris Convention and Indonesia should be implic-
itly bound by the Paris Convention with respect to the patent law.
66. Text, supra note 34, Article 29, Section 1.
67. Text, supra note 34, Article 31, Section 1.
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evidenced in its provision in Article 32 which states that further
regulations governing this area will be stipulated at a later date.6"
Rights Of A Patent Holder
Once a patent is granted, Article 9 states that the holder is
entitled to 14 years of patent protection starting from the date the
patent application is ffled.69 This date and the date of expiration
must be recorded in the General Register of Patents and published
in the Official Patent Gazette.70 During the 14-year period, a Pat-
ent Holder must use his patent commercially. He must "produce,
sell, rent, deliver, use, to supply for sale, or rent, or deliver the pat-
ented products" or "use the patented production process to produce
goods."71 The working of the patent must be carried out on Indo-
nesian soil.72 When the patent expires, the holder may request a
one-time only, two-year extension. 3 Section 1 of GR No. 34/1991
Article 63, stipulates that a written request for renewal must be sub-
mitted to the Patent Office "within a period of twelve months and at
least six months before the patent expires."'74 A fee of Rp. 100,000
(approximately 50 U.S. dollars) will be charged.71 Article 63, Sec-
tion 3 promises further regulations regarding the matter.76
Compulsory Licensing
The patent law also contains provisions for Compulsory Li-
censing. Article 82 allows any person to apply for the implementa-
tion of a patent after thirty-six months from the date the patent was
first issued, if the said patent "had not been implemented in Indone-
sia by the Patent Holder even though there has been opportunity for
commercial implementation of the patent which should have been
utilized."' 77 The applicant must show that he (1) is capable of im-
plementing the patent himself and (2) has the facilities to fully put
the patent to use. 71 Should the District Court decide that the im-
68. Text, supra note 34, Article 32; see also GR 34/1991 Article 45, which reads "Fur-
ther regulations on the patent application with the right of priority will be stipulated by the
Minister." The government is evidently uncomfortable with this area of the law.
69. Text, supra note 34, Article 9, Section 1.
70. Text, supra note 34, Article 9, Section 2.
71. Text, supra note 34, Article 17.
72. Text, supra note 34, Article 18.
73. Text, supra note 34, Article 42.
74. GR No. 34/1991, Article 63.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Text, supra note 34, Article 82.
78. Text, supra note 34, Article 83, Section l(a).
274 [Vol. 9
INDONESI S NEW PATENT LAW
plementation is feasible and will "yield benefits for a large part of
the society," the Compulsory License will be issued.79 The Com-
pulsory License is valid only for the period necessary to work the
patent."0 The Compulsory License Holder shall pay the Patent
Holder royalties, the amount of which will .be determined by the
District Court.8
1
Criminal Provisions
The criminal provisions begin in Chapter XII with Article 126.
One who intentionally violates the rights of a patent holder by using
the latter's patent for commercial gain faces an imprisonment for a
maximum of seven years and a fine of a maximum of Rp. 100 mil-
lion (approximately 55,000 U.S. dollars).8 2 The new law also pro-
vides for the investigation mechanism to tackle criminal acts in this
field. It vests the investigative authorities not only in the State po-
lice but also in civil servants responsible for patent development.
These investigators may:
1. Examine reports relating to criminal actions in the field
of patent;
2. Investigate a person suspected of violation of the patent
law;
3. Obtain information and evidence from individuals or
entities connected with their investigations;
4. Examine all documents pertaining to their
investigations;
5. Investigate locations for evidence and confiscate such
evidence found;
6. Request expert assistance in the investigation. 3
Temporary Patent Applications Filed Under The
Government Announcement of 1953
The patent law allows for the renewal of temporary patent ap-
plications filed according to the Governmental Announcement of
1953. Those who fied these temporary patent applications between
August 1, 1981 and November 1, 1989 were required to submit
their new applications between August 1, 1991 and July 31, 1991.4
79. Text, supra note 34, Article 83, Section l(b).
80. Text, supra note 34, Article 83, Section 3.
81. Text, supra note 34, Article 85, Sections 1 & 2.
82. Indonesia, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Vol. 12, No. 5, May 15, 1990, at 20.
83. Id.
84. Text, supra note 34, Article 131, Section 1. See also GR No. 34/1991, Article 76.
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Failure to do so would result in the expiration of those temporary
patent applications.8 5 If a patent is granted, the period of protec-
tion is "from the date of receipt of the patent application based on
the Announcement." 6 As for patents filed more than 10 years
prior to August 1, 1991, they are "deemed null and void." 7
IV. PROBLEM AREAS OF THE NEW PATENT LAW
The preceding section mentioned some of the more significant
provisions of the patent law. Investors and critics alike know that
the laws are not without flaws. This comment discusses problem
areas in the Indonesian patent law by looking through the lenses of
one of the industries affected by this new law, the pharmaceutical
industry. This overview also evaluates Government Regulations
No. 32/1991 and No. 34/1991 enacted on June 11, 1991 as efforts
by the government to pacify the investors and clarify the laws.
The pharmaceutical industry has substantial foreign capital in-
vestments in Indonesia. These foreign pharmaceutical companies
have suffered losses due to patent infringement and counterfeit
medications. Yet unfortunately, several provisions of the patent
law do not favor this industry. The foreign pharmaceutical compa-
nies have not been pleased with the way the Indonesian government
has treated them. A 1988 drug legislation restricted foreign compa-
nies to producing drugs of their own invention. They are also re-
quired to invest in the manufacture of one of the chemical
ingredients in Indonesia.8 In addition, foreign companies are pro-
hibited from registering generics or non-prescription over-the-
counter products.8 9 They have also been denied the privilege to dis-
tribute free samples to doctors since December 1987.90 All these
cut into the investors' profit margins.
This time, with regard to the patent law, the pharmaceutical
industry is displeased with several things: the length of time of the
patent protection; the parallel import provision; the compulsory li-
censing requirement; and the provision of automatic revocation for
non-use. The foreign pharmaceutical companies have voiced their
disagreements to the legislators. These concerns will be addressed
in turn.
85. Text, supra note 34, Article 131, Section 2.
86. Text, supra note 34, Article 131, Section 4.
87. Text, supra note 34, Article 131, Section 3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Period Of Protection
The fourteen-year duration of the patent, starting from the
date of application, is deemed too short.91 The development and
testing of the drugs takes between eight and twelve years. The time
for patent examination, and occasionally appeal, all translate to
granting different inventions different protection terms. Further-
more, the government only has about 30 patent examiners.92 It
could take quite some time before a new patent application gets
processed.9 3 If the applicant needs to appeal the Patent Office's ini-
tial decision and later obtains a favorable verdict from the Patent
Appeal Commission, an additional year may have elapsed. This
would in essence grant patent owners substantially less than four-
teen years of protection.
To settle this concern, one of two options, or a combination of
both could be done. The first option is to employ more patent ex-
aminers to expedite the registration and inspection processes. The
Indonesian government should have the foresight to see that addi-
tional examiners will be necessary. Now is the time to train its ex-
aminers so that they will be ready to meet the demands in the
future. The other option is to change the law so that the patent
protection period accrues upon the granting of the patent applica-
tion. This measure would be fair to all industries. A combination
of the two would certainly appease numerous companies and poten-
tial investors.
Parallel Import
The pharmaceutical industry is also opposed to Article 21. Ar-
ticle 21 states that "(t)he importation of patented products or prod-
ucts made by patented production process or equivalents produced
by anyone other than the Patent Holder shall not constitute a viola-
tion of the patent concerned except in certain cases to be further
regulated by Government Regulation." 94 This provision threatens
the pharmaceutical companies in Indonesia because it allows im-
ports to enter the market and compete directly with their products.
Article 21 can potentially render a patent protection valueless.
However, it is necessary to look at the Indonesian govern-
91. Indonesia Agrees on Patent Protection, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. NEWS, Nov. 24,
1989.
92. Enforcement Rules Needed for Patent Act, JAKARTA PosT, Apr. 7, 1991, at 1.
There may be more patent examiners now.
93. Id.; see also Indonesia, BUSINESS ASIA, Aug. 5, 1991, at 274.
94. Text, supra note 34, Article 21. "Equivalents" probably means "counterfeits."
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ment's concern to fully comprehend the controversy. By enacting
the 1988 drug legislation for example, the government was able to
promote domestic industries. The manufacturing of one chemical
per company cumulated into numerous factories, which simultane-
ously translated into jobs and the transfer of valuable know-how.
Indonesia is anxious to learn skills and formulae. The fact that the
government must protect this interest, which poses a formidable
barrier to foreign investment, forces the government to walk on a
fine line. A disequilibrium towards either side will be costly to both
parties.
GR 32/1991, the promised regulation mentioned in the Article
21, is proof of how the government treads the line with caution and
compromises. Article 1 of GR 32/1991 attempts to pacify the
pharmaceutical industry by allowing the companies to import cer-
tain listed products without a violation.9" The Attachment names
fifty pharmaceutical products. Although the list is subject to
changes made by the government, the products are essential to
many pharmaceutical companies. The government also added the
clause "used for the protection of medicines in Indonesia" to em-
phasize its willingness to cater to the demands of the pharmaceuti-
cal industry.96
Compulsory Licensing
One other burdensome provision deals with compulsory licens-
ing. As mentioned before, anyone may apply for a compulsory li-
cense thirty-six months after a patent has been granted. If the
Patent Holder can convince the Court that the non-use is due to
some impossibility, for example the pending of a certain health reg-
ulation, the Court can adjourn or dismiss the case. 97 The foreign
pharmaceutical industry argues that this provision hampers creativ-
ity and innovation. Compulsory licensing should be a last resort, a
mechanism to be used only if affable license negotiation with a pat-
entee becomes difficult. In all fairness to Indonesia, such a regula-
95. Government Regulation No. 32/1991 dated June 11, 1991 [hereinafter GR No. 32/
1991], Article 1 reads:
(e)xcept raw materials or certain products as mentioned by the Attach-
ment of this Government Decree, the import of patented products or products
manufactured through a process under patent which is carried out by other
people holding the patent and used for the production of medicines in Indone-
sia, is a violation of the patent rights.
96. Id. See also Importation of Patented Drugs Restricted, JAKARTA PoST, Sat. June 15,
1991.
97. Text, supra note 34, Article 84.
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tion is not unreasonable, given the government's agenda to boost
the local pharmaceutical companies.
Automatic Revocation
Article 94 is another provision deemed hostile by the foreign
pharmaceutical companies. The Article pertains to the revocation
of patents. Failure of a patentee to use his patent in Indonesian
territory within forty-eight months from the date it was granted will
result in the invalidation of said patent.98 The foreign pharmaceuti-
cal companies argued that 4 years is a very small window of time
for them. It is quite impossible for a company to start marketing a
new product or establish a local production within this time frame.
Furthermore, this provision contradicts Article 5(A)(3) of the Paris
Convention (London Text). The Paris Convention article states
that a revocation may occur only when the prior grant of a compul-
sory license has been found inadequate to prevent the abuse of
rights. Articles 65 and 66 of GR 34/1991 eliminated the harshness
of the automatic revocation provision. Article 65 made the non-use
clause inapplicable "if the invention is not implemented or used in
Indonesia in connection with the failure to get a license to make or
market the product resulted with the said patent in Indonesia." 99
Article 66 couches the government's favoritism for the local phar-
maceutical industry by indicating in Section 1 that the use of "cer-
tain" patents outside Indonesian territory would be deemed to be
use within Indonesian territory insofar as "the product resulting
from the patent is marketed in Indonesia and in the neighboring
countries. . . ." Section 2 defines "certain" patents as those
which are given the privilege by the Minister based on substantial
reasons. 101
These regulations allow both the foreign investors as well as
the government to come out as winners. The foreign investors en-
joy some exceptions given to them, while the government keeps its
control by letting a Minister grant the privilege. However, such
compromises may raise a host of additional concerns from indus-
tries which believe they are not as protected as the pharmaceutical
industry. A little discrimination might be tolerated at the outset,
but it cannot continue. The laws in place should be well-drafted,
with few or no regulations to amend and in essence "weaken" the
98. Text, supra note 34, Article 94.
99. GR No. 34/1991, Article 65.
100. Id. at Article 66.
101. Id.
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effects. It would be unfortunate should the original rule become the
exception.
While the above-mentioned concerns are those related to the
pharmaceutical industry, they are shared by numerous other indus-
tries. The pharmaceutical companies continue to lobby for changes
to be announced in future Government Regulations in particular as
to health regulations which have an impact on patents. Only time
will tell if their efforts are rewarded.
V. GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PATENT LAW
The biggest barrier to the success of protecting intellectual
property through the patent laws lies not within the laws but in
their enforcement. Without the necessary mechanisms to ensure
compliance with the law, this patent system can be rendered ineffec-
tive. The government is not oblivious to this fact. Hence, it has
undertaken several measures to prepare for the implementation
stage.
First, the government knows that high quality patent consul-
tants make a big difference to the system. A knowledgeable patent
consultant can give a comprehensive explanation of the system to
potential patent applicants. A better prepared patent application
helps accelerate the application process. Hence, in Government
Regulation No. 33/1991 dated June 11, 1991, President Suharto
stipulated a Special Registration for Patent Consultants. The Eluci-
dation of GR 33/1991 states that "(a)mong others the Law empha-
sizes that patent applications by the inventor or the one entitled to it
who is domiciled outside the territory of the Republic of Indonesia
must be submitted through Patent Consultants." 10 2 Although the
patent law itself only required applications filed as proxy to be han-
dled by a Patent Consultant, the Elucidation is the better authority.
To qualify as a Patent Consultant, a person must hold a certificate
as a "Graduate of Technology and Natural Science or another
field" and must possess, as of November 1, 1991, two years of expe-
rience as a Patent Consultant handling patent applications for gov-
ernmental or private interests. Such qualified persons may register
within six months of the enactment date of GR 33/1991.103 The
government is quick to explain that such registration is a temporary
102. Elucidation of Government Decree No. 33/1991 on Special Registration for Patent
Consultants, June 11, 1991.
103. A clarification of Article 2 of the Elucidation GR No. 33/1991 on Special Registra-
tion for Patent Consultants, June 11, 1991.
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one. It is special because "it is not fully based on the conditions as
usually determined for Patent Consultants."" °  This measure is
merely to get the process moving. After the cut-off date, the gov-
ernment will impose more stringent requirements for qualifications
as patent consultants.10 5
The government is also giving its laws some bite by adequately
training its police force. When Indonesia sought to improve its
copyright protection by making frequent raids, its efforts were crip-
pled by the fact that the police lacked the "technical skills" required
to identify illegal goods.10 6 Patent infringement is even more elu-
sive. The government has asked the cooperation of the patent hold-
ers to put out manuals to educate police and help them combat the
sale or distribution of illegal goods.10 7
Yet another means relied on at this early stage of implementa-
tion is to allow patent holders who have discovered the infringe-
ment of their patents to easily obtain preliminary injunctions. They
can seek this temporary remedy before they try for a more substan-
tial prosecution of the violation. Such a measure prohibits the vio-
lators from continuous infringement while awaiting trial. Article
123 is the embodiment of this principle. A "(j)udge may order said
patent violation to be stopped... while the claim is being investi-
gated by the District Court."1 08
The government is also educating the people about intellectual
property rights. Prominent speakers from all over the world have
been flown in to "spread the word." ' 9 The newspapers have been
printing articles explaining in layman's terms the essence of the pat-
ent law. The protection of intellectual property is a new concept to
a nation that has had free access to information regarding manufac-
turing, processing, etc. Knowledge about the patent laws, their
objectives and the economic consequences of the violation of these
laws will give the Indonesian public a better awareness of the signifi-
cance of patents in their society.
104. A clarification of Article 3 of the Elucidation GR No. 33/1991 on Special Registra-
tion for Patent Consultants, June 11, 1991.
105. P.D.D. Darmawan, Patent Implementing Regulations, IP ASIA, July 4, 1991, at 10.
106. Indonesia; Fulfilling the Promise, INsTrrtrTONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1991, at S19.
107. Id.
108. Text, supra note 34, Article 123, Section 2; Indonesia, supra note 81, at 25.
109. To Enforce Patent Act, Ministry of Justice Will Issue Six Decrees, JAKARTA POST,
Aug. 1, 1991.
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VI. Two SUGGESTIONS FOR THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT
TO MAKE THE PATENT LAW MORE EFFECTIVE
The government has shown signs that it is serious in its en-
deavor to reduce, if not eliminate, qualms about poor intellectual
property protection. However, though the government is taking
measures to ensure the smooth implementation and effectiveness of
the patent law, there are two other means which may be worth con-
sidering: 1) tie the idea of intellectual property protection more
closely to the ideals of the Pancasila; and 2) introduce ex parte in-
junctions similar to Anton Pillar orders and/or Mareva injunctions
in common law countries.
1. The Teachings of the Pancasila
The Pancasila is the five principles of the state ideology of In-
donesia. The principles are: (1) Belief in God; (2) Just and civilized
humanity, including tolerance, to all people; (3) Unity in Indonesia;
(4) Democracy led by the wisdom of deliberation among representa-
tives of the people; and (5) Social justice for all. In a speech on
October 2, 1990, the Minister of Justice, Dr Ismail Saleh stated in
passing that the protection of intellectual property through patents
should become clear to Indonesians because the teachings of the
Pancasila prompt people to respect the property of others.110 This
statement, with reference to patents, translates to the virtues of re-
specting the rights of inventors or patent holders to their patented
inventions, as well as the rights of license holders who paid royalties
to their licensors."' Dr. Saleh's comment deserves a little more
thought. The Pancasila underlies Indonesian life; an association of
a new concept with part of a national philosophy is a simple but
effective means to bring home the point of the patent laws to the
Indonesian public.
2. The Use of Ex parte Injunctions
An Anton Pillar order, named after a well-known English case
Anton Pillar KG v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd. (1976 Ch. 55), is
an interlocutory order which a plaintiff can seek to allow him or her
to enter a defendant's premises and seize any documents or other
110. "Sambutan Menteri Kehakiman Republik Indonesia Pada Loka Karya Keliling Di
Bidang Paten Bagi Para Aparat Penegak Hukum" address by the Minister of Justice, Dr.
Ismail Saleh, Jakarta, Oct. 2-3, 1990.
111. Id.
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evidence of patent or copyright infringement. 112 The order is made
ex parte and the defendant often has no notice of the upcoming
search and seizure. 1 3 This is an effective means to discover the
suppliers and/or buyers of the illegally manufactured products. 14
Since there is a great potential for abuse, courts are generally cau-
tious and hesitant to give Anton Pillar orders. 15 The plaintiff is
required to show: 1) a very strong prima facie case; 2) potential of
serious damages; 3) clear evidence of defendant possessing some in-
criminating assets or documents; and 4) a potential that the defend-
ant may destroy the incriminating evidence before a case can be
brought against him. 16
Hong Kong boasts of the best seizure and impoundment record
in the world since its courts started granting Anton Pillar orders
more liberally. 117 The Indonesian government may be well-advised
to consider using the same tool to combat copyright infringements
and simultaneously enhancing its patent protection.
Another development by the courts as a response to fighting
piracy is the Mareva injunction.' This is a powerful instrument
that freezes the defendant's assets and allows only for the disposal
of limited expenses until the case comes to the court." 9 The de-
fendant is thus prevented from moving his or her assets out of the
country and the plaintiff can get adequate compensation if the case
is ruled in his favor.
Sometimes the threat of being sued and losing in court is pow-
erful enough to deter patent and/or copyright infringements. The
Indonesian patent law may be more effective when aided by the
mere presence of the Anton Pillar order and the Mareva injunction.
It is not difficult for the Indonesian courts to look into these reme-
dies and incorporate them in their current legal system.
The government has set out to do an immense task: to educate
the public about intellectual property protection and to alert them
to the moral wrongfulness of piracy. It may be advisable for the
112. Justinian, Copyright and Power Over Pirates, THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD., Sept. 20,
1982, Section 1, at 12.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Computer Piracy in Hong Kong: The Golden Arcade, Part I, IP AsIA, Aug. 15, 1988,
at 3.
116. Id.
117. Enforcement News, Asia USITC Report: How Did Asia Score?, IP AsIA, Apr. 22,
1988, at 30.
118. See Justinian, supra note 111, at 12.
119. Id.
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government to establish milestones at various intervals to monitor
the situation. The public response to new laws and regulations
should be tracked so as to enable the government to quickly identify
and remedy problems which may arise.
VII. WILL THIS NEW PATENT LAW BE SUCCESSFUL?
The implementation of the patent laws will be the key to the
success of this system. Nonetheless, the answer to the question
"Will this new patent law be successful?" depends also on what is
deemed a success. If the increase in foreign investments is the cho-
sen yardstick, the patent law may not be "successful" during the
first two or three years. Foreign investors may choose to wait to see
how the government will implement the laws they have written to
evaluate the extent of the protection in theory as well as in practice.
While it may be impossible to ascertain the number of new foreign
or indeed local investments attributable to the existence of the pat-
ent law alone, it is safe to say that the patent law will arrest the
amount of apprehension of investing in Indonesia.
The patent law will also persuade current businesses in Indone-
sia that the government is doing its best to protect their products.
Investors may decide to give the patent law some time and the gov-
ernment some cooperation by assisting with the education of the
public regarding intellectual property rights.
If the yardstick used to measure the success of the patent law is
the reduction of piracy activities, it would be almost impossible to
speculate on the effectiveness of the law. Unfortunately, the eco-
nomic rewards of piracy are more immediate and much easier to
define than those of protecting intellectual property rights. It will
be difficult to convince consumers to cease buying pirated products.
So long as the demand is high, pirates will take their chances.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There has been much discussion about Indonesia's new patent
laws. Some potential foreign investors are slightly apprehensive;
others are optimistic. Some current investors are suspicious or
nonchalant; yet others are merely curious. No matter how one
looks at this development, it is apparent that the Indonesian govern-
ment is taking a significant step in the right direction. It is time that
Indonesia demolish her unsightly image as one of the world's worst
intellectual property protectors. However, we should not expect the
problem to disappear immediately. It will take time before Indone-
sia becomes comparable to the United States or the European Com-
[Vol. 9284
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munity in the area of intellectual property protection. Nonetheless,
the government should be commended for its efforts. With the help
of the Indonesian people and foreign investors alike, the problem of
pirating or copying foreign goods will eventually be contained.
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INTRODUCTION
The goal of this Comment is to discuss and describe for the
non-scientist attorney: (1) the technologies involved in the three
major methods of DNA testing; (2) potential uses for the polymer-
ase chain reaction (PCR), and issues surrounding its use in the fo-
rensic setting, including the cases to date; and (3) proposed
regulations and legislative action. Also, this comment refutes some
of the criticisms levelled against DNA testing in general and at-
tempts to correct some of the errors in previously published legal
papers regarding DNA technology and cases. Prosecutors, com-
mercial laboratories, and the media are not the only ones who are
pushing DNA profiling evidence into court. It is hoped that the
"stunned defense bar"1 will realize the tremendous exculpatory po-
tential of DNA analysis.
While the technique utilizing restriction fragment length
polymorphisms (RFLP) has been accepted by many more appellate
level and higher courts,2 PCR has also been accepted by some ap-
1. Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evi-
dence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1990); Rode Sherman, DNA
Unraveling, 15 NAT'L L.J. 1 (1993).
2. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992); People v. Axell, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 1990); Kelly v.
State, 792 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Glover v. State, 787 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990); State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989); Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436
(Ga. 1990); People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. Co.Ct. 1988); Martinez v. State, 549
So.2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989)
[DNA test results admitted, but not probability evidence]; Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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pellate courts3 and by the Virginia Supreme Court.' However, as
recently demonstrated by the California First District Court of Ap-
peal,' acceptance of RFLP is not uniform. Given the overwhelming
acceptance and adoption of PCR in the scientific community, it is
likely that such acceptance by the judicial system will come with
time.
Probably because of the quantity of attention given RFLP,
commonly referred to as "DNA Fingerprinting," it is a little known
or appreciated fact that PCR was successfully used to the benefit of
the defense in the very first criminal case involving DNA analysis in
the country.7 However, PCR is useful for both the prosecution and
defense, as was shown in a recent San Mateo County, California
case.' This case dramatically illustrated the usefulness of PCR in
both exonerating and implicating suspects of such crimes as sexual
assault.
BASIC GENETICS AND DNA REPLICATION
In recognition of the fact that many attorneys do not have easy
access to genetics texts9 recent enough to describe PCR, and the
3. Fuller v. Texas, 827 S.W.2d 919 (rex. Crim. App. 1992); Trimboli v. Texas, 817
S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
4. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609 (Va. 1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth,
385 S.E.2d 850 (Va. 1989); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989); Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989).
In another case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed with an indigent defendant
that PCR might help exonerate him, but refused to require the state to fund post-conviction
investigations that might reveal exculpatory evidence. Commonwealth v. Davis, 574 N.E.2d
1007 (Mass. 1991).
5. People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
6. The wide and enthusiastic support and acceptance of PCR in the scientific commu-
nity is illustrated by the inclusion of over 12,000 PCR references in the Medline database
accessed through LEXIS. A LEXIS (MEDIS, MEDLNE Library, 86-91 File) search
("polymerase w/1 chain w/1 reaction") conducted on 14 Jan. 1993 retrieved 12,016 refer-
ences. A narrower, modified search ("and forens!") retrieved 94 references.
7. Pennsylvania v. Pestinakis, cited in DNA Typing Draws First Blood in Pennsylvania,
ScI. SLEUTHING NEWSL., Summer 1987, at 1, 1.
8. People v. Quintanilla, No. C-23691 (San Mateo Super. Ct., Aug. 16, 1991). In this
case, the DNA typing requested by the initial suspect excluded him. Based on this and other
evidence, the prosecution dismissed the charges against the suspect. Approximately one year
later, a second suspect, already under investigation in several rape cases, was implicated.
This suspect was included through PCR typing. Although various samples had been submit-
ted to Cellmark Diagnostics (Germantown, MD) for RFLP analysis, Cellmark was unable to
obtain banding patterns. Nonetheless, PCR results implicated him, he matched the original
victim's physical description, his wife possessed jewelry stolen from the victim, and his finger-
prints matched those lifted from her car. Following a Kelly-Frye hearing, the PCR evidence
was admitted in his trial, and he was convicted. Id.
9. For exhaustive coverage of genetics, the reader is referred to such texts as BENJ1A-
MIN LEWIN, GENES (2d ed. 1985); BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE
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observation that accurate and sufficiently simple (yet detailed
enough to be useful) descriptions of DNA technology are few and
far between in the legal literature, a relatively large portion of this
comment is devoted to the science involved in DNA analysis.
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the "genetic blueprint" or
"code" which makes each living organism, with the exception of
identical twins, unique from all others. DNA is contained within
every nucleated cell in the human body. 10 With the exception of the
reproductive cells, human DNA is arranged in 23 pairs of distinct
and separate chromosomes.1" Each chromosome is composed of
many "genes" 2 and the entire DNA complement is called the
"genome." 13  Thus, the human genome is composed of 46 total
chromosomes which are paired such that homologous chromo-
somes are bound together within the nucleus.
Chromosomes are divided into two general groups-the auto-
somes and sex (X and Y) chromosomes. Autosomes are all chro-
mosomes other than the sex chromosomes. Somatic human cells
(body cells that are non-reproductive) have 22 pairs of autosomes
and 1 pair of sex chromosomes. The total number of paired chro-
mosomes in somatic cells is called "diploid" (2n). Reproductive
cells (egg and sperm) are called "gametes" or "germ cells." Ga-
metes contain the "haploid" chromosome number (n). This means
CELL (1983); MAXINE SINGER & PAUL BERG, GENES AND GENOMES (1991), and virtually
any recent biology or molecular biology textbook.
10. The major portion of DNA in each cell is located within a "nucleus." Thus, cells
without nuclei do not contain DNA. While most cells are nucleated, such cells as the mature
red blood cells of mammals do not have nuclei and thus do not contain DNA. See Luis C.
JUNQUEIRA & JOSE CARNEIRO, BASIC HIsTOLOGY 261 (4th ed. 1983).
Animals and plants also contain a minor amount of extrachromosomal DNA. This
DNA is contained within organdies responsible for energy production. Thus, in animal cells
this DNA is located within mitochondria; in plants, it is located within chloroplasts.
11. Humans have 22 matched pairs of autosomes and one pair of sex chromosomes,
LORNE T. KIRBY, DNA FINGERPRINTING 8 (1990).
12. Although the term "gene" was coined by Johanssen in the early 1900's, Gregor
Mendel advanced the concept of the "gene" as early as 1865. Id. at 7.
13. The human genome is composed of approximately 3 billion base pairs. Chromo-
somes range in size from about 80 to 300 million base pairs. It has been estimated that only a
minor fraction of DNA (perhaps less than 10%) represents coding DNA and regulatory
sequences. The remainder consists of repetitive and other sequences, the function and impor.
tance of which are not presently understood. Eric D. Green & Robert H. Waterston, The
Human Genome Project; Prospects and Implications for Clinical Medicine, 266 JAMA 1966,
1967 (1991).
Of the estimated 50,000 to 100,000 genes present in the human genome, approximately
5000 have been catalogued, 1900 have been assigned to particular chromosomes and 600 have
been isolated (in cloned form). Less than 0.1% of the DNA sequences in the human genome
have been determined. Id.
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that they contain one copy of each autosome and one sex
chromosome.
Basically, one chromosome in each pair is inherited from the
individual's mother, and the other chromosome is inherited from
the father. Thus, during normal embryonic development, a particu-
lar gene from the father will be paired with the homologous gene
from the mother.14 Each homologous chromosome pair contains
genes situated in pairs at certain places ("loci"). Paired genes
which code for certain characteristics are called "alleles."
15
As organisms must be able to replenish dead cells as well as
produce gametes, DNA replication is an important facet of cell
growth and development. Each time somatic cells divide,16 DNA
replication must occur in order to ensure that each of the two
daughter cells will contain a diploid chromosomal number.1 7 In the
first step of this complicated process, the rungs of the "ladder" are
separated between the paired bases to produce two "complemen-
tary" strands of DNA." Each strand becomes a "template" to
14. This is made possible by the process known as "meiosis," which occurs during the
development of eggs and sperm (gametes). LEWIN, supra note 9, at 688. In the process of
meiosis, after chromosomal replication occurs, the nucleus and cell divide twice to produce
four cells, each with one-half the original chromosome number. Thus, each gamete will con-
tain only one of the two homologues of the parent chromosomes (it is "haploid"). Somatic
cells contain two copies of each chromosome and are called "diploid." Id. at 27-33.
15. Alleles are alternate forms of the genes that determine the expression of some par-
ticular characteristic. KIRBY, supra note 11, at 7-8.
While a person may inherit the allele for blue eyes from one parent and the allele for
brown eyes from the other, only one eye color is normally expressed. In this example, the
brown eye gene is "dominant" and the blue eye gene is "recessive;" this brown-eyed person
would be "heterozygous" for the eye color gene. If the person had inherited brown eye genes
from both parents, he would be "homozygous" for the gene which codes for eye color. Id. at
8.
16. The process whereby a somatic cell divides after chromosomal replication is called
"mitosis." LEWIN, supra note 9, at 688.
17. For example, when skin is injured, new skin cells must be produced in order to
replace the dead ones. The skin cells surrounding the damaged area are stimulated to begin
dividing. The DNA of these cells is replicated and the cells undergo "mitosis," or cell divi-
sion. This ensures that normal skin cells containing the proper diploid number of chromo-
somes will replace those killed as a result of the injury.
18. DNA is commonly described as a "twisted helix," "twisted ladder," or "spiral stair-
case." The ladder rungs (or steps in the staircase) are composed of pairs of "nucleotide"
bases. Within DNA, there are four bases-adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C) and gua-
nine (G). Normally, each base is paired with another through hydrogen bonds, with adenine
paired with thymine and cytosine paired with guanine. The ladder's handrails are composed
of sugar (deoxyribose) and phosphate molecules. Strictly speaking, a nucleotide is a base
connected to a sugar and a phosphate. The paired bases are often referred to as "base pairs."
It is the particular base sequence which determines the characteristics of the individual
animal.
The other nucleic acid, ribonucleic acid or "RNA," is composed of the same nucleotides,
with the exception that thymine is replaced by uracil (U) (which like thymine, pairs with
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which new nucleotides are added. To accomplish this, an enzyme
called "DNA polymerase" travels along each of these separated
"template" strands, binding complementary bases in their appropri-
ate places thereby building new ladders from each of the two
strands and producing two identical DNA molecules from one orig-
inal parent DNA. This process allows each daughter cell to contain
one DNA strand from the parent cell and maintains the genetic
integrity of the organism.
Although DNA polymerase is not entirely mistake-proof, it is
quite reliable and will faithfully reproduce the parent DNA mole-
cule. As DNA replication is a very important function in cell divi-
sion, DNA polymerases are not limited to complex animals.19
While there are many other enzymes involved in DNA replica-
tion,"0 DNA polymerase is the enzyme of primary interest in the
polymerase chain reaction.
FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS
The genes of greatest interest in genetic analysis are those for
which there are many variations and are thus termed
"polymorphic." 2 1  Usually, for a locus to be considered
polymorphic, the most common allele must occur at a frequency of
less than 99% and according to the Hardy-Weinberg law,22 at least
2% of the population must be heterozygous at that locus. 23 At the
molecular level, polymorphism may result from a single nucleotide
base change, or from a change in the number of tandem repeats in a
adenine). RNA is copied from the DNA and is involved in protein production. Some viruses
(e.g., the retroviruses, such as the human immunodeficiency viruses, and feline leukemia vi-
rus) have RNA as their genetic material instead of DNA.
19. Lower organisms such as bacteria, fungi and parasites have their own DNA
polymerases which carry out the same replication functions. As discussed below, DNA
polymerases and other enzymes from bacteria and other organisms are useful tools in molecu-
lar biology and genetic engineering.
20. For descriptions of the structures and functions of the various enzymes involved in
eukaryotic (e.g., human) and prokaryotic (e.g., bacteria) DNA replication, see the appropri-
ate chapters in ARTHUR KORNBERG, DNA REPLICATION (1980).
21. "Polymorphism" refers to different forms of the same basic structure. There are
many examples of polymorphism in human genetics, such as ABO blood types and eye color.
22. According to the Hardy-Weinberg law, in a large randomly mating population,
where no disturbances by outside influences such as mutation, migration, or selection exist,
the relative proportions of the different genotypes remain constant between generations.
KIRBY, supra note 11, at 168. See also Victor Weedn, DNA Profiling, 1 EXPERT EVIDENCE
REP. 61, 66 (1989), for a simple explanation of the Hardy-Weinberg principles.
The "genotype" is the genetic make-up of an organism. The "phenotype" is the appear-
ance or other characteristic of the organism which results from the interaction of its genetic
constitution with the environment. LEWIN, supra note 9, at 25, 689.
23. KIRBY, supra note 11, at 25.
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repetitive DNA sequence. The changes may be neutral, with no
detectable phenotypic effect, or they may result in the production of
different forms of the same protein or enzyme ("isozymes")24 or
they may be lethal.
There are three basic DNA analysis methods commonly used
to determine identity and relatedness between individuals: (1) direct
gene sequencing or "mapping," (2) RFLP, and (3) PCR. Prior to
testing by any of these methods, electrophoresis or spectrophotome-
try is often used to determine the amount and size characteristics of
the DNA present in the sample, if any.
Direct Sequencing
The goal of direct sequencing is to determine the exact nucleo-
tide sequence present in the DNA molecule of interest.25 Because
DNA is ultimately responsible for the uniqueness of each individ-
ual, direct DNA sequencing is the only method which can deter-
mine identity with 100% accuracy.26
Understandably, mapping the large numbers of genes present
on each individual chromosome by direct sequencing requires Her-
culean efforts.2 7 Nonetheless, due to advances in equipment and
24. Id.
25. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 185.
26. George Sensabaugh, Use of DNA Fingerprinting in Forensics, Paper presented at the
American Society for Microbiology, Northern California Branch and Northern California
Association of Public Health Microbiologists, 8th Annual Combined Fall Conference (Octo-
ber, 1991).
27. Sequencing the human genome is the goal of the "Human Genome Project," an
ambitious, international, 15-year (minimum) cooperative venture. Anthony V. Carrano,
Human Genome Project-A Global and Local Perspective, Paper presented at the American
Society for Northern California Branch and Northern California Association of Public
Health Microbiologists, 9th Annual Combined Fall Conference (Oct. 1992). PCR is largely
responsible for making a project of this magnitude feasible. As stated previously, in order to
analyze each genomic sequence, many copies of DNA are necessary. Thus, the researchers
must make thousands, if not millions, of copies of each gene. This would take much longer if
traditional methods of molecular cloning such as those described in R.W. OLD & S.B. PRIM-
ROSE, PRINCIPLES OF GENE MANIPULATION (4th ed. 1989) and J. SAMBROOK ET AL., MO-
LECULAR CLONING (2d ed. 1989) were necessary.
The implications of sequencing the human genome are staggering. The recent discover-
ies of the genes associated with muscular dystrophy, manic depression, cystic fibrosis, and
Alzheimer's disease are merely illustrative aspects of the tremendous potential presented by
this project. Hereditary defects may also be diagnosed more efficiently and earlier in
pregnancies. Eventually, such defects may be eliminated through sophisticated genetic tech-
niques. See Green & Waterston, supra note 13.
Concerns have arisen in association with the Human Genome Project, including privacy
issues related to the database which will be generated. See Deborah Jackson, Hacking the
Genome, ScI. AM., Apr. 1992, 128, 128, for a description of the problems involved in estab-
lishing the database. Other issues include patenting of the DNA involved in this project.
While some scientists within the National Institutes of Health desire to patent DNA of un-
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knowledge, the combination of either direct sequencing or RFLP
and PCR will probably become the third generation of DNA
testing.28
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP)
A. Introduction
RFLP is the DNA testing technique commonly referred to
within the legal profession as "DNA fingerprinting," due to the
barcode-like results observed in the ultimate product of the analy-
sis. 29 RFLP, the first generation in DNA analysis for casework,
was developed by Alec Jeffreys and his colleagues in Britain.30 It
has been used extensively in the United States, the United King-
dom,3 1 Canada32 and China.33  RFLP was used in the first sensa-
known coding specificities, many others are opposed to patenting these gene sequences. In
fact, this controversy over patenting contributed to the resignation of James Watson as the
head of the Human Genome Project. See Leslie Roberts, Two Strikes Against CDNA Patents,
257 Sm. 1620 (1992).
28. See Carolyn S. Harrington et al., HLA DQct Typing of Forensic Specimens by Ampli-
fication Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) Analysis, 51 FORENSIC SCI.
INT'L 147 (1991); Kentaro Kasai et al., Amplification of a Variable Number of Tandem Re-
peats (VNTR) Locus (pMCT118) by the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Its Applica-
tion to Forensic Science, 35 J. FORENSIC SCL 1196 (1990); Ulf B. Gyllensten & Henry A.
Erlich, Generation of Single-Stranded DNA by the Polymerase Chain Reaction and its Applica-
tion to Direct Sequencing of the HLA-DQA Locus, 85 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sm. 7652 (1988).
29. Because DNA typing is based on very different principles than traditional finger-
printing, it is somewhat unfortunate that the term "Fingerprinting" has been associated with
DNA testing. While this term has traditionally only referred to RFLP, some commentators
unfamiliar with the science and technology group all DNA testing methods, including PCR
applied to specific genetic loci within the term. Also, contrary to some accounts, "DNA
Fingerprinting" was not "discovered" by Jeffreys, it was invented by him. See Ricardo
Fontg, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide to Admissibility and Use, 57 Mo. L. REV.
501, 502-503 (1992).
30. Jeffreys' work developed from fundamental research done by E.M. Southern on the
technique of "Southern blotting" DNA from electrophoresis gels onto membranes (E.M.
Southern, Detection of Specific Sequences Among DNA Fragments Separated by Gel Electro.
phoresis, 98 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 503 (1975)) and the work of Wyman and White on a
polymorphic DNA locus which was characterized by a number of "variable number tandem
repeats," better known as VNTR's (A.R. Wyman & R. White, A Highly Polymorphic Locus
in Human DNA, 77 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SC. USA 6754 (1980)).
Publication of Jeffrey's work heralded the present era of exploration into the study of
DNA in many disciplines. Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable 'Minisatellite' Regions in
Human DNA, 314 NATURE 67 (1985).
31. See David J. Werrett et al., The Introduction of DNA Analysis Into Home Office
Forensic Science Laboratories in England and Wales, BANBURY REP. 32: DNA TECH. AND
FORENSIC SC. 233 (1989).
32. See Barry D. Gaudette, Forensic DNA Analysis in the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, BANBURY REP. 32: DNA TECH. AND FORENSIC Sci. 229 (1989).
33. See Xiao-Wei Zhang et al., Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Analysis of
Forensic Science Casework in the People's Republic of China, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 531 (1991).
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tionalized DNA criminal case, which catapulted DNA analysis into
the public and legal spotlight.34
However, this case was not the first use of DNA profiling in
the forensic setting. Alec Jeffreys was also involved in a 1983 immi-
gration case involving the son of a Ghanian woman who was a legal
resident of the United Kingdom. When authorities refused to allow
the boy to immigrate to the U.K., Jeffreys was able to show that
there was only a one in 6 X 10-6 probability that the boy was not
the woman's son. Conceding that as the world's population was
only about 4 billion, authorities eventually allowed the boy to immi-
grate.35 Thus, RFLP has found an important niche in paternity (or
maternity) testing, as it correlates well with traditional methods and
may be very informative in cases where traditional methods yield
inconclusive or insufficient results.36
Because of the tedious, time-consuming, labor-intensive and
subjective procedures which require specific training in the tech-
niques of molecular biology, RFLP is perhaps best done in research
labs. Presently, there are relatively few forensic labs which use
RFLP (such as Lifecodes, Cellmark, GeneScreen, the Department
of Justice, and the FBI).
While someone sufficiently trained in the methodology may
consistently obtain meaningful results, it is an inherently complex
test system. This is probably one of the reasons why the large pri-
vate labs (e.g., Cellmark and Lifecodes) are primarily molecular bi-
ology laboratories. Their forensic work is simply an offshoot of
their primary efforts related to genetic testing.
Given the technical challenges37 involved in the development
34. This highly celebrated British case was the subject of Joseph Wambaugh's book,
THE BLOODING (1989). The case involved three quiet villages in Leicester, two murdered 15-
year old girls, a baker named Colin Pitchfork, a colleague named Ian Kelly who passed
himself off as Pitchfork in the massive DNA sample collection efforts which led to the sub-
mission of samples from 5,512 males between the ages of 13 and 30 residing in the villages,
and a geneticist named Alec Jeffreys. In this case, reports indicated that the odds against two
unrelated persons having the same banding pattern as the suspect and Pitchfork was about 30
billion to one. Anthony Schmitz, Murder on Black Pad, HIPPOCRATES, Jan-Feb. 1988, at 49.
35. For an account of this case, see Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Positive Identification of an
Immigration Test-Case Using Human DNA Fingerprints, 317 NATURE 818 (1985); William
G. Hill, DNA Fingerprint Analysis in Immigration Test-Cases, 322 NATURE 290 (1986); John
I. Thornton, DNA Profiling, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 20, 1989, at 18.
36. Lois A. Tonelli et al., Use of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Fingerprints for Identity
Determination: Comparison with Traditional Paternity Testing Methods--Part I, 35 J. FOREN-
SIC Sci. 1265 (1990); Karen R. Markowicz et al., Use of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Finger-
prints for Identity Determination: Comparison with Traditional Paternity Testing Methods-
Part II, 35 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1270 (1990).
37. These challenges include: (1) preliminary sequencing of the DNA of interest; (2)
production of oligonucleotide probes (strings of single-stranded nucleotide bases complemen-
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of useful RFLP systems, it is easy to understand why molecular
biologists have been involved in this type of research. While some
criminalists are molecular biologists, many must return to school to
learn the language and methods of molecular biology in order to
become proficient. Forensic scientists, such as criminalists who
conduct DNA analyses, must truly have a hybrid education-they
must apply their knowledge and understanding of the forensic sci-
ence world in the realm of molecular biology. They must have a
good working knowledge of the legal system, particularly in areas
related to the evidentiary system and testifying in court. Unlike the
molecular biologist working in the research setting, criminalists
must put their reputations on the line every time they testify as to
their laboratory results; their techniques and methods are continu-
ously under close scrutiny. Thus, while research molecular biolo-
gists play important and necessary roles in the development of
forensic DNA tests, the members of the forensic community are in
the best position to determine and designate the optimal routes to
take in the ongoing collaboration of forensics and molecular
biology.
B. Technology
Basically, RFLP involves (1) using restriction enzymes to chop
up the DNA of interest into segments of differing sizes and molecu-
lar weights;3" (2) running these DNA segments on an electrophore-
tary to the DNA of interest); (3) dealing with the vagaries of electrophoresis and "Southern"
blots; (4) subjective analysis of differences in band migration through the electrophoresis gel;
and (5) the infamous "band shift" frequently mentioned in RFLP court cases such as People
v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). See also Colin Norman, Maine Case Deals
Blow to DNA Fingerprinting 246 Sci. 1556, 1557-1558 (1989).
38. As indicated above, see supra note 13, most of the human genome is composed of
"non-coding" DNA (DNA that does not contain the code for a protein). Within these non-
coding regions, there are repetitive segments of varying lengths. These repetitive segments
are called VNTRs (variable number tandem repeats) because they are composed of sequences
of nucleotide bases which are repeated in tandem, any number of times. Thus, VNTRs are
polymorphic-different individuals will have a different number of repeated sequences at a
particular spot in the genome.
Restriction enzymes recognize specific base pair sequences and will cleave the DNA only
at these particular sites. Thus, if a specific recognition base sequence is present, a restriction
enzyme which recognizes that site will cleave the DNA molecule to produce fragments of a
certain length. If the site is absent, a fragment of different length will be produced.
Polymorphism often results from neutral changes (changes in which mutations create or
abolish recognition sites for restriction enzymes in noncoding DNA). KIRBY, supra note 11,
at 26. Obviously, if changes occur within controlling sequences or structural genes (e.g.,
those which code for proteins), there may be serious phenotypic consequences (such as cystic
fibrosis). Id.
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sis gel 9 to separate them into "bands" based on their size and
weight; (3) denaturing the DNA to make it single-stranded; (4)
"blotting" the DNA onto a membrane; (5) adding radioactively-
labelled DNA oligonucleotide probes complementary to a particu-
lar sequence of interest; (6) exposing the membrane to X-ray film to
produce an autoradiogram; (7) observing the banding patterns pro-
duced by the radioactive probes on the autoradiogram (or
"autorad"); and (8) comparing the banding patterns produced by
the different test samples.
Because many DNA samples are run in different lanes on the
electrophoresis gel at the same time," the scientist is able to com-
pare the migration distances of the bands in each lane separated in
the gel during electrophoresis. If the banding patterns in two sam-
ples are identical, this indicates the samples may have originated
from the same source.
By using various restriction enzymes, the scientist can produce
different DNA segments with correspondingly different base se-
quences and lengths. Through sample comparisons, the use of mul-
tiple restriction enzymes, and statistical methods, the analyst
determines whether the "evidence" sample was from the suspect,
victim or someone else. "Direct sexing" of DNA may be used as an
internal control and/or for sex determination in cases where the sex
of the person is unknown.41
One major problem with RFLP that is commonly dealt with in
the forensic setting is the minute amount of sample which is often
the only evidence available. Current RFLP technology requires 1
to 10 g of DNA for a single analysis.
39. Electrophoresis is a technique commonly used to separate component parts of pro-
teins, nucleic acid fragments or other molecules. In RFLP, the restriction enzyme-treated
sample DNA is placed in a lane on an agarose gel (or other gel material). When an electric
current is applied to the gel, the DNA fragments move through the gel at rates dependent
upon such factors as their electrical charges, size and weight.
For a detailed description of the technical aspects involved in RLFP, see KIRBY, supra
note 11, at 91-131, 135-145.
40. In addition to the samples from each person involved and any evidence samples
available, a size-marker DNA cocktail is also run in one lane. This sample, containing DNA
fragments of known molecular weight and size, is used as a reference to determine the
number of base pairs which correspond to each band in the test sample patterns.
The "blotting" of DNA fragments from an agarose gel to a more solid support, such as a
nylon membrane or cellulose acetate filter paper, for subsequent detection is called "Southern
blotting," named for the researcher who originally developed the technique. See Southern,
supra note 30, at 29.
41. Lilya V. Verbovaya & Pavel L. Ivanov, "Sexing" Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) on
DNA Fingerprint Gel: An Internal Control for DNA Fingerprint Evidence, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI.
991 (1991).
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Blood contains 5000 to 10,000 nucleated cells per microlitre; this
corresponds to 25 to 50 ptg of DNA/mL. Thus bloodstains
would have to contain at least 50 [tL of blood to be amenable to
analysis. The corresponding limit value for semen is about 10
[tL. To put this latter value in context, a vaginal swab holds
about 100 [tL of fluid; thus semen collected on swabs cannot be
diluted more than about 1:10.42
This is also a problem when multiple test procedures are neces-
sary. The decision must then be made whether to use the entire
sample for RFLP anaylsis, or forego RFLP in favor of other ana-
lytic methods. Another consideration is that there may be an insuf-
ficient quantity of high molecular weight DNA available due to
sample degradation by bacterial action, sunlight or other DNA-de-
stroying forces. The relative stability of dried DNA has been stud-
ied in controlled experimental studies,43 as well as from teeth,"
mummy tissfie and 140-year-old dried muscle. 5 In some cases,
RFLP is possible.4' However, this is not always the case, and other
methods such as PCR are sometimes required.
In addition to requiring relatively large samples, RFLP has a
major drawback in that it commonly involves the use of radioactive
reagents, a distinct disadvantage for crime labs. Unlike most
42. George F. Sensabaugh, Forensic Biology-Is Recombinant DNA Technology in its
Future?, 31 J. FORENSIC Sci. 393, 395 (1986).
43. Peter Gill et al., Forensic Application of DNA Fingerprints, 318 NATURE 577 (1985);
Dwight E. Adams et al., Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Analysis by Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorphisms of Blood and Other Body Fluid Stains Subjected to Contamination and
Environmental Insults, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1284 (1991); David J. Walsh et al., Isolation of
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) From Saliva and Forensic Science Samples Containing Saliva,
37 J. FORENSIC Sc. 387 (1992); Terry L. Laber et al., Evaluation of Four Deoxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) Extraction Protocols for DNA Yield and Variation in Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorphism (RFLP) Sizes Under Varying Gel Conditions, 37 J. FORENSIC SCI. 404
(1992); C.T. Comey & Bruce Budowle, Validation Studies on the Analysis of the HLA-DQcc
Locus Using the Polymerase Chain Reaction, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1633 (1991)
44. Ted R. Schwartz et al., Characterization of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Obtained
from Teeth Subjected to Various Environmental Conditions, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 979 (1991);
John S. Waye et al., Sensitive and Specific Quantitation of Human Genomic Deoxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) in Forensic Science Specimens: Casework Examples, 36 3. FORENSIC SCd. 1198
(1991).
45. R. Higuchi et al., DNA Sequences From the Quagga, an Extinct Member of the
Horse Family, 312 NATURE 282 (1984).
46. J.E. Allard, Murder in South London: A Novel Use of DNA Profiling, 32 J. FOREN-
SIC Scd. Soc'Y 49 (1991); William D. Haglund et al., Identification of Decomposed Human
Remains by Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Profiling, 35 J. FORENSIC Sd. 724 (1990); Evan
Kanter et al., Analysis of Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms in Deoxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) Recovered From Dried Bloodstains, 31 J. FORENSIC Sci. 403 (1986); Alan Giusti
et al., Application of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Polymorphisms to the Analysis of DNA
Recovered From Sperm, 31 J. FORENSIC Sci. 409 (1986); S. Pibo, Molecular Cloning of
Ancient Egyptian Mummy DNA, 314 NATURE 644 (1985); Higuchi supra note 45.
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clinical laboratories, many forensic labs do not have the facilities
required for isotope work.47 Major concerns associated with the use
of radioactive reagents include their cost, relatively short half-lives
(while some of the radioactivity may remain for a long time, the
reagent will degrade to the point where it is no longer sensitive
enough for use in the test system), hazardous waste disposal consid-
erations, the need to monitor personnel and lab space for radiation
dose and contamination, and licensing regulations. If a spill occurs,
it is possible that at least a portion of the laboratory will become
unusable because no one will be allowed to enter the contaminated
area. Due to these factors, many laboratorians are unwilling to ac-
cept the risks and disadvantages of using radioactive test methods.
These concerns have helped stimulate the development of much
simpler and less dangerous test methods (e.g., PCR) which utilize
enzyme-based detection systems, rather than radioactive labels.
One strong advantage of RFLP is that it is possible to derive
phenomenonal probability statistics relating to the determination of
whether a particular person is responsible for the crime under inves-
tigation. The greater the probability that the RFLP patterns ob-
served in the evidence samples and the subject match, the greater
the likelihood that the person is the one responsible for the crime.4 8
There are even methods which may be used to determine the iden-
tity of a suspect who claims that another family member was re-
sponsible for the crime.49 Thus, RFLP's "power of discrimination"
is potentially very high.
Because population genetics form the basis for these determi-
nations, there has been much research into the genetic makeup of
various human subpopulations.50 The methods used to estimate the
probabilities are relatively complex. In the forensic setting, most
47. Sensabaugh, supra, note 42, at 396.
48. "In any case, using a single probe .... [t]he probability that another, unrelated
individual would share exactly the same pattern is 3 X 10" . Add the products of a second
probe, and the probability shrinks further, to 5 X 10-.." Roger Lewin, DNA Fingerprints in
Health and Disease, 233 Sci. 521, 522 (1986).
In a recent appellate case, the frequency of the defendant's genotype in the Caucasian
population was determined to be one in 300 million. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786,
789 (2d Cir. 1992).
49. I.W. Evett, Evaluating DNA Profiles in a Case Where the Defence is "It was my
brother," 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. SoC'Y 5 (1992).
50. M. Baird et al., Allele Frequency Distribution of Two Highly Polymorphic DNA Se-
quences in Three Ethnic Groups and Its Application to the Determination of Paternity, 39 AM.
J. HUM. GENETICS 489 (1986); Balazs et al., Human Population Genetic Studies of Five
Hypervariable DNA Loci, 44 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 182 (1989). See also, Robert Gaensslen,
When Blood is Their Argument: Use and Interpretation of Genetic Marker Frequency Data in
Forensic Serology, 12 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 75 (1985).
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discussion has centered around two statistical methods. For exam-
ple, the FBI uses a "fixed bin method" to establish this
probability." The National Research Council's (NRC) Committee
on DNA Technology in Forensic Science recommend the "ceiling
principle" as a method which is even more conservative than the
FBI's fixed bin method. 2 As discussed below, population genetics
and the statistics used to produce impressive probabilities are a sub-
ject of concern to many commentators and expert witnesses . 3
Perhaps, in their rush to gain court acceptance of RFLP, its
advocates have been overzealous in promoting its discriminatory ca-
pabilities. It is one thing to say that there is a 1 chance in a million
that this test has identified the person responsible for the crime. It
may be too much for many people to comprehend that there is a 1
chance in 1,000,000,000,000. Its extraordinary claims make it
somewhat suspicious, much like the promises made by the patent
medicine salesman from an earlier time in our history. The claims
simply seem too good to be true. Thus, association of such claims
with the test method may make it much easier for the judge or jury
to disregard the evidence as untrustworthy.
Although some of the distrust associated with RFLP has over-
flowed into the PCR arena, the concerns with PCR are much differ-
ent than those associated with RFLP. Also because its power of
discrimination is not as great as that of RFLP, such claims of unre-
liability based on skewed population genetics and statistics are not
as applicable to PCR.
The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)
A. History
While at Cetus, biochemist and researcher Kary Mullis con-
ceived and began developing methods to use polymerase to produce
51. For a detailed explanation of this statistical method, see Bruce Budowle & Keith L.
Monson, A Statistical Approach For VNTR Analysis, 1989 PROC. INT'L SYMP. FORENSIC
ASPECTS DNA ANALYSIS, 121 (1989). See also, The FBI's Response to Recommendations by
the Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science of the National Research Council,
National Academy of Science, 19 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 57-59 (1992).
52. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 90-
93 (1992).
53. Bruce Budowle & John Stafford, Response to Expert Report by D.L. Hartl Submit-
ted in the Case of United States v. Yee, 18 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 101 (1991); Bruce
Budowle & John Stafford, Response to "Population Genetic Problems in the Forensic Use of
DNA Profiles" by R.C Lewontin Submitted in the Case of United States v. Yee, 18 CRIME
LABORATORY DIG. 109 (1991); Eric S. Lander, Population Genetic Considerations in the Fo.
rensic Use of DNA Typing, BANBURY REP. 32: DNA TECH. AND FORENSIC SCI. 143 (1989).
See also Eric Lander, Expert's Report in People v. Castro (undated).
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multiple DNA copies.54  The elegant simplicity and tremendous
theoretical potential of this DNA multiplication scheme has revolu-
tionized molecular biology. Indeed, it rapidly became the method
of choice of molecular biologists and others who study DNA.
"While the field of forensic serology was being revolutionized by the
prospect of DNA analysis, the field of molecular biology was being
revolutionized by the invention of the polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), which ultimately has had an impact on every area of biolog-
ical science."' 55 Given its utility, it is perhaps not surprising that
PCR represents a significant intellectual property concern with im-
mense economic potential.5 6
54. See K. Mullis & F. Faloona, Specific Synthesis of DNA In Vitro Via a Polymerase
Catalysed Chain Reaction, 155 METHODS ENZYMOLOGY 335 (1987); K. Mullis et al., Specific
Enzymatic Amplification of DNA in Vitro: The Polymerase Chain Reaction, 51 COLD SPRING
HARBOR SYMP ON QUANTITATIVE BIOLOGY 263 (1986); Randall K. Saiki et al., Enzymatic
Amplification of -Globin Genomic Sequences and Restriction Site Analysis For Diagnosis of
Sickle Cell Anemia, 230 Sci. 1350 (1985); Randall K. Saiki et al., Analysis of Enzymatically
Amplified f-Globin and HLA-DQc DNA With Allele-Specific Oligonucleotide Probes 324 NA-
TURE 163 (1986).
55. Rebecca Reynolds et al., Analysis of Genetic Markers in Forensic DNA Samples Us-
ing the Polymerase Chain Reaction, 63 ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 1,1 (1991).
56. Cetus successfully defended two very important PCR patents (U.S. Patent Nos.
4,683,195 and 4,683,202) against Du Pont in 1991. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Cetus
Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1174 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Cetus
Corp. No. 89-2860, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18382 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 1991).
Until Cetus sold its entire GeneAmp PCR technology business to Hoffman-La Roche for
an aggregate cash price of $300 million plus royalties on future Roche PCR sales, Cetus sold
PCR equipment through a joint venture with Perkin-Elmer. Cetus To Sell PCR Business to
Hoffman-La Roche for $300 Million Plus Royalties, Bus. WIRE, July 22, 1991, available in
LEXIS/Nexis Library Bus. Wire File. PCR sales through the joint venture amounted to $26
million for the fiscal year ending June, 1991 and were expected to grow 40-50% in 1992.
Sabin Russell, Cetus Wins Patent Case Over Du Pont Crucial Victory For Biotech Firm, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 28, 1991, at Cl.
Cetus and Chiron Corporation recently merged to form the second largest independent
biotechnology firm. The new company, worth about $600 million in cash assets, focuses on
diagnostics, vaccines, cancer therapeutics and ophthalmics. Chiron and Cetus to Form "Sec-
ond Largest" Biotech Firm, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, August 5, 1991, at 1. Almost
simultaneously with the Chiron merger, Cetus sold the PCR rights to Roche. Emma Chy-
noweth, Cetus Sells Diagnostics to Roche, Merges With Chiron, CHEMICAL WK., July 31,
1991, at 12. Prior to the sale, Roche agreed to abide by the decision in a lawsuit brought
against Cetus by Eastman Kodak Company to seek injunctive relief in regard to technology
co-developed during the terms of an agreement between Cetus and Kodak. Stockholders
Make it Official. Chiron, Cetus to Merge, Roche Acquires PCR, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEW-
SWATCH, December 16, 1991, at 1; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Cetus Corp., 1991 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 151 (Del. Ch. Oct. 4, 1991); See also, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Cetus Corp., 1991 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 197 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1991).
Hoffman LaRoche is aggressively enforcing its rights to the large Taq market (in Eu-
rope, it was valued at $26 million in 1991), as demonstrated by the recent suit filed against
Promega. See Peter Aldhous, Roche Gets Tough on Illicit Sales of PCR Reagent, 258 Sci.
1572 (1992).
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While much attention has been focused on the somewhat con-
troversial Human Genome Project, PCR is also becoming increas-
ingly important in many other areas. Development of PCR
methods led to the subsequent development of the DQct test used in
the forensic setting,57 human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) detec-
tion and diagnostic techniques,58 methods for the identification and
detection of other microorganisms in various settings, including the
aquatic environment, food, dairy, soil and clinical samples, 9 neona-
tal screening' (e.g., detection of genes associated with cystic
fibrosis,61 and sickle cell anemia62), identification methods for chro-
57. Henry A. Erlich et al., The Use of the Polymerase Chain Reaction for Genetic Typ-
ing in Forensic Samples, 1989 PROC. INT'L SYMP. FORENSIC ASPECTS DNA ANALYSIS 93;
George F. Sensabaugh, Forensic Application of the Polymerase Chain Reaction, 31 J. FOREN-
sic Sc. Soc'y 201 (1991); Rebecca Reynolds et al., supra note 55; Atsushi Akane et al., Sex
Identification of Forensic Specimens By Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): Two Alternative
Methods, 49 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 81 (1991); Cetus Corporation, Forensic Analysis By the
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), CETUS BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 1990; James J. Harring-
ton, An Evaluation of the Forensic Application of the Polymerase Chain Reaction Technique
for Use in New Jersey: Legal and Scientific Considerations, (unpublished manuscript).
58. Chin-Yih Ou, DNA Amplification For Direct Detection of HIV-1 in DNA of Periph-
eral Blood Mononuclear Cells, 239 ScI. 295 (1988); M.F. Rogers et al., Use of the Polymerase
Chain Reaction For Early Detection of the Proviral Sequences of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus in Infants Born to Seropositive Mothers, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1649 (1989); M. Ray-
field et al., Mixed Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection in an Individual: Demon-
stration of Both HIV Type I and Type 2 Proviral Sequences By Using Polymerase Chain
Reaction, 158 J. INFECTIouS DISEASES 1170 (1988).
59. E.J. Thomas et al., Sensitive and Specific Detection of Listeria Monocytogenes in
Milk and Ground Beef with the Polymerase Chain Reaction, 57 APPL. ENVIRON. MICROBIOL.
2576 (1991); Henry A. Erlich et al., Recent Advances in the Polymerase Chain Reaction, 252
ScI. 1643, 1649 (1991); David H. Persing, Polymerase Chain Reaction: Trenches to Benches,
29 J. CLINICAL MICROBIOL. 1281 (1991); Richard A. Gibbs, DNA Amplification by the
Polymerase Chain Reaction, 62 ANALYTICAL CHEM. 1202 (1990); Deborah Y. Kwoh & T.
Jesse Kwoh, Target Amplification Systems in Nucleic Acid-Based Diagnostic Approaches, AM.
BIOSCIENCES LABORATORY 14 (Oct. 1990); Polymerase Chain Reaction Project Exploring Po-
tential Clinical Applications, AIDS RES. EXCHANGE, July/Aug. 1989, at 1; Ichiro Saito et
al., Detection of Epstein-Barr Virus DNA by Polymerase Chain Reaction in Blood and Tissue
Biopsies From Patients with Sogren's Syndrome, 169 J. EXPERIMENTAL MED. 2191 (1989);
Shuichi Kaneko et al., Detection of Serum Hepatitis B Virus DNA in Patients with Chronic
Hepatitis Using the Polymerase Chain Reaction Assay, 86 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCi. 312
(1989).
60. Edward R.B. McCabe et a]., DNA Microextraction From Dried Blood Spots on Filter
Paper Blotters: Potential Applications to Newborn Screening, 75 HUM. GENETICS 213 (1987);
Edward M. Rubin et al., Newborn Screening by DNA Analysis of Dried Blood Spots, 82 HUM.
GENETICS 134 (1989).
61. C. Williams et al., Same Day, First-Trimester Antenatal Diagnosis For Cystic Fibro-
sis By Gene Amplification, 2 LANCET 102 (1988); A. Handyside et al., Birth of a normal girl
after in vitro fertilization and preimplantation diagnostic testing for cystic fibrosis, 327 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 905.
62. R.K. Saiki et al., Enzymatic Amplification of f-globin Genomic Sequences and Re-
striction Site Analysis For Diagnosis of Sickle CellAnemia, 230 Sc. 1350 (1985); S.H. Embury
et al., Rapid Prenatal Diagnosis of Sickle Cell Anaemia By a New Method of DNA Analysis,
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mosomal abnormalities and specific mutations, 63 gene replacement
therapy" and the development of other tests too numerous to men-
tion.65 PCR can even be used to determine ABO genotypes and
sex.66  The ability of PCR to amplify DNA from both a single
human sperm and a diploid cell represents a major breakthrough in
human pedigree analysis.67 PCR is also useful in cases where the
person is dead, but some of their tissues have been preserved in par-
affin.68 Use of these preserved samples precludes the necessity of
exhumation and allows DNA analysis on those who have been cre-
mated. PCR methods such as the AmpliTypeE DQcc kit may also
be used in cases where bones are available for analysis.69 PCR has
also been used to study the epidemiology of Lyme disease, a re-
cently recognized, yet ancient disease.7 °
316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 656 (1987). PCR can also be used to diagnose many other genetic
diseases, such as Huntington's disease (I. McIntosh et al., Prenatal Exclusion Testing for
Huntington Disease Using the Polymerase Chain Reaction, 32 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 274
(1989)), and phenylketonuria (Cynthia Bottema et al., Direct Carrier Testing for
Phenylketonuria by PCR Amplification of Specific Alleles, AMPLIFICATIONS, Mar. 1990, at
27).
63. PCR made the identification of chronic myeloid leukemia as the first cancer in
which a specific genetic abnormality was identified. Ernest S. Kawasaki et al., Diagnosis of
Chronic Myeloid and Acute Lymphocytic Leukemias by Detection of Leukemia-Specific
mRNA Sequences Amplified In Vitro, 85 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. USA 5698 (1988).
64. Mark R. Hughes & C. Thomas Caskey, Medical Genetics, 265 JAMA 3132 (1991).
65. For an excellent review of the applications of PCR in medical diagnostics for ge-
netic diseases, see Barry I. Eisenstein, The Polymerase Chain Reaction, New Method of Using
Molecular Genetics for Medical Diagnosis, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 178 (1990). See also,
Shirley Kwok & John Sninsky, Application of PCR to the Detection of Human Infectious
Diseases, in PCR TECHNOLOGY 235 (Henry A. Ehrlich ed., 1989).
For an excellent recent overview of PCR and its multitude of applications, see Henry A.
Erlich et al., supra note 57.
66. James Chun-I Lee & Jan-Gowth Chang, ABO Genotyping by Polymerase Chain Re-
action, 37 J. FORENSIC SC. 1269 (1992); Rebecca Reynolds, Rapid Determination of Gender
Using the Polymerase Chain Reaction, Paper presented at the 77th Semi-Annual Seminar of
the California Association of Criminalists (May, 1991).
67. Honghua Li et al., Amplification and Analysis of DNA Sequences in Single Human
Sperm and Diploid Cells, 335 NATURE 414 (1988).
68. Darryl Shibata et al., Fixed Human Tissues: A Resource for the Identification of
Individuals, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1204 (1991); Darryl Shibata et al., Human Immu-
nodeficiency Viral DNA Is Readily Found in Lymph Node Biopsies from Seropositive Individu-
als, 135 AM. J. PATHOL. 697 (1989); and Eric C.J. Claas et al., Human Papillomavirus
Detection in Paraffin-Embedded Cervical Carcinomas and Metastases of the Carcinomas by
the Polymerase Chain Reaction, 135 AM. J. PATHOL. 703 (1989).
69. M.N. Hochmeister et al. Typing of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Extracted From
Compact Bone From Human Remains, 36 J. FORENSIC ScI. 1649 (1991).
70. David H. Persing et al., Detection of Borrelia burgdorferi DNA in Museum Speci-
mens ofIxodes dammini Ticks, 249 Sci. 1420 (1990); and David H. Persing, Borrelia, Babe-
sia, Yersinia: Emerging Blood-Borne Pathogens, Paper Presented at the American Society for
Microbiology, Northern California Branch and Northern California Association of Public
Health Microbiologists, 8th Annual Combined Fall Conference (Oct. 1992).
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PCR has been a major factor in the development of the newly-
formed fields of molecular anthropology71 and molecular paleontol-
ogy," in which evolutionary relationships between species and the
development of modem organisms are investigated.73 PCR is even
being used to monitor environmental contamination, 4 establish the
new medical field of diagnostic molecular pathology,75 and to help
identify those killed in the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf.76 The
tremendous contributions which PCR has made in so many areas
related to molecular biology led to its designation as "Molecule of
the Year" in 1989 by Science, a leading scientific journal.77
B. Technology
PCR is based on a very simple idea. Perhaps the most appro-
priate analogy for PCR is as a genetic photocopy machine. 78 The
PCR amplification system simply takes advantage of the natural
DNA replication system and manipulates it to the advantage of the
analyst to produce many millions of DNA copies.
71. David A. Lawlor et al., Ancient HLA Genes From 7,500 Year-Old Archaeological
Remains, 349 NATURE 785 (1991); S. PHbo et al., Mitochondrial DNA Sequences From a
7000-Year Old Brain, 16 NUCLEIC AciDs RES. 9775 (1988); S. Pmibo, Ancient DNA: Extrac-
tion, Characterization, Molecular Cloning, and Enzymatic Amplification, 86 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. Sci. USA 1939 (1989); Erika Hagelberg et al., Ancient Bone DNA Amplified, 342
NATURE 485 (1989); Ulf B. Gyllensten & Henry A. Erlich, Ancient Roots for Polymorphism
at the HLA-DQct Locus in Primates, 86 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. USA, 9986 (1989); and
Philip E. Ross, Eloquent Remains, Sc. AM., May, 1992, at 115. See also, Thomas J. White et
al., The Polymerase Chain Reaction, 5 TRENDS IN GENETICS 185 (1989); Leslie Roberts, How
to Sample the World's Genetic Diversity, 257 Sc. 1204 (1992)..
72. Jared M. Diamond, Old Dead Rats Are Valuable, 347 NATURE 334 (1991); Svant
Pibo & Allan C. Wilson, Polymerase Chain Reaction Reveals Cloning Artefacts, 334 NA-
TURE 387 (1988); and D. Janczewski et al., Molecular Phylogenetic Inference From Saber-
Toothed Cat Fossils of Rancho La Brea, 89 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. USA 9769 (1992).
73. Bryan Sykes, The Past Comes Alive, 352 NATURE 381, 382 (1991).
74. Asim K. Bej et al., Detection of Coliform Bacteria in Water By Polymerase Chain
Reaction and Gene Probes, 56 APPLIED ENVTL. MICROBIOL. 307 (1990); Asim K. Bej et al.,
Detection of Escherichia coli and Shigella spp. in Water Using the Polymerase Chain Reaction
and Gene Probes, 57 APPLIED ENVTL. MICROBIOL. 1013 (1991); Asim K. Bej et al., Detection
of Viable Legionella pneumophila in Water By Polymerase Chain Reaction and Gene Probe
Methods, 57 APPLIED ENVTL. MICROBIOL. 597 (1991).
75. W.W. Grody et al., Diagnostic Molecular Pathology, 2 MOD. PATHOLOGY 553
(1989).
76. George W. Clarke, 'Genetic Fingerprinting' Grows as Important Forensic Tool, L.
ENFORCEMENT Q., May-June-July 1991, at 5, 28.
77. Daniel E. Koshland, The Molecule of the Year, 246 Sci. 1541 (1989); Ruth L.
Guyer & Daniel E. Koshland, The Molecule of the Year, 246 Sca. 1543 (1989).
"Like the radio telescope and electron microscope, it represents an advance of a funda-
mental nature." J. Madeleine Nash, Ultimate Gene Machine, TIME, August 12, 1991, at 54,
56.
78. Robert Keeler, Uses for PCR Are Multiplying in Gene-Related Research, 30 RES.
Dav., Aug. 1991, at 30.
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To accomplish this, DNA is extracted from the test sample and
combined with a mixture of the heat-stable DNA polymerase (Taq)
originally obtained from a hot springs bacterium (Thermus
aquaticus) and all of the building blocks necessary for DNA replica-
tion, including nucleotides and primers.7 9
A machine, such as the Perkin-Elmer thermal cycler,80 is used
to heat the sample DNA. Heating causes the bonds between the
bases to break, separating the molecule into two strands (the DNA
is "denatured"). This allows the primers to bind ("anneal") to the
complementary sequences on the single-stranded template DNA
strands. DNA polymerase then works from the site of the annealed
primer-template and catalyzes the synthesis of new DNA strands by
linking nucleotides together in the precise order specified by the
template DNA strands. This is termed "extension." The cycle of
denaturation, annealing and extension is then repeated as many
times as necessary to produce the desired number of DNA copies."1
Under highly "stringent" conditions, the Taq polymerase is able to
very faithfully reproduce the DNA molecule.8 2 Thus, the amplifi-
79. Primers are segments of DNA with known sequences, designed and produced by
the researcher so that they will bind ("anneal") to the DNA sequences which flank the sec-
tion of DNA of interest in the sample to be amplified. When they are bound to the DNA, the
primers serve as signals for the DNA polymerase to attach to the DNA and begin forming
the complementary strands.
80. The Perkin-Elmer DNA Thermal Cycler is a microprocessor-controlled, thermal
cycling instrument which automates the rapid and precise temperature changes needed in the
PCR process. User-programmable files and preprogrammed protocols can be used. The
sample holding block will accommodate 48 0.5 L microcentrifuge reaction tubes. The tem-
perature range is -50C to 1000C. PERKIN-ELMER CETUS, DNA THERMAL CYCLER 480
SALES BROCHURE 8-9 (1990).
81. In the DQcL test kit, the program of denaturation, annealing and extension is re-
peated for 30 cycles. CETUS AMPLITYPEB HLA DQcL FORENSIC DNA AMPLIFICATION &
TYPING Krr, PACKAGE INSERT 13 (undated) [hereinafter AMPLITYPEm PACKAGE INSERT].
82. This works because the hydrogen bonds between incorrectly paired bases (such as
adenine and cytosine, for example) are too weak to withstand the heat. Thus, if the DNA
polymerase made a mistake and tried to pair the wrong base to the parent DNA strand, the
base would "fall off" and either DNA replication would be halted at this point or the correct
base would be added before the DNA polymerase moved on down the molecule.
The rate at which the AmpliTaq( DNA polymerase (the Taq polymerase included with
the DQu test kit) misincorporates nucleotides (inserts an incorrect base while it is extending a
DNA chain) is estimated to be from 1 per 10,000 to I per 200,000 incorporated nucleotides
per replication cycle.
Using a "worst case" (mutation rate assumptions of I in 10,000, 32 doublings
at 100% efficiency and the fewest number of replicates which can be detected
in the AmpliType0 Kit), no more than 1 product molecule in 50 could have a
replication error in the region of an allele specific oligonucleotide probe. (A
more reasonable estimate is 1 molecule in 500, and even this low probability is
based on "worst case" assumptions). The probability of such an error con-
verting one allele to another in a probe region is even lower: even if such an
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cation products truly reflect the content of the original DNA sam-
ple. Prior to the detection steps described below, the amplified
DNA is again denatured. This allows the "oligonucleotide-specific
DNA probes" to bind to complementary sequences which may be
present in the sample of amplified DNA.
Detection of the DNA of interest in the test sample is accom-
plished with these oligonucleotide-specific probes which are com-
posed of DNA strands complementary to those of the DNA of
interest. 3 In most common test systems, including the Ampli-
Type DQx test kit, a "dot" of each probe correlating to the DNA
sequence of each allele under investigation is attached to a nylon
membrane at a distinct location."4 Under suitably stringent condi-
tions, the probe captures complementary amplified DNA; the probe
will not bind to any non-complementary DNA sequences. This
characteristic greatly contributes to the test's high degree of
specificity.
In the DQcx test kit and many other test systems, the detection
component is comprised of three molecules-biotin, streptavidin,
and horseradish peroxidase.Y5 Biotin is bound to the primers while
the streptavidin and horseradish peroxidase are used together as an
"enzyme conjugate." This conjugate is added during the final steps
of the test procedure. Biotin has an extremely strong affinity and is
highly specific for streptavidin.8 6 Thus, if the DNA in the sample
and its attached primer is bound to the probe, the horseradish per-
error were to occur in the first amplification cycle, it would not generate a
detectable signal using this amplification and typing procedure.
CETUS CORPORATION, AMPLITYPEO USER GUIDE 6-30 (version 2, 1990) [hereinafter USER
GUIDE].
83. Thus, if the sequence in the amplified DNA is ATTCG, the probe sequence will be
TAAGC.
84. This is called a "reverse dot-blot." R.K. Saiki et a., Genetic Analysis of Amplified
DNA With Immobilized Sequence-Specific Oligonucleotide Probes, 86 PROc. NATL. ACAD.
Sm. USA 6230 (1989). In the original DQct test kit, the sample DNA was dotted onto nylon
membrane strips held within individual wells; different solutions, each containing a different
probe was added to each strip. This is called a "dot blot." R.K. Saiki et al., Analysis of
Enzymatically Amplified J-Globin and HLA-DQoL With Allele-Specific Oligonucleotide Probes,
324 NATURE 163 (1986); Catherine T. Comey, The Use of DNA Amplification in the Analysis
of Forensic Evidence, 15 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 99 (1988).
There is an inherently much greater chance of human error involved in the dot blot
procedure. Care must be used to properly and thoroughly label each well and add the correct
probe solutions. In the DQa test kit reverse dot-blot format, the kit is supplied with each of
the probe DNAs bound to membrane strips. Thus, the analyst just needs to add the test
DNA to the strip. While labelling and care should be used with this test also, there are fewer
steps involved, thereby decreasing the amount of manipulation required.
85. Radioactive probes, such as those used for RFLP, are used by some researchers.
86. Meir Wilchek & Edward A. Bayer, The Avidin-Biotin Complex in Immunology, 5
IMMUNOLOGY TODAY 39 (1984). See also, Pennina R. Langer et al., Enzymatic Synthesis of
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oxidase reacts with a soluble, colorless compound te-
tramethylbenzidine (TMB), to produce an insoluble blue product.
The allelic composition of the sample DNA is indicated by the pres-
ence of blue spots on the nylon membrane. In addition to the "test"
spots used to identify the discrete alleles, there is also a "control"
spot which will turn blue if the DQct genes have been amplified.
The intensity of each test dot is compared with that of the control
spot; if the control dot is not present, the test is deemed
unreadable.8 7
There are several important considerations which must be kept
in mind while developing PCR technology for use in genetic marker
detection in the forensic setting. As listed below, various criteria
have been expounded:
In order to be of maximum benefit to the forensic scientist, a
genetic marker system for forensic PCR analysis should satisfy
the following criteria:
1. The marker should be highly polymorphic and have a high
level of genetic heterozygosity.
2. The target sequence should be easily and specifically
amplified.
3. Methods for detecting allelic variation should be uncompli-
cated and thoroughly reliable.
4. Population data on genotype frequencies must be available in
order to assign estimates of the marker's power of discrimi-
nation and the probability of false inclusion.
5. The marker systems should be inherited independently so
that frequencies derived from one marker system can be
multiplied with those from others, thereby increasing the
power of discrimination. Independent inheritance occurs
when the markers are on separated chromosomes or are in
linkage equilibrium when present on the same
chromosome.88
Presently, there are very few test systems which have been suf-
ficiently developed for forensic use. The most well-known is the
AmpliType D DQa test kit. 9  While AmpliTaq5 (the Taq
Biotin-Labeled Polynucleotides: Novel Nucleic Acid Affinity Probes, 78 PROC. NATL. ACAD.
Sci. USA 6633 (1981).
87. See USER GUIDE, supra note 82, at 4-1. Dots with signals less than the "C" dot
should be interpreted with caution.
88. Cecilia H. von Beroldingen et al., Applications of PCR to the Analysis of Biological
Evidence, in PCR TECHNOLOGY: PRINCIPLES & APPLICATIONS FOR DNA AMPLIFICATION
209, 210 (Henry A. Erlich ed., 1989).
89. Another test system used by some companies detects polymorphisms within a re-
lated locus, DQ0. This test system takes advantage of many of the same reagents as the DQcc
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polymerase) is the subject of patents,90 the primer and probe se-
quences are not proprietary.91 Thus, unlike the proprietary probes
used in RFLP (e.g., the probes developed by Jeffreys), the sequences
of these molecules are available for any scientist to produce and
test.
In the AmpliTypef test kit, a specific portion of the human
genome which is known to code for particular structures on white
blood cells ("leukocytes") is amplified and used to "type" the per-
son being studied.92 The human leukocyte antigen system (HLA) is
the area of interest in the AmpliTypef' kit. This kit has been devel-
oped and refined to the point where a trained person can use the
necessary equipment and the reagents provided in the kit, easily fol-
low the established protocol and obtain useful results. Importantly,
this area of the human genome has been extensively studied due to
its role in immune system function.
C. The Human Leukocyte Antigen System (HLA)
The HLA system is composed of proteins (or "antigens")
which are coded for by a large number of genetic loci present on
kit, such as the Taq polymerase and the thermal cycler. Different probes and primers are
used to detect allelic variations within the 13 subunit of the DQ molecule, instead of the a
subunit which is the basis of the Cetus DQa test kit.
GeneScreen of Dallas, Texas was the major company utilizing DQ13. Linda Carrico,
Texas'First Forensic Lab Set to Open in Dallas, 4 TEX. LAW. 1 (1989). However, they have
recently switched to the more well-known DQct test kit. Telephone Interview with Robert
Giles, Scientific Director, Gene Screen (Dec. 1991).
90. Taq DNA polymerase and AmpliTaqO DNA polymerase are covered by U.S. Pat-
ent No. 4,889,818, assigned to Cetus Corporation. Cetus is also the assignee of the
GeneAmpc' PCR Process covered by U.S. Patent Nos. 4,683,202; 4,683,195; 4,800,159; and
4,965,188.
91. The probe sequences of the Cetus DQct test kit are published in USER GUIDE, supra
note 82, at Figure 1-4.
92. These structures are called "antigens." Antigens are recognized by antibodies, the
small proteins produced by a sub-group of white blood cells known as B lymphocytes or B-
cells. Antibodies are extremely important in the proper functioning of the immune system
and help the body recognize "foreign" antigens, such as those contained on viruses and bacte-
ria. They also help in the recognition and potential elimination of abnormal tissue cells,
including malignant and senescent cells.
Tissue typing is used to determine which array of antigens are present in the tissue; this
is of utmost importance in transplantation and other medical procedures. If someone re-
ceives an organ from a donor of a different type, it is very likely that the recipient will reject
the transplanted organ, often leading to other complications and death. Therefore, it is very
important that the tissue type of both the donor and recipient be determined before any
transplantation attempts are made. Tissue typing is also often used in paternity investiga-
tions.
Thus, PCR DQct typing can be considered tissue typing on a genetic level, instead of at
the antigenic level. PCR simply goes straight to the source of the code.
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chromosome #6.1' Due to the large number of allelic variations in
these proteins, there is a large degree of polymorphism.9" The HLA
proteins are divided into two structurally and functionally distinct
groups-Class I and Class II." Within Class II, there are three
families of proteins-DP, DQ and DR.96 Each of these Class II
proteins is composed of two subunits, "a" and "3," which are sepa-
rately encoded in the DNA of each gene cluster.97 HLA DQA1 is
the gene which codes for the a subunit.98
Within DQa, there are eight different alleles and one
"pseudogene." 9 9 The "major" alleles, DQA 1, 2, 3 and 4, differ
from one another at many nucleotide positions; they are easily dif-
93. Karen A. Sullivan & Bernard Amos, The HLA System and Its Detection, in MAN-
UAL OF CLINICAL LABORATORY IMMUNOLOGY 835, 835 (Noel R. Rose et al. eds., 1986).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 835-837. The Class I antigens are present on the membranes of most nucle-
ated cells and are recognized as the classical tissue transplantation antigens ("histocompa-
tibility antigens"). Benjamin D. Schwartz, The Human Major Histocompatibility HL4
Complex, in BASIC & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 55, 59 (Daniel P. Stites et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984). The Class II proteins are found on the immune system cells. These proteins are very
important in bone marrow transplantation and autoimmune diseases.
Autoimmune diseases are diseases which are caused by the attack of the body's immune
system on the body itself. Examples of these very destructive diseases include systemic lupus
erythromatosus (SLE), pernicious anemia, rheumatoid arthritis, juvenile diabetes, and others.
JOHN W. KIMBALL, INTRODUCTION TO IMMUNOLOGY 494 (2d ed., 1986); and Henry A.
Erlich & Teodorica L. Bugawan, HLA Class II Gene Polymorphism: DNA Typing, Evolution,
and Relationship to Disease Susceptibility, in PCR TECHNOLOGY: PRINCIPLES & APPLICA-
TIONS FOR DNA AMPLIFICATION 201 (Henry A. Erlich ed., 1989).
96. Sullivan & Amos, supra note 93, at 836.
97. Id.
98. The World Health Organization developed a new nomenclature system for these
antigens. This comment uses the old nomenclature simply to avoid confusion with much of
the literature which also uses the old nomenclature.
The new nomenclature, shown in the table below for the protein, gene and various alleles
associated with the locus, was adapted from WHO, Nomenclature for Factors of the HLA
System, 1989, 31 IMMUNOGENETICS 131 (1990).
Nomenclature used in this review WHO revised nomenclature
Protein DQc DQra
Gene DQor DQAI
Allele DQA 1.1 DQA*0101
DQA 1.2 DQAI*0102
DQA 1.3 DQA1*0103
DQA 2 DQAI*0201
DQA 3 DQAI*0301
DQA 4.1 DQA1*0501
DQA 4.2 DQA*0401
DQA 4.3 QA*0601
Pseudogene DXct DQA2
99. Pseudogenes are nonfunctional gene copies which remain in the genome, although
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ferentiated by one probe sequence.'00 There are also subtypes
within 1 (1.1, 1.2, 1.3) and 4 (4.1, 4.2, 4.3). Although these sub-
types differ from each other by only one or a few nucleotides, they
will all bind with the probe for the major type (i.e., 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3
will all bind with the probe for 1); the 1 subtypes are distinguished
by using additional probes specific to the correspondingly different
sections for each allele.10 1 While 4.1, the most common type 4 al-
lele, can be distinguished from 4.2 and 4.3, these other alleles are
relatively rare and are identical to each other in the sequence de-
tected by the AmpliTypeD HLA DQct test system. 10 2 Therefore,
because 4.2 and 4.3 are not included, the test system only makes use
of the six most important alleles.
Following PCR amplification of the evidence samples, the
DQct types are compared. If the DQct genotype of the suspect is
different from that of the evidence sample, the suspect is "excluded"
and cannot be the donor of the evidence. Unlike matches or inclu-
sions, exclusions are independent of the frequencies of the genotype
in the population.0 3
If the suspect and evidence have the same genotype, then the
suspect is "included" as a possible source of the evidence sample.
The probability that another, unrelated individual would also
match the evidence is equal to the frequency of that genotype in the
relevant population. Multiple studies have been conducted to deter-
mine the genotype frequencies in various ethnic and geographically-
defined population groups; significant differences were observed be-
tween the ethnic groups examined."°
they may have recently lost their function in evolution. See, USER GUIDEsupra note 82, at 1-
3.
100. R. Saiki et al., Genetic Analysis of Amplified DNA With Immobilized Sequence.Spe-
cific Oligonucleotide Probes, 86 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. USA 6230 (1989).
101. USER GUIDE, supra note 82, at 1-3.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 5-1.
104. In a recent study, over 1400 individuals were typed using both the dot-blot and
reverse dot-blot methods to determine the DQc± genotypes for 11 population groups. The
observed frequencies of DQc± genotypes did not significantly deviate from those expected on
the assumption of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. There was a slight excess of homozygotes in
one Hispanic (denoted by "Spanish surname") and one Southeast Asian group which was
found to be consistent with the heterogeneity of these groups. These data indicate that the
HLA-DQa marker system is useful in individual identification because genotype frequencies
can be reliably estimated from allele frequency data. Rhea Helmuth et al., HLA-DQa Allele
and Genotype Frequencies in Various Human Populations, Determined Using Enzymatic Am.
plification and Oligonucleotide Probes, 47 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 515 (1990).
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D. Population Genetics and the DQa Level of
Discrimination
As stated above, in order to develop PCR kits, (e.g., Ampli-
TypeE), it is necessary to identify all of the possible alleles which
could be present at the locus of interest, determine their DNA se-
quences and then study large populations to determine the frequen-
cies of each allele and genotype for various ethnic groups.10 5 These
population genetics data are used to determine the statistical
probabilities that a certain person within a particular racial group
will have a particular combination of HLA DQca alleles. As dis-
cussed in more detail below, the DQct system is more discriminating
than any of the traditional genetic markers used in forensics.10 6
For example, each person has two DQA alleles (one contrib-
uted from each parent) and there are a total of six alleles detected in
the AmpliType(' system. Thus, there are 21 potential genotypes
which may be detected. The frequencies of these genotypes range
from less than 0.0005 to 0.15.107 The discriminating power (DP) of
the DQct typing system is 0.93.108 This compares favorably with
the discriminating power of the ABO red cell typing system (DP =
0.60), and analysis of the isozyme PGM (phosphoglucomutase) (DP
= 0.76).109 From these numbers, it is evident that, by itself, PCR
DQct typing can neither provide individual identification nor
achieve the phenomenally high numbers generated by RFLP meth-
ods. However, it has proved useful in conclusively including or ex-
cluding criminal suspects in circumstances where conventional
typing has failed or insufficient DNA was available for RFLP." °
There are some distinct advantages to PCR over RFLP. Un-
like presently used RFLP systems, it is an allele-specific system
which identifies a discrete trait inherited in a clear Mendelian fash-
ion. The distinctness and permanence of the DQct allelic variants is
clearly demonstrated by their maintenance over millions of years.I
Comparison of the observed genotype frequencies with the Hardy-
105. Id.; See also, Sara A. Westwood & David J. Werrett, An Evaluation of the Polymer-
ase Chain Reaction Method for Forensic Applications, 45 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 201 (1990).
106. George F. Sensabaugh & Cecilia von Beroldingen, The Polymerase Chain Reaction:
Application to the Analysis of Biological Evidence, in FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 63, 72
(Mark A. Farley & James J. Harrington eds., 1991).
107. von Beroldingen et al., supra note 88, at 212.
108. Discriminating power is the probability of distinguishing between two randomly
selected individuals from all of the populations studied.
109. Sensabaugh & von Beroldingen, supra note 106 at 212.
110. See, eg., People v. Quintanilla, No. C-23691 (San Mateo Superior Ct., Aug. 16,
1991). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 8.
111. Gyllensten & Erlich, supra note 71.
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Weinberg expected frequencies can help validate typing methods-
an excess of homozygosity would reveal a population substruc-
ture." 2 The close fit between the observed and expected DQca geno-
type frequencies affirms the typing methodology and genetic model.
Thus, although the discrimination power for the DQU marker
system is less than that for most RFLP systems, it is a simple and
rapid method which is capable of analyzing minute and degraded
samples. As more PCR-based markers are researched and become
readily available, a panel of tests will likely be developed which, in
addition to the exclusionary value already provided by the DQat
system, will provide valuable information for individual inclusions.
Alone, the AmpliTypel system for DQct provides a power of
discrimination of approximately 83 to 94%.113 However, because
the DQct alleles are inherited independently from the conventional
marker systems, results can be combined to increase the overall
power of discrimination. Thus, combining the individualization po-
tentials for DQa, ABO, PGM and secretor status in a typical sexual
assault case increases this power of discrimination to 99%.114
The following table is from an informational flyer provided by
Cetus, which illustrates how DQca test results can be presented in
court in conjunction with results from conventional genetic marker
typing in a typical sexual assault case.
112. Helmuth et al., supra note 104, at 521.
The assumption of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium allows estimation of genotype frequen-
cies from observed allele frequencies and makes high levels of individual discrimination possi-
ble from relatively limited population data. For many VNTR (variable number tandem
repeat) or RFLP systems, the discrimination of alleles is limited by gel electrophoresis resolu-
tion. A great excess of homozygotes may be found in VNTR population samples. Eric
Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial, 339 NATURE 501 (1989). The inability to fully dis-
criminate classes due to limitations of the typing methodology and potential subpopulation
structure may contribute to an excess of homozygotes. High mutation rates in some VNTR
systems also creates the expectation of homozygote excess (up to 5%). Alec Jeffreys et al.,
Spontaneous Mutation Rates to New Length Alleles at Tandem Repetitive Hypervariable Loci
in Human DNA, 332 NATURE 278 (1988).
113. Helmuth et al., supra note 104, at 520.
114. See Sensabaugh, Biochemical Markers of Individuality, in FORENSIC SCIENCE
HANDBOOK 338-415 (Richard Saferstein ed., 1982).
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ABO/Secretor
Sample Status PGM HLA DQa
VictimRe ceBo 0 Secretor 1+ 1.2,1.2Reference Blood
1.3,2 (Sperm)
Vaginal Swab A & H Activity 1+1- 1.2,1.2
(Epithelial cells)
Questioned Hair
From Victim's Not Done Not Done 1.3,2
Pubic Combing
Suspect
Reference Blood A Secretor 1 + 1- 1.3,2
The results in the above hypothetical case indicate that the sus-
pect cannot be excluded because the semen contributor is an ABO
Type A Secretor with PGM type 1 + 1- or 1- activity and DQct
type 1.3,2. Without including DQc gene frequency information,
this combination of types occurs in approximately 7% of the white
population."1 But, if DQL gene frequency information is included,
the combination of types occurs in approximately 0.09% of the
white population.116 Furthermore, the suspect is also not excluded
as the source of the questioned pubic hair. DNA extracted from the
hair root was 1.3,2, which is consistent with the DQax type of the
suspect. This DQa genotype occurs in approximately 1.9% of the
white population, a genotype frequency less common than that of
the conventional ABO, PGM and secretor systems combined.
Recognizing the great potential in combining PCR with RFLP
or direct sequencing, many researchers are studying the possibili-
ties.l"T The combination of PCR and RFLP affords a greater detec-
tion sensitivity than can be achieved by the RFLP method alone
and greater discrimination than can be achieved by PCR alone."s
This is a very powerful combination of methods which could result
115. B.W. Grunbaum et al., Distribution of Genetic Frequencies and Discrimination
Probabilities for 22 Human Blood Genetic Systems in Four Racial Groups, 25 J. FORENSIC
Sci. 428 (1980).
116. Id.
117. K. Kasai et al., Amplification of VNTR Locus (pMCT118) by the Polymerase Chain
Reaction (PCR), 1989 PROC. INT'L SYMP. FORENSIC ASPECTS DNA ANALYSIS 279 (1989);
Bruce Budowle et al., Analysis of the VNTR Locus DIS80 by PCR Followed by High-Resolu-
tion PAGE, 48 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 137 (1991); David R. Engelke et al., Direct Sequenc-
ing ofEnzymatically Amplified Human Genomic DNA, 85 PRoC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA 544
(1988).
118. See, Bruce Budowle et al., Review Article: An Introduction to the Methods of DNA
Analysis Under Investigation in the FBI Laboratory, 15 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 8,18
(1988). Also see, Proceedings of the International Seminar on the Forensic Application of PCR
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in another generation of DNA typing methods.'19
E. Perceived Problems Associated with PCR
In addition to the low level of discrimination, as discussed
above, there are several perceived problems with PCR. However,
while some of these problems are of valid concern, others appear to
be make-weight legal arguments against the use of the technology.
Concerns voiced in the literature and cases include:
(1) "allelic drop-out";
(2) the sensitivity of the test and the potential for
contamination;
(3) the small number of laboratories conducting the test; and
(4) interpretation problems.
1. "Allelic Drop-Out"
This is a term which has been used to describe differential or
preferential amplification, the situation in which the procedure
greatly favors one of the two alleles present in a heterozygous indi-
vidual such that the results would lead one to wrongly conclude
that the individual was homozygous at the locus examined.' 20
However, there is no scientific basis for the belief that differential
amplification occurs in the AmpliType(' system.
First, there is no evidence that selective priming for some al-
leles relative to other alleles occurs in the AmpliType(' system.121
However, an alternative explanation is that there is selective dena-
turation of some alleles relative to others. An experiment was con-
ducted on DNA from a DQct 1.1,4 heterozygote to determine
whether selective denaturation occurs. 122 At 90°C or above, there
Technology, 18 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. (1991), and Bruce Budowle, AMP-FLPs: Genetic
Markers for Forensic Identification 18 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 134 (1991).
119. Amplified restriction fragment length polymorphisms (AmpFLPs) are recently de-
veloped test systems in which a DNA sample too small for conventional RFLP analysis is
first amplified and then tested by RFLP. G.T. Horn et al., Amplification of a Highly
Polymorphic VNTR Segment by the Polymerase Chain Reaction, 17 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES.
2140 (1989); E. Boerwinkle et al., Rapid Typing of Tandemly-Repeated Hypervariable Loci by
the Polymerase Chain Reaction: Application to the Apolipoprotein B 3'Hypervariable Region,
PROc. NAT'L ACAD. Sdl. 212 (1989). A test kit for D1S80 is currently available. This kit
may become the first AMP-FLP kit used for forensic purposes. See Kasai et al., supra note
28, and Y. Nakamura et al., Isolation and mapping of a polymorphic DNA (pMCT118) on
chromosome ip (Dis8O), 16 NUCLEIC ACIDS REs. 9364 (1988). This method not only takes
advantage of the exquisite sensitivity of PCR, but it also minimizes the problems of bacterial
DNA contamination, and increases the quantity of sample DNA so that RFLP is possible.
120. USER GUIDE, supra note 82, at 6-24.
121. Id. See also Gyllensten & Erlich, supra note 71.
122. The sequences of DAQ 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 alleles significantly differ from the DQA 2,3,
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was consistent typing of DQct 1.1 and 4. Below 88"C, neither allele
amplified nor typed. However, at 88"C, the results reflected prefer-
ential amplification of DQA 4 as compared to DQA 1.1 (DQA 4
allele could be amplified, but not DQA 1.1). These results are based
on the ability of the DQA 4 allele to be denatured and serve as a
template at this low temperature.
Therefore, preferential amplification and hence, allelic drop-
out is a possibility if the temperature of the reaction is substantially
below the specified temperature of 94"C. If the temperature of the
thermal cycler wells is close to 940C during denaturation, preferen-
tial amplification and "allelic dropout" should not occur.12a Thus,
this important study indicated that the phenomenon is possible, but
improbable, as long as the equipment is properly calibrated and
maintained. Therefore, as an additional control, the kit presently
on the market contains a heterozygous human genomic DNA con-
trol of DQct type 1.1,4.
Also, the population genetics data do not reveal an excess of
homozygotes which would be attributable to some hypothetical
"blank" or "null" allele that might fail to amplify. 124 In addition,
as the oligonucleotide primers are capable of amplifying a specific
DQct fragment from many different primate species, the sequences
to which the primers are complementary are highly conserved in
evolution.125 Thus, allelic drop-out is a "non-problem" which a
proponent of PCR evidence should be able to discuss if the oppo-
nent of the evidence brings it up.
2. Sensitivity and Contamination
The exquisite sensitivity of PCR is both its blessing and its
curse. PCR has the capability to amplify the DNA present in a
single hair root, 2 6 including several-month-old fallen hairs in
and 4 alleles in that they have a higher GC to AT base pair ratio. USER GUIDE, supra note
82, at 6-24. This is significant in denaturation because there are three hydrogen bonds be-
tween GC pairs and only two bonds between AT pairs. See LEWIN, supra note 9, at 17-24.
Thus, higher temperatures (more energy) are required to break GC bonds than AT bonds.
The experiment was designed to determine whether, under non-standard conditions, prefer-
ential amplification occurs due to the selective denaturation of some alleles.
123. USER GUIDE, supra note 82, at 6-24.
124. Helmuth et al., supra note 104, at 520.
125. Gyllensten & Erlich, supra note 71.
.126. Russell Higuchi et al., DNA Typing From Single Hairs, 332 NATURE 543 (1988). In
this publication, the authors indicate that the DNA in hair is often limited and/or degraded.
Id. at 544. This does not appear to be a major problem for PCR, but would preclude the use
of RFLP.
The use of hair samples has various advantages over the use of blood. Some suspects
may be unwilling to provide blood for testing due to their religious beliefs or customs. In
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which DNA was not detectable by the usual chemical methods
(representing less than 1 ng DNA). 127 This is of particular signifi-
cance because hair is one of the most frequently found forms of
biological evidence at crime scenes. 128
Given this extreme sensitivity, one major concern is that "con-
taminating" DNA present in the sample will be amplified and com-
pletely mask the true DNA of interest.129 However, there are many
routes by which such contaminating DNA may be avoided, de-
tected and/or eliminated. Nonetheless, a justifiable concern is that
forensic samples are relatively rarely pure (with the exception of
blood collected by venipuncture).
There are many potential sources of contaminating DNA, in-
cluding DNA contributed by the victim, bystanders, the analyst, or
even other organisms. There is also the concern that previously am-
plified DNA will contaminate the test DNA sample as it is being
processed within the lab. 30
Contaminating DNA From Species Other Than Humans. The
DQca test system is designed with very specific primers and probes.
In numerous tests, it was established that only primate DNA is am-
plified in this test system.' DNA from dogs, cats, bacteria, viruses
and other organisms will not be amplified nor even detected. 132
Thus, unless a chimpanzee or gorilla is involved in a crime scene,
some situations, transport of blood is impractical. In the veterinary setting, hair samples may
be much easier to get than blood. This could be very important in endangered species pro-
grams where the risk of stress and/or anesthesia used during blood collection may be too
great. Collection of hair samples makes it much easier to get the information desired, but
with the least impact upon the animal. Also, if the animal is dead, blood may not be avail-
able, making hair the sample of choice.
See also, Rieko Uchihi et al., Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Typing of Human Leukocyte
Antigen (HLA)-DQAI From Single Hairs in Japanese, 37 J. FORENSIC Sc. 853 (1992).
127. Higuchi et al., supra note 126, at 545.
128. RICHARD E. BISBING, THE FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION AND ASSOCIATION OF
HUMAN HAIR 185 (Richard Saferstein ed., 1982).
129. See, Russell Higuchi & Edward T. Blake, Applications of the Polymerase Chain Re-
action in Forensic Science, BANBURY REP. 32: DNA TECH. AND FORENSIC Sci. 265, 273
(1990)
130. S. Kwok & R. Higuchi, Avoiding False Positives with PCR, 339 NATURE 237, 237
(1989); Eden Fisher & David R. Lincoln, 7 RECOMBINANT DNA TECH. BULL. 1 (1984); J.
Fenton Williams, 7 BIoTECHNIQUES 762, 767 (1989); and Richard A. Gibbs & Jeffrey S.
Chamberlain, The Polymerase Chain Reaction: A Meeting Report, 3 GENES & DEVELOP-
MENT 1095, 1097 (1989).
131. USER GUIDE, supra note 82, at 6-27; Cetus Corporation, Background Information:
Polymerase Chain Reaction-PCR Technology, Nov. 1987; and Cetus Corporation, Forensic
Analysis By the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), CETUS BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 1990.
132. USER GUIDE, supra note 82, at 6-27. Also, while amplified DNA from chimps and
gorillas will hybridize to the probes, amplified DNA from more distantly related primates
does not hybridize. See also Gyllensten & Erlich, supra note 71.
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there is no danger that non-human DNA will be amplified or de-
tected by this test.
Contaminating DNA From "Extraneous" Humans. One con-
cern voiced by some commentators is that, unlike the "pristine"
medical setting in which pure samples are supposedly ensured, fo-
rensic samples often contain DNA from more than one person. 133
However, while mixed samples are probably the norm for fo-
rensic samples, anyone who has worked in a hospital can attest that
the medical environment is anything but pristine, and pure samples
are sometimes impossible to obtain. A prime example of this is
amniocentesis, in which samples contain cells contributed by the
mother as well as by the fetus. Another example involves the detec-
tion of cancerous 134 or HIV-infected cells,135 where the entire point
of the test is to identify the few malignant or infected cells hidden
within a large population of normal cells. A third example is the
detection of HIV-1 in discarded needles.1 36 It would seem very dif-
ficult to argue that these three situations reflect the "large," and
"clean" samples many commentators associate with the use of PCR
and other DNA techniques in medical and research labs.137 Con-
trary to the depiction by one commentator that "scientists analyze
fresh, hygienic and relatively unlimited amounts of DNA,"' 38
clinical and research laboratories often must work with small quan-
tities of contaminated samples which are not necessarily "fresh" nor
133. Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, Sci.
AM. May 1990, at 46; Simon Ford & William C. Thompson, A Question of Identity, 4 CAL.
DEFENDER No. 3 42, 43 (undated); Anthony Pearsall, Comment, DNA Printing: The Unex-
amined "Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77 CAL. L. Rnv. 665 (1989); Stephen C. Petrovich,
DNA Typing: A Rush to Judgment, 24 GA. L. REv. 669 (1990); William C. Thompson &
Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75
VA. L. REv. 45 (1989) [hereinafter DNA Typing]; William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, Is
DNA Fingerprinting Ready for Trial? (An Update), 4 CAL. DEFENDER No. 3, 36 (undated);
C. Thomas Blair, Comment, Spencer v. Commonwealth and Recent Developments in the Ad-
missibility of DNA Fingerprint Evidence, 76 VA. L. REv. 853 (1990); Hoefrel, supra note 1;
Michael Damore, What Every Criminal Lawyer Should Know, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 114, 116-
117 (1991).
134. This includes detection of human papillomavirus infection, a risk factor for develop-
ment of squamous and glandular neoplasia of the genital tract. Marion T. Cornelissen et al.,
Localization of Human Papillomavirus Type 16 DNA Using the Polymerase Chain Reaction in
the Cervix Uteri of Women with Intraepithelial Neoplasia, 70 J. GEN. VIROLOGY 2555 (1989).
135. Winand Lange et al., Detection by Enzymatic Amplification of ber-abl mRNA in
Peripheral Blood and Bone Marrow Cells of Patients with Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia, 73
BLOOD 1735 (1989); PCR Profiles: Polymerase Chain Reaction ii Situ, AMPLIFICATIONS
Mar. 1990 at 20. See also, Ou, supra note 58.
136. Stephen Raff'anti et al., Determination of HIV-1 Status of Discarded Sharps:
Polymerase Chain Reaction Using Minute Quantities of Blood, 264 JAMA 2501 (1990).
137. Thompson & Ford, supra note 133, at 36, 38; Pearsall, supra note 133, at 671.
138. Pearsall, supra note 133, at 671.
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"hygienic." It is also very difficult to argue that some settings in
which PCR has found widespread use provide large and clean sam-
ples (e.g., molecular anthropology and paleontology).
If medical science can cope with potentially significant "con-
tamination" problems, it is reasonable to believe that contamination
problems may be just as effectively dealt with in the forensic setting.
Indeed, this has been recently and conclusively established in two
cases, one involving the rather gruesome disappearance of a
child,1 39 and the other involving identification of a murder victim
from 8-year old skeletal remains."4 The tidbits of human tissue
mixed among corn silage and the skeletal remains exposed to the
elements for eight years were amenable to the PCR analysis which
answered the questions asked in these two cases. Thus, it is highly
likely that PCR will continue to be used in similar cases where van-
ishingly small quantities of sample are available, as well as in cases
where the species of the sample source must be determined.14 PCR
may also prove useful in cases in which there may be a question of
whether the blood present in an evidence sample was contributed by
a human or some other animal.
The FBI conducted an extensive validation study on the effects
of induced contamination and sample handling on the ability to per-
form PCR analysis.142 The study included dried or moist stains put
together, blood mixed with perspiration stains on a shirt, blood-
stains which were physically handled, contaminated by exposure to
aerosols created by coughing, mixed with shed scalp tissue, and
placed in contact with contaminated scissors, and blood that was
139. The 2-year old daughter of two farm laborers was reported as missing during the
corn harvest. Unidentifiable tissues were subsequently found among the silage. Samples
from the parents and the recovered tissues were tested with both RFLP and the DQct test
system. The DNA results indicated that the tissue recovered from the silage was human and
confirmed the probable parentage of the two farm workers. P. Mulhare et al., An Unusual
Case Using DNA Polymorphisms to Determine Parentage of Human Remains, 12 AM. J. FO-
RENSIC MED. PATHOLOGY 157 (1991).
140. Enka Hagelberg et al., Identification of the Skeletal Remains of a Murder Victim by
DNA Analysis, 352 NATURE 427 (1991).
141. For example, this could be of great importance in the prosecution of wildlife
poachers and importers of endangered species. PCR methods (not HLA DQct) may be devel-
oped to identify which species or subspecies a particular confiscated steak, pelt or mounted
trophy belongs. For a discussion of how RFLP is already in use for such purposes, see
KIRBY, supra note 11, at 233-259. For a brief description of the laboratory most likely to use
DNA typing in such circumstances, the National Fish and Wildlife Forensics Laboratory in
Ashland, Oregon, see Thomas Brom, All God's Creatures, CAL. L., Dec. 1991, at 44-45. A
recent article describes the development of probes suitable for use in wildlife forensic science.
R.S. Blackett & P. Keim, Big Game Species Identification by Deoxyribonucleic Probes, J. Fo-
RENSIC ScI. 590 (1992).
142. C.T. Comey & B. Budowle, supra note 43.
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mixed with other substances such as saliva. 143 No detectable con-
tamination was found to be introduced by handling, coughing, or
the presence of perspiration. Likewise, the two moist stains placed
in contact with each other and allowed to dry did not cross-contam-
inate. However, the mixture of saliva and blood equal amounts
apeared to result in a combined HLA-DQct phenotype; the salivary
phenotype appeared to be stronger, probably due to the presence of
a large number of epithelial cells. 1"
3. Small Number of Forensic Laboratories Using the
Test
The small number of forensics laboratories using the test has
been a factor for some courts which have excluded PCR evi-
dence.145 As of March 1991, Cetus reported that over 30 forensic
labs were performing DQx typing.14 6 Given the capital outlay re-
quired to begin PCR analysis, it is not too surprising that more labs
have not started using the technology. 47 In addition, there are
costs of training personnel in the proper use of the methods. 148
Sending samples to an outside laboratory is also expensive."49
Although there are probably many labs who would like to have the
capability of using PCR, most of them are unlikely to have the nec-
essary resources available in these lean economic times. 150
In view of the advantages presented by PCR as compared with
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. People v. Mack, No. 861116 (Sacramento Super. Ct. 1991).
146. Cetus Corporation, Attorney/Investigator Slide Presentation of Forensic DNA Analy-
sis Methods (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Slide Presentation]. In comparison, over
50 forensic labs were "capable" of performing RFLP as of the same date. Id.
147. In March 1991, Cetus estimated the total purchase price for all the new capital
equipment necessary for PCR analysis to be $15,000 to $20,000 for a typical crime lab. How-
ever, this is comparatively inexpensive, as RFLP capital equipment costs are estimated at
approximately $150,000 to 200,000. Id.
148. In 1991, the cost of a one week training course at Cetus was $1000. Id.
149. In June 1989, DNA testing ranged from $325/sample at Lifecodes to $490/sample
at Cellmark to $1500/case at Forensic Science Associates. The expert witness fees (daily rate
plus expenses) ranged from $1,000/day for a Ph.D. or $750/day for a non-Ph.D. from
Cellmark, $100-$125/hour for Forensic Science Associates and $750/day for Lifecodes. OF-
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 25 (1990) [hereinafter GENETIC
WITNESS].
150. The FBI's report on forensic DNA testing indicates that many labs would be inter-
ested in conducting DNA analysis, but lack of necessary personnel, insufficient space or
equipment, insufficient budget resources, and insufficient caseload or local demand for DNA
testing fail to justify establishing a DNA laboratory. The lack of or difficulty in obtaining a
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license for handling radioactive materials, the
length of time required to become operational and the unavailability of DNA testing training
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
RFLP, it would be very useful if this analysis was available in every
crime lab. Most cases do not require the sophisticated techniques,
sometimes difficult interpretations and astronomical numbers gen-
erated by RFLP. In most cases, it would seem likely that PCR in
combination with other serological markers would provide a quick,
relatively inexpensive and very reliable yes/no (inclusion/exclusion)
answer. 151
4. Interpretation Problems
Some witnesses have testified to discrepancies in the reading of
the dot blots. However, these concerns have largely been negated
by the inclusion of a "control" dot on the probe strips. This is be-
cause in order for the test to be deemed "readable," the intensity of
color at a test dot must be at least as intense as that of the "All
Control." '152 Thus, if the "all control" (C) dot is more intense than
the other dot, it is an indication that the results need careful
analysis.
Sexual Assault Evidence Samples. In forensic DNA PCR anal-
ysis, sexual assault evidence samples are often involved. Usually,
these are the archetypal mixed samples, typically containing a
sperm cell component contributed by the male rapist and vaginal
epithelial cells contributed by the female victim. Techniques such
as "differential lysis" have been developed, which allow good sepa-
ration between the sperm and epithelial cell fractions.15 3
Differential lysis takes advantage of the physical and biochemi-
cal characteristics and differences between the relatively resistant
sperm cells and the relatively fragile epithelial cells. Epithelial cells
will lyse (burst) under conditions which are much less harsh than
those required to lyse sperm. Thus, by lysing the epithelial cells and
centrifuging the sample to physically separate the sperm from the
epithelial DNA now present in suspension on the top of the sperm
were other concerns. Jay V. Miller, The Outlook for Forensic DNA Testing in the United
States, 17 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 1 (Supp. 1) (1990).
151. PCR analysis can be completed within a few days, while RFLP often requires weeks
of work. Slide Presentation, supra note 146, at 15.
152. The "C" dot is the weakest on the strip. If it is absent, an accurate determination of
the type cannot be made. This is because there may be other probe signals below the thresh-
old of detection. The "C" dot provides assurance that the appropriate typing and sub-typing
dots should be clearly visible. If visible dots with signal intensities less than the "C" dot are
present, this is an indicator of possible procedural error, mixed samples, DNA contamination
or the presence of DXa, DQct type 1.3,4, or subtypes of the DQA 4 allele. USER GUIDE,
supra note 82, at 4-1. The package insert also contains a useful section on troubleshooting.
Id. at 29-34.
153. Giusti et al., supra note 46; and USER GUIDE, supra note 82, at 3.18 to 3.19.
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fraction, the DNA from the victim may be harvested from the evi-
dence sample. In subsequent steps, the sperm are lysed and the rap-
ist's DNA is harvested.
In a typical sexual assault case, many samples are tested simul-
taneously. "Mixed" evidence samples, such as those from vaginal
swabs or semen stains on the victim's clothes, are tested along with
"pure" DNA collected from both the suspect and the victim, and
the sperm cell and epithelial cell fractions are isolated from a por-
tion of the "mixed" evidence sample. By testing all of the various
combinations of the above samples, along with samples from any
other person who may have contributed DNA to the evidence (e.g.,
sperm contributed by the victim's boyfriend if he had intercourse
with the victim prior to the sexual assault) will allow determination
of the allelic composition of each sample. Because each person only
has two alleles, a maximum of two alleles should be identified in
each sample. However, if the sample is mixed, it is very likely that
three or more alleles will be detected. Of course, if the two people
share the same DQcx type, there will still only be two alleles identi-
fied, even if the sample is "mixed." However, they will also be
found to have the same type in their "pure" samples. Thus, there
are internal controls within the test methodology which help ensure
that the results obtained by the laboratory are correct and reliable.
Nonetheless, these results simply mean that the suspect can neither
be included nor excluded from the pool of potential suspects based
on PCR DQct typing. Other means of identification and other types
of evidence will probably be required for conviction.' 54
Other Sample Types. Mixed samples may also be found in
bloodstains and other biological evidence. In this case, it becomes
even more important to test "pure" samples from both the victim
and the suspect. Differential lysis will not work in this situation, as
there is no significant difference in the resistance to harsh environ-
mental conditions of blood cells obtained from different people.
While mixed samples are very common, there are numerous
legal circumstances in which "pure" DNA samples are available.
These include paternity determinations' and cases involving the
identification of murder victims.'56 The expense of DNA testing is
154. USER GUIDE, supra note 82, at 4-6 to 4-8.
155. See B.P. Ludes et al., Parentage Determination on Aborted Fetal Material Through
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Profiling, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1219 (1991).
156. Akane et al., supra note 57; Yvonne Baskin, DNA Unlimited, DISCOVER, July 1990,
at 77; Cetus Corporation, supra note 57; Jeremy Cherfas, Genes Unlimited, NEw SCIENTIST,
April 1990, at 29; Forensics Experts Tackle Task of Identifying Thousands of 'Disappeared'
Victims, 261 JAMA 1388 (1989); Hagelberg et al., supra note 140; Lawrence Kobilinsky &
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particularly justified when corroborating evidence in difficult cases
is needed to help convince the jury of the suspect's guilt or inno-
cence. However, it is unlikely to supplant the other major identifi-
cation test systems such as fingerprint analysis, red cell typing (e.g.,
ABO), and other methods commonly used to identify a suspect as
the perpetrator of a crime. It is most probable that PCR will be
used as an adjunct test in combination with other evidence and
analyses to help bolster a case and ensure either a conviction or an
acquittal.
F. Laboratory Design and Test Protocols
This section highlights additional aspects of DNA testing
which attorneys must keep in mind. While attorneys involved in
DNA cases must understand the technology to a certain extent,
they also must have an awareness of laboratory set-up and proce-
dures. It is important for the legal community to realize that labo-
ratory design and test protocols are potentially significant aspects of
the tests which may need to be addressed in court.
It is highly advisable for attorneys to be extremely familiar
with the laboratory and the person who conducted the tests on the
evidence. Thus, if the opponent to the test procedure raises issues
regarding contamination, the well-prepared proponent of the evi-
dence should be able to counter the arguments with specific descrip-
tions, photographs or other documentation of the care and diligence
with which samples are handled and tested in the laboratory. On
the other side of the fence, if the opponent of the evidence is aware
of sloppy technique, the lack of controls and/or unsuitable labora-
tory design which could foreseeably lead to contamination, this
would be an important argument against the evidence.
Because laboratory design and test protocols play potentially
very significant roles in the success of DNA testing conducted in a
particular facility, the laboratory and test protocols should be estab-
lished with the potential contamination problems in mind. Envi-
Louis Levine, Recent Application of DNA Analysis to Issues of Paternity, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI.
1107 (1988); Henry C. Lee et al., Genetic Markers in Human Bone: L Deoxyribonucleic Acid
(DNA) Analysis, 36 J. FORENSIC Sci. 320 (1991); Henry C. Lee et al., DNA Analysis in
Human Bone and Other Specimens of Forensic Interest: PCR Typing and Testing, 31 J. Fo-
RENSIC SCI. Soc'Y 213 (1991); Roger Lewin, A Matter of Maternity, 233 Sci. 522 (1986); B.P.
Ludes et al., Parentage Determination on Aborted Fetal Material Through Deoxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) Profiling, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1219 (1991); J. Madeleine Nash, Ultimate Gene
Machine, TIME, August 12, 1991, at 54; Schwartz et al., supra note 44; and Darryl Shibata et
al., Fixed Human Tissues: A Resource for the Identification of Individuals, 36 J. FORENSIC
Sci. 1204 (1991).
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ronmental contamination from within the laboratory may result
from the introduction of DNA from the analyst, another unampli-
fled sample or a previously amplified sample. Although these pres-
ent important considerations, good laboratory practice will
overcome them.15 7 Gloves should be worn at all times, masks
should be worn by laboratorians working with samples, aerosols
should be minimized, and sample tubes should be tightly closed
when not in use. 158
To prevent the transfer of DNA from one sample to another,
extra precautions should be taken during the DNA extraction and
PCR setup steps. Simple precautions such as using a fresh pipette
tip for each sample, carefully opening reaction tubes, and keeping
the tubes closed when they are not being used will prevent this type
of contamination. 159 The DNA extraction and PCR setup of evi-
dence samples should be done at a separate time from the DNA
extraction and PCR setup of reference samples to prevent cross-
contamination.160 It is also recommended that DNA extraction of
samples containing high levels of DNA (e.g., whole blood) be con-
ducted separately from samples with low DNA levels (e.g., single
hairs, small bloodstains, etc.).1 61
Laboratory design features and strict adherence to recom-
mended methods will avoid the problem of "carry-over" (contami-
nation of a sample with amplified DNA from a previous PCR
reaction). Carryover contamination is a major concern because am-
plification product is an ideal substrate for subsequent
amplifications.
A single PCR reaction produces an enormous number of copies
(as many as 10") that can potentially contaminate samples yet to
be amplified. Since the number of copies of amplified DNA in a
completed PCR reaction is so high, inadvertent transfer of even a
minute volume to a yet to be amplified sample by splashing or
aerosol may result in the amplification and typing of the "con-
taminating" DQct sequence. For example, if reusing a pipette tip
transfers 0.1 iL, this can be as many as 1010 copies of amplifiable
sequence. By comparison, a microgram of human genomic
DNA contains only about 10' copies of a single-copy gene like
157. "Tidiness and adherence to a strict set of protocols can avoid disaster." B. Furrer et
al., Improving PCR Efficiency, 346 NATURE 324 (1990); see also, S. Kwok & R. Higuchi,
Avoiding False Positives With PCR, 339 NATURE 237 (1989).
158. USER GUIDE, supra note 82, at 2-1. Also, as a general rule, it is good practice to
wear lab coats to protect street clothes from splashed chemicals.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2-3.
161. Id.
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DQct. 162
Thus, nothing should move "upstream" in the flow of analysis.
The laboratory should be organized into three designated work ar-
eas so that the area in which amplified DNA is handled is physi-
cally isolated from the DNA extraction and PCR setup work areas
(e.g., separate rooms). While they may be located in the same
room, the evidence handling and DNA extraction area should be a
separate, distinct work area from the PCR set up area. 163 Micros-
copy, photography and any other evidence handling activities
should be conducted in the DNA extraction work area. 64 If the
work area where amplified DNA is handled is a separate but contig-
uous room, the laboratory design should be such that air flows to-
ward the amplified DNA area. Dedicated equipment should be
clearly labelled for use in each specific work area and not be used
elsewhere.
Various researchers concerned with the problems of carryover
contamination and the expenses involved in completely segregated
laboratory designs have developed internal methods within the
PCR reaction tubes to control such contamination.1 65 In these
methods, amplified DNA is rendered incapable of re-amplification
in a subsequent test should it contaminate another sample. While
these methods provide additional protection against contamination,
they still must be used in conjunction with good laboratory
technique.
Regardless of the contamination prevention methods used, no
equipment, large or small, expendable or not, should be allowed to
move from one designated section of the lab to another. 66 The
162. Id at 2-1.
163. USER GUIDE, supra note 82, at 2-2.
164. For detailed special precaution guidelines regarding this area, see Id. at 2-3 to 2-4.
165. Stephen Isaacs et al., Post-PCR Sterilization: Development and Application to an
HIV-1 Diagnostic Assay; 19 NUCLEIC ACIDS Ras. 109 (1991); George D. Cimino et al., Post-
PCR Sterilization: A Method to Control Carryover Contamination for the Polymerase Chain
Reaction, 19 NUCLEIC AcIDs REs. 99 (1991); Chin-Yih Ou et al., Use of UVIrradiation to
Reduce False Positivity in Polymerase Chain Reaction, BIoTECHNIQUES 442 (1991); Yu
Sheng Zhu et al., The Use of Exonuclease III for Polymerase Chain Reaction Sterilization, 19
NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 2511 (1991); Mary C. Longo, Use of Uracil DNA Glycosylase to Control
Carry-over Contamination in Polymerase Chain Reactions, GENE 125 (1990); Gobinda Sarkar
& Steve Sommer, Shedding Light on PCR Contamination, 7 NATURE 343 (1990); Gobinda
Sarkar & Steve Sommer, More Light on PCR Contamination, 347 NATURE 340 (1990); Y.
Jinno et al., Use of Psoralen as Extinguisher of Contaminated DNA in PCR, 18 NUCLEIC
ACIDS RES. 6739 (1990); and PERKIN-ELMER CETUS, GENEAMP PCR CARRY-OVER PRE-
VENTION KIT, PART No. N808-0068 PRODUCT LITERATURE (undated).
166. For example, the thermal cycler should not be placed in the area in which samples
are prepared.
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work flow should always be directed one way. This represents sig-
nificant protection for the incoming samples as they are processed.
As the concerns are no less acute in the forensic setting than they
are in the medical and diagnostic arena, preventing carry-over con-
tamination by previously amplified samples through sectioning of
the work area, and preventing the upstream movement of samples,
equipment and supplies represents good laboratory technique which
should be appreciated by everyone who works with PCR. Prior to
sending samples to a lab, the attorney would do well to visit the lab
and determine whether these precautions are in place.
ADMISSIBILITY AND OTHER ISSUES INVOLVING DNA ANALYSIS
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
With the increasing acceptance of DNA tests in courts
throughout the United States, it appears that the admissibility ques-
tions regarding these testing methods will eventually be moot.
However, the battles are not yet over. PCR cases have been held in
Pennsylvania, Kansas, Texas, California, Florida, Virginia, New
York, Colorado, Ohio, and Oregon.167 Overall, as of October,
1991, PCR-based DQcu typing methods were used in biological evi-
dence analysis in over 250 cases.16 PCR has also been admitted in
Italy.169 The evidence has been excluded in only a few cases. 70
However, the skirmishes are not likely to be over permanently until
more appellate level or higher courts have heard PCR cases.
Controversy has long surrounded the admissibility of scientific
techniques, especially in the criminal trial setting. Since the 1923
decision in United States v. Frye,17' new scientific evidence has been
scrutinized by various legal tests throughout the different jurisdic-
tions within the United States.
167. Forensic Science Associates, PCR DNA COURT CASES, HLA DQcc FORENSIC
DNA AMPLIFICATION AND TYPING INFORMATIONAL HANDOUT (3/29/91). In one of the
latest cases, People v. Groves, No. 90CA1049, 1992 Colo. App. LEXIS 369 (Colo. Ct. App.
October 8, 1992), the court ruled that the erroneous inclusion of PCR test results related
solely to transactional evidence was harmless error even though the trial court did not con-
duct a preliminary Frye test on the PCR evidence.
168. Edward Blake et al., Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) Amplification and Human
Leukocyte Antigen (HLA)-DQcx Oligonucleotide Typing on Biological Evidence Samples:
Casework Experience, 37 J. FORENSIC ScI. 700 (1992).
169. See Bruno Dallapiccola et al., PCR DNA Typing for Forensics, 354 NATURE 179
(1991). A subsequent paper challenged the methods used in the PCR tests admitted in the
case referred to in the Dallapiccola paper. Angelo Fiori & Vincenzo L. Pascali, Forensic Use
of PCR in Italy, 356 NATURE 471 (1992).
170. People v. Martinez, No. C 82183 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. 1989); and People v.
Mack, No. 861116 (Sacramento Super. Ct. 1990).
171. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.1 72
As with many other scientific methods, there has been a long
history of attacks on the scientific analysis of blood and other body
fluids. As recently as 1988, there were court challenges to the relia-
bility of ABO typing of blood and other stain evidence. 173
In the case of DNA analyses, most of the arguments go back to
the traditional claim that forensic evidence is different from clinical
samples obtained in the "pristine" medical setting. These same ar-
guments occurred in the 1970s-1980s regarding electrophoretic typ-
ing of proteins such as PGM in bloodstains and other bodily fluid
evidence.174 It was not until the relatively recent case of People v.
Reilly,175 that the electrophoresis debate was settled for good in
California.
The DNA debate is still very active, as evidenced by the ap-
proximately twenty appellate and state supreme court decisions dis-
cussing the admissibility of DNA typing."16
172. Id. at 1014.
173. C. Holden, Science in Court, 243 ScI. 1658 (1987); and W.F. Rylaarasdam, Farewell
to Hired Guns, Judges Should Pick Their Own Experts to Testify on Technical Issues, S.F.
DAILY J., August 26, 1992, at 4. See also, Sheila Jasanoff, Science on the Witness Stand,
IssuEs Sc. TECHN., Fall 1989, at 80.
174. David D. Dixon, The Admissibility of Electrophoretic Methods of Genetic Marker
Bloodstain Typing Under the Frye Standard, 11 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 773 (1986); R.E.
GAENSSLEN, SOURCEBOOK IN FORENSIC SEROLOGY, IMMUNOLOGY, AND BIOCHEMISTRY
(1983); R.E. GAENSSLEN (ED.), SOURCEBOOK IN FORENSIC SEROLOGY, IMMUNOLOGY, AND
BIOCHEMISTRY UNIT IX: TRANSLATIONS OF SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS THE ORIGINAL
LITERATURE OF MEDICOLEGAL EXAMINATIONS OF BLOOD AND BODY FLUIDS (1983); Jo-
seph R. Melvin et al., Paternity Testing, in 2 FORENSIC SCIENCE HANDBOOK 273 (Richard
Saferstein ed., 1988); F. Samuel Baechtel, The Identification and Individualization of Semen
Stains, in 2 FORENSIC SCIENCE HANDBOOK 348 (Richard Saferstein ed., 1988); Henry C.
Lee, Identification and Grouping of Bloodstains, in FORENSIC SCIENCE HANDBOOK 267
(Richard Saferstein ed., 1988); and Sensabaugh, supra note 114.
175. 242 Cal. Rptr. 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
176. George W. Clarke, supra note 76, at 5,7. For a sample of a Kelly-Frye motion in
opposition to the introduction of RFLP evidence, see Walter F. Krstulja, Sample Kelly-Frye
Motion Opposing the Introduction of DNA (RFLP) Evidence, 5 CAL. DEFENDER, No. 1, 1992,
at 40.
[Vo. 9
POL YMERSE CHAIN RE CTION
A. California's Kelly-Frye Test
In assessing whether scientific evidence should be admitted,
California uses the test set forth in People v. Kelly,177 a case which
expands the basic legal prerequisites for admissibility previously es-
tablished by Frye.
[The] admissibility of expert testimony based upon the applica-
tion of a new scientific technique traditionally involves a two-step
process: (1) the reliability of the method must be established, usu-
ally by expert testimony, and (2) the witness furnishing such tes-
timony must be properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion
on the subject. Additionally, the proponent of the evidence must
demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were done in the
particular case. 178
The function of the Kelly-Frye rule is to safeguard against the
presentation of either unfounded or prematurely developed scien-
tific methods, or unfounded evidence to juries.17 9 The reasoning is
that "[l]ay jurors tend to give considerable weight to 'scientific' evi-
dence when presented by 'experts' with impressive credentials."180
Kelly-Frye hearings are preliminary hearings in which the
judge determines whether or not to permit particular scientific evi-
dence to be presented to the jury during trial. In a typical Kelly-
Frye hearing, both the proponent and the opponent of the scientific
technique bring in a parade of scientific experts and present their
best arguments for or against the admissibility of the particular sci-
entific evidence involved. Thus, the proponent's witnesses will tes-
tify to the usefulness, reliability and overwhelming acceptance of
the technology within the appropriate scientific community, while
the opponent's witnesses will testify to its absolute worthlessness.
It is important to remember that the issue to be decided in a
Kelly-Frye hearing is the admissibility, not the weight of the evi-
dence.1" In California, the decisions in People v. Smith 182 and Peo-
ple v. Farmer'183 have more clearly defined the narrow scope of the
legal admissibility inquiry. As stated in Smith, "the Frye test dic-
tates that criticism of the specific methodology employed goes to the
177. 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
178. Id. at 1244 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original); See also, People v. Shirley, 641
P.2d 775, 795 (Cal. 1982); and People v. Brown, 709 P.2d 440, 447-448 (Cal. 1985).
179. People's Points and Authorities Defining the Parameters of the Kelly-Frye Hearing
at 2, People v. Lewis, No. C-27037 (San Mateo Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1991).
180. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1245 (1976).
181. People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
182. 263 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
183. 765 P.2d 940 (Cal. 1989).
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credibility of the testimony, not admissibility."'84
As there is no requirement that the court must understand the
technology in question, the judge's role in Kelly-Frye is relatively
limited. In a case involving hypnosis, the California Supreme Court
stated, "our duty is not to decide whether hypnotically induced re-
call of witnesses is reliable as a matter of 'scientific fact,' but simply
whether it is generally accepted as such by the relevant scientific
community."' 85 Nonetheless, because most people probably prefer
to know what is going on around them, it would be advisable to
present the evidence in such a way that the judge is able to grasp the
concepts and understand the technology and vocabulary, at least on
a rudimentary level.
Also importantly, there is no requirement for absolute unanim-
ity of views within the scientific community prior to the determina-
tion that a new scientific method is reliable.
The Frye test does not demand the impossible-proof of an abso-
lute unanimity of views in the scientific community before a new
technique will be deemed reliable; any such unanimity would be
highly unusual,.... Rather, the test is met if the use of the
technique is supported by a clear majority of the members of that
community. 1
86
Kelly/Frye does not demand judicial absorption of all the rele-
vant literature, nor does it require a decision once and for all
whether a particular kind of scientific evidence is reliable. The
court need only conduct a 'fair overview' of the subject, sufficient
to disclose whether 'scientists significant either in number or ex-
pertise publicly oppose [a technique] as unreliable' [citation]. 187
Quite simply, the only determination to be made during a
Kelly-Frye hearing is whether or not the scientific technology is gen-
erally regarded as reliable within the relevant scientific community.
This itself has fueled some debate concerning the scope of the rele-
vant scientific community and the degree of acceptance which can
be considered "general." In terms of the "relevant scientific com-
munity," it appears that most courts are willing to adopt a broad
view with regard to PCR testing. 188
184. Smith, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 682-83 n.4 (citing State v. Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618 (S.D.
1988))(emphasis in original).
185. People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d 775, 797 (Cal. 1982).
186. People v. Reilly, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)(quoting People v.
Guerra, 690 P.2d 635, 656 (Cal. 1984))(emphasis added).
187. Reilly, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 509 (quoting People v. Brown, 709 P.2d 440, 450 (Cal.
1985)).
188. The judges in some cases have indicated that the relevant scientific community is
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At the hearing, the proponent of the evidence has the burden
of bringing in suitable expert witnesses willing to testify to the ac-
ceptance of the technology in the scientific community. In order to
testify, the witness(es) must be properly qualified by the court as
expert(s) in the field. With the help of the attorney, the proponent's
expert witnesses must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the method is reliable and accepted within the scientific com-
munity. Thus, the proponent of the evidence has the burden of
making the necessary showing of compliance with Frye, (i.e., of
demonstrating by means of qualified and disinterested experts that
the new technique is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant
scientific community). 189
In addition to the reliability of the evidence and the, qualifica-
tion requirements for expert witnesses, there is a "correct proce-
dure" prong in the Kelly-Frye standard.1 90 Thus, it must be
determined that the technique was performed reliably in the case at
issue, before the evidence may be presented to the trier of fact. 191 If
the test procedure was not reliably performed, then the evidence
should not be admitted. This requirement highlights the necessity
for the attorneys to be familiar with the lab and personnel who con-
ducted the DNA analysis.
In addition to correct laboratory procedures, attorneys must be
familiar with the statistical methods used to calculate the probabili-
ties that the person on trial is the one responsible for the crime.
This is largely due to the large amount of discussion regarding the
admissibility status of statistical evidence.
For example, in People v. Collins, 92 the prosecution's use of
statistical approximation was criticized on two levels: (1) the prose-
cution failed to introduce proof of the probability of individual
events; and (2) the prosecution failed to present any proof of the
mutual independence of those individual frequencies. However,
this decision does not stand for the proposition that in the face of
not limited to forensics, but encompasses the entire scientific community which uses PCR.
People v. Moffett, No. 103094 (San Diego County Super. Ct. May, 1991); People v.
Quintanilla, No. C-23691 (San Mateo County Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1991). However, there
have been other Kelly-Frye hearings in which the PCR evidence was excluded as not being
accepted in the relevant scientific community. People v. Mack, No. 86116 (Sacramento
Super. Ct. Sept. 1990).
189. Shirley, 641 P.2d at 796. See also, Brown, 709 P.2d at 447-448, and Kelly, 549 P.2d
at 1244.
190. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244.
191. Reilly, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14; People v. Dellinger, 209 Cal. Rptr. 503, 509-10
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
192. 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
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disagreement regarding the quality of proof on either of these
points, a trial judge has the authority to preclude their presentation
to the jury.
In People v. Yorba,'93 the court followed well established Cali-
fornia precedent in finding that statistical estimations based on bio-
logical evidence is a weight and not an admissibility issue,
particularly when the estimations are based on the application of
long-standing scientific principles.' 94 It would certainly seem that
the Mendelian inheritance exhibited by HLA DQct would fall into
the category of "long-standing scientific principle." Even test pro-
cedures which have the potential for statistical estimation, but
which yield only equivocal results, have been deemed admissible.195
The simple fact that a defendant is not excluded by test results has
been found relevant for the jury to learn.196 Thus, the population
genetics and frequencies associated with PCR and RFLP should go
to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
Nonetheless, many commentators have argued that DNA evi-
dence should be regarded as unreliable unless and until detailed evi-
dence on population structures is available.' 97  However,
probabilities have been used for many years. Thus, there is no rea-
son to summarily disregard them simply because they are applied to
DNA analyses. A "statement of a probability is, by its nature, a
statement of partial knowledge, so it is paradoxical to imply that in
principle we cannot calculate the probability of an event without
further empirical knowledge."' 98 Much is already known about the
population substructures for various loci, including DQcC. Also,
when is enough, enough? When would the opponents to the use of
DNA in court cases be satisfied that the population studies were
sufficient and the statistical methods appropriate? 99
193. 257 Cal. Rptr. 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
194. Id. at 645-646.
195. In People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1991), two cigarette butts found at a crime
scene were analyzed in an attempt to determine whether the defendant might have smoked
them.
This endeavor would have been much easier if PCR had been used to analyze saliva on
the cigarette butts. M.N. Hochmeister et al., PCR-Based Typing of DNA Extracted From
Cigarette Butts, 104 INT'L J. L. MED. 229 (1991).
196. Cooper, 809 P.2d at 888.
197. See, eg., R.C. Lewontin & D.L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing,
254 Sci. 1745 (1991).
198. John Brookfield, Law and Probabilities, 355 NATURE 207 (1992).
199. See D.A. Stoney, Reporting of Highly Individual Genetic Typing Results: A Practical
Approach, 37 J. FORENSIC Sci. 373 (1992) for a detailed discussion of the interpretation of
serologic typing data, population genetics, statistics, and the peculiarities of DNA testing in
the forensic arena.
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B. The Bar's Response to DNA Testing
It is somewhat surprising that defense associations are so ada-
mantly opposed to DNA tests when they can absolutely exclude a
person on trial from being the perpetrator of the crime.2"° A good
example is the first suspect arrested in the Quintanilla case, but ex-
onerated based on PCR typing.20 1 Of 250 PCR cases, 70% of the
PCR analyses were requested by the prosecution and 30% by the
defense.2 2 In 198 cases, 35% resulted in the exclusion of the sus-
pect and 65% in inclusion; the same percentage of inclusions was
obtained for cases done at the request of the prosecution as those
done at the request of the defense.20 3
The power of exclusion represents much of the benefit pro-
vided by PCR. If a suspect is excluded, that's it. If a suspect is
included, that's all it means. Other evidence will be needed in order
to conclusively establish that the person is indeed the true culprit.
The defense should consider the possibility that without DNA evi-
dence, an innocent person may be convicted.
The high rate of exclusions (including inconclusive results)
may be due to various factors, including the irrelevance of the evi-
dence to the crime, or, in sexual assault cases, the failure of the
rapist to ejaculate, or recent sexual activity of the victim.2°4 Until
additional systems are developed which will enhance the discrimi-
nation power of the tests, other testing methods and/or evidence
will be required in order to result in conviction. Because DNA test-
ing is so useful to the innocent defendant, one would think that
defense attorneys would be more circumspect in their evaluation of
the methods. Post-conviction reversals due to PCR test results have
been obtained in at least five cases.20 5 It is rather hypocritical to
oppose the admission of DNA tests when the prosecution is the pro-
ponent of the evidence, but vigorously work for its admission when
200. Edward T. Blake et al., Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) Amplification and
Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA)-DQa Oligonucleotide Typing on Biological Evidence Sam-
ples: Casework Experience, 37 J. FORENSIC Sc. 700 (1992). See also, Sherman, supra note 1.
201. See supra note 8.
202. Blake et al., supra note 200, at 721.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Telephone Interview with Edward Blake, Forensic Science Associates (Nov. 5
1992). These defendants include Gary Dotson (Illinois), Woodall (West Virginia), Joe Jones
(Kansas), Steve Linscott (the "dream slayer") (Illinois), and Cary Cotler (New York).
In the Woodall case, the defendant recently settled with West Virginia for $1 million, the
maximum sum which he could have received had there been a trial. This settlement was
apparently arranged by the state in order to avoid revealing the full extent of prosecutorial
misconduct which occurred during Mr. Woodall's trial. Id.
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the defense is the proponent." 6 Indeed, this appears to be the case
in an on-going attempt by Peter Neufeld, a prominent New York
attorney, to reverse the New York conviction of a man serving time
for rape.207 Mr. Neufeld has been against the admission of DNA
results.20 8 However, as it now appears that PCR will be able to
exonerate a client, he has become a proponent of the test.
To date, there have been no cases in which an innocent defend-
ant has been convicted solely on the basis of DNA analysis. Such a
circumstance is likely to never occur. Indeed, in a recent Connecti-
cut case, the jury completely disregarded the exonerating DNA evi-
dence.209 "At times, testing fails to produce results, but it has never
created false positives."'2 10
One author argues that the rights involved in criminal trials
are so overwhelmingly important that such a new technology
should not be used.21' However, these arguments are greatly dimin-
ished by the fact that PCR is used in many life and death settings,
many of which involve no "suspect. ' '212 For example, PCR is used
in genetic counselling 21 3 and may contribute to the decision of a
couple to terminate a pregnancy should the fetus be severely de-
206. Judge Mudd noted that in different cases, both the prosecution and the defense have
opposed PCR. Reporter's transcript, at 1010, People v. Moffett, No. 103094 (San Diego
Super. Ct. 1991). Judge Mudd views this as indication that PCR is ready for the courtroom; it
isn't any different from any other evidence-"if it's for you, you're willing to support it; if it's
agin you, you're willing to challenge it." Id. at 1010. He found it an interesting and telling
factor that in a number of cases, the defense had found it necessary to support PCR. Id. at
1010-1011.
207. As relayed by Edward Blake, supra note 205. See also, Sherman, supra note 1.
208. See Peter J. Neufeld and Nelville Colman, When Science takes the Witness Stand,
ScI. AM. May, 1990, at 46.
209. In March 1990, a six-person jury ignored the exculpating DNA evidence analyzed
for the defense by the FBI laboratory and convicted Ricky Hammond of a 1987 kidnapping
and rape. See Connecticut's Doubtful Claim to Fame: DNA Results Rejected by Jury, Scd.
SLEUTHING NEWSL., Winter 1990, at 6; Jack Ewing, Connecticut Jury Disregards DNA Test,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 23, 1990, at 9.
In Moffett, Judge Mudd noted that, "I don't think trial lawyers give jurors enough credit
for being intelligent, because my personal experience with RFLP was that in jury question-
naires they were able to put that particular evidence in the context of the entire trial and give
it the weight to which they felt it to be entitled." Kelly/Frye Hearing Transcript at 1014,
People v. Moffett, CR-103094 (San Diego Super. Ct. 1991).
210. L. Koblinsky, Recovery and Stability of DNA in Samples of Forensic Science Signifi-
cance, 4 FORENSIC Sci REv. 67, 79 (1992).
211. See Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 495.
212. The fact that life and death decisions are being made daily based on PCR made
such a significant impression on Judge Mudd, that he commented on Judge Tochterman's
finding that in criminal law, the standard must go beyond that acceptable in the medical,
scientific and research communities. Reporter's Transcript at 1007, People v. Moffett, No.
103094 (San Diego Super. Ct. 1991).
213. This also includes determining the sex of a fetus. Michal Witt & Robert P. Erick-
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formed or genetically "defective." The couple is able to make the
tough, yet informed decision concerning whether to terminate the
pregnancy or be prepared for a child with special requirements and
needs should they choose to continue the pregnancy. The use of
PCR in the genetic assessment of fetuses is most certainly of life and
death importance and magnitude.
The use of PCR in genetic counselling may impact the choice
of prospective parents to even conceive.21a If they know that they
are extremely likely to have an infant with serious mental and/or
physical impairments, a couple may be more likely to adopt a
healthy child rather than take the risk of having their own.
With the overwhelming acceptance of PCR in a wide variety of
scientific disciplines and its increasing court acceptance, admissibil-
ity should soon be an issue of the past. The fight can then be shifted
to the weight of the evidence, as it is with most other types of physi-
cal evidence presented at trial. Whether the laboratory is reputable,
conducts "good" science, and follows established protocols will be-
come the primary focus. If the laboratories conducting the tests
meet the strictest of controls, then the evidence should be allowed
to speak for itself in either implicating or exonerating the involved
person. Expert witnesses should help, rather than hinder the court
in understanding the technologies and their limitations.
C. Expert Witnesses
In view of its widespread use and overwhelming adoption by a
great number of scientists working in numerous disciplines world-
wide, it is very difficult to imagine that a molecular biologist with
any practical experience would agree to testify that PCR is unrelia-
ble and not useful in the appropriate scientific community.215 Per-
haps the availability of generous expert witness fees and the
perceived ego-boost associated with legal recognition as an "expert"
has led some scientists, traditionally short of funding for their re-
search projects to make statements in court which are not only mis-
leading, but are actually false.
Great care must be used in the selection of expert witnesses.
son, A Rapid Method for Detection of Y-Chromosomal DNA From Dried Blood Specimens by
the Polymerase Chain Reaction, 82 HuM. GENETICS 271 (1989).
214. See Scott C. Kogan et al., An Improved Method for Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic
Diseases By Analysis of Amplified DNA Sequences, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 985 (1987).
215. It is even included as an important part of the most recent genetics textbooks such
as SINGER & BERG, supra note 9, at 420-25.
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One author suggests that qualified experts should exhibit the
following:
(1) undergraduate and graduate degrees in the relevant field of
expertise, (2) specialized training in the subject area as it relates
to forensics, (3) some training in forensics, (4) those professional
licenses or certifications universally required by recognized pro-
fessional groups in the expert's discipline, (5) evidence of experi-
mentation, teaching, publication within the specialty area, or
some combination of these, (6) prior disciplinary evidence that is
direct and relevant to the issues or issues being considered. Also
desirable would be (1) postgraduate (or postdoctoral) training,
(2) publications which appear in (reviewed) sceintific journals,
(3) the development of scientifically acceptable tests or proce-
dures, (4) association with, and leadership in, appropriate scien-
tific societies, and (5) experiences as an expert witness. 216
Not only must expert witnesses in DNA trials be well-in-
formed and current on the most up-to-date technologies, they
should also have practical experience in the methods used to ana-
lyze DNA. Those "experts" whose only experience has been gained
tangentially or solely through the literature should be viewed with
great skepticism.
The Court in People v. Brown,21 7 included an additional ca-
veat-that the witness "must also be 'impartial,' that is, not so per-
sonally invested in establishing the acceptance of the technique that
he might not be objective about disagreements within the relevant
scientific community. '218  Common warning signs that an expert
witness is biased include, that he/she (1) is exclusively or almost
exclusively, a witness for one side (prosecution or defense), (2)
makes statements that he/she "could not be wrong," (3) does not
describe the evaluation procedures used in his/her laboratory
("they are classified" or "too complex to understand"), (4) does not
bring data, materials or the relevant examination results to the
courtroom, and/or (5) makes unwarranted (oftentimes vague) per-
sonal attacks on opposing witnesses.21
Financial ties and potential biases of any expert witnesses
should be disclosed in the trial before the jury, not at the admissibil-
ity preliminary hearing stage. The court in New Jersey v. Wil-
216. H. Hollien, Expert Witness: Ethics and Responsibilities, 35 J. FORENSIC SCi. 1414,
1417 (1990).
217. People v. Brown, 709 P.2d 440 (Cal. 1985).
218. Id. at 448.
219. Hollien, supra note 216, at 1416.
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liams22° stated that, "evidence of the financial rewards that a
witness or a corporation with whom he is associated will gain from
the use of the new scientific technique will surely be presented to the
jury which can determine what weight, if any, to give to the testi-
mony of each expert." '221 As the State in the same case contended,
"simply because learned experts earn a living with their expertise
should not prohibit the admissibility of their opinions." '222 Imparti-
ality concerns have lead to many discussions regarding the testi-
mony of scientists who are very involved in the development and
use of new technology, usually within the industry setting. How-
ever, there are those within the academic research community who
could be viewed as biased one way or another regarding the technol-
ogy.223 Perhaps the ties of all experts should be disclosed to the
jury. It is possible that jurors would be shocked at the very gener-
ous fees collected by expert witnesses, some of whom seem to be on
the "circuit" so to speak, ready and willing to testify for a fee.
One product of the litigation involving DNA typing has been
the development of a "cottage industry" or "welfare state" of de-
fense experts (including some attorneys) who travel around the
country to testify against the admissibility of DNA testing. For
many of these experts, most of their yearly income is derived from
in-court testimony.224 Various authors have expressed concern
about the ethics or advocacy displayed by some experts. 225 Per-
haps, as some authors have suggested, the court should appoint and
pay for expert witnesses, as courts do in other countries.226
Regardless of their source of payment, it is possible that per-
sonal vendettas and a desire to continue a controversy long after it
has been resolved (quite possibly in order to continue collecting ex-
pert witness fees) will continue to greatly disserve the legal and sci-
entific communities and justice system. Instead of directly
addressing the issues in the case, the attorneys, judges and juries are
forced to witness the in-fighting and personality conflicts between
scientists who sometimes have egos as large as their counterparts in
220. No. 1991 WL 276327, at *7 (N.J. Super. L. Aug. 5, 1991).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Perhaps this is fostered by the highly competitive "publish or perish" mentality
within academia. It is undoubtedly a resume enhancer if a scientist can include testifying in
court regarding science.
224. Clarke, supra note 76, at 27-28.
225. See Hollien, supra note 216, at 1415 for a list of references which express this view.
226. Holden, supra note 173; and Rylaarsdam, supra note 173.
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the legal profession.2 27
Some scientists, by succumbing to the seductive aspects of tes-
tifying in court, have done much to discredit themselves in the eyes
of the scientific community at large. Many of these people are sim-
ply ill-informed. Although they may not intentionally misrepresent
the technology, many are unfamiliar with courtroom procedures,
cross-examination, and/or forensics and are made to look like fools
through their own testimony.228
Expert witnesses must be familiar with the techniques used in
the particular case in which they are testifying. Many principal re-
searchers within the academic community are professors who do
very little actual laboratory research; they are often forced to leave
the "bench work" to their post-doctoral fellows, graduate students,
undergraduates and technicians. The reality of the academic situa-
tion is that professors must devote time to acquiring and adminis-
tering grants, serving on school committees, advising graduate,
undergraduate and potential students, preparing and presenting pa-
pers at professional meetings and for publication, participating in
school events, as well as teach. It is easy to see why many academ-
ics simply do not have the time to conduct much hands-on research
themselves. However, it is only through the practical application of
these techniques that a scientist will become sufficiently familiar
with the methods to testify fairly and accurately.
One embarrassing example is the testimony of Dr. Mary-Claire
King, an expert witness who testified in the People v. Mack229 and
People v. Mello230 Kelly-Frye hearings regarding the AmpliTypef
DQct test kit. In the Mack hearing, Dr. King stated that she was
not aware of the results of the test kit blind trials conducted by the
California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors and that
these results had not been published.231 However, the results of the
first round were published in 1988. She also admitted that she was
in error when she stated in the Mello hearing that Alan Wilson de-
veloped PCR technology.2 32 Furthermore, she admitted that she
had not even read the protocol manual used in conjunction with the
227. See Reporter's Transcript, at 53-54, People v. Williams, No. 110047 (San Francisco
Super. Ct. 1983); People v. Brown, 709 P.2d 440 (Cal. 1985).
228. See, eg., Reporter's Transcript, at 2248-2252, People v. Mack, No. 86116 (Sac.
Super. Ct. 1990) [hereinafter, Mack Transcripts]. See also, Hollien, supra note 216 at 1416-
1417.
229. Mack Transcripts, supra note 228.
230. Reporter's Transcript at 3480, People v. Mello, No. 27819 (Riverside Super. Ct.
1989) [hereinafter Mello Transcripts].
231. Mack Transcripts, supra note 228, at 2244-2247.
232. Mello Transcripts, supra note 230, at 2248-2250.
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AmpliTypeE DQax test kit ("AmpliType( User Guide")2 33,
although she testified that she had used the kit. She also testified
that she learned about PCR from a paper on the extinct quagga;2 34
the "quagga paper" did not even involve the use of PCR. 35
This type of testimony is a shining example of why the aca-
demic community is not necessarily the best source for expert wit-
nesses, contrary to the admonitions of Thompson and Ford, two
commentators on the use of DNA testing who stated that "[t]o find
experts who are "disinterested and impartial," courts will need to
look to the academic community. 2 36 It would seem highly prob-
able that an expert in PCR and molecular biology would at least
know who originally developed PCR technology. An indignant
contingent of scientists very knowledgeable in PCR and molecular
biology were sufficiently outraged by the Mello admissibility hear-
ings to publish a response to the inaccurate interpretation of the
DQct evidence.237
Justification for the use of academicians as expert witnesses has
also included such statements as "[m]ost studies evaluating DNA
typing are published by employees of these companies, or university
researchers who have a financial relationship with these compa-
nies."23 However, with the literally thousands of articles on PCR
and DNA typing published in the scientific literature, this statement
is very difficult to defend.
It is also important for the legal community to realize that one
of the major goals of the scientific literature is to present materials,
methods and results of particular experiments and investigations,
especially in peer-reviewed journals.239 Scientific articles must be
published in a manner such that the experiments may be repeated
by others. Results from these repeated experiments are published
which either confirm or dispute the procedures and/or results of the
original experimenters. It is through this continual interaction be-
tween researchers, that scientific principles develop and gain
acceptance.
233. Id. at 2234-2236, 2281-2282.
234. Id. at 3480.
235. Higuchi et al., supra note 45.
236. DNA Typing, supra note 133, at 59. See also, Ricardo Fontg, supra note 29, at 530.
237. Henry A. Erlich et al., Reliability of the HLA-DQa PCR-based Oligonucleotide Typ-
ing System, 35 J. FORENSIC SCi. 1017 (1990).
238. DNA Typing, supra note 133, at 59.
239. Given the large number of comments and articles in the legal literature which con-
tain erroneous material regarding DNA testing and methods, perhaps the legal profession
should consider adopting a peer-review process for law reviews.
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It is very unlikely that there is a paper published in the scien-
tific literature which refutes the statements and results of the
Higuchi et al. paper,2' called into question by Thompson and
Ford241 because two of the authors, Higuchi and Erlich are Cetus
researchers. Also, not mentioned in the Thompson and Ford arti-
cle, the other two researchers involved, Celia von Beroldingen and
George Sensabaugh, were associated with the University of Califor-
nia, not Cetus. Regardless of their affiliation, just because a scien-
tist works for a particular company does not mean that he or she
will be unethical on the witness stand or in the scientific press. To
do so is professional suicide. Such persons are eventually discov-
ered and made to pay the price, a good example being the recent
investigations into Gallo's laboratories regarding the discovery of
HIV.242 Whether a scientist works in the biotechnology industry
or at an university, it does not necessarily mean that they leave their
ethics at home when they come to testify in court.
D. The Impact of People v. Castro243
Easily the most discussed DNA case, Castro has become the
signal case used by those opposed to the use of DNA evidence, as it
represents the first successful challenge to DNA typing evidence.
However, despite the outburst of criticism and dire predictions in
the legal and lay literature, Castro has not been repeated.
Although others may disagree, and although the case did not
even involve a "crime lab" per se, the fiasco of Castro has had both
positive and negative effects on forensic science. Notwithstanding
the outcry regarding the case, the impact of Castro in New York
courts appears to be minimal, as demonstrated by subsequent
cases. 244 In many respects, the entire Castro incident was really
nothing more than a tempest in a teapot.
What has been lost in the excitement generated by the case is the
fact that the opinion is merely the trial court's assessment of a
legal issue which the prosecution had rendered moot by conced-
ing in its brief that the evidence of a match in DNA patterns was
inadmissible. Mr. Castro later pled guilty, thus the soundness of
the trial court's legal opinion will never be reviewed on
240. Higuchi et al., supra note 126.
241. See DNA Typing, supra note 133, at 59.
242. Malcolm Gladwell, At NIH, An Unprecedented Ethics Investigation: New Questions
Involving Scientist Robert Gallo and Discovery of HIV Being Probed, WASH. POST, Aug. 17,
1990, at A8.
243. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
244. See, eg., People v. Shi Fu Huang, N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1989).
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appeal. 2 4
5
On the positive side, Castro put the laboratories conducting
DNA testing on notice that the judicial system is not willing to ac-
cept evidence based on sloppy and questionable test methods.
While the Castro court declined to state that evidence gained
through proper procedures would be inadmissible, it did exclude the
evidence in this case because Lifecodes, the lab hired to conduct the
DNA (RFLP) tests, did not even follow its own guidelines.24  Cas-
tro also points out some areas in which attorneys can deal with this
type of data and possibly find sources of error.247
On the negative side, Castro provided much fodder for the
opponents of DNA testing who sensationalize the issues and claim
to consider DNA testing as either unreliable, unverifiable, too inva-
sive of privacy and/or simply too difficult and complex to
understand.248
One bit of science that the Castro court seized upon was the
"mixing" experiment. While in its judicial activism mode, the court
made several suggestions to the scientific community regarding cer-
tain procedures, one of which was the mixing experiment proposed
by Lander, a prominent population geneticist. Lander insisted that
if one mixed a known sample with an unknown sample which was
thought to be from the same source prior to performing RFLP, then
if the bands moved to the same place on the gel, they could be from
the same source.249 While this type of solution to bandshifting in
RFLP may be appropriate for paternity cases, it has been shown to
be unworkable in forensic cases.250 Unfortunately, the Castro court
gave great weight to this advice.
Other aspects deserving of mention include: (1) all of the evi-
dence was consumed in the testing; (2) the trial court ruled that the
forensic DNA identification test met the Frye standard; (3) the
court ruled that population frequency data should be related to the
245. Rockne Harmon, DNA Fingerprinting Critics Titillate Rather Than Inform, L.A.
DAILY J., March 14, 1990, at 6.
246. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
247. Roger Parloff, How Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld Tripped Up the DNA Experts,
AM. L., Dec. 1989, at 50.
248. See Petrovich, supra note 133; Pearsall, supra note 133; Lander, supra note 112;
Hoeffel, supra note 1. These are but a few of the multitude of review articles covering Castro
and the problems encountered.
249. Lander, supra note 112.
250. McNally et al., Increased Migration Rate Observed in DNA From Evidentiary Mate-
rial Precludes the Use of Sample Mixing to Resolve Forensic Cases of Identity, 1 APPLIED
THEORETICAL ELECTROPHORESIS 267 (1990), discussed in Amicus Curiae's Brief at 29, Peo-
ple v. Barney, No. A048789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1991).
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weight of the evidence, not the admissibility; (4) the court rendered
an opinion in spite of the prosecution's concession that the match
between the samples was unreliable and therefore inadmissible; (5)
the results conceded by the prosecution to have been unreliable and
deemed by the court to have been deficient were later demonstrated
to have given the correct result; when Mr. Castro later pled guilty,
he admitted that the blood on his watch spattered there when he
stabbed the victim; (6) private labs such as Cellmark and Lifecodes
are not crime labs per se, and their analysts are molecular biologists
who generally have no appreciation for the characteristics of foren-
sic samples, nor the considerations involved in testing them; and (7)
because there was a guilty plea, the legal soundness of the trial
court's decision will never be examined on appeal. One develop-
ment, due largely to the debacle of Castro, has been the call for state
and/or federal regulations pertaining to the use of DNA evidence.
PROPOSED REGULATIONS
A. History
In the forensic science world, regulations have long been con-
troversial. Unlike clinical laboratories,251 crime laboratories are not
subject to regulation.252 Many criminalists have long felt that there
is no need for outside regulation because, in contrast to the clinical
setting, crime laboratories are subject to rigorous review by courts
and juries.2"3 While this is true, there has been much concern
voiced in the legal and forensic literature regarding the need for
regulation through some other mechanism.254
A recent report by the Committee on DNA Technology in Fo-
rensic Science, as approved by the National Research Council
251. Clinical laboratories are subject to various regulatory programs and agencies, in-
cluding the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services and the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals and
Health Care Organizations (JCAHO). The most recent major legislation concerning clinical
laboratories was the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), Pub.
L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2901 (1988) which addresses the need for uniform federal profi-
ciency testing standards. See also, 55 Fed. Reg. 20,896 (1990); 42 C.F.R. Parts 405, 416, 440,
482, 483, 488 and 493.
252. The exception to this is blood alcohol analysis, which in California is administered
by the Department of Health Services under Cal. Admin. Code Title 17.
253. Interview with Gordon Deeg, Senior Criminalist, San Mateo Police Department, in
San Mateo, CA (Oct. 5 1992).
254. David Helvarg, Crime Labs Under the Microscope, CAL. L., Dec. 1991, at 43; Simon
J. Young, DNA Evidence-Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 1991 CRIM. L.R., 264. See also,
Mark Thompson, DNA's Troubled Debut, CAL. L., June 1988, at 36.
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(NRC),255 and the FBI's Response to that Report stress the neces-
sity for national standards.256 The call for standards is primarily
related to a desire to instill public confidence in the accuracy and
reliability of DNA test results.257 Contrary to the disinformation
published in the lay press upon the release of the Report by the
Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science,2 58 the Com-
mittee did not conclude that "courts should cease to admit DNA
evidence until laboratory standards have been tightened and the
technique has been established on a stronger scientific basis."1
259
The Committee does however emphasize the need for a high level of
quality control in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data.
It also recommends standardization of laboratory, procedures, and
establishment of a mandatory accreditation program.26' While
most of the concern is related to proficiency testing for RFLP meth-
ods, PCR is also included.
While there are problems associated with allowing the court
system to determine the quality of DNA testing, there is no need for
courts to stop admitting evidence obtained through properly con-
ducted and analyzed DNA test procedures. Concerns regarding the
courts' ability to determine the quality of DNA testing include the
fact that courts only see a fraction of a forensic scientist's analy-
ses.261 Also, if the charges are dropped against a suspect, the court
will never see the evidence, regardless of the analytical result. As
they do not have the expertise, resources or mechanisms to control
or supervise scientific quality control programs, courts should not
be expected to do so. Although the court is not the ideal forum for
ensuring quality science, the adversary process is a means by which
those who practice "bad" science may be discredited, while those
who practice "good" science may enjoy the credibility they deserve.
255. COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, DNA TECHNOLOGY
IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992) [hereinafter DNA TECHNOLOGY].
256. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RE-
SPONSE TO THE REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCI-
ENCE (1992) [hereinafter FBI RESPONSE].
257. John W. Hicks, Message From the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Labora-
tory, 19 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 41, 41 (1992).
258. Gina Kolata, U.S. Panel Seeking Restriction on Use of DNA in Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 1992, at Al, Al.
259. Id.
260. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 255, at 97-110; Victor A. McKusick, Opening
Statement, April 14, 1992 (unpublished).
261. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.
L. TECH. 109, 166-172 (1991), for a discussion of the courts and the quality of forensic
science.
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Quality control/quality assurance 262 is the responsibility of
those working in the laboratories. As with all professions, there are
no doubt individuals within forensics who do not act responsibly
nor even ethically. However, there are also many individuals within
the field who take professional pride in their work, act responsibly,
and treat their duty to the court with respect and honesty.
It is unfortunate that both the lay and legal literature on crime
labs has stressed the problems in such a way that it would appear
that every lab within the U.S. is inept and incompetent.263 This
may be at least partially fostered by the fact that while many
criminalists are scientists who work in the law enforcement setting,
some technicians working in crime labs have law enforcement back-
grounds, but no science education.216 This is an area of concern, as
sometimes unqualified individuals attempt to undertake responsibil-
ity that is beyond their capabilities. However, just because a techni-
cian is involved in a case does not mean that their work is shoddy.
Technicians perform tasks according to strict protocols and their
work is overseen by a supervisor. They have no authority to make
procedural changes nor the latitude to exercise judgment. In con-
trast, the forensic scientist or analyst is foremost a scientist who
conducts the preliminary assessments of evidence as it is received,
identifies the legal and/or investigative questions which must be an-
swered in the case, and develops the analytical strategies to answer
those questions.265 The analyst either assigns the project to some-
one or conducts the analysis himself/herself, and then must inter-
pret the results. If there are any discrepancies or questions
regarding the test accuracy, the approach is to re-analyze the
evidence.
The ultimate results must then be explained in an impartial,
non-technical way to law enforcement personnel, attorneys, judges
262. Or, as it is now often termed, "continuous quality improvement."
263. Helvarg, supra note 254; George J. Annas, DNA Fingerprinting in the Twilight
Zone, HASTINGS CENTER REP., March/April 1990, at 35; Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note
261; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for the
Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a Cause ofForensic
Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19 (1991).
264. Helvarg, supra note 254, at 44.
265. George Sensabaugh, Genetic Typing of Biological Evidence, Comments for the
Cooper Amicus Brief, CAL. Assoc. CRIMINALISTS NEWSL., July 1987, at 11, 16.
As exemplified by the court in People v. Young, 381 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1986), some
courts and experts have a misguided belief that a higher degree (e.g., Ph.D.) is a prerequisite
for status as a scientist, or perhaps without a higher degree, one can't be anything more than
a technician. A scientist is a person who does science, regardless of the initials after their
name. The better assessment criteria are the responsibilities and expectations associated with
the person's position in employment and in the scientific community to which they belong.
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and juries. Thus, the forensic analyst bears a substantial burden of
responsibility for knowing what to do, how to do it and how to
explain it in terms understandable to the layperson. Regardless of
its importance, forensics training is often not readily available to
many experts.266 This is a great disservice to the legal system, as
the expertise of many scientists goes unappreciated and misunder-
stood by juries and judges.
B. Validation Studies, Standards and Proficiency Testing
As with any new technology, validation studies and proficiency
testing have been facets in the development of the AmpliType(
HLA DQct test kit. Concurrently, the growth of DNA analysis
stimulated much discussion and study into the regulation of labora-
tories conducting DNA testing. "Setting standards for forensic ap-
plications of DNA testing is the most controversial and unsettled
issue. Standards are necessary if high-quality DNA forensic analy-
sis is to be ensured, and the situation demands immediate atten-
tion. 267 In a recent case, People v. Schwartz,268 the Minnesota
Supreme Court denied the admissibility of DNA test results on the
grounds that the lab performing the test did not meet TWGDAM
Guidelines or provide proper discovery.2 69 TWGDAM is the FBI's
Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods which is
charged with examining quality assurance, population statistics and
databanking. TWGDAM held its first meeting in November 1988,
and its members include representatives from crime labs which are
implementing or close to implementing DNA analysis, and com-
mercial laboratories.270 It is somewhat ironic that at the time the
evidence was analyzed in Schwartz, there were no TWGDAM
guidelines available to follow.
Various professional organizations, such as the American Soci-
ety of Human Genetics, the California Association of Crime Labo-
ratory Directors (CACLD) and The Society for Forensic
Haemogenetics, have published official statements or position pa-
pers regarding DNA analysis. 271 The interest in establishing a na-
266. Hollien, supra note 216, at 1416-1417.
267. GENETIC WrrNEss, supra note 149, at 10.
268. 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
269. Id. at 427-428.
270. GENETIC WITNEss, supra note 149, at 13; TWGDAM, Guidelines for a Quality
Assurance Program for DNA Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Analysis, 16 CRIME
LABORATORY DIG. 40 (1989).
271. Ad Hoe Committee on Individual Identification by DNA Analysis, The American
Society of Human Genetics, Individual Identification by DNA Analysis: Points to Consider, 46
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tionwide DNA database will help foster standardization and
conformity; consistency is required if an efficient and useful com-
puterized system is to be established.272 Setting the necessary stan-
dards will require much thought and research.
As must be done with all new test systems, extensive validation
studies have already been conducted on PCR. These studies have
shown that DQct typing can be accomplished without producing
false positive or false negative results.27a
C. AmpliType(' Kit Development
Validation and proficiency testing have been important aspects
of the AmpliTypeD kit since its inception. In 1986, the FBI ap-
proached Cetus about PCR-based forensic DNA typing. In 1989, a
prototype DQca typing system was sent to the FBI and beta testing
of the Cetus AmpliType0 kit began. From 1989-1990, over 3,000
samples were analyzed by the FBI, including fresh samples, dried
stains, and samples for population studies. Research on the effects
of sample exposure to light, chemical and biological agents was also
performed. The AmpliType kit did not become available for sale
in the U.S. until February, 1990. In March, 1990, it became avail-
able in Europe, Australia and Asia. From late 1990 to May 1991,
the FBI analyzed over 750 casework samples.274
There are also other mechanisms for proficiency testing in
place.27 For example, CACLD conducted two rounds of blind
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 631 (1990); California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors,
Position on DNA Typing of Forensic Samples, CAL. ASSOC. CRIMINALISTS NEWSL., April
1988, at 4; AABB Parentage Committee: Proposed Standards for Tests Involving DNA
Polymorphisms-November 1987, reprinted in CAL. ASSOC. CRIMINALISTS NEWSL., April
1988, at 5; Statement of the Society for Forensic Haemogenetics Concerning DNA Polymorph-
isms, reprinted in CAL. ASSOC. CRIMINALISTS NEWSL., April 1988, at 5. On Mar. 30, 1990,
a resolution was adopted by the CACLD membership to endorse the TWGDAM guidelines
for DNA analysis and support establishment of a national forensic data base system based on
the FBI's RFLP analysis.
272. Stanley D. Rose & Tim P. Keith, Standardization of Systems: Essential or Desira-
ble?, BANBURY REP 32: DNA TECH AND FORENSIC Sci. 319, 319 (1989); and Henry C. Lee
& Robert E. Gaensslen, The Need for Standardization of DNA Analysis Methods, BANBURY
REP 32: DNA TECH AND FORENSIC Sci. 217 (1989).
273. Catherine T. Comey et al., Validation Studies on the Analysis of the HLA DQca
Locus Using the Polymerase Chain Reaction, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1633 (1991).
274. Sharon Reid, U.S. and International Use of the AmpliTypelD Kit, presented at a
PCR Workshop Presented by Cetus for the California Association of Criminalists (May 18,
1991).
275. Proficiency testing is currently offered through programs such as the Collaborative
Testing Service (CTS), in association with the Forensic Science Foundation (FSF). Participa-
tion in this program is voluntary and anonymous. It includes physiological fluids and sam-
ples for DNA testing. GENETIC WITNESS, supra note 149, at 79-80.
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proficiency tests with Cellmark, Lifecodes and Forensic Science As-
sociates/Cetus (FSA/Cetus).
D. California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors
(CA CLD) Tests
In the first round of 51 samples, Lifecodes obtained DNA re-
suits from 37 samples and made no errors. In its set of 50 samples,
Cellmark obtained DNA results from 44 samples and made 1 incor-
rect match. This was a human error which was subsequently reme-
died by purchasing a large capacity centrifuge, thereby reducing
sample manipulation. FSA/Cetus obtained results for all 50 of the
samples provided. There was one incorrect match reported. Again,
this was due to a human error (failure to introduce a sample into
the appropriate chamber or a bubble in the vacuum apparatus),
which was subsequently remedied by the routine testing of all sam-
ples in duplicate.276
In the second round of testing, all three laboratories received
50 samples. Lifecodes obtained results for 48 samples, while FSA/
Cetus obtained results for all 50 samples. Neither Lifecodes nor
FSA/Cetus reported any incorrect matches. Cellmark obtained re-
sults for 45 samples, reported that two samples gave inconclusive
results and made one incorrect match.277
The errors made in the blind trials were all human errors, not
errors that decreased the reliability of the procedure itself. In deter-
mining the admissibility of a technology, it is important to distin-
guish between the validity of the technology and the possibility that
human error may lead to an incorrect result in the application of
that technology. The statistical probabilities obtained with DNA
testing (e.g., RFLP) have nothing to do with the possibility of
human error in the performance of the test. While the possibility of
human error is unfortunate, it can never be totally eliminated.278
Apparently, unlike most people (including attorneys, who may
also be involved in a case involving life and death), criminalists are
subject to a requirement of 100% accuracy. Not only is this unfair
to the scientists who are conducting the work, it is impossible.
While some commentators decry the errors made in the crime lab as
276. If significantly different results are observed for these duplicate tests, the scientist is
on notice that there is a problem and the test should be repeated.
277. Report of CACLD Blind Trial #2, March 29, 1990.
278. Frederick R. Millar, Jr., DNA: Facts and Myths, CAL. L., July 1989 at 12 (letter to
the editor).
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unacceptable,279 it is important for those within the legal profession
to recognize that crime labs are not infallible. As with all profes-
sionals, including attorneys, forensic scientists should be held to a
reasonable standard of care.
The technology is ready and able to do what it was designed to
do; the potential for human error(s) must be recognized and fail-
safe protocols must be followed in order to avoid erroneous results.
Testing samples in duplicate, saving aliquots of samples for later
testing, careful labelling of samples and meticulous record-keeping
all help reduce the potential for human error. Thus, there are meth-
ods by which forensic scientists may reduce the possiblity of such
error. These factors should be taken into consideration when the
court addresses the weight, not the admissibility of the evidence.
Critics of proficiency programs argue that the results serve to
emphasize the need for tighter control, including mandatory regula-
tion through legislation.2 80 In a rather contentious debate, played
out in the editorial section of "California Lawyer," it was claimed
that in a recent hearing in Ventura, "the president of the California
Laboratory Directors and two other association members covered
up errors made by a commercial DNA laboratory in a "blind" test
of its accuracy."28' Another author, Mark Thompson also stated,
[For that matter, it turns out the proficiency test wasn't exactly
blind. One of the genetic fingerprinting labs, Cellmark Diagnos-
tics, initially turned in its result in a form that was "unintel-
ligible," admitted Margaret Quo head of the Orange County
Sheriff's Department crime lab, in recent testimony in a Ventura
County hearing. She contacted Celmark officials, met with them
to review the problems, and allowed them to submit cleaned up
conclusions three months later. That laundered report is what
was released as the results of a "blind" proficiency test.
282
In a response letter, CACLD DNA Committee members Jan
Bashinski, Linda Hartstrom and Margaret Kuo (not "Quo") stated:
[T]he CACLD DNA Committee conducted the blind trials fairly
and honestly. Neither the organization nor the individual com-
mittee members and the agencies they represent benefit finan-
cially or personally from administering the test irrespective of the
outcome. To suggest that we would jeopardize our reputation to
help cover up Cellmark's error is ridiculous.283
279. Jonakait, supra note 261.
280. GENETIC WITNESS, supra note 149, at 149.
281. William C. Thompson, Letter to the Editor, CAL. L., July 1989, at 16.
282. Mark Thompson, Letter to the Editor, CAL. L., July 1989, at 16.
283. Jan Bashinski et al., More on DNA, CAL. L., Sept. 1989, at 17.
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Mr. William Thompson's statement that there was a cover up
regarding the CACLD DNA proficiency study is completely false.
The hearing he refers to was in People v. Axell,284 at which, on May
8, 1989, Margaret Kuo testified regarding the CACLD study.
In a responsive "Letter to the Editor," Carol J. Nelson, the
prosecutor in People v. Axell,28 5 stated that claims made in Dr.
Thompson's letter were "patently untrue." She suggests reading
the transcripts of the Kelly-Frye hearing to determine the amount of
weight Ms. Kuo's and Mr. Thompson's testimony on both direct
and cross-examination should be given. For example, "he is cur-
rently earning a significant percentage of his income attacking
DNA identification in courts throughout the country. As such, he
is hardly an unbiased observer of what is happening in the court-
room or in the field of DNA identification." '286
This whole sequence of letter exchanges has another layer of
involvement. The letter from Mr. William Thompson was printed
despite an appeal to the editor by the author to remove the inaccu-
rate reference to a cover-up. Also, the editor was initially unwilling
to publish Ms. Nelson's response letter. This led the CACLD DNA
Committee to consult an attorney and send a response letter. The
editor printed a portion of the letter, not including a reference to the
request Dr. Thompson made to alter his original letter to the editor.
Thus, in addition to the expert witnesses who travel around the
country and testify against DNA testing admissibility in court, the
legal press is also distorting the facts regarding cases and testimony.
As of mid-February 1990, DNA typing evidence has prevailed in
virtually every legal skirmish. In spite of this overwhelming suc-
cess, media portrayals, such as a January New York Times arti-
cle, "Some Scientists Doubt the Value of Genetic Fingerprint
Evidence," continue in their attempts to polarize and sensation-
alize the issues, often taking quotations out of context. If DNA's
legal successes were covered as thoroughly as its few setbacks,
the readership would be bored to tears .... Opponents of the
technology point to their few limited successes, ignoring the real-
ity of the entire legal experience to date.287
For the benefit of all who have read the various opinions, the
facts were that the blind aspect of the testing was never compro-
mised, there never was a "cover-up," nor has Margaret Kuo given
284. Ventura Sup. Ct. CR-23911, May, 1989.
285. Carol J. Nelson, Letter to the Editor, CAL. L., Sept. 1989, at 17-18.
286. Id.
287. Rockne Harmon, supra note 245, at 6.
19931
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYL4W JOURNAL
any testimony to support this claim.288
E. Federal Legislation
There have been two bills introduced into Congress which deal
with DNA testing. The first bill, H.R. 3371, known as the "DNA
Identification Act of 1991" (Edwards bill) was introduced by Rep-
resentative Don Edwards in 1991 and incorporated into the 1991
Crime Control Act passed by the House of Representatives. 28 9 This
bill was drafted in consultation with the FBI and the forensic com-
munity; the FBI has registered its support of the bill.290 The bill
would authorize a DNA advisory board with the responsibility of
recommending standards for quality assurance and proficiency test-
ing to the FBI Director, who after consideration, would issue stan-
dards to serve as the basis for proficiency testing programs
administered by laboratory testing organizations. 91
The other bill, H.R. 339, known as the "DNA Proficiency
Testing Act of 1991" (Horton Bill), was introduced by Representa-
tive Frank Horton in January, 1991. This bill requires that states
desiring to acquire equipment through federal funds, agree that
their labs will meet standard guidelines and participate in profi-
ciency testing at least every six months.292 This bill proposes that
the FBI publish DNA testing standards based on TWGDAM
guidelines and that the FBI certify forensic DNA laboratory profi-
ciency testing programs. The bill also provides that the DNA
database program under development by the FBI in conjunction
with state and local forensic laboratories be tied to the requirements
of the Act.293 The FBI does not support the Horton Bill and op-
poses a direct regulatory role for itself.294 Thus, it remains to be
determined who will regulate forensic labs who conduct DNA tests.
288. For accounts of the blind trials, see Statement of the DN,4 Committee Regarding the
Cellmark Blind Trial Report, DNA COMMITrEE REPORT (1989).
289. DNA Identification Act of 1991 (H.R. 3371) Title X, Omnibus Crime Control Act
of 1991, §§ 1002, 1003, 1004.
290. The FBI's Responses to Recommendations by the NRC'S Committee on DNA Tech.
nology in Forensic Science, 19 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 55-56 (1992) [hereinafter The FBI's
Response].
291. Id.
292. H.R. 339 (1991).
293. This program, designated CODIS (Combined DNA Index System) is the FBI's na-
tional DNA identification system which is being designed to allow the storage and exchange
of DNA records submitted by state and local forensic DNA laboratories. FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES FOR DNA
DATABASES (1991).
294. The FBI's Response, supra note 290, at 56.
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If not the U.S. Department of Health Services, it is likely that the
responsibility will fall on the states.
F. State Regulation
In addition to the federal government, states have-the authority
to regulate forensic DNA typing by both private labs and public
crime laboratories. At first blush, it would appear that the State
Department of Health Services (Health Services) would be the ap-
propriate regulatory branch to oversee forensic DNA labs, as this
department is responsible for clinical and public health labs.295
However, regardless of the source of the regulations, it is important
to remember that regulation in itself will not solve all of the
problems.
For example, the experience in California crime labs in the
context of blood alcohol regulation is very disturbing. The Depart-
ment of Health Services oversees blood alcohol testing in the state
and has set forth very exacting requirements for labs conducting
these tests.296 There are some very real problems in the relationship
between the state's labs and Health Services, which could make effi-
cient regulation of DNA labs very troublesome.297
In order to avoid the regulatory problems caused by Health
Services, the CACLD Professional Practices Committee prepared a
legislative proposal in 1989 which would have organized a Board of
Forensic Science Practices administered under the auspices of the
Department of Consumer Affairs.2 98 The Board of Forensic Sci-
ence Practice was not accepted by the Attorney General's Advisory
Board; the Attorney General declined to sponsor legislation to cre-
ate the bodies recommended by CACLD, and the Governor
dropped funding for all of the proposed regional DNA labs with the
exception of the Department of Justice lab in Berkeley. Thus, state
regulation, at least in California, is on questionable footing.
295. With the implementation of CLIA see supra note 251, public health and other de-
partments may not have the personnel nor funds to initiate involved regulatory programs for
forensic laboratories.
296. For example, there are a number of pages of complex regulations governing
breathalyzer tests within the CAL. REGS., tit. 17, §§ 1215-1222.2.
297. For example, while there is a mechanism for input to the Health Services Director
concerning regulations regarding forensic alcohol analysis provided for in CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 436.50 (West 1990)(amended 1992), and an "Advisory Committee" was
formed, this committee has not met since 1985. Also, although procedural changes must be
submitted to Health Services, it may take three years to gain approval. Telephone Interview
with Kathryn Holmes, Contra Costa Crime Laboratory (Jan. 10, 1992).
298. PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES COMMITTEE OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF
CRIME LABORATORY DIRECTORS, REPORT TO THE BOARD (1989).
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G. Self-Regulation
Self-regulation is another avenue by which the goals of regula-
tion may be achieved without the intervention of a regulatory
agency.2 99 The California Association of Criminalists has instituted
a voluntary written examination for Certificates of Professional
Competency in Criminalistics. The test and certification program
recognize the variety inherent in criminalistics and are designed to
demonstrate that the criminalist has a basic understanding of the
underlying concepts, principles and other aspects of the profes-
sion." While it is a completely voluntary program, it does repre-
sent a step toward responsible self-regulation of the criminalistics
profession at the local level.
Because of the diverse subject areas within forensics, a uni-
form, federal regulatory or proficiency testing program for all of
these areas would require a large commitment of manpower,
money, effort and time. For example, criminalists may be required
to gain expertise in such diverse areas as protein, organic and inor-
ganic chemistry, molecular biology, biology, firearms, arson, explo-
sives, fingerprint comparisons, photography, computers and other
electronic equipment, analysis of drugs, soil, fiber, glass, animal and
human hair, human and animal sperm, bloodstains, blood spatters,
paint, gunshot residue, alcohol, inks and handwriting, questioned
documents, and various other disciplines.
Again, the major considerations are economic. Who will pay
for all of this? Is the public willing to foot the bill for a system that
in most instances already works quite well? There is a fair
probability that the cost of regulating all of the subdisciplines
within crime labs would be too exorbitant, especially considering all
299. GENETIC WrNEss, supra note 149, at 73-75. Self-regulation is also described in
Jan S. Bashinski, Laboratory Standards: Accreditation, Training and Certification of Staff in
the Forensic Context, BANBURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCI. 159
(1989). The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD) is another profes-
sional forensic science organization which has established voluntary quality assurance pro-
grams through a nationwide crime lab accreditation program.
300. An Open Letter to the Association Membership, CAL. ASSOC. CRIMINALISTS
NEWSL., Jan. 1990, at 10.
The American Board of Criminalistics (ABC) will administer the first ABC General
Examination in 1993. ABC Diplomate certificates will be available for those who received
the California Association of Criminalists Certificate of Professional Competency in
Criminalistics. The ABC certificates will expire five years after their dates of issuance. For
Diplomate status, applicants must possess a minimum of an earned baccalaureate degree or
its equivalent in a natural science or an appropriately related field from an accredited institu-
tion. A minimum of two years full-time experience of active work in criminalistics is also
required. "Fellow" status has additional experience and testing requirements. American
Board of Criminalistics, Inc., Certification Process, Sept. 1992.
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of the effort that would be expended to oversee such a compara-
tively small number of laboratories. The cost-benefit ratio would
likely tilt toward non-regulation.
Regardless, the self-regulation route would require much coop-
eration between crime labs and law enforcement agencies nation-
wide, if a nationwide DNA database program is to be effective. In
some aspects, it also comes back to the legal profession. While the
prosecution often has no choice in the laboratory facility used, the
defense may utilize any laboratory it wishes. If an attorney uses a
laboratory with a questionable reputation, the work product will
also seem questionable. It is very prudent to know the strengths
and weaknesses of each lab available; the networks within the legal
community should make this type of information readily available.
With the importance of the issues involved in criminal trials, the
choice of crime laboratory (and, perhaps, analytical method) would
seem to warrant at least the same amount of consideration as one
puts into choosing a family physician.
H. Who Will Be Regulated, and By Whom
Regardless of the method, proficiency testing of DNA analysis
methods is on its way. It remains to be seen how standards will be
implemented. Another unknown is the identity of the agency re-
sponsible for implementing these standards. For example, will fed-
eral and/or state regulatory agencies (such as Health Services) have
roles to play? Hopefully, the regulations will be fair, meaningful,
reasonable and practical.
While it appears likely that forensics regulations will be mod-
elled after those for clinical laboratories, the rule-makers must re-
member that crime labs and clinical labs are very different entities.
While they will be able to draw from the experience gained from
clinical laboratory regulation in order to keep from reinventing the
wheel, crime labs serve very different functions and clientele. Un-
like clinical laboratories, crime labs do not have patients who pay
for their services. Thus, crime labs cannot pass costs along to con-
sumers. It is highly unlikely that defendants will be made to pay for
the evidentiary analyses associated with the alleged crime. Also,
who will be regulated-all crime labs, only those associated with
police departments, only private labs, etc.? Thus, while regulation
and proficiency testing requirements are inevitable, many questions
remain, such as:
(1) Who will pay for the proficiency testing?
(2) Who will prepare and distribute the necessary samples?
1993]
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(3) Will it be mandatory or voluntary?
(4) Will it apply to all laboratories or just those associated with
law enforcement agencies (i.e., prosecution)?301
(5) What role will state agencies, such as Health Services play?
(6) Will professional societies and organizations have a voice in
regulation implementation?
(7) Will regulation extend to other areas of criminalists (e.g.,
questioned documents, firearms, drug analysis, microscopy, fin-
gerprinting etc.)? and
(8) Will certification of criminalistics be required and if so, how
will this be administered?
CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSTICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
While RFLP will undoubtedly continue to be an important test
method in DNA analysis both within and beyond the forensic com-
munity, it is almost inevitable that PCR will supplant it. The ease
of use, the very minimal requirement of a single nucleated cell, and
the elegant simplicity of the entire methodology make it particu-
larly attractive for use in the crime lab setting. Although contami-
nation is a potential problem, care in laboratory design and
protocols will help ensure that it will not be a factor in genetic anal-
yses of forensic samples. It is quite possible that combination sys-
tems like the "AmpFLP's" now available or direct sequencing in
combination with PCR will supplant both PCR alone and RFLP.30 2
The development of alternative test systems, including the mi-
tochondrial 3°3 DNA test procedures used to identify "missing" per-
301. For example, in California, the prosecution must use an accredited laboratory for
its alcohol analyses, while the defense can go anywhere, no matter how incompetent the lab
is.
302. See supra notes 118-119 for various references other advances have also proven to
be significant improvements in PCR analysis. A modified DNA extraction process using
Chelex® 100 has been developed, which appears to provide better results and facilitates the
combination of PCR and RFLP. Sean Walsh et al., Chelex 100 as a Medium for Simple
Extraction of DNA for PCR-Based Typing From Forensic Material, 10 BIOTECHNIQUES 506
(1991). Chelex® 100, followed by PCR of DQci and DIS80 were recently used to genetically
characterize saliva from cigarette butts. This study included three cigarette butts recovered
from two crime scenes (adjudicated cases) and indicated that PCR-based DNA typing is a
potential method for analyzing traces of saliva left on such seemingly innocuous pieces of
evidence as cigarette butts. Hochmeister, supra note 195.
303. Mitochondria are "organelles" contained within cells which serve as the cell's en-
ergy factory. Any energy the cell needs to survive or divide is obtained through the inten-
sively biochemically active mitochondria. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 484-500.
Unlike the other organelles within the cell's cytoplasm (with the exception of the nu-
cleus, the cytoplasm comprises the entire area within the cell), mitochondria contain their
own complement of DNA. It is hypothesized that mitochondria represent the evolutionary
"remains" of bacteria which infected cells long ago and were commandeered by the cells as
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sons in Argentina,3° also have additional potential for the forensic
setting and parentage determinations. 35 As mitochondrial DNA is
inherited only through the maternal lineage, the maternal history of
a person may be determined by analyzing their mitochondrial
DNA. 306 This is also of great potential value in the study of genetic
diseases, especially those which have a sex-linked component.
Modified PCR methods designed to analyze RNA have proven
to be extremely valuable, especially in the development of medical
diagnostic tests. It is also possible that RNA analysis could be uti-
lized in the forensic setting.
The future of DNA analysis as applied to forensics as well as
the traditional areas of medical research appears quite bright. Per-
haps the best advice to the legal community is to be prepared.3 "7
Before deciding whether or not to use DNA analysis in court, the
attorney will need to obtain many items and much information
from the laboratory doing the analysis, and should if at all possible,
visit the site in order to get a first-hand feel for the facility and the
people doing the work.30
As additional techniques and refinements are developed, it is
likely that the technology will continue to improve as well. As ad-
ditional PCR systems are developed, they must be thoroughly char-
acterized and proven to be reliable. During the time the kits are
developed and marketed, it would be to the profession's ultimate
benefit if they were subjected to the same rigorous standards as are
applied to clinical diagnostic test kits. Although this would delay
energy factories. This is supported by the fact that mitochondria contain DNA which is
completely independent of the DNA contained within the nucleus. Id. at 541-542.
304. Chris Raymond, Forensics Experts Tackle Task of Identiying Thousands of'Disap-
peared' Victims, 261 JAMA 1388 (1989).
305. Denise S. Rath & Carl R. Merril, Mitochondrial DNA and Its Forensic Potential,
PROC. INT'L SYMP. FORENSIC ASPECTS DNA ANALYSIS 113 (1989).
306. Allan C. Wilson & Rebecca L. Cann, The-Recent African Genesis of Humans, Sci.
AM., April, 1992, at 68; and R. Cann et al., Polymorphic Sites and the Mechanisms of Evolu-
tion in Human Mitochondrial DNA, 106 GENETICS 479 (1984).
307. As legend has it, Pasteur once said, "Chance favors the prepared mind."
308. The decision whether or not to use DNA will require much thought. Be sure to get
a copy of the complete lab file for the case, a list of the standard operating procedures (espe-
cially those used in your case), a curriculum vitae of the person who performed the test (it
might be advisable to also get a copy of their supervisor's curriculum vitae as well), peer-
reviewed articles characterizing the probes used in your case, if RFLP was done, a descrip-
tion of the database used in your case (including allele frequencies, sample sources, database
size and any ethnic characterizations of the samples) and a description of the method to
calculate frequencies and the confidence intervals applicable to the case. Be sure to also get
copies of the curriculum vitae for all the expert witnesses you might use. Finally, be sure to
determine if there are any relationships between the testing laboratory and the expert
witnesses.
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the introduction of new methods and/or genetic markers, it would
help decrease the amount of court time and written criticism dedi-
cated to the use of genetic markers in the legal system. However,
regardless of its future development, a firm foundation of reliability
and tremendous usefulness is in place.
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He who receives an idea from me, receives instructions himself
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, re-
ceives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and
mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition,
seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by
nature.
Thomas Jefferson
INTRODUCTION
History has shown that it is in the nature of mankind to learn
the ideas of others, to benefit from their use, and, in many instances,
to improve upon them. The advisability of using the teaching of
those that have already solved a particular problem is reflected in
the proverbial admonition, "Don't reinvent the wheel."2 Laboring
over the solution to a problem which has already been satisfactorily
solved by another is popularly understood to be a wasteful use of
one's talents. It is better, or at least more efficient, to direct inven-
tive energies toward improving upon a given solution, or devising a
solution to an entirely different problem. Not only do ideas and
information spread, the value of the ideas and information is often
enhanced as they pass from one to another.
This essay focuses upon how patent documents 3 can be an inte-
gral part of the process by which scientists and engineers learn from
the teachings of others. More particularly, patent documents are a
valuable source of technical information for advancing the under-
standing of a given technological art. In addition to discussing the
intrinsic value of the information therein contained, this essay also
discusses the ways in which patent documentation is made accessi-
ble. More particularly, the discussion highlights some recent devel-
opments in information storage and retrieval technology - such as
1. 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 180-181 (H.A. Washington ed.) (1854).
2. Recognizing the value of learning from others has often been metaphorically stated
in terms of the person standing on the shoulders of a giant who is able to see even further
than the giant himself. For example, Samuel Taylor Coleridge said, "The dwarf sees farther
than the giant, when he has the giant's shoulders to mount on." SAMUEL TAYLOR, THE
FRIEND, section i, Essay 8. And, Sir Isaac Newton said, "If I have seen further it is by
standing on the shoulders of giants." SIR IsAAc NEWTON, LETrER TO ROBERT Hoox, Feb-
ruary 5, 1675/76.
3. Unless otherwise noted, throughout this paper the term "patent documents" in-
cludes all published patent documents and patent related publications. Typically, such docu-
ments and publications would include: utility patents, patents of addition or improvement,
dependent patents, patents of importation (revalidation, confirmation and introduction), in-
ventors' certificates, precautional patents, secret patents when published, reissue patents,
plant patents, petty patents, registrations and design patents.
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the advent of Compact Disc-Read Only Memory ("CD-ROM")
and on-line data accessibility. Such advancements have greatly im-
proved the availability of patent documentation so that it is a viable,
indeed convenient and economical, information resource. The essay
concludes with a discussion of the role of the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") and the International Patent
Documentation Center ("INPADOC") of the European Patent Of-
fice ("EPO") in the dissemination of patent documentation, espe-
cially to developing countries.
PATENTS As A SOURCE OF TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION
Academic textbooks, scholarly treatises, journal articles, and
the like, are well known to scientists and engineers as important
sources of technological information. In addition to these more
traditional sources of information, patent documents, which are
published by and available through many patent offices around the
world, likewise contain detailed technological information. Unfor-
tunately, patents may be overlooked as an information source.4
Patents are a rich source of information which can be highly
valuable in teaching the state of a given technological art, and
thereby contribute to invention and innovation. One author stated,
Technological information is the life-blood of the innovative and
inventive process and patents are also the vital source for such
purpose. Patents should be, an integral part of the any data base
from which relevant items are selected in the provision of both
current awareness and retrospective searches. There is a need for
the change in the attitude of scientists and engineers towards the
patents. The academic training of technologists and scientists
should be similarly oriented to make them rely equally on patent
literature along with journal articles. 5
4. L. 0. Aina, The Use of Patent Literature By Nigerian Scientists, INSPEL, Vol 23(3),
164, 168 (1989), [hereinafter cited as "Aina"]; D. Chester, Getting Benefits From Patents,
LASIE, Vol. 15, No. 2, Sept/Oct 1984, 2, 8-9; Sophie K. Hudnut, Patents as Information
Sources, ONLINE '82 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, 1 (1982), [hereinafter cited as "Hudnut"];
Sudarshan Kumar, Patents as Source of Technological Information, HERALD OF LIBRARY
SCIENCE, July-October, 1984, 175, 180, [hereinafter cited as "Kumar"]; William S. Lawson,
Patents as a Source of Technological Information paper accompanying presentation in Chi-
cago, Ill., on Dec. 1, 1979, 1, 6, [hereinafter cited as "Lawson"]; and Susan M. Tertell, Pat-
ents are an Overlooked Information Source, BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR
INFORMATION SCIENCE, October/November 1986, 24, [hereinafter cited as "Tertell"].
5. Kumar, supra note 4, at 181.
Another author stated,
As a source of technological information across the whole spectrum of
technology, the collection of patents has no equivalent. To researchers it can
be a rich source of current state-of-the-art information, new ideas, and problem
1993]
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Clearly, patents can serve a very useful role in providing current
information to those attempting to understand a given technology.6
In certain instances, however, there are limits to the technolog-
ical information that can be found in patents. For example, the pat-
ent statutes of some countries have listings of subject matter which
is considered nonstatutory. Most countries limit patentable subject
matter to inventions of a technological nature. Examples of subject
matter which is nonstatutory in certain countries include inventions
relating to national security, medicines, pharmaceutical products,
scientific principles (computer programs), food, as well as inven-
tions contrary to law or morality, or injurious to health. These ex-
clusions are often based upon the given country's perceived need to
promote unrestricted technological development, resulting in the
exclusion of the granting of exclusive monopolies in certain fields.
In India, for instance, substances per se relating to or produced by
chemical processes, (including alloys, optical glass, semi-conductors
and intermetallic compounds) are non-patentable. However, meth-
ods or processes for producing such substances are patentable for a
relatively short term.
In spite of these particular limitations, there are a number of
key reasons why patents are a valuable source of technical informa-
tion. Firstly, a fundamental prescription of patent systems around
the world7 is that in order to be granted a patent, the applicant must
solving technology, all of which may lead to more productive research and
development. Patent documents are a vital information source which should
be consulted before an industrial enterprise, research and development labora-
tory or an individual engages in costly and time consuming experiments with
the objective of developing a new patentable product.
Chester, supra note 4, at 4.
Citing Eckhard Derday, a third author has said,
According to Derday (1985), the technological information contained in
patent documents is very crucial in the field of innovation, and since the
growth of any national economy is largely influenced by the degree of its in-
novativeness, the full exploitation of patent information becomes obvious.
Derday further emphasized that patent information is a unique instrument for
the transfer of technical knowledge from developed to developing countries.
Aina, supra note 4, at 164.
6. On the other hand, there may be countries where a patent application for nonstatu-
tory subject matter is preliminarily published, but not patented. Consequently, preliminary
patent publications could serve as exceptionally good sources of technological information.
7. In discussing the requirements of patent systems around the world, rather than
offering a sampling of the patent laws of a number of specific countries, throughout this paper
the authors will refer to the provisions of "The 'Basic Proposal' for the Treaty and Regula-
tions", compiled by the Diplomatic Conference For The Conclusion Of A Treaty Supple-
menting The Paris Convention As Far As Patents Are Concerned, WIPO Doc. PLT/DC/3,
December 21, 1990; [hereinafter cited as "Draft Harmonization Treaty]. Additionally, the
authors will refer to the draft "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
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disclose the invention with sufficient clarity and completeness that
the invention could be carried out by a person skilled in the art to
which the invention relates.' In fulfilling this requirement, appli-
cants must usually disclose at least one mode, and possibly even the
best mode, of carrying out the invention.9 This disclosure by the
applicant is often accompanied by a set of drawings which aid in the
description of the invention.Io Patent laws squarely place an obliga-
tion on the applicant to disclose the invention in a manner that
would enable others to practice the art. Those skilled in the art can
thus consult patents and gain practical insights into the technology.
Another reason patents are a valuable source of technological
information is that the patent application will include a discussion
of the background art which is useful for understanding the inven-
tion." Patent drafters often address this aspect of the patent disclo-
sure by describing a particular problem, the drawbacks of other
solutions to the problem, the inventor's solution, and the advan-
tages resulting from that solution.12 By consulting patent docu-
ments for technical information, one gets a concise summary of the
state of the art with the invention placed in a historical context.
Additionally, because each applicant is required to clearly and con-
cisely claim the matter which comprises the invention,13 the patent
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods," draft version released by GATT Director
General, Arthur Dunkel on December 20, 1991, MTN.TNC/W/FA, pp. 57-90, [hereinafter
cited as Draft TRIPS Agreement]. The authors have elected to refer to these two documents
because to the extent that the drafts are a culmination of many years of international negotia-
tions focused upon the harmonization of patent and intellectual property laws, they reflect a
degree of consensus by the international community on the purpose, content, and format of
patents. Furthermore, a review of the general principles and requirements reflected by the
draft treaty and agreement provisions cited in this paper will reveal these principles and re-
quirements that are generally implemented, in one form or another, in the various national
patent laws around the world.
8. Draft Harmonization Treaty, supra note 7, Article 3(l)(a); and Draft TRIPS Agree-
ment, supra note 7, Article 29(1). Mandating the disclosure of the invention so that the rest
of society can benefit from the teaching contained in the disclosure is generally regarded as
the quid pro quo for the exclusive rights granted to the inventor through the patent.
9. Draft Harmonization Treaty, supra note 7, Rule 2(l)(vi), and Draft TRIPS Agree-
ment, supra note 7, Article 29. International Patent applications filed under the Patent Coop-
eration Treaty ('PCT"), for example, are generally required to include a description of
performing the invention in the best mode. (Rule 5.1 (a) (v) PCT). Thus, patents filed in
countries requiring the disclosure of the best mode will likely contain more complete informa-
tion than patents from countries without a best mode requirement.
10. Draft Harmonization Treaty, supra note 7, Rule 2(1) (v).
11. Id. Rule 2(1) (ii). See also General Introduction to the Use of Patent Documents
and the Technological Information Contained Therein, prepared by the International Bureau
of WIPO, Doe. No. WIPO/PD/SOF/90/1, dated October 1990, 21, [hereinafter cited as
"WIPO Introduction"].
12. Draft Harmonization Treaty, supra note 7, Rule 2(l) (iii).
13. Id. Article 4(2) and (3), and also see Rule 3(2) stating that "[t]he definition of the
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distinguishes the new from the old by highlighting the inventor's
advancement of the technology.
A further requirement for the granting of a patent, which
makes patents valuable sources of technological information, is that
the invention must be new and it must involve an inventive step. 14
These statutory provisions insure that the patented invention was
not within the public domain before the effective date on which the
patent application was filed. " Once having conceived the invention
or reduced the invention to practice, the threat of the loss of rights
due to public disclosure of the invention by some other source moti-
vates inventors to fie for a patent promptly. Consequently, patent
documents will generally reveal information which is at the fore-
front of the given area of technology. 16
In addition to being a source for the timely disclosure of tech-
nology, patent documents are often the only source of disclosure of
important scientific or engineering information. Studies show that
approximately 70%, or more, of what is disclosed in patent docu-
ments is not revealed in other publicly available sources.17 Neglect-
ing the information in patents can therefore disadvantage the
researcher, insofar as he or she could be failing to consult a unique
source of significant information. Without that information, the re-
searcher may expend considerable efforts working on a problem to
which there is already an acceptable solution. For example, accord-
matter for which protection is sought shall be in terms of the technical features of the
invention."
14. Id. Article 10(1) of Alternative A and Article 11(1), and Draft TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 7, Article I1(1). See also wIPo Introduction, supra note 11, at 7.
15. Draft Harmonization Treaty, supra note 7, Article 1l(2)(b). Many countries today
have absolute novelty requirements for inventions to be patentable. To meet this require-
ment, the invention should not have been made part of public knowledge prior to the date of
patent application. In other words, the invention cannot have been divulged to the public by
an act - such as public use, non privileged disclosure, publication, sale, or manufacture -
anywhere in the world, such that one skilled in the art would be able to practice the invention
from information obtained from the act. Other countries, such as Japan and the U.S., have
relative novelty requirements whereby pre-filing publication of the invention anywhere in the
world can result in the loss of novelty, but in order for a public use to result in the loss of
novelty it must occur within the country. In the United States inventors are also given a one
year grace period during which they may file a patent application even after public disclosure
or use. See 35 U.S.C. sec. 102(b). In Japan, Article 30(1) of the Patent Law provides a six-
month grace period in respect of printed publications (and certain other written disclosures)
of the invention attributable to the applicant, provided written request for the application of
Article 30(1) is made when the application is filed. Because failure to file within the grace
period will result in a loss of rights, even under the relaxed standards of a relative novelty
country, there is, nonetheless, motivation to file for a patent promptly.
16. wIPO Introduction, supra note 11, at 7.
17. Chester, supra note 4, at 5; Hudnut, supra note 4, at 1; Lawson, supra note 4, at 6;
Tertell, supra note 4, at 24; and WIPO Introduction, supra note 11, at 8.
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ing to one author international studies have estimated that at least
10% of all R&D expenditure is duplication of what could have been
determined through a patent search. This translates into the waste
of approximately 100 million R&D dollars per year in Australia. 8
Patent laws require the invention to be industrially applica-
ble.1 9 This insures that the invention has some utility. Frequently,
the patent will include not simply concepts, but also detailed infor-
mation on the possible practical applications of the invention.20
Moreover, the expense associated with securing and maintaining a
patent will generally insure that the invention has some perceived
value, since the patentee would not incur that expense otherwise.
Patents therefore include relevant technological information, which
will have a practical utility for members of the engineering and sci-
entific communities.
THE ACCESSIBILITY OF PATENTS AS AN INFORMATION SOURCE
Patent documents are inherently valuable to scientists and en-
gineers because of the technical information they contain. How-
ever, due to the sheer volume of patent documents published
around the world each year,2" their value as an information re-
18. Chester, supra note 4, at 6.
19. Draft Harmonization Treaty, Article 10(1), Alternative A, and Draft TRIPS
Agreement, Article 27, supra note 7.
20. WIPO Introduction, supra, note 11, at 8.
21. A report of the World Intellectual Property Organization, reveals that in 1990, the
year for which the most current data is available, the total number of patents applied for in
the 82 nations covered by the report was 1,663,280. During that year the total number of
patents granted in the 82 nations was 548,304. Intellectual Property Statistics 1990, Publica-
tion A of the World Intellectual Property Organization, Doc. No. IP/STAT/1990/A (Publi-
cation A).
Focusing upon the United States, for example, statistics of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") reflect the trend toward more patents being applied for and
granted, suggesting that an increasing amount of technical information is revealed in patents.
Year No. of App. * No. Granted Pats. *
1985 117,006 71,661
1986 122,433 70,860
1987 127,917 82,952
1988 139,825 77,924
1989 152,750 95,539
1990 164,558 90,366
* Figures only relate to utility patents.
During the fiscal year ending September 30, 1991, the USPTO had granted 92,474 utility,
plant, and reissue patents.
In addition to patents, patent offices also collect and index other publications, which are
used in prior art searches, along with the patents. Again referring to the USPTO, statistics
reveal the daunting volume of documents that are added to the collection of just one patent
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source would be greatly diminished if they could not be conve-
niently and efficiently accessed by those interested in using them.
Fortunately, patent documents are catalogued in a manner that
is designed to facilitate their easy access. Ease of accessibility is due
in part to the classification of documents within the given patent
system, and also to the typically uniform format by which individ-
ual patent documents tend to be structured. Accordingly, an indi-
vidual who is familiar with general research techniques can quite
readily access documents within the system, and quickly assess the
usefulness of a given document.
Naturally, the first concern of the researcher interested in using
patents is how to access the system. The classification of patents,
according to their respective areas of technology, is the means by
which individual documents are cataloged, and therefore ac-
cessed.22 Using a variety of search aids,23 the researcher can find
the class and subclass in which the given technology is catalogued.
Frequently, a given technology area may be catalogued in more
office. For example, during the years shown, the USPTO added the following U.S. and non-
U.S. documents to its collection.
Year U.S. Doc. Non-U.S. Do=s
1985 285,000 359,000
1986 291,000 373,000
1987 353,000 363,000
1988 506,000 378,000
1989 436,000 381,000
1990 458,000 512,000
Patent Type Summary Report as of December 31, 1990.
As of December 31, 1991, the USPTO housed a total of 31 million U.S. and non-U.S. docu-
ments, comprised of patents and other printed publications.
Finally, although it is not known precisely how many patent documents have been pub-
lished in toto, estimates place the number at about 30 million, with an additional I million
patent applications and granted patents being added each year. WIPO Introduction, supra
note 11, at 6 - 7; Chester, supra note 4, at 8.
22. Presently, over 50 countries apply the International Patent Classification ("IPC")
system to their patents. Also, as of January, 1990, the IPC divided technology into 8 sec-
tions, 118 classes, 616 subclasses, 6,871 main groups and 57,324 subgroups, for a total of
64,195 divisions or subdivisions. "The International Patent Classification (IPC), Its Philoso-
phy and Use," Prepared by the International Bureau of WIPO, Doc. No. WIPO/PD/SOF/
90/2, dated October 1990, [hereinafter cited as "WIPO Classification"], at 4 and 6. Also see
WIPO Introduction, supra note 11, at 10 - 12. Current versions of the IPC are available in
English and French. There are also translations into other languages, such as Chinese, Ger-
man, Hungarian, Japanese, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, Spanish, and Thai, which makes the
use of IPC relatively economical and simple for use by searchers from developing and indus-
trialized countries alike. It is estimated that more than 90% of the patent documents in the
world bear the IPC symbols and can be accessed therefrom.
In addition, the patent system in a given country will also have its own classification
system, and there are naturally variations in their respective levels of sophistication. As of
January, 1992, the United States Patent Classification System has 415 classes and 127,194
subclasses for its patent documentation. Issued U. S. patents include within the bibliographic
1993] THE TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVYTION PROCESS
than one class or subclass, which may make the research project
somewhat more complex, but still manageable. Having located the
appropriate classes and subclasses, the researcher can then retrieve
the individual documents within the class or subclass for review.24
The researcher is further assisted by the fairly uniform format
by which standard information is presented in the patent.25 Patent
formats include a title,26 an identification of the technical field to
which the invention relates,27 a discussion of the background art,28
a description of the invention with reference to the background
information the appropriate U.S. Patent Classification numbers as well as International Pat-
ent Classification ("IPC") numbers.
The European Classification ("ECLA") is a variation and an extension of the IPC devel-
oped by the European Patent Office. The ECLA system comprises 65,000 subdivisions of the
IPC and additionally 39,900 more detailed subdivisions.
There are also private entities which have developed their own classification system. For
example, the Derwent classification system, developed by Derwent Publications Limited, is
well organized and continually updated. Derwent provides instruction manuals and a World
Patent Index comprising listings of patent documents from thirty countries/groups including
EP and PCT. The system also provides views of trends in technological innovation through
patents-statistical-analysis. Derwent has international branches which allow access to its
database from one of several geographic locations in the world.
Conversion tables for interconnecting patent classification systems of different countries
have been developed, but are not as effective as would be desired by a modern searcher or
user, because of the diversity in the approach to the classification by different countries.
23. The searching of patents classified according to the IPC is accomplished by refer-
ence to a Guide which explains the layout, use of symbols, principles, rules and application of
the IPC, as well as a survey of the classes and a summary of the main groups. WIPO Classifi-
cation, supra note 22, at 5.
In the United States the Index to the U.S. Patent Classification gives an alphabetical
listing of subject matter headings or descriptions. Additional sources such as the MANUAL
OF CLASSIFICATION contains the classification schedules, while the U.S. PATENT
CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS gives a detailed definition of what is included in or
excluded from a particular classification, adding useful search notes. Also see Hudnut, supra
note 4, at 5; Lawson, supra note 4, at 11; and Tertell, supra note 4, at 24-25.
Yet another information tool available in the United States is the Official Gazette
("OG"), which is published weeldy by the USPTO, and contains a summary of each patent
issued during the week, arranged according to the subject matter of the patent. Typically, the
OG entry for a given patent will contain the abstract of the invention and a representative
illustration of the invention taken from the patent.
24. The U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SUBCLASS LISTING lists the patent
numbers which fall within a certain classification so that the researcher can then retrieve the
documents. See Tertell, supra note 4, at 25.
25. WIPO Introduction, supra note 11, at 7.
26. Draft Harmonization Treaty, supra note 7, Rule 2(1).
27. Id. Rule 2(1) (i).
28. Id. Rule 2(l) (ii). A description of the background art is commonly found in the
patents of most countries, even though the inclusion of such is not always mandated by stat-
ute. There are, however, patent systems which require the discussion of relevant prior art in
sufficient detail. The European Patent Convention is an example of one such system. Rule
27, chapter II, Provisions Governing The Application, Implementing Regulations to Part III
of the European Convention.
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art,2 9 an explanation of the invention by reference to examples,
where appropriate, and by reference to the drawings,30 and finally
the claims.31 In addition, patents typically have an abstract which
contains a concise description of the invention, sometimes including
a drawing or figure.32 Abstracts are often translated into a number
of different languages. Therefore, even if the patent is in a language
which is not understood by the researcher, a translated version of
the abstract may be consulted. Particularly, by reference to the title
and the abstract, the researcher can easily and accurately determine
whether the patent document is relevant.
Patent documents contain so-called bibliographic data that
provides useful peripheral information. For example, the biblio-
graphic data typically includes an identification of the inventor, the
assignee, if any, the filing date, the publication date, and the issue
date. Such information can assist the researcher in determining
the vintage of the technology involved. This may have a direct
bearing on its usefulness. It can also assist the researcher in locat-
ing the inventor or assignee, to have direct discussions relating to
the invention if necessary or desirable, or to obtain a license to
avoid infringement. Such information also provides an indication
of which individuals or corporate entities are involved in particular
areas of technology.
The bibliographic data might further include, in addition to a
national classification, the international classification of the inven-
tion. Using the classification, a searcher could further refine a
search by narrowing the examination to: patents in a particular
country; patents in a particular language; or patents which belong
to a specific assignee.
The bibliographic data often also includes references to other
patents and prior art documents which were considered by the pat-
29. Id. Rule 2(1) (iii).
30. Id. Rule 2(v) and (vi).
31. Id. Article 4. There are patent systems which permit the filing of provisional pat-
ent applications with no claims, to be followed by a complete application with claims. If no
complete application is filed on time, the provisional application, without claims, might be
published, laying open the complete specification. Such a system exists in the United King-
dom. In any event, a searcher must be aware that for an unexpired patent, the onus not to
infringe is upon the user of the information.
32. WIPO Introduction, supra note 11, at 8 and 13. Also, information on abstracts
may be obtained from the following sources:
- The Japanese Patent Office, Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan.
- Derwent Publications Ltd., Rochdale House, 128, Theobalds Rd. London WClX-
8RP, U.K.
- Chemical Abstracts Service, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 43210, USA.
33. Id. Article 6(1), and see also WIPO Introduction, supra note 11, at 8.
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ent examiner in connection with the examination of the patent ap-
plication. Using the listed references, a searcher may obtain other
patents and nonpatent literature, such as technical publications, ar-
ticles and other documents, which might be relevant in the context
of the particular invention in question. It is also possible to deter-
mine whether a given document has been cited as a reference in
subsequently published patent documents, which further expands
the linkwork of successive publications. All such information can
be invaluable to the researcher in efficiently ferreting out the other
documents which contain information on related technology. In
addition, through the use of the cross-references, the researcher can
develop a confidence that all, or virtually all, related sources of in-
formation have been consulted.
The documents that comprise the data collection of a given
patent office are generally publicly accessible at the central patent
office in any given country. So too are the various search aids that
assist in finding relevant documents. To the extent that the central
patent office of a given country is physically accessible to only a
small percentage of the residents of the country, and an even
smaller percentage of the world community, many patent offices are
committed to the dissemination of patent information by expanding
the availability of the documents through a number of different
methods.34
For example, within a given country, there may be a number of
patent depository libraries which are geographically dispersed so
that persons in other regions of the country will have access to
many, but not all, of the same documents contained in the central
patent office's collection.35 In order to achieve world-wide distribu-
tion, the central patent office of one country may have exchange
agreements with other countries through which they respectively
exchange documents. 36 Through this distribution system, patent
documents are made more accessible.
Patent offices around the world may be strongly committed to
34. William S. Lawson, USPTO Perspectives - Use Automation Products Available From
USPTO, [hereinafter cited as "Lawson Perspectives"], for presentation at AIPLA mid-win-
ter meeting, (January, 1992) at C12, describing the mission of the USPTO.
35. In the United States, for example, there are presently over 70 Patent Depository
Libraries in 45 states and the District of Columbia. See Lawson Perspectives, supra note 34,
at C12.
36. The United States has such exchange agreements with approximately 35 other
countries resulting in the USPTO annually sending out a total of 51 sets of U.S. documents,
either on paper or on microfiche. Given that the USPTO publishes on the order of 100,000
documents per year, over 5,000,000 patent documents are distributed around the world by
the USPTO annually.
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improving the availability of patent documents to their own citizens
and the world community. Historically, however, there were signif-
icant impediments to the achievement of this objective. Tradition-
ally, patent documentation was accessed manually using paper
copies, microfilm, or microfiche. The searcher scrutinized abstracts
or full texts in order to locate patents that were of interest. Thus,
the search process was performed manually, and was understanda-
bly slow. In addition, unless the searcher was geographically situ-
ated close to the central patent office, or a depository library,
accessibility was limited.
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IMPROVING DOCUMENT
ACCESSIBILITY
There are presently a wide variety of data bases37 which con-
tain information covering patent documents. Recent technology
developments have enhanced the means by which the information
contained in the data bases are made available on both a local and
remote basis. The availability of these improved sources and access
services continues to spread. Two important technological develop-
ments which have improved the availability of patent documents
are on-line access to computer stored data bases and access through
CD-ROMs. 38
So-called "on-line" access to computer stored data bases refers
to access over some type of telecommunications network. Such
data bases are made accessible to subscribers of the given on-line
service by the private entity which makes the service available.39
Subscribers to the service may be charged one time or annual sub-
scription fees, as well as actual use fees which are computed on the
basis of the amount of time one is actually connected to the on-line
resource, not unlike a regular telephone charge.
Typically, an on-line data base enables the searcher to direct
the inquiry to the various items of bibliographic data, such as inven-
tor's name, patent owner, title, abstract, classification, filing date, or
publication date. Therefore, if a researcher was not familiar with
37. Generally, a data base is a collection of information which pertains to a given sub-
ject area or topic. The individual records within the data base are uniformly formatted so
that each record contains the same type of information, though obviously not the same infor-
mation, for each entry. Examples of data bases for patent documents, and the type of infor-
mation contained in each data base are given in Appendix A.
38. Lawson, supra note 34, at C16 - CI10; Tertell, supra note 4, at 25.
39. Examples of such private parties which provide on-line services are Dialog, Orbit,
Patolis, and STN. Also see Appendix A for a selected listing of the data bases which they
respectively provide, and their addresses and telephone numbers.
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the most relevant classification of the technology which needs to be
searched, these other data fields can be searched to identify one or
more patents in the target area of the search.
In addition to accessing data bases on-line, the same or other
data bases can be stored and accessed on CD-ROM.' A CD-ROM
provides a very convenient, compact, electronic medium for storing
relatively large amounts of information in word searchable form.
For example, about 1000 U.S. patents could be stored in full text
and image form on a single CD-ROM disc. In their protective
plastic cases, 100 CD-ROM discs storing about 100,000 U.S. pat-
ents could be housed in less than three and a half feet of shelf
space.4" The use of CD-ROMs requires a PC-AT computer, a high
resolution screen, a CD-ROM drive and printer. The printing of
facsimile images will require a laser printer.
CD-ROMs which contain full bibliographic information, text
and drawings in facsimile form, are available to facilitate local re-
production of individual copies in a quick, inexpensive manner. At
present, the availability of such CD-ROMs is limited to U.S., EPO,
PCT, German and U.K. patent documents.42 There are also CD-
ROMs which contain bibliographic information, abstract and repre-
sentative drawings in facsimile form, or bibliographic information
only. Naturally, the type of information on a given CD-ROM will
determine the limits of the search one is capable of performing us-
ing that resource.
SOME ON-LINE AND CD-ROM SEARCHING TECHNIQUES
It should first be noted that although patent documents can be
accessed and searched through a variety of known data-bases all
over the world, the consistency and value of the search results de-
pend heavily on the limitations of the data-base and the manner of
searching. Additional variables affecting the search relate to the pe-
culiarities and the features of the accessed patent system, and the
specific kinds of patents being accessed.43
40. A selected listing of CD-ROM products and the sources that make the products
available are shown in Appendix B.
41. Lawson, supra note 34, at C18.
42. Lawson, supra note 34, at CI1o.
43. For example, searchers should be aware that applications filed under the European
Patent Convention ("EPC") or the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") will typically result
in national applications/patents in designated countries. EPC/PCT applications are, how-
ever, subject to preliminary publication at about eighteen months after the priority date of the
respective application. Such preliminary publications also are documented and stored in
databases and can be accessed during a search. EPC/PCT applications in the course of their
prosecution enter the national stage, and, if granted, culminate in national patents which are
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Nonetheless, the availability of patent information on CD-
ROMs and on-line data bases provides alternatives to local search-
ing. For example, using CD-ROMs, a local search and retention
facility can be set up to permit full text document reproduction
without incurring the expense associated with accessing on-line data
bases. Searches can be conducted using CD-ROMs containing only
bibliographic data, titles and/or abstracts to locate patents of inter-
est. CD-ROMs storing full images can then be used to provide
screen displays or hard copy full text and drawings of those patents.
One disadvantage of this approach is that despite their storage ca-
pacities, several CD-ROMs may need to be searched to cover a de-
sired period or range of patents, thus slowing down the search
process.
Alternatively, a search could be conducted using an on-line
data base service to identify patents of interest from one or more
data bases. Once those patents are identified on line, one could then
access those patents from a full text/image CD-ROM and
reproduce the complete patent. This approach facilitates a more
comprehensive search over a range of patents from various sources
while minimizing the expense through local reproduction and re-
view of full text copies.' However, the cost of accessing on-line
data bases over international data links could be quite significant.
THE ROLES OF WIPO AND INPADOC
The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")
plays a central role in promoting the use of patent documentation as
a source of technological information. WIPO promotes the free ex-
change of patents and related publications between patent offices all
documented and classified just like other national patents, by interested agencies, eg.,patent
offices, WIPO and other data bases. The searcher will be able to observe the differences, if
any, in the text and other portions of the preliminary publication as compared with those in
the final granted patent.
44. By way of example of the practical use of these on-line and CD-ROM resources, the
Law Department of Digital Equipment Corporation in Maynard, Massachusetts, USA, cur-
rently uses on-line data base services to locate English language equivalents of non-English
language patents, such as prior art references cited in Patent Office Search and Examination
Reports. Also under consideration is the expanded use of on-line patent data bases and CD-
ROMs for retroactive searching purposes, such as evaluating the novelty of invention disclo-
sures as part of a decision making process prior to filing the patent application. CD-ROMs
offer an attractive basis for self-contained on-site bibliographic and abstract searching and
full text patent documentation retrieval, particularly for USPTO and EPO patent documenta-
tion. However, CD-ROM abstract searching currently is of limited value because CD-ROMs
containing abstracts are available only for the past few years. For example, CASSIS/BIB
contains only abstracts for the most recent previous three years while ESPACE CD-ROM
products do not extend back before 1989.
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over the world. Patent publications both in paper form and in
microform are exchanged under various arrangements, with the
flow of information designed to address the needs of developing
countries.45
Additionally, WIPO has assisted the patent offices of some
countries and organizations, such as those of Brazil and the African
Intellectual Property Organization, to modernize the documenta-
tion of their information and records. Representatives from devel-
oping countries have been invited to attend training courses
arranged by WIPO which discuss the use of technological informa-
tion contained in patent documents.
WIPO oversees a permanent committee on patent information
("PCPI"). PCPI comprises working groups which provide infor-
mation to developing countries on requested searches, general infor-
mation, and standards. WIPO also maintains a program which
provides developing countries state of the art searches covering the
technology in a requested area. This service relies upon the assist-
ance of several donor countries, such as Germany, Sweden, Austria,
which have contributed both time and energy.
Another significant contribution of WIPO is the publication of
guidelines for establishment of regional patent information and doc-
umentation centers ("PIDC's"), to help promote the dissemination
of technological information to developing countries. The docu-
ment entitled "Guidelines for the Organization of a Patent Informa-
tion and Documentation Center," was updated in 1987. The two
objectives of the guidelines are first, to facilitate "the access of de-
veloping countries to technical information already existing in doc-
uments such as those concerning patents and other information
important to the transfer and use of technology;" and second, to
encourage developed countries to "make available in a systematic
manner, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, the
results of their research and development relevant to the social and
economic development of developing countries."
WIPO has also published the so-called INID code which per-
tains to "recommendation concerning bibliographic data relating to
patent documents," and a user oriented guide to the International
Patent Classification system. The guide includes four key sections
45. One method by which patent documentation could become more accessible in de-
veloping countries is through the creation of Patent Information Document Centers
("PIDC") under guidelines published by WIPO. It seems desirable for WIPO to start PIDCs
in developing countries where a PIDC does not exist and thus get the, local government
involved in technology acquisition/transfer efforts according to need.
1993]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLIW JOURNL [
of interest to developing countries, namely iron and steel, fertilizers,
agro-industries, and agricultural machines and implements, for ob-
taining solutions to certain technical problems.
In addition to WIPO, a comprehensive international referral
service relating to patent documentation is provided by the Interna-
tional Patent Documentation Center (INPADOC) located in Vi-
enna. INPADOC was created in 1972 under an agreement between
WIPO and the Republic of Austria. It is now operated as part of
the Patent Information Directorate of the EPO.
INPADOC stores and updates basic bibliographic data on the
published patent documents of a large number of countries, organi-
zations, or other entities.46 The bibliographic data processed and
stored by INPADOC is available to government authorities and the
public. Due to the comprehensiveness of the bibliographic data,
documentation pertinent to specific technical categories and all cor-
responding patent documents filed for the same invention can be
located. Using this information and the link established by the
common convention priority date, a "family" of patents can be
identified. 7 Once the members of the family of patents are identi-
fied, it can be determined whether the patent is available in a given
language. Also, the number of members in the family, which is de-
termined by the number of different countries in which the patent
was filed, will give some indication of the perceived importance of
the invention.
INPADOC presently makes available a Patent Register Ser-
vice ("PRS") which gives information on the legal status of patent
applications and the granted patents for 12 countries and organiza-
tions.4" The INPADOC Patent Gazette (IPG), a weekly publica-
46. Those countries, organizations, or other entities are: Argentina, Aripo, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Peoples Republic of China, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malawi, Mexico, Monaco,
Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of
Korea, Romania, South Africa, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, the European Patent
Office (applications for European patents), the International Bureau of WIPO (international
applications under the PCJ). The UK patents registered in Hong Kong and Singapore are
also recorded.
47. Once a searcher locates a patent document using its classification, by calling the
family of patent documents all of which relate to the same priority document, the patent
document of a particular language or a particular country can be identified. The researcher
should be aware, however, that unless the data base includes non convention countries, it is
likely that the patents in the non convention countries, such as Taiwan, India, and Pakistan,
would not be included in the family listing.
48. Those countries or organizations are: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany,
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tion, has four indexes: a numerical index; an IPC symbol index; an
index of names of applicants and owners; and an index of inventors
names. Each index contains references to all patent documents en-
tered in the INPADOC data bank during the proceeding week.
Users can thereby readily monitor developments in a particular
technical field, or the activities of a given firm, enterprise or inven-
tor. INPADOC bibliographic data and legal status data for patent
documents are available on microfiche and tape while the IPG is
available on microfiche.
CONCLUSION
Patents are a well-indexed and well-classified source of techno-
logical information. They can therefore be beneficially used by in-
dividual researchers, corporations, research and development
organizations, universities, governments, and others, to learn the
technology revealed therein. Patent documentation can also be a
useful tool for planning development, allocating funding, and pro-
ducing statistical information. Whereas patent documentation has
traditionally been an underutilized information resource, perhaps
due to its more remote accessibility, modem technology has greatly
enhanced its availability. Moreover, accessibility is made even eas-
ier due to organizations, such as WIPO, which are chartered to im-
prove the wide distribution of patent documentation and the
dissemination of technological information. To the extent that the
course of history amply demonstrates the value of learning from the
teachings of others, it would certainly be undesirable for patents to
remain an overlooked source of technological information, espe-
cially by developing nations.
Denmark, European Patent Office, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Netherlands, United
States of America, and WIPO.
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APPENDIX A - ON-LINE SERVICES
The following is a selected listing of several data bases and a
brief statement of the scope of the contents of each. Also listed are
the source entity responsible for maintaining the data bases, as well
as the on-line service through which the data base is accessible.
With respect to the source entities and each on-line service, the ad-
dress and telephone numbers are provided. Address, telephone, and
FAX numbers are also included for providers of the on-line
services.
Data bases:
INPADOC
This data base contains bibliographic information for patent docu-
mentation from over 50 countries and organizations. The source is
the European Patent Office, and it is available on-line through DIA-
LOG, ORBIT, STN and PATOLIS.
JAPIO
This data base contains English language bibliographic information
and abstracts of published, unexamined Japanese patent applica-
tions published since 1976. The source is the Japan Patent Informa-
tion Organization, and it is available on-line through ORBIT.
WORLD PA TENT INDEX
This data base contains bibliographic information, abstracts, and
special subject classification codes for patent documents from 31
patent issuing authorities. The source is Derwent, and it is available
on-line through DIALOG, ORBIT and QUESTEL.
Addresses and telephone numbers for selected sources:
European Patent Office
Principal Directorate, Patent Information, European Patent Office,
EPIDOS-INPADOC Services, Moellwaldblatz 4, Postfach 163, A-
1041 Vienna, Austria. (From January 20, 1992). Telephone: 43-1-
5261201; FAX: 43-1-52126-1493.
Japan Patent Information Organization
Japan Patent Information Organization, International Department,
Sato-Dia Bldg.; 4-1-7 Toyo, Kotu-Ku, Tokyo 135, Japan. Tele-
phone: 81-3-5690-5555; FAX: 81-3-5690-5566.
United States Patent and Trademark Office
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Office of Electronic Information
Products and Services, Crystal Mall 2, Room 304, Washington,
D.C. 20231, U.S.A. Telephone: 1-703-557-5652.
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Addresses and telephone numbers for selected on-line services:
DIALOG
Main office:
U.S.A. - Dialog Information Services, Inc., 3460 Hillview Avenue,
Palo Alto, CA 94304, United States. Telephone: 415-858-3785;
FAX: 415-858-7069.
Other offices:
ARGENTINA - In/Base Argentina S.A./DIALOG, Paraguay
1345, Piso 8, Of. C-D, Buenos Aires. Telephone: 54-1-814-4258;
FAX: 54-1-814-4258.
AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALAND - Insearch Limited/DIALOG,
P.O. Box 123, Broadway, Sydney, NSW 2007. Telephone: 61-2-
212-2867; FAX: 61-2-281-5427.
BRAZIL - PTI/DIALOG, Publicacoes Tecnicas Internacionais
Ltda., Rua Peixoto Gomide 209, 01409 Sao Paulo SP. Telephone:
55-11-257-2157; FAX:55-11-258-6990.
CANADA - Micromedia Ltd./DIALOG, 158 Pearl Street, To-
ronto, Ontario M5H 1L3. Telephone: 416-593-5211; FAX: 416-
593-1760
CHILE - Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones, S.A./DIA-
LOG, (ENTEL-CHILE), Santa Lucia #360, Piso 8, Santiago. Tel-
ephone: 56-2-71-21-21; FAX: 56-2-690-2638.
DENMARK - DataArkiv/DIALOG, Glentevej 65, DK-2400 Co-
penhagen NV. Telephone: 45-38-33-52-10; FAX: 45-31-19-93-51
FINLAND - Esselte Micromedia/DIALOG, Italahdenkatu 22 BA,
00210 Helsinki. Telephone: 358-0-692-6419; FAX: 358-0-692-
7820
FRANCE - Learned Information/DIALOG, 75 avenue Par-
mentier, 75011 Paris. Telephone: 33-1-40-21-24-24; FAX: 33-1-
40-21-24-00
GERMANY - EXIT Datenbankdienste/DIALOG, Graf-von-
Stauffenbergstrasse 19, D-4800 Bielefeld 1. Telephone: 49-521-16-
10-21; FAX: 49-521-10-99-00
HONG KONG - Information Services/DIALOG, 50 F'Aguilar
Street, Central, Hong Kong. Telephone: 852-868-0877; FAX: 852-
845-0141.
INDIA - Informatics (India) PVT Ltd./DIALOG, PB No. 360,
Malleswaram llth Cross, Bangalore, India 56003. Telephone: 91-
812-845-2041.
ISRAEL - Teldan Information Systems Ltd./DIALOG, 7 Derech
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Hasholom, Tel-Aviv, Israel 67892. Telephone: 972-3-25-00-73;
FAX: 972-3-62-39-09.
JAPAN - KINOKUNIYA COMPANY LTD., ASK Information
Retrieval Services, P.O. Box 55 Chitose, Tokyo 156. Telephone: 81-
3-439-0123; FAX: 81-3-439-1093.
JAPAN - MARUZEN CO. LTD., MASIS CENTER, P.O. Box
5335, Tokyo International 10031. Telephone: 81-3-271-6068;
FAX: 81-3-271-6082.
KOREA - Data Communications Corporation of Korea, Sales and
Marketing Division, 10th Floor, Insong Building, 194-45, Hoehy-
undong 1 GA, Choong-Ku, Seoul. Telephone: 82-2-791-1114;
FAX: 82-2-796-8811.
MEXICO - Asesores Especializados en Informacion y Documenta-
cion, S.C., AEID/DIALOG, Ceres 43, Col. Florida, 01030 Mexico,
DF. Telephone: 52-5-534-8950; FAX: 52-5-534-8950.
NORWAY - AXESS A/S/DIALOG, P.O. Box 86 Bryn, 0611 Oslo
6. Telephone: 47-2-72-12-70; FAX: 47-2-72-12-66
SAUDI ARABIA - Arabian Advanced Systems, AAS/DIALOG,
P.O. Box 20129, Riyadh 11455. Telephone: 966-1-476-6337.
SPAIN- Editorial Garsi SA/DIALOG, Numancia, 85-87, bajo,
08029 Barcelona. Telephone: 34-93-322-99-11; FAX: 34-93-322-
96-52
SWEDEN - DataArkiv/DIALOG, Box 1502, S-171 29 Solna. Tele-
phone: 46-8-705-1300; FAX: 08-82-82-96
SWITZERLAND - Centredoc/DIALOG, Rue Brequet 2, CH-
2007, Neuchatel. Telephone: 41-38-205-639; FAX: 41-38-25-48-73
U.K. - Learned Information/DIALOG, P.O. Box 188, Oxford OX1
5AX, United Kingdom. Telephone: 44-865-730-275; FAX: 44-
865-736354
ORBIT
Main office:
USA - Maxwell Online, Inc., 8000 Westpark Drive, McLean, VA
22101. Telephone: 1-703-442-0900; FAX: 1-703-893-4632.
Other offices:
AUSTRALIA - Maxwell Online, Locked Bag 44, Botany, NSW
2019. Telephone: 61-2-316-9631; FAX: 61-2-316-9485.
JAPAN - USACO Corporation, 13-12 Shinbashi 1-Chome,
Minatoku, Tokyo, 105. Telephone: 81-3-3502-6471; FAX: 81-3-
3593-2709.
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KOREA - Samsung Co., LTd., Business Development Dept.,
Taepyong-no. 2-GA, Chung-gu, Seoul, Korea 100-102. Telephone:
82-2-751-2542; FAX: 82-2-751-2776.
U.K. - Maxwell Online, Achilles House, Western Avenue, London
W3 OUA, England. Telephone: 44-81-992-3456; FAX: 44-81-993-
7335
PA TOLIS
Japan Patent Information Organization, Sato Dia Bldg., 4-1-7,
Toyo, Kotu-Ku, Tokyo 135, Japan. Telephone: 82-3-5690-5555;
FAX: 82-3-5690-5566.
QUESTEL
Main Office:
FRANCE - Questel, 55 Avenue des Champs Piereux, 92012
Nanterre Cedex, France. Telephone: 33-1-46-14-55-55.
STN
Main Office:
GERMANY - STN International, P.O.Box 2465, D-7500 Karl-
sruhe 1. Telephone: 49-7247/82-45-66; FAX: 49-7247/29-68.
Other offices:
AUSTRALIA - CSIRO Information, Resources Unit, 314 Albert
Street, East Melbourne, Victoria. Telephone: 03-418-7333.
U.S.A. - STN International, 2540 Olentangy River Road, Colum-
bus, OH 43202. Telephone: 614-421-3698; FAX: 614-421-3713
Access to these on-line services from countries throughout the
world is available through Public Data Networks ("PDNs") which
facilitate international data communication. PDNs are generally
run by the national telecommunication authority of the country.
Subscribers to a national PDN can then use international networks
such as DIALNET, TYMNET or SprintNet to connect to an on-
line service. DIALOG, ORBIT and STN can be accessed via
TYMNET and SprintNet; PATOLIS via Venus-P.
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APPENDIX B - CD-ROM PRODUCTS
The following is a selected listing of sources which maintain
and provide CD-ROM products, and the contents of those prod-
ucts. Included with each title is a brief description of the scope of
the contents of the CD-ROM, and finally a listing of the addresses
and telephone numbers of each source.
CD-ROM products of the European Patent Office:
ESPACE-EP
This CD-ROM product contains the complete EPO patent specifi-
cations published since 1989. Each is stored in image form so that
the text, drawings, and formulae can be reproduced exactly as the
original using a laser printer. All bibliographic data on the title
pages are index coded and title searches can be made in English,
French or German.
ESPA CE-FIRST
This CD-ROM product contains the first pages of EPO and PCT
patent applications published since 1989. Each is stored in facsim-
ile format with searchable bibliographic information and abstracts.
ESPA CE- WORLD
This CD-ROM product contains the complete PCT patent applica-
tions published since 1991. Each is stored in facsimile format with
searchable biographical information and titles.
ESPA CE-A CCESS
This CD-ROM product contains EPO patent applications pub-
lished since 1978. Each is stored in image form with bibliographic
information on the title page index coded for searching. Searchable
English language abstracts are progressively being introduced.
ESPA CE- UK
This CD-ROM product contains bibliographic data (searchable)
and complete facsimile images of United Kingdom patent applica-
tions (A-documents) published since 1990.
CD-ROM products of the Japan Patent Information Organization:
JAPIO
This CD-ROM product contains the full text images of unexamined
Japanese patent and utility model applications published since 1987,
including bibliographic information. It is in Japanese.
CD-ROM products of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office:
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CASSIS/BIB
This CD-ROM product contains the U.S. classifications, assignees,
titles, abstracts (most recent three years only) and patent origin
(residence state or country of first named inventor) for U.S. patents
issued since 1969.
CD-ROM products of MicroPatent:
ClaimSearch
This CD-ROM product contains the full text of all claims for pat-
ents issued by the USPTO since 1975 together with bibliographic
information.
FullText This CD-ROM product contains the full text of patents
issued by the USPTO since 1975. Patents can be retrieved by patent
number only.
PatentImages
This CD-ROM product contains the full-text images of U.S. patents
including drawings for patents issued by the USPTO since 1990,
with backfiles to 1976 available during 1992.
Addresses and telephone numbers for the selected sources:
European Patent Office
Principal Directorate, Patent Information, European Patent Office,
EPIDOS-INPADOC Services, Schottenfeldgasse 29, Postfach 82/
P.O. Box 82, A-1072 Vienna, Austria. (From January 20, 1992).
Telephone: 43-1-52126-0; FAX: 43-1-52126-1493.
Japanese Patent Information Organization
Japan Patent Information Organization, International Department,
Sato-Dia Bldg.; 1-7 Toyo 4-chome, Kotu-Ku, Tokyo 135, Japan.
Telephone: 81-3-5690-5555; FAX: 81-3-5690-5566.
United States Patent and Trademark Office
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Office of Electronic Information
Products and Services, Crystal Mall 2, Room 304, Washington,
D.C. 20231, U.S.A. Telephone: 1-703-557-5652.
MicroPatent
MictroPatent Canada - Micromedia Limitee, Mr. Gary Gibson, 265
Hotel de Ville, Hull, Quebec J8X. Telephone: 800-567-1914; FAX:
819-770-9265
MicroPatent Europe, Ms. Elisabeth Hearle, Cambridge Place, Cam-
bridge CB2 1NR, England. Telephone: 44-223-311-479; FAX: 44-
223-66440
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MicroPatent France - Chadwyck-Healey France, 3, rue de Mari-
vaux, 75002 Paris. Telephone: 33-42-86-80-20; FAX: 33-42-61-33-
87
MicroPatent Mexico - Diffusion Cientifica Latinoamericana S.A.,
Glorieta de Claveria, Mexico, 08020 DF. Telephone: 52-5-396-
1818; FAX: 52-5-341-3647
MicroPatent USA, 25 Science Park, New Haven, CT 06511. Tele-
phone: 1-203-786-5500; FAX: 1-203-786-5499.
CASE NOTES
Computer Associates v. Altai and Apple v. Microsoft: Two Steps
Back From Whelan?
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, (2d Cir. 1992). Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 799 F.Supp. 1006, (N.D. Cal. 1992).
Audrey F. Dickey*
In 1986, the Third Circuit, in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Den-
tal Laboratory,1 defined a test f6r copyright infringement of com-
puter programs that went beyond simply looking for literal copying
of the elements. The court laid the foundation for what has become
known as the "look and feel" analysis to determine substantial simi-
larity by comparing not only the literal elements, but the sequence,
structure and organization of a program. Since Whelan, many
courts have used a similar analysis for determining copyright in-
fringement of software, but in the summer of 1992, two cases were
decided that may mark the beginning of a retreat from the "look
and feel" doctrine, and may have a significant impact on the future
of computer program copyright actions. These cases are Computer
Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,2 a Second Circuit case,
and Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.3 from the Northern
District of California.4 Both cases criticized the approach in Whe-
lan and bring forth the question as to whether similarity in struc-
ture will continue to be sufficient to show copyright infringement in
computer software.
The courts began their analysis in both cases by looking at the
two elements needed to show infringement, access and substantial
similarity. In both cases, access was available and so the question
hinged on whether there was substantial similarity. In neither case
Copyright 0 1993 by Audrey F. Dickey.
* B.A. University of Michigan; M.B.A. Santa Clara University Leavey School of
Business and Administration; Candidate J.D. 1993 Santa Clara University School of Law.
1. 787 F.2d 1222.
2. 23 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1241 (2d Cir. 1992).
3. 799 F.Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
4. Coincidentally, both decisions were written by a Judge Walker. John M. Walker,
Jr. in the Computer Associates case, and Vaughn Walker in Apple v. Microsoft.
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was there literal copying of the elements. Although the analyses
used by the two judges appeared to be different, there were funda-
mental similarities in the treatment of the programs, looking at
them not as whole works, but at their component parts to determine
similarity. The results were also similar. In Computer Associates,
no infringement was found. In Apple v. Microsoft, summary judg-
ment was granted on 300 out of 304 alleged violations, with only
four elements found to be possible protected expression.
The facts of Computer Associates were outlined in the District
court decision.5 Computer Associates (CA) wrote a job-scheduling
program called CA-Scheduler for the IBM System 370 family of
computers. IBM sells three different operating systems for this fam-
ily, and software developers who want their programs to run on all
three must usually write three different versions in order to be con-
sistent with whatever operating system the customer might choose.
To avoid the burden of writing three versions of CA-
SCHEDULER, CA wrote one version, consisting of two parts. One
part, called SCHEDULER, performed the actual job scheduling
functions. When it needed to communicate with the operating sys-
tem, it passed control to the second part, ADAPTER. ADAPTER
provided the proper interface between SCHEDULER and the oper-
ating system and was able to communicate with any of the three
operating systems, translating the commands from SCHEDULER
to the proper format for the operating system in use. ADAPTER
was used not only in CA-SCHEDULER, but in other programs
written by CA. ADAPTER was not sold separately.
Altai attempted to market a program similar to CA-
SCHEDULER, but Altai's version was not as versatile. Their first
attempt, called ZEKE, did not have the equivalent of an
ADAPTER module, but was only able to run on one IBM operat-
ing system. Subsequently, Altai developed Oscar, their version of
ADAPTER. The first version of OSCAR, OSCAR 3.4, was written
by a former employee of CA and, it was later discovered, contained
much code that was copied directly from ADAPTER. Once it was
revealed to Altai's management that OSCAR was a possible in-
fringement on CA's program, they began efforts to rewrite OSCAR
in order to eliminate all of the copied code. It is this second version
of OSCAR, OSCAR 3.5, that is in question in this case. The argu-
ment hinged on whether Altai's OSCAR 3.5 was substantially simi-
lar to CA's program. CA claimed that despite the rewrite of
OSCAR, it was still substantially the same as ADAPTER. In the
5. Computer Associates Int'l. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 544, 549-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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decision, the court agreed with Whelan that copyright infringement
can go beyond just literal copying.6 But the court went on to say
that this did not end the analysis. Rather, the next step was to de-
termine the extent of the protection for non-literal structure.
Judge Walker then discussed the problem inherent in the idea-
expression dichotomy and the even greater difficulty in separating
the two in computer programs. Whelan was cited for its attempt to
draw the line between idea and expression, but Judge Walker then
criticized the Whelan concept of a single idea defining a program.
In the Whelan analysis, once the idea of the program is determined,
the program itself provides the expression of that idea. Judge
Walker saw this as the fatal flaw in the Whelan reasoning, the as-
sumption that only one idea could underlie any computer program.
According to Judge Walker, a program can contain many sub-pro-
grams, each with its own idea.7 Judge Walker then explained the
Second Circuit approach to determining substantial similarity, the
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test. This is a three-part test
that starts with the abstractions test first expounded by Learned
Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures.' The program is broken
down into levels of abstraction from the most complex, a collection
of instructions, to the simplest, the ultimate function of the pro-
gram. After the levels are identified, then the filtering test takes
place. Each component at each level is examined to determine
whether or not the component is protectible expression. It could be
that the module contains an idea rather than expression. If the
module is expression, that expression may be dictated by considera-
tions of efficiency, required by factors external to the program, or
taken from the public domain. Any of these reasons would cause
that component to be non-protectible.
Once the elements deemed non-protectible in the filtration pro-
cess have been sifted out, the remainder represents the "core of pro-
tected expression." 9 At this point, the court must determine if the
defendant copied any aspect of this expression. But another part of
the analysis focuses on the copied portion's relative importance to
the overall program. Thus, even if substantial similarity is found, it
may be that the similar piece is determined to be of such relatively
little importance to the overall work that no infringement would be
found. Judge Walker defended his approach as one that "not only
6. Computer Associates, 23 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1241, 1249.
7. Id. at 1252.
8. 45 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1930).
9. Computer Associates, 23 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1241, 1256.
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comports with, but advances the constitutional policies underlying
the copyright act."10 He emphasized that the primary objective of
the copyright law is to stimulate creativity, not reward authors. He
criticized the Whelan rationale as too sweeping because it allows the
first to implement certain techniques to put a "lock" on them, re-
sulting in an inhibition of creation. He also stated his belief that
copyright is not the most suitable method of protection for com-
puter software and that the result of the decision in this case flowed
from Congressional intent, rather than the most effective way to
protect computer software. 1
In applying his test to the instant case, Judge Walker looked at
each level of abstraction in the alleged infringed program,
ADAPTER. The levels of abstraction that he found were object
code, source code, parameter lists and macros, services required,
and the general outline. At the code levels, he found no similarity
at all, since the code had been rewritten to remove the identical
code. On the level of parameter lists and macros, there were ele-
ments that were similar to protected elements, but they were
deemed insignificant compared to the overall program. The list of
services required were found to be determined by the demands of
the operating system, and the organizational charts were considered
to be simple and obvious, following naturally from the work's
theme.12 Thus, no infringement was found.
Apple's suit against Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard (HP) in-
volved the immensely successful Windows software by Microsoft,
which sits on the DOS 3 operating system and extends its visual and
graphical capabilities. Apple also uses a graphical interface for its
Macintosh line of computers. In 1985, in an attempt to put to rest
arguments as to whether Windows infringed on Apple's copyright
for its Macintosh operating system, Apple granted to Microsoft a
non-exclusive license for the audiovisual displays in the first version
of Windows, Windows 1.0. In turn, Microsoft had given HP a li-
cense for some of the displays used in Windows that HP had incor-
porated into their software called NewWave. However, these
licenses covered only the displays found in Windows 1.0 and did
not cover those that first appeared in a subsequent release, Windows
2.03. Apple filed suit against Microsoft and HP for infringing on
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1257.
12. Id. at 1260.
13. This is a Microsoft trademarked acronym for Disc Operating System.
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those copyrights of elements not covered by the 1985 agreement. 14
Apple attempted to base its suit on the similarity of the overall look
of Windows and NewWave to the Apple Macintosh graphical inter-
face which Apple later described as a "desk-top metaphor.""5 In
1985, the court did not accept Apple's "look and feel" argument
and requested that Apple submit a list of the alleged similarities
between the Macintosh displays the Windows and NewWave. Ap-
ple's list contained 189 alleged similarities-between the Apple works
and Windows and 147 similarities between the Apple displays and
NewWave. 16 Microsoft and HP filed motions for summary judg-
ment, claiming no infringement on a variety of grounds. The court
determined that 179 of the similarities claimed in Windows17 and
135 in NewWave18 were covered by the 1985 license. A subsequent
decision determined that the ten remaining items relating to Win-
dows and 53 out 54 of the NewWave items were subject to little or
no copyright protection and summary judgment was granted to
Microsoft and HP on those 63 items.19 Apple moved for reconsid-
eration and this decision is the result of that reconsideration. In this
case, Judge Walker used the two-part test of the Ninth Circuit for
determining copyright infringement. This test starts with an extrin-
sic, or objective, analysis of the work using expert testimony to de-
termine criteria for comparison.20 During this stage of the analysis
not only is similarity of ideas determined, but the elements that can
be protected by copyright must be identified. This is similar to the
filtering step used by Judge John Walker in the Computer Associates
decision. Once the protectible elements are determined, an "intrin-
sic test" or "subjective analysis of expression"21 is used. This part
of the test is performed not by the court, but by the trier of fact.
However, should the extrinsic analysis result in no protectible ele-
ments of the work, then the intrinsic test is unnecessary and sum-
mary judgment is appropriate.22
Judge Walker then went on to describe the doctrines that
would cause an element to be deemed unprotectible, that is, merger,
14. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F.Supp. 925, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
15. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F.Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
16. Id. at 1016.
17. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F.Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
18. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F.Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
19. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 1992 WL 75423 (N.D. Cal. 1992)..
20. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).
21. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357.
22. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F.Supp. 1006, 1020 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
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indispensable expression (scenes a faire), idea rather than expres-
sion, and lack of originality. According to Judge Walker, courts
have developed these limiting doctrines as a response to the prob-
lem of balancing between the revenue and cost effects inherent in
copyright protection. Although copyright affords an incentive to
authors by allowing them to recoup their investment in creativity, it
also increases the costs of creation by keeping that creative work the
exclusive property of one author.23
Apple argued that in order to understand the appearance of the
Macintosh interface one must look not only at the individual ele-
ments, but the way those elements interact with one another. Thus,
the "look and feel" doctrine could be used to compare the overall
appearance of the Macintosh with Windows and NewWave. How-
ever, Judge Walker rejected this argument, saying that the desktop
metaphor was not the idea unifying the expressive elements, but
rather merely "a collection of visual displays and user commands
designed to render use of the computer.., more utilitarian."24 He
saw the elements as performing a purely functional purpose, and
likened the display and commands to the various parts of an auto-
mobile. No copyright protection is available for utilitarian
articles. 25
The court then went on to criticize the Whelan court for its
formulation that a program's overall purpose constitutes the idea
and that the program itself is the expression of that idea. According
to the law of the Ninth Circuit, a program can contain many ideas.
Judge Walker also pointed to the 1985 agreement as proof that Ap-
ple and Microsoft accepted the individual displays as the protectible
expression, not the totality of the programs.26 Having explained his
approach to the problem, Judge Walker then proceeded to analyze
each of the displays in question. He had granted summary judg-
ment to Microsoft on its claims of non-infringement for all ten re-
maining items in his previous decision. In this reconsideration, he
affirmed his previous decision on all items. Previously HP was
granted summary judgment for all but one claim, the trash can
icon.
In the instant decision, Judge Walker reconsidered and
changed his decision of three items dealing with the appearance of
icons as windows are opening and closing, as well as reaffirming the
23. Id. at 1021.
24. Id. at 1023.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1025.
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protectibility of the trash can icon.2 7 In determining the protec-
tibility or non-protectibility of the elements in question, Judge
Walker used the limiting doctrines mentioned above. Microsoft
and HP were able to show that before and during the development
of Lisa, the predecessor to the Macintosh, the Apple development
engineers were exposed to other graphical interface systems, and
that Apple incorporated into their products some of the ideas that
they obtained from observing these other systems. The defendants
also showed that the other graphical user interfaces on the market
always incorporate the basic elements of the Macintosh interface.
Due to these two arguments, many of the contested elements were
found to be non-protectible because of either lack of originality or
indispensable expression. In addition, some elements were found to
contain not expression but ideas.
In both cases, the courts were critical of the Whelan approach
which treats a program as the expression of a single idea. The
courts in these two decisions also used similar methods of breaking
the program down into many elements and "filtering out" non-pro-
tectible elements, making a case for "look and feel" much more dif-
ficult to support. The role of sequence, structure and organization,
the foundation of the "look and feel" doctrine, played little or no
part in the analysis by concentrating on the parts rather than the
whole.
However, one should not draw a conclusion from these cases
that "look and feel" is dead. *In each case, unique factors existed
that may not be present in other software copyright cases. In Com-
puter Associates, the program's function was narrowly defined by
the application. Judge John Walker based much of his decision on
non-protectibility on the reason that the element was required by
factors external to the program. It has been well known in the in-
dustry that Apple's development engineers acquired many of their
ideas for the Lisa, the forerunner of the Macintosh, from systems
that they saw at Xerox. It was not surprising, then, that Judge
Vaughn Walker leaned heavily on the limiting doctrine of lack of
originality in reaching his decision. Should the next software case
contain none of these unique factors, it may be that the decision will
heartily support the Whelan approach. We will have to wait and
see.
Judge John Walker, in discussing the policy considerations
leading to his decision, described his dilemma as follows:
27. Apple, 799 F.Supp. at 1042.
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To be frank, the exact contours of copyright protection for non-
literal program structure are not completely clear. We trust that
as future cases are decided, those limits will become better de-
fined... Generally, we think that copyright registration - with
its indiscriminating availability - is not ideally suited to deal
with the highly dynamic technology of computer science. Thus
far, many of the decision in this area reflect the courts' attempt to
fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole. 28
The law of software copyright is constantly changing. These two
decisions could be two steps in a totally different direction, or they
could be merely a detour along the road we have been following for
six years. Only time and the courts will tell.
28. Computer Associates, at 1257.
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IS AN INHERENTLY DISTINCTIVE TRADE DRESS
PROTECTABLE UNDER § 43(A) WITHOUT HAVING
ACQUIRED A SECONDARY MEANING? Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.CT. 2753 (1992), rehearing denied,
113 S.CT. 20 (1992).
Fariba Soroosh*
INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1992, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
inherently distinctive trade dress1 is protectable under Section
43(a)2 of the Lanham Act3 [hereinafter the Act], without a showing
that it has acquired a secondary meaning.4 In affirming the Fifth
Circuit's decision, the High Court followed that Circuit's reasoning
that trade dress should be protected by the same principles applica-
ble to trademarks because they both serve "the same statutory pur-
Copyright © 1993 by Fariba Soroosh.
* Ms. Soroosh holds a B.S. in Business Management from San Jose State University
and a J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law.
1. In defining trade dress, the Court adopted the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' defini-
tions. The Fifth Circuit "quoted from Blue BellBio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253,
1256 (5th Cir. 1989): 'The "trade dress" of a product is essentially its total image and overall
appearance.' Id. See [Taco Cabana Int'l, Ina v. Two Pesos, Inc.], 932 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th
Cir. 1991)." Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2755 n.1 (1992), rehear-
ing denied, 113 S.Ct. 20 (1992).
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that trade dress "involves the total image of a product
and may include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics,
or even particular sales techniques" (quoting John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,
711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)). Id.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). The Court considered the version of the code prior to
the 1988 amendments. It provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation
of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such
goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with
knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or repre-
sentation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or
deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a
civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that
of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person
who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false
description or representation.
Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2761 n.1 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982 ed.)).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
4. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2753.
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pose of preventing deception and unfair competition."' Justice
Byron White wrote the opinion joined by six other members of the
Court, Justices Stevens and Thomas filed separate concurring opin-
ions, and Justice Scalia concurred with the majority and with Jus-
tice Thomas's opinion.
The holding in this case, granting trade dress protection to the
particular motif of a restaurant chain, is significant for several rea-
sons. First, the Court resolved a conflict among the Courts of Ap-
peals and determined that § 43(a) does not impose a blanket
secondary meaning requirement for trade dress protection. This
case sets forth the rule that a distinctive trade dress should get the
same treatment as a distinctive trademark under § 43(a). Hence,
protection is granted when a particular mark or dress is either in-
herently distinctive6 or has become sufficiently distinctive through
acquiring a secondary meaning7.
Second, the Court declared that the Fifth Circuit had been cor-
rect in applying trademark analysis to trade dress, because there is
no textual basis for treating the two differently. The protection of
both is necessary in achieving legislative purposes behind the Lan-
ham Act.8
Finally, the Court rejected petitioner's argument that a new
inherently distinctive dress that has not attained a secondary mean-
ing be given temporary protection, to be terminated if a secondary
meaning is not achieved over time. The Court reasoned that if a
trade dress is granted protection in the first place without having a
secondary meaning, then it must be inherently distinctive and capa-
ble of identifying its source. Such a dress deserves continued pro-
tection without regard to its ability to succeed in the market and
attain a secondary meaning.
BACKGROUND
Taco Cabana, respondent, opened its first restaurant in San
Antonio, Texas, in 1978. Customer response to this Mexican res-
5. Id. at 2755.
6. An inherently distinctive trade dress is capable of identifying a product or service's
source because of its intrinsic nature. Id. at 2757.
7. "Secondary meaning is used generally to indicate that a mark or dress 'has come
through use to be uniquely associated with a specific source.'" Id. at 2756 n.4 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, Cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1990)).
8. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2755 (1992), rehearing de-
nied, 113 S.Ct. 20 (1992).
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taurant with its festive motif9 was so favorable that by 1985, respon-
dent had opened five more restaurants in the San Antonio area.
Two Pesos, petitioner, opened its. first restaurant in December
1985, in Houston. Petitioner's atmosphere and decor were very
similar to that of the respondent. Petitioner expanded rapidly in
Houston and other Texas cities, but did not enter the San Antonio
area. In 1986, respondent started to expand into other markets, in-
cluding Austin, Dallas, El Paso and Houston, where petitioner was
also doing business.
In 1987, respondent sued petitioner in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas I° for trade dress in-
fringement under § 43(a), and for theft of trade secrets under the
Texas common law"1 . Respondent claimed that it had a trade dress
that was protectable under § 43(a) from its inception, "i.e., an elab-
orate, consistently maintained combination of structural and decor
elements that give it a consistent look."' 2
A jury trial ensued, in which the jury was instructed to return
its verdict in the form of answers to five questions. "The jury's an-
swers were: Taco Cabana has a trade dress;13 taken as a whole, the
trade dress is non-functional;l 4 the trade dress is inherently distinc-
9. The respondent described its Mexican trade dress as
a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated
with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior
and exterior areas with the interior patio capable of being sealed off from the
outside patio by overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of the building is
a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes.
Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.
Id.
10. Taco Cabana International, Inc. and Taco Cabana, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., No. H-
87-0026, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16068 (S.D. Texas 1988).
11. On this issue the jury concluded that Two Pesos had misappropriated Taco Ca-
bana's trade secrets, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos,
Inc., 932 F.2d at 1124. Petitioner did not appeal this decision.
12. Briefs Are Filed in Mexican Restaurant Trade Dress Case, PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 1077, at 523 (April 16, 1992).
13. The District Court instructed the jury: "'Trade dress' is the total image of the
business. Taco Cabana's trade dress may include the shape and general appearance of the
exterior of the restaurant, the identifying sign, the interior kitchen floor plan, the decor, the
menu, the equipment used to serve food, the servers' uniforms and other features reflecting on
the total image of the restaurant.'" Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753,
2754 n.1 (1992).
14. Respondent's dress would be functional if, as a whole, it was essential to the very
nature of being a Mexican restaurant. "The Fifth Circuit holds that a design is legally func-
tional, and thus unprotectable, if it is one of a limited number of equally efficient options
available to competitors and free competition would be unduly hindered by according the
design trademark protection." Id. at 2760 (citing Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732
F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984)).
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tive; the trade dress has not acquired a secondary meaning in the
Texas market; and the alleged infringement creates a likelihood of
confusion on the part of ordinary customers as to the source or as-
sociation of the restaurant's goods or services."15 Since the jury was
instructed that Taco Cabana's trade dress would be protectable if it
had either acquired a secondary meaning or was inherently distinc-
tive, judgment was entered for Taco Cabana. The trial court
awarded Taco Cabana $2.8 million in damages"1, and "held that
Two Pesos had intentionally and deliberately infringed Taco Ca-
bana's trade dress." 7
On appeal, petitioner argued that the jury's finding of no sec-
ondary meaning contradicted their finding of inherent distinctive-
ness. 8 According to petitioner, what Taco Cabana had was a broad
and functional business concept which did not come under the lim-
ited protection of trade dress. 9 Petitioner further argued that if
such a concept is granted trade dress protection, it should only be
for a limited time.20 If no secondary meaning is attained during this
time, protection should cease and aggressive competitors should be
allowed to expand in the market using the same business concept.21
The Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's argument, and affirmed the
District Court's judgment.
The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that their approach in this
case was in conflict with the Second Circuit.22 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Ap-
peals on the question of whether trade dress which is inherently
distinctive is protectable under § 43(a) without a showing that it has
acquired secondary meaning."
23
15. Two Pesos, at 2756. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court assumed that the jury
was correct in their findings. Id. at 2758.
16. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991). In
calculating this figure, the District Court doubled the damages award and granted attorney's
fees. See Inherently Distinctive Trade Dress Is Protectable Without Secondary Meaning, PAr.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 1088, at 213 (July 2, 1992).
17. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2756. The Fifth Circuit agreed with this holding stating
that "[t]he weight of the evidence persuades us .... that Two Pesos brazenly copied Taco
Cabana's successful trade dress, and proceeded to expand in a manner that foreclosed several
important markets within Taco Cabana's natural zone of expansion." Id. 2756 at n.5 (quot-
ing Two Pesos, 932 F.2d at 1127 n.20). This holding seems to have only affected the amount
of damages awarded to respondent, and did not have any bearing on the High Court's analy-
sis and holding.
18. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2754.
19. See Briefs Filed in Mexican Restaurant Trade Dress Case, supra note 12.
20. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2754.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2756.
23. Id. at 2757 (citing 112 S.Ct. 964 (1992)). The Court noted that certiorari was not
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DISCUSSION
The Second Circuit Approach Rejected
In Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc. 24, the Second
Circuit held that "§ 43(a) protects unregistered trademarks or de-
signs only where secondary meaning is shown."2 That Court did
not adopt the view that an "unregistered mark was capable of iden-
tifying a source and that copying such a mark could be making any
kind of false statement or representation under § 43(a). ' '26 The ra-
tionale underlying their decision was that "unregistered marks did
not enjoy the presumptive source association enjoyed by registered
marks and hence could not qualify for protection under § 43(a)
without proof of secondary meaning."2 7 Although this Circuit later
altered its position and waived the secondary meaning requirement
for nondescriptive suggestive marks28, they have continued to im-
pose such a requirement on trade dress under § 43(a).29
The Supreme Court rejected this approach because, as Justice
White noted, it was "in considerable tension with the provisions of
the Act."30 The Court reasoned that since section 231 of the Act,
which sets out trademark registrability requirements only requires a
secondary meaning for descriptive marks, there must be marks
being granted "on the second question presented by the petition, which challenged the Court
of Appeals' acceptance of the jury's finding that Taco Cabana's trade dress was not func-
tional." Id. at 2757 n.6.
24. 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
25. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2756 (1992) (citing Chevron
Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981)).
26. Id. at 2759.
27. Id. (citing Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 303 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
28. Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1985).
29. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2759-60.
30. Id. at 2759.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1052. This section sets out circumstances under which a trademark
would not be registrable. Only two subsections are at issue in this case:
No Trade mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from
the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on
account of its nature unless it ....
(e) Consists of a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, or
(2) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily
geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, except as in-
dications of regional origin may be registrable under section 1054 of this title,
or (3) is primarily merely a surname.
(f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a)-(d) of this section, nothing in
this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant
which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce ....
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1992).
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(such as distinctive ones) that qualify without having a secondary
meaning.3 2 The Court also stated that "These same marks, even if
not registered, remain inherently capable of distinguishing the
goods of the users of these marks.""3
The Court found support in other Circuits that follow the ap-
proach used by the Fifth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit, for example,
has held that if the dress is inherently distinctive, proof of secon-
dary meaning is then needless.34
Fifth Circuit Approach Adopted
In afirming the Fifth Circuit's judgment, the High Court ap-
proved of, and adopted, that Circuit's approach to trade dress pro-
tection under § 43(a). "The Fifth Circuit was quite right in
Chevron" , and in this case, to follow the Abercrombie classifica-
tions36 consistently and to inquire whether trade dress for which
protection is claimed under § 43(a) is inherently distinctive."37
The analysis is therefore two fold; first, the mark or dress has
to qualify for registration3 1 under § 2 of the Act; and second, it has
to be examined under § 43(a) for non-functionality and likelihood
of confusion.39 The second step is straight forward, the first one
deserves a detailed discussion.
In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.4, Judge
Friendly set out what was to become the traditional trademark reg-
32. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2759.
33. Id., see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 supra note 31.
34. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2760 (citing Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc,,
826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 1987)). See also Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974 (1Ith
Cir. 1986) (The Eleventh Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit approach in Chevron, infra note
35); Excerpts From The United States Trademark Association's Amicus Brief in Two Pesos...,
82 THE TRADEMARK REPORTER 440 (May-June 1992)(the United States Trademark Associ-
ation supports the Fifth Circuit's position that inherently distinctive trade dress may be pro-
tected without proof of secondary meaning).
35. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th
Cir. 1981).
36. See discussion infra pp. 10-12.
37. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2760.
38. The Court stated that actual registration is not required for protection under
§ 43(a). They reaffirmed the position taken earlier in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Labo.
ratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982), that § 43(a) "prohibits a broader range of practices than
does § 32 [15 U.S.C. § 1114], which is applied to registered trademarks .. " Two Pesos, 112
S.Ct. at 2757 (quoting Inwood, supra at 858). The Court went on to say that "it is common
ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general princi-
ples qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part
applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under
§ 43(a)." Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2757.
39. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2758.
40. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
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istrability analysis under § 2. According to this classic formulation,
trademarks are usually classified in categories of increasing distinc-
tiveness.41 "[T]hey may be (1)generic; (2) descriptive; (3) sugges-
tive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful."'42 The latter three categories are
entitled to registration because they are inherently distinctive, that
is, "their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a
product."'43 Conversely, marks that "refer to the genus of which
the particular product is a species," or generic marks, are not regis-
terable. 4 In between these two extremes, there exists the descrip-
tive mark category, into which the respondent's dress fell.
Pursuant to § 2(e) of the Lanham Act, purely descriptive
marks are not registerable because they do not identify the particu-
lar source, but merely describe the product.4  However, § 2(f) of
the Act provides that descriptive marks that have "become distinc-
tive of the applicant's goods in commerce" are registerable.46 The
Supreme Court in Taco Pesos, in harmony with the Fifth Circuit,
held that this general rule, usually applicable only to trademarks,
should also be applied to trade dress protection cases.47 Justice
White cited the most recent definition of distinctiveness as "an iden-
tifying mark [that] either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has ac-
quired distinctiveness through secondary meaning."'48
The Court reasoned that an inherently distinctive trade dress is
also capable of identifying its source,49 and that "the protection of
trade dress serves the same statutory purpose of preventing decep-
tion and unfair competition."5 0  Furthermore, the Court consid-
ered it important that there was no textual basis in § 43(a) either
mentioning the concept of secondary meaning, or supporting the
different treatment of marks and dresses.51 The only specific re-
quirements for protection under this section, and the second part of
the analysis, is establishing non-functionality and lack of likelihood
of confusion among consumers.5 2 Additionally, the Court foresaw
41. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2757 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch 537 F.2d 4).
42. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2757.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194
(1985)).
45. Id.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), supra note 31.
47. Two Pesos, 112 S.CL at 2760.
48. Id. at 2758 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, pp.
37-38, and comment a (Tent.Draft No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990)).
49. Id. at 2754.
50. Id. at 2760.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2758.
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the adverse effects of imposing a blanket secondary meaning re-
quirement on all inherently distinctive trade dress, and was ex-
tremely concerned about its anti-competitive effects.
The Court disfavored imposing such a requirement because it
would be contradictory to the free enterprise ideology that un-
derlaid the Constitutional basis of trademark protection. It would
also undermine the legislative intent behind the Act. In regard to
this, the court stated:
Protection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks, serves the
Act's purpose to secure the owner of the mark the goodwill of his
business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish
among competing producers. National protection of trademarks
is desirable, Congress concluded, because trademarks foster com-
petition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the pro-
ducer the benefits of good reputation.5 3 By making more difficult
the identification of a producer with its product, a secondary
meaning requirement for a nondescriptive trade dress would hin-
der improving or maintaining the producer's competitive
position.54
Petitioner's Limited Protection Argument Rejected
The Court rejected petitioner's proposal that a distinctive trade
dress be granted temporary protection at the outset subject to termi-
nation if secondary meaning is not attained over time. The Court
held that there was no textual basis in § 43(a) for this concept. Us-
ing the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the Supreme Court stated that
"[i]f temporary protection is available from the earliest use of the
trade dress, it must be because it is neither functional nor descrip-
tive but an inherently distinctive dress that is capable of identifying
a particular source of the product." ' The Court felt that lack of
market success and consumer recognition over an unspecified pe-
riod of time were not valid bases for discontinuing protection. 6
"The user of such a trade dress should be able to maintain what
competitive position it has and continue to seek wider identification
among potential consumers. '57
Some analysts see this holding as a sign that the Supreme
53. Id. at 2760 (quoting Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,
198 (1985)).
54. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2760 (1992), rehearing de-
nied, 113 S.Ct. 20 (1992).
55. Id. at 2759.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Court recognized the doctrine of "secondary meaning in the mak-
ing.""8 This doctrine aims at protecting an inherently distinctive
trade dress that has not yet been identified by the public as belong-
ing to a certain proprietor. Hence, trade dress originators would
have the chance to build up their reputation and compete in new
markets, while being protected against imitators who would deter
competition and expansion. The Court believed that an opposite
holding would discourage start-up companies from entering the
market, knowing that their original, nonfunctional and inherently
distinctive trade dress would not be protected absent enough con-
sumer recognition for a secondary meaning.59
CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's conclusion, but
maintained that there was no textual support for that decision in
§ 43(a). Instead the holding was the logical result of the gradual
transformation of the meaning of § 43(a) by the Federal Courts,
and was well supported by Congress's codification of these changes
through recent amendments to the Act.'
In light of the general consensus among the Courts of Appeals
that have actually addressed the question, and the steps on the
part of Congress to codify that consensus, stare decisis concerns
persuade me to join the Court's conclusion that secondary mean-
ing is not required to establish a trade dress violation under
§ 43(a) once inherent distinctiveness has been established.61
Justice Thomas also concurred with the judgment of the Court,
but believed that the decision was well grounded in the common
law, codified by Congress in § 43(a). 62 Furthermore, he believed
that the majority's analysis and interpretation of § 2, would lead to
the misconstruction of that statute.63 Justice Scalia fied a concur-
ring statement stating that although he joined the opinion of the
Court, he was in complete agreement with Justice Thomas's analy-
58. See Howard R. Popper, A Tale of Tacos and Trade Dress, NEW JERSEY L. J., Au-
gust 17, 1992, at 14. "Prior to Taco Cabana, the doctrine had been applied.., in Jolly Good
Industries, In. v. Elegra, Inc, 690 F.Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), but had been put into doubt
by the Federal Circuit in... Cicena Ltd. v. Colombia Telecommunications Group, (CAFC
1990)." Id. According to the article, the doctrine was finally rejected by the Second Circuit
in Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Ina, (May 15, 1992). "Taco Cabana would seem to overrule...
Cicena Ltd... . as well as... Laureyssens .. " Id.
59. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2759.
60. Id. at 2761-2766.
61. Id. at 2765.
62. Id. at 2766-67.
63. Id. at 2766.
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sis which was complementary to the Majority's opinion."
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to this ruling, trade dresses enjoy the same protection
as trademarks under § 43(a). Additionally, the Court removed re-
gistration as a prerequisite to protection under the Act, and re-
placed it with a registrability requirement. Hence, first the mark or
dress must be registerable under § 2 by being either inherently dis-
tinctive or having attained a secondary meaning. Second, if regis-
terable, the analysis shifts to § 43(a) and the mark or dress must be
non-functional and unlikely to create confusion among the consum-
ing public.
The Supreme Court aimed at giving effect to the legislative
purposes behind the Act of preventing deception and unfair compe-
tition. Since both trade dress and trademarks perform the same
source identifying function and achieve the purposes of the Act,
protection of both under a uniform federal standard is necessary
and logical. This decision provides a clear guideline as to exactly
what kind of trade dress is protected for both new start-ups desiring
to gain trade dress protection and competitors who would like to
enter the market using a similar idea. There are no anti-competitive
effects because if the dress is functional, descriptive, or generic, it
will not be protected.
64. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2761.
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BOOK REVIEW
PATENT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
PATENT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION HANDBOOK. By
Tom Arnold with Michael G. Fletcher and Robert J. McAughan,
Jr. Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1991. 140 pages, 2 appendices.
$85.00.
Nancy Yeend*
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has been used by com-
mercial attorneys for many years to resolve conflicts without resort-
ing to litigation. ADR processes, however, have been used for only
slightly more than a decade to resolve patent disputes, as Tom Ar-
nold points out in the Patent Alternative Dispute Resolution Hand-
book. There are many ADR processes that may be used to settle
patent disputes, but this book fails to provide a comprehensive dis-
cussion of those processes. While the book provides a reasonably
thorough analysis of arbitration in the patent area, it presents only
elementary passages on mediation and minitrial with minor refer-
ences to other ADR processes. For this reason, the title of the book
is a misnomer and a more accurate title would have been "Patent
Arbitration Handbook."
The writing style is informal, peppered with slang and collo-
quialisms typical of Arnold's Texas vernacular. The jaunty style
begins in the Preface and is evident in Part One, but the colorful
Ian guage fades as the book progresses.
The book is divided into three parts followed by two extensive
appendices. Part Three consists of a single page that should have
been indorporated elsewhere in the book. The pages of the book are
separately numbered by chapter and the book is approximately 280
pages in length. The two appendices comprise fifty percent of the
Copyright 0 1993 by Nancy Yeend.
* President, ADRA, Alternative Dispute Resolution Associates, Palo Alto, CA;
ADR Instructor, San Francisco Law School.
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book. Half of the remaining book is a single chapter on binding
arbitration.
The text of the Patent Alternative Dispute Resolution Hand-
book, for the most part, is an expansion of Arnold's article, Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Cases.1 He received
an award in 1992 from the Center for Public Resources for an origi-
nal article advancing the understanding in the field of ADR.2 Un-
fortunately, the book does not maintain the tight writing style and
consistent structure of the article.
Part One of the book is divided into five extremely short chap-
ters covering the overburdened courts, evolution of ADR in patent
law, and the increased use of ADR in general. Arnold describes the
usual arguments in favor of ADR, including the chaos of the courts
and the burdensome resource consumption of litigation, particu-
larly the high expenditures of time and money. Arnold provides
some compelling statistics, but his justification for use of ADR in
patent law brings nothing new to the field. His arguments in favor
of ADR are the same as those previous authors have raised in other
areas of law.
The author's division of the evolution of ADR into three sepa-
rate chapters is puzzling. The subdivision of a topic into multiple
chapters seems unnecessary when a single chapter is little more
than one page long. This chronic segmentation of subjects is per-
petuated throughout the book.
The final chapter in Part One reviews the advantages of ADR.
The issues discussed focus particularly on arbitration and delineate
the customary advantages cited in all basic ADR texts: time,
money, finality, expertise of a neutral, confidentiality, and preserva-
tion of relationships.
Part Two of the book contains sixteen chapters and promises,
in its title, to address "Types of ADR Applied to Patent Disputes,"
leading the reader to expect a wide-ranging discussion of numerous
ADR processes used in the patent law area. The result is disap-
pointing. The chapter on arbitration represents more than fifty per-
cent of the entire original text. Although not all the various forms
of ADR have been used effectively to settle patent disputes, as Ar-
nold accurately points out, the mere listing of ADR processes
hardly warrants the title of "Patent Alternative Dispute Resolution
Handbook."
1. Tom Arnold, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Cases, 9 AIPLA
SELECTED LEGAL PAPERS 1 (1991).
2. CPR Legal Program Award (1991).
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Chapter 7, on binding arbitration, is one of two high points in
the book. Here, Arnold articulates the basics of arbitration includ-
ing agreements to adapt the process, discovery, enforceability, rules,
and liquidated damages. Two complete discussions are presented in
this chapter: arbitration law and international law.
The footnotes concerning current United States arbitration law
are complete, and the points made regarding the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as applied to arbitration are well worth reading.
The discussion of international arbitration of intellectual property
disputes is informative and offers readers a valuable summary of the
international status of ADR by using examples from several
countries.
The last half of the binding arbitration chapter embodies the
primary value of this book: a nuts-and-bolts discussion of patent
arbitration. Included are time-saving tips from one who obviously
has experience with patent arbitration. He focuses on the special
issues unique to patent disputes. Arnold and his associates discuss
fundamental issues such as choice-of-law clauses, discovery, liqui-
dated damages, injunctions, rules of evidence, and awards. Of sig-
nificance is the discussion of issues surrounding the arbitrators
themselves: selection, neutrality, and number. The author shines
as he provides the ADR novice with a condensed course in
arbitration.
There does not appear to be any readily identifiable taxonomic
ordering to the series of chapters addressed in Part Two. More
than a dozen ADR processes are introduced, but the discussion
does not lead the reader along a clear, well-marked path. Processes
could have been explained more effectively based on a continuum -
from those providing the most control by the involved parties over
the outcome to the least control, or grouped by binding versus non-
binding or private versus court-annexed. It would be helpful for the
attorney new to ADR to read a discussion of the various processes
in some logical order. Taxonomic ordering allows relationships
among the various processes to become apparent.
It is difficult to understand why Summary Jury Trial and Mod-
erated Settlement Conference were not included in the "Court-An-
nexed ADR" chapter, particularly when both are court-annexed
processes, and the presented discussion is minimal. Surprisingly,
negotiation, the bread-and-butter ADR process for all attorneys,
even patent law attorneys, is addressed by Arnold only in passing.
After arbitration the ADR processes of minitrial and media-
tion receive the most attention. The mediation chapter covers the
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basics of the process and nearly half the chapter is spent on a trade-
mark mediation example. This discussion closely parallels the text
of the AIPLA article.3 Although the illustration is appropriate,
mediation is such an important dispute resolution process, it is dis-
appointing that this chapter was not more informative. This chap-
ter describes "Requirements of Mediation" which, in fact, are not
universal. For example, the mediator becoming a fact-finder may
be a violation of the code of ethics in some states.4 As with any
generic text, state rules may contradict broad statements and the
author should make appropriate qualifications.
The portion of the chapter covering the rudimentary aspects of
one type of minitrial is adequate. While Arnold, throughout the
book, decries the lack of consistency in the definitions of ADR
terms, he refers to minitrial as an arbitration hybrid. Most ADR
writers consider the minitrial a mediation hybrid5 because of the
non-binding nature of the minitrial. The reasons given pro and con
for this process are not unique to minitrial, but are consistent with
all non-binding processes.
The second high point of the book is the appendices: Appen-
dix A, "Rules of Arbitration" and Appendix B, "Patent ADR
Materials." Appendix A comprises nearly eighty percent of the ap-
t endices and consists of reprints of arbitration rules from seven dif-
ferent national and international organizations which administer
the arbitration process. As a repository for this collection of rules,
Appendix A may function as a ready reference for comparison of
the various arbitration rules. These rules are time-dated and so
their value is limited.
Appendix B1 includes a sample ADR agreement which incor-
porates a two-step process for resolving disputes: minitrial followed
by mediation. The rationale for this suggested sequence appears to
be Arnold's contention that although foreign courts frown on arbi-
tration of patent disputes, they do not seem concerned about settle-
ment processes when decisions are reached through negotiation.
The only shortcoming of this section is a lack of discussion of the
issue of finding amicable parties to a lawsuit who are willing to
calmly discuss an ADR contract. To his credit, in earlier chapters,
Arnold encourages incorporation of ADR in contracts between par-
3. Arnold, supra note 1.
4. See, eg., Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, §§ 10.010-10,290.
5. See, eg., Green, Marks, & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternative
Approach, 11 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 493 (1978); also see YAROSLAV SOCHYNSKY & MARIAN
BAIRD, CALIFORNIA ADR PRACTICE GUIDE, fig. 31-2 at 31-7 (forthcoming 1992).
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ties during their initial transactions as a mechanism to construc-
tively manage conflict before a dispute escalates.
The pearl in this book is Appendix B2, "Mediation Outline."
The twenty-one pages are a quick course on how to be a mediator.
These pages provide a detailed outline of the stages of the mediation
process and the techniques available to the mediator. Although not
intended as a "how-to" course, this section of the book provides a
road map for those who desire a better understanding of the process
so they can anticipate and prepare for more effective representation
of their clients. The page of verbatim text from the book Getting to
Yes,6 however, was a distraction.
The binding arbitration chapter and the listing of arbitration
rules make Arnold's work a basic arbitration handbook. The out-
line of the mediation process in the appendix is a concise primer.
The book in general has significant weaknesses in format, structure,
and content. On balance, Arnold's earlier article7 delivers as much
substance as the text in this book and is more enjoyable reading.
6. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETInNG To YES (1981).
7. Arnold, supra note 1.
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